ISSN 1997-1370 (Print)
ISSN 2313-6014 (Online)

Журнал Сибирского федерального университета

Гуманитарные науки

Journal of Siberian Federal University

Humanities & Social Sciences

2020 13 (8)

ISSN 1997-1370 (Print)
ISSN 2313-6014 (Online)

ЖУРНАЛ СИБИРСКОГО ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА
Гуманитарные науки

2020 13(8)

JOURNAL OF SIBERIAN FEDERAL UNIVERSITY
Humanities & Social Sciences

Издание индексируется Scopus (Elsevier), Российским индексом научного цитирования (НЭБ), представлено в международных и российских информационных базах: Ulrich's periodicals directiory, EBSCO (США), Google Scholar, Index Copernicus, Erihplus, КиберЛенинке.

Включено в список Высшей аттестационной комиссии «Рецензируемые научные издания, входящие в международные реферативные базы данных и системы цитирования».

Все статьи находятся в открытом доступе (open access).

Журнал Сибирского федерального университета. Гуманитарные науки.
Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences.

Учредитель: Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Сибирский федеральный университет» (СФУ)

Главный редактор Н.П. Копцева. Редактор С.В. Хазаржан. Корректор И.А. Вейсиг
Компьютерная верстка И.В. Гревцовой

№ 8. 30.08.2020. Индекс: 42326. Тираж: 1000 экз.

Свободная цена

Адрес редакции и издательства: 660041 г. Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79, оф. 32-03

Отпечатано в типографии Издательства БИК СФУ
660041 г. Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 82а.

http://journal.sfu-kras.ru

Подписано в печать 24.08.2020. Формат 84x108/16. Усл. печ. л. 15,7.
Уч.-изд. л. 15,2. Бумага тип. Печать офсетная. Тираж 1000 экз. Заказ № 11416.

Возрастная маркировка в соответствии с Федеральным законом № 436-ФЗ: 16+

CONTENTS

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1234–1237

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0652
УДК 101

Introduction to the Philosophical Thematic Issue of the Journal of Siberian Federal University

Natalia P. Koptseva*
Siberian Federal University
Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation

Received 06.04.2020, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 12.08.2020

Abstract. The introduction to the thematic issue devoted to philosophical sciences reveals the concept that unites all the articles published therein. Philosophical topics are developed by Russian scientists in different cities, scientific organisations and universities. One of the most famous in the modern philosophical world is the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The thematic philosophical issue contains articles by authors from this famous philosophical institute. However, not only Moscow School is presented in this issue, but no less famous St. Petersburg and Ural Schools of Philosophy also have their scientific representatives. Krasnoyarsk philosophers are represented by works related to philosophical methodology and historical and philosophical perceptions in modern culture. At present, Russian humanities refer to philosophy as a metatheory that provides the most effective methodological and conceptual approaches not only for the social sciences and humanities, but also for modern natural science and technological discoveries.

Keywords: philosophy, history of philosophy, methodology, concepts, schools of philosophy.

Research areas: philosophy; culturology.

Citation: Koptseva, N.P. (2020). Introduction to the philosophical thematic issue of the Journal of Siberian Federal University. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1234–1237. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0652.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: decanka@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000–0003–3910–7991

Philosophical sciences in the modern world retain their importance in various aspects. From the point of view of natural science, technical sciences, humanities and social research, philosophical sciences develop conceptual and methodological approaches, substantiate concepts, categories, principles, and study the patterns of intellectual activity and thinking. At the same time, philosophy reflects on its own basis, transforming into metaphilosophy (Vasil'ev, 2019, Oizerman, 2009, Porus, 2019, Safonov, 2018). The history of philosophy also acts as a metaphilosophy (Oizerman, 2009, Koptseva, 2017), since here philosophical reflection is placed in the temporal context and embedded in the historical logic of various forms of culture (Koptseva & Kirko, 2014).

Modern philosophical sciences continue to serve as the basis for the emergence of new forms of humanitarian and social knowledge: studies of cultural memory, media research, educational sciences (Kurennoy, 2020a, 2020b), gender studies, ethnic studies and religious studies are connected in different ways with philosophical range of issues that do not arise in the 21st century, but originate from the first ancient schools, where philosophy first acquired a name, form, status and content.

In the thematic philosophical issue of the Journal of Siberian Federal University, an attempt is made to cover various forms of the modern existence of philosophy. First of all, we are talking about the established schools of philosophy, the mother of which is the School of Philosophy associated with Lomonosov Moscow State University and the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Thus, the first deans of the Department of Philosophy at Ural University were professors of Lomonosov Moscow State University – Leonid Mikhailovich Arkhangelsky and Mikhail Nikolaevich Rutkevich.

No less famous and highly effective is St. Petersburg School of Philosophy, closely associated with Krasnoyarsk philosophical community. Thus, the first dean of the Department of History and Philosophy at Krasnoyarsk University and the founder of the Department of Philosophy at this university, Albert Yanovich Raibekas, was a graduate of the Leningrad State University majoring in two fields: physics and philosophy. This is a very representative situation for the 50s of the 20th century, when scientific and technological progress was inseparable from philosophical understanding, and Soviet philosophy was consciously developing as the philosophy of modern science and technology.

Since ancient times, philosophy has accompanied itself with the reflection of its own foundations, including those built in a certain historical logic. The history of philosophy is always associated with the current status of philosophy, which shows that modern civilizational problems can find a good solution in ancient wisdom, in the arguments of Plato and Aristotle, their students, which constitutes the school of world philosophy.

In the proposed thematic philosophical issue, a benevolent reader will find various philosophical topics, get acquainted with new authors, learn the results of new research by authors that are well known today in Russia and the world. The core of the thematic issue is constituted by articles by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, this scientific organisation is represented here by 7 author's in-depth studies, reflecting the tendencies of modern Russian philosophy. We are talking about the articles by the Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.A. Guseinov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.V. Sineokaya, Doctor of Philosophy V.K. Shokhin, Doctor of Philosophy A.V. Prokofyev, Doctor of Philosophy A.Yu. Antonovskiy, Junior Researcher S.Yu. Boroday. For this module of scientific articles, the Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.V. Smirnov and RAS Corresponding Member Yu.V. Sineokaya were invited editors. The Editorial Board of the Journal expresses its sincere gratitude to them and expresses hope for further fruitful cooperation.

Two articles by authors from St. Petersburg – Roman Viktorovich Svetlov and Elena Vladimirovna – to a certain degree represent the philosophical studies of this university city, the second philosophical capital of our country, the connection of which with Krasnoyarsk philosophers was mentioned above.

The Ural School of Philosophy sent many students to Krasnoyarsk University in the first half of the 80s of the 20th century. Therefore, the publication of Ural authors, I. Krasavin and T. Kerimov, can naturally be supplemented by the article by V. Zhukovsky and D. Pivovarov. Professor V.I. Zhukovsky is a student of Professor D.V. Pivovarov. Daniil Valentinovich Pivovarov stood at the origins of our scientific journal. He left us early and with the publication of his article the Editorial Board wants to once again honour his memory and express its gratitude to him for his constant intellectual assistance. The theory of culture as a process of ideal formation is the main conceptual and methodological principle of Krasnoyarsk research in the field of culture studies, art history, religious studies, ethnology, social and cultural anthropology. Thus, the philosophical school goes beyond the boundaries of a region or city and, through its students, settles in other regions and cities, contributing to the expansion of the Republic of scientists (F. Bacon).

Thus, Professor V.I. Zhukovsky already represents Krasnoyarsk school, which the research of Professor N.P. Koptseva in collaboration with Associate Professor K.V. Reznikova on contemporary historical and philosophical topics is adjacent. In the article by N.P. Koptseva and K.V. Reznikova philosophy reveals its methodological function for ancient natural science, which is the basis of various modern sciences.

Regional philosophical schools are not limited to Yekaterinburg, but are logically supplemented by the city of Orenburg, whose authors – Doctor of Philosophy I. Belyaev and Candidate of Philosophy M. Lyashchenko – presented the Journal with the results of their philosophical studies of socio-cultural determinants of current Russian processes.

Thus, philosophical research on the banks of the Yenisei continues by means of effective interaction and modern scientific communication. The Editorial Board welcomes its new authors and expresses the hope that new times will bring new opportunities and modern Russian philosophy will be presented in the Humanities Series of the Scientific Journal of Siberian Federal University through various trends and philosophical styles.

References

Koptseva, N.P., & Kirko, V.I. (2014). Some concepts of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russian philosophy, revealing specific forms of collective identities. In *Revista de Filosofia*, 76(1), 7-31.

Koptseva, N.P. (2017). Truth in Martin Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In *Revista de Filosofia*, 85(1), 22-45.

Kurennoy, V.A. (2020a). Filosofiia liberal'nogo obrazovaniia: printsipy [Philosophy of liberal education: principles]. In *Voprosy obrazovaniia* [*Issues of Education*], 1, 8-39.

Kurennoy, V.A. (2020b). Filosofiia liberal'nogo obrazovaniia:konteksty [Philosophy of liberal education: contexts]. In *Voprosy obrazovaniia* [*Issues of Education*], 2, 8-36.

Oizerman, T.I. (2009). *Metafilosofiia. Teoriia istoriko-filosofskogo protsessa* [*Metaphilosophy. Theory of historical and philosophical process*], Moscow, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Porus, V.N. (2019). Filosofskii status "Metafilosofii nauki" [Philosophical status of "Metaphilosophy of science"]. In *Epistemologiia i filosofiia nauki* [*Epistemology and philosophy of science*], 2 (56), 134-150.

Safonov, A.S. (2018). Filosofiia v meniaiushchemsia mire: tri tipa metafilosofii [Philosophy in the changing world: three types of metaphilosophy]. In *SocioTime*, 4(16), 27-35. DOI: 10.15350/2410-0773.2018.4.27

Vasil'ev, V.V. (2019). Metafilosofiia: istoriia i perspektivy [Metaphilosophy: history and prospects]. In *Epistemologiia i filosofiia nauki* [*Epistemology and philosophy of science*, 2 (56), 6-18.

Вступительная статья к философскому тематическому выпуску журнала Сибирского федерального университета «Гуманитарные науки»

Н.П. Копцева
Сибирский федеральный университет
Российская Федерация, Красноярск

Аннотация. Во введении к тематическому номеру, посвященному философским наукам, раскрывается замысел, объединяющий все статьи, опубликованные в нем. Философская тематика разрабатывается российскими учеными в разных городах, научных организациях, университетах. Разумеется, одним из наиболее известных в современном философском мире является Институт философии Российской академии наук. В основу тематического философского номера были положены статьи авторов, работающих в этом знаменитом философском институте. Однако не только московская школа представлена в данном номере, не менее знаменитые санкт-петербургская, уральская философские школы также имеют своих научных репрезентантов. Красноярские философы представлены работами, связанными с философской методологией и историко-философскими рецепциями в современной культуре. В настоящее время российская гуманитаристика обращается к философии как метатеории, дающей наиболее эффективные методологические и концептуальные подходы не только для социальных и гуманитарных наук, но и для современного естествознания и технологических открытий.

Ключевые слова: философия, история философии, методология, концепции, философские школы.

Научные специальности: 09.00.00 – философские науки; 24.00.00 – культурология.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1238–1249

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0504
УДК 1(091), 8(82)

Socratic Dialogue as Kairotic Logos

Elena V. Alymova*
Saint Petersburg State University
St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Received 17.12.2018, received in revised form 16.10.2019, accepted 18.11.2019

Abstract. The article is dedicated to the Soctatic dialogue as a genre of Ancient philosophical literature, represented by the so-called Socratics. The masterpieces of this type of composition are the dialogues of Plato. A special feature of the following research is that the Socratic dialogue is being treated in the light of one of the most intricate concepts of Ancient Philosophy – *kairos*. Its meaning is especially obscure since being present in various contexts such as poetry and prose compositions it has no special definition. In the article the concept of *kairos* is being reconsidered. This new interpretation is based on the original affinity of the *kairos* with the art of weaving, which, in its turn, is considered as paradigm of the art of interweaving of logoi and dramatic composition.

Keywords: kairos, logos, Socratic dialogue, philosophical dialogue, Socratics, art of weaving, Plato.

The current research is fulfilled within the framework of the project: Russian Foundation of Fundamental Research No. 17 – 03 – 00616a: Socratic Schools as Phenomenon of Ancient Philosophy and Culture. 2017–2019.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Alymova, E.V. (2020). Socratic dialogue as kairotic logos. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1238–1249. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0504.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: ealymova@yandex.ru

Introduction

We have already dealt with such concepts as logos, mythos and chronos (Alymova, 2008: 8–28; Alymova, 2017a: 21). Hereby we continue our line of research and would like to turn to one of the most enigmatic and provocative concepts of Ancient Philosophy – *kairos*. It is a complex concept, not easily reduced to a simple formula. The meaning of *kairos* is especially obscure since being present in various contexts such as poetry (e.g. *the Victory Odes* of Pindar or dramatic poetry) and prose compositions (e.g. of Gorgias, Aeschines Socratucus, Plato and the authors of *the Corpus Hippocraticum*) it has no special definition within these contexts. At the same time the range of interpretations of *kairos* is rather vast: we find numerous testimonies not only in philosophical explications but also in translations, e.g. *due measure*, *wise moderation*, *proportion*, *profit*, *possibility*, *circumstances*, *crisis*, *aim*, *season*, *timing*, "*srok*"/"*svoi chas*" ("the day of destiny") (M. Gasparov), "*pora*" ("high time") (V. Bibikhin, A. Akhutin) and last but not least – opportunity. The list of interpretations cited above makes it evident that two significations prevail – time and opportunity. *Kairos* as *opportunity* retains a close relation with the etymon, which at first sight fixes the original sense of the word – *porta* (door, entrance) or *portus* (port) (nowadays another version to render the meaning has become current – *the window of opportunities*). It is bizarre how the senses of *opportunity* and *time* – not to mention *measure* – coincide in one and the same signification. No doubts, certain efforts might be exerted (and they were exerted) to reconcile all the interpretations mentioned above. But the problem is that such unifying interpretations are founded on preconception that *kairos* is primarily connected with time and timing. The relevant sources for such interpretation are following: as a designation for the moment in which the situation irreversibly turns to the better or worse, the word *kairos* started to be used approximately from the second half of the Vth BC, and in this connection *the Corpus Hippocraticum* and the famous sculpture of Lisippus of Sicyon should be mentioned. As for *the Corpus Hippocraticum*, the following quotation is traditionally referred to: Χρόνος ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ καιρὸς, καὶ καιρὸς ἐν ᾧ χρόνος οὐ πολύς (Hippocrates, 1923: 312) (Time/Chronos, is that, in which there is kairos, and kairos, in which there is chronos, is not long [The translation is ours – E.A.]). It is remarkable that time as *chronos* is being opposed to time as *kairos* (which is, as a matter of fact, measured as "being not long"). On the other hand, the sculpture of Lisippus has become the visual paradigm of *Kairos* as a crucial and decisive moment.

The interpretation of *kairos* as time/moment impacted the Christian conception of *kairos* as it is proposed, for example, by Paul Tillich in two works with the same title – "Kairos" (1922 and 1948), where *kairos* is interpreted as the moment (and in this sense it is being conceived as timeless) when and where the human existence opens itself to the eternity (*being-towards-eternity*).

Significant concepts, which constitute the arsenal of philosophical vocabulary, have to be reconsidered now and then in order not to become an automatically used vocabulary of shoptalk. The concept of *kairos* should not be exception.

To analyze the concept of *kairos* is not an end in itself in the framework of our article. In our paper we defend the interpretation based on the original affinity of the *kairos* with the art of weaving, which we consider as paradigm of the art of interweaving of *logoi* and even of the art of dialectics and dramatic composition as they are represented in Plato's dialogues.

Materials and Methods

We propose to start with specific texts and even objects to sharpen the meaning of the concept of *kairos*. The different significances of the Greek word *kairos* have been recently investigated, among others, by Monique Trédé-Boulmer (Trédé-Boulmer, 1992). Monique Trédé-Boulmer argues that the meaning "the opportune moment" puts restrictions on the concept of *kairos*, drastically reducing its semantic potential. Still we are substantially influenced by another French scholar – Bernard Gallet – and his opus "Recherches sur Kairos et l'ambiguïté dans la

poesie de Pindar" (Gallet, 1990). He studies the poetry of Pindar whose poetic vocabulary privileges the word *kairos*. To this interpretation adheres Michail Jampolsky (Jampolsky, 2007: 50 – 59).

While the widely accepted translations are all derived from the preconceived idea of time, Bernard Gallet argues that this is not the case in Pindars' *Odes*. He (as well as M. Trédé-Boulmer) follows the intuition of Richard Onians. R. Onians was the first to suggest the affinity between two words kairos and kairos (accentuated with circumflex over the diphthong) – "The Origin of European thought about the body, the mind, the soul, the world, time and fate" (Onians, 1951). This circumflexed form did not really exist in Greek – this word appeared in numerous scholia to Homer (namely to a line from the VIIth book of *the Odyssey*). R. Onians put forward a brilliant conjecture though unfortunately left it aside without deducing any conclusions. He surmised that kairos belonged to the art of weaving: that is, according to R. Onian's idea, kairos is whether the warp or has something to do with separating of threads. Still he himself followed another way corroborating the interpretation of *kairos* as opportunity.

Having presented a synopsis of interpretations we turn to the relevant sources.

Reconsidering *kairós***.** All the roads lead us to Homer. Homer does not know (or at least does not use) the word *kair**o**s*. Instead he uses the adjective *k**ai**rios* and the neuter of it with the article – to *k**ai**rion*. The earliest evidence of the word *kair**o**s* in this form gives Hesiod (*Works and Days*). Here we have one mention (v. 694):

> μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος (Hesiod, 1878: 81)
>
> One should be moderate. And kairos in everything is the best
>
> [The translation is ours. – *E.A.*].

And here arises a problem – how should we connect the *kair**o**s* interpreted in this way with the line in Homer's *Odyssey* (the only line in this poem where the Poet uses a word of the root in question), which serves a point (or rather – the point) of reference (Od. VII, 107):

> καιρουσσέων δ' ὀθονέων ἀπολείβεται ὑγρὸν ἔλαιον (Homer, 1984: 121).

In order to retain the context we quote the translation [translation of Homer here and elsewhere of A.T. Murray] of it at some length:

> And others weave webs, or, as they sit, twirl the yarn, like unto the leaves of a tall poplar tree; and from the **closely-woven** linen the soft olive oil drips down. For as the Phaeacian men are skilled above all others in speeding a swift ship upon the sea, so are the women / cunning workers at the loom, for Athene has given to them above all others skill in fair handiwork, and an understanding heart (Homer, 1919a: 239, 241).

This passage was vastly commented on by the scholars of the Late Antiquity because of this strange form καιρουσσέων, which presupposed the existence of adjective καιρόεις (this form is but hypothetical). Hereby we are referred to the art of weaving.

We shall adduce another evidence, following the way blazed by Bernard Gallet (Gallet, 1990). It will be the *Dendra panoply* or Dendra armor. It is an example of a Mycenaean-era panoply (full-body armor) (in the collection the Napflion Archeological museum) made of bronze plates, discovered in 1960 in the village of Dendra in the Argolid (the region of the Peloponnese). The Dendra panoply is a sort of scale armor consisting of many individual small, or not very small as in our case, scales (plates) of various shapes attached to each other and to a backing of cloth or leather in overlapping rows. It represents the oldest form of metal body armor, which was widely used throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It dates to the end of the fifteenth century BC. The Dendra Panoply consists of fifteen separate pieces of bronze sheet, held together *with leather thongs or leather cords*. It protected the wearer from neck to knees. The panoply

includes breast-plates and back-plates, greaves (leg-protectors) and arm-guards. We shall not go into a detailed description, but rather draw attention to the points of interest concerning our arguments.

With this panoply we intrude into the reign of the art of war. So it seems natural to evoke Homer's *Iliad*. It provides a context for the adjective ***kai**rios* and for the neuter of it with the article – to *k**ai**rion*.

Let us cite some relevant contexts from Homer's Iliad (Il. IV, 183-187):

> Τὸν δ' ἐπιθαρσύνων προσέφη ξανθὸς Μενέλαος·
> θάρσει, μηδέ τί πω δειδίσσεο λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν·
> οὐκ **ἐν καιρίῳ** ὀξὺ πάγη βέλος, ἀλλὰ πάροιθεν
> εἰρύσατο ζωστήρ τε παναίολος ἠδ' ὑπένερθε
> ζῶμά τε καὶ μίτρη, τὴν χαλκῆες κάμον ἄνδρες (Homer, 1910: 71).

> But fair-haired Menelaus spake and heartened him, saying: "Be thou of good cheer, neither affright in any wise the host of the Achaeans. Not in a fatal spot hath the shaft been fixed; ere that my flashing belt stayed it, and the kilt beneath, and the taslet that the coppersmiths fashioned" (Homer, 1924-25a: 167).

Another example (Il. VIII, 324 – 328):

> θῆκε δ' ἐπὶ νευρῇ· τὸν δ' αὖ κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ
> αὐερύοντα παρ' ὦμον, ὅθι κληῖς ἀποέργει
> αὐχένα τε στῆθός τε, μάλιστα δὲ καίριόν ἐστι,
> τῇ ῥ' ἐπὶ οἷ μεμαῶτα βάλεν λίθῳ ὀκριόεντι,
> ῥῆξε δέ οἱ νευρήν· (Homer, 1910: 156).

> (Now Teucer) had drawn forth from the quiver a bitter arrow, and laid it upon the string, but even as he was drawing it back Hector of the flashing helm smote him beside the shoulder where the collar-bone parts the neck and the breast, where is the deadliest spot (Homer, 1924-25a: 363).

The spot which is called κ***αί***ριον, means a vital point and to hit it would mean to cause death.

And here comes forth the following question: how to connect the meanings of *opportunity* and *death*, that is the question of how to reconcile two notions – καίριος (καίριον) as a vital spot and καιρός as *timing* and *measure*.

At this point we have to turn to the verse of *the Odyssey* (Od. VII, 107), mentioned above, which recounts the process of making fabrics by the Phaeacian women. Καιρουσσέων – plural genitive of καιρόεις, this is an adjective with the meaning of *a thing defined as possessing in great measure the quality determined by this adjective*. For example: χαρίεις – graceful (full of χάρις), δολόεις – wily (full of δόλος), ὑλήεις – woody (full of ὕλη). In our case we are bound to suppose that a thing defined as καιρόεις has to be defined as full of something like καῖρος. This circumflexed word is being reconstructed on the basis of Homer's καιρουσσέων. It is but conjectural and as such it appears in the scholia and commentaries to the epic of Homer. According to the reconstruction, we restore the verb – * καιρόω (supply with καῖρος). A context within the limits of which we gain the word καῖρος is the context of the art of weaving.

We have already put the question, how to reconcile the meanings of *opportunity*, *vulnerable spot* and *due measure*. An immediate transition from one meaning to another looks strange. We admit, it is easy to reinterpret this transition *post factum*. But the question about the original meaning, the conceptual core of the notions *opportunity*, *vulnerable spot* and *due measure* still exists. The interpretation is aggravated by a reconstruction of a technical meaning of καῖρος, in the sense of the art of weaving.

So we have at our disposal καιρός and καῖρος. We have to draw a line between these two terms. Let us turn to the dictionaries. H. Frisk defines καιρός as *rechtes Mass*, *Zeitpunkt*, *Gelegenheit* (due measure, right moment, opportunity) (Frisk, 1960: 755) and assigns καιρός and καῖρος to two different entries. P. Chantraine makes a point of these

two different meanings but in the entry dedicated to καῖρος he says: "mais le mot rend peut-être compte de καιρός, qui pourrait être un employ figuré ("le point exact, le point de rencontre, le nœud?") avec changement d'accent. Voir καιρός" (The word most probably supposes καιρός, which, in its turn, might be used figuratively ("the crucial point, the point of junction, the knot?") with a different accent. See καιρός [Translation is ours. – E.A.]) (Chantraine, 1968–1980: 480).

A vulnerable spot means the most appropriate spot to penetrate, where a weapon could hit effectively. To hit such a spot a solder should be appropriately trained and versed in such stratagems. R. Onians thinks that καιρός (if such a word existed in the poems of Homer) would signify the target, which was to be hit by the archers while they were training. And this target looked, according to R. Onians and Homer (as interpreted by R. Onians), as an aperture or hole in the blade of a battle-ax (ὁ πέλεκυς). An image of such a battle-ax and the act of shooting is represented in *the Odyssey*, XIX, 573–576:

> τοὺς πελέκεας, τοὺς κεῖνος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἑοῖσιν
> ἵστασχ' ἑξείης, δρυόχους ὥς, δώδεκα πάντας·
> στὰς δ' ὅ γε πολλὸν ἄνευθε διαρρίπτασκεν ὀϊστόν.
> νῦν δὲ μνηστήρεσσιν ἄεθλον τοῦτον ἐφήσω· (Homer, 1984: 370).
>
> Those axes which he was wont to set up in line in his halls, like props of a ship that is building, twelve in all, and he would stand afar off and shoot an arrow through them. Now then I shall set this contest before the wooers (Homer, 1919b: 269, 271)

and in the Odyssey, XXI, 120–123:

> πρῶτον μὲν πελέκεας στῆσεν, διὰ τάφρον ὀρύξας
> πᾶσι μίαν μακρήν, καὶ ἐπὶ στάθμην ἴθυνεν,
> ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖαν ἔναξε. τάφος δ' ἔλε πάντας ἰδόντας,
> ὡς εὐκόσμως στῆσε· (Homer, 1984: 391).
>
> First then he set up the axes, when he had dug a trench, one long trench for all, and made it straight to the line, and about them he stamped in the earth. And amazement seized all who saw him, that he set them out so orderly (Homer, 1919b: 313).

According to the interpretation of R. Onians, καιρός means exactly the aperture, through which the arrow is shoot, whence the meaning of *opportunitas* (πόρος, a means of passing) derives.

But if we evoke Homer's Phaeacians we notice that another understanding will be possible as well: καιρουσσέων δ' ὀθονέων ἀπολείβεται ὑγρὸν ἔλαιον (and from the **closely-woven** linen the soft olive oil drips down). The idea is clear: the more appropriately and tightly the threads of the warp are put into order, the better is the quality of the fabric produced. The distance between the threads of the warp should be minimal or better – optimal. In this case the lesser the distance is, the better is καιρός. To ensure the optimal distance between the threads of the warp a special device is wanted, something like a regulating thread, which separates the threads of the warp preventing them from tangling. The threads of the warp are responsible for the length of a fabric, the threads of the weft – for a fabric itself. In other words: the threads of the warp make a fabric possible, the threads of the weft – real and they also account for a design or pattern.

So the fabrics of the Phaeacians give us, as it seems, the original idea of καιρός. It looks like here for the first time we have fixed the sense of καιρός /καῖρος known to Homer.

Compared to the sense of καίριος in the military contexts of *the Iliad*, the passage describing the tissues of the Phaeacians could add to our understanding of the concept in discussion. What this weak spot of the panoply (καίριον) has to do with καῖρος? Καῖρος is a special thread, placed at one edge of a would-be tissue, which being interwoven between the threads of the warp secures the order and prevents the threads of the warp from tangling. The role of this regulating thread (supposedly

καῖρος) would be very important taking into account the absence of warp-beams in the structure of the ancient loom: καῖρος facilitated the process of inserting the filling thread (weft).

So καῖρος would be a flexible linkage, a thread interwoven between the warp which exerts two functions at once: it separates and connects at the same time. To illustrate how it worked we shall cite Homer again (Il. XIX, 384–385):

> πειρήθη δ' ἕο αὐτοῦ ἐν ἔντεσι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, –
> εἰ οἱ ἐφαρμόσσειε καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἀγλαὰ γυῖα· (Homer,1911: 155)
>
> and goodly Achilles made proof of himself in his armour, whether it fitted him, and his glorious limbs moved free (Homer, 1924–25b: 365).

In order to be efficient in a battle, a warrior needs to feel himself comfortable in his armor. So he secures it with the thongs (e.g. the Dandra panoply as described above), fastens all the pieces of his panoply so that they fit perfectly and protect the vital parts of the body without impeding his movements.

Let us, for example, recall the scene – Hector hits Tuecer's shoulder (Il. VIII, 324 – 328). A glance cast on the armor makes it evident that this part of the cuirass (which protects a shoulder) is most weak and vulnerable because this is just the very spot of ligatures – the cords connecting the plates of a panoply. In other words, this part of the armor would be supplied with a great number of καῖρος*es*. One could consider such a spot μάλιστα καίριον (a most vulnerable). The ligatures of a panoply remind the καῖρος of the loom.

Let us recapitulate the principal connotations of the word *kairos*, being interpreted as a derivative of καῖρος:

1) as a regulating thread it supposes the idea of *control*;

2) again as a regulating thread it secures the vertical order of the warp guaranteeing this way the *due measure*, and as result we produce a tissue of high quality;

3) as an interwoven thread it *separates* and *connects* at the same time.

So a *kairotic spot* should be any part of the panoply, where the ligatures are situated. These cords or thongs should be tight enough in order the cuirass protect the body of a soldier, making apertures minimal, but at the same time they should not impede the movements of a soldier. Briefly, all the cords, ligatures and threads (if we talk about tissues) must be optimal.

Summing up the arguments of this part of our paper, we come to the following conclusion: the concept of *kair**o**s* suggests a set of elements, which constitute this phenomenon. It means that *kair**o**s* should not be interpreted as a moment, an opportunity et cetera. It should rather designate a complex structure, including a set of elements with an ambiguous connotation, such as, for example, opportunity/inopportuneness, a right moment/a wrong moment. Such an interpretation is rooted in the notion of *kair**o**s* as it has been construed above.

As a set of elements and constituent parts involving the phenomenon of time, *kairos* can be reconsidered within a special context – *the context of narration and composition*. We possess textual evidences in the Greek lyrics, which could serve us to corroborate this hypothesis. So we turn to the poetry of Pindar (522/18–448/438).

In *the Victory Odes* of Pindar there is a lot of words and expressions which have obvious reference to the art of weaving. This metaphorical transference of the notions, directly connected to the concrete art of weaving, to the domain of poetry is quite legitimate. Let us remember κόσμος ἐπέων (an order of the words). We have a similar image in Homer's *Iliad*, III, 212: μύθους ὑφαίνω (I weave words or discourse), or very close semantically – πλέκειν λόγους (interweave words), which, for that matter, hints at a complex composition of Aristotle, that is his ἁπλοῖ μῦθοι (simple plots)/πεπλεγμένοι μῦθοι (complex plots). So ὑφαίνω, ἐξυφαίνω, πλέκω, συμπλέκω, διαπλέκω, πλόκος, and to add – ποικίλλω with an adjective ποικίλος – belong to the semantic group which fixes different shades of the art which has to do with threads. Not

to leave it unsubstantiated, we quote Pindar (Olympic I, 8–9):

> ὁ πολύφατος ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται
> σοφῶν μητίεσσι (Pindar, 1997: 46).
>
> The famous hymn is embraced by the wisdom of wise men (Pindar, 1997: 47)
> [The translation is ours. – *E.A.*]

This passage is interesting because of a pun on words, which suggests two meanings because of similarity in sound: πολύ-φατος (famous) and πολ-ύφατος, the second part of which sounds to the Greek ear as if it were a form of the verb ὑφαίνω (I weave).

We shall not exaggerate quoting. A close reading of Pindar's contexts evoking the art of weaving, leads us to understand that this art is intimately connected with the art of poetic composition: καιρός here means intertwining of themes, ingenious composition, ability to unite a multitude into a comprehensible unity. The wise are those who are capable to understand this complexity. And the complexity itself *evolves in time and through time*. This articulation of elements and the relevant composition have discursive and thus temporal nature. The same nature reveals itself in the phenomenon of a literary composition (plot) and dialogue.

The royal art of weaving. Now we turn to the dialogue as a philosophical genre. It originates in the practice of sophistic *agon logon* (competition of discourses) and the practice of Greek drama. In the circle of the so-called Socratics this form of discourse was very popular (Alymova, 2017b: 97–116).

Panatios in the famous doxographic book of Diogenes Laertius (DL II, 64) (Diogenes Laertius, 2008: 136) names six authors of Socratic dialogues: Antisthenes, Aeschines, Pheado, Eucleides, Xenophon and Plato. The Socratic writings originated in a narrow circle of close disciples of Socrates. As a genre the Socratic dialogue is a collective production. It flourished between 390 and 350 BCE.

We have already discussed the problem of origin of the Socratic dialogue (Alymova, 2017b: 97–116), so we will not go into details here. Hereby we would like to emphasize one aspect. A great contribution to the configuration of the Socratic dialogue was made by the Sophists (Alymova, 2015: 23 – 29). They not only initiated the practices of contest of speeches (ἀγῶνες λόγων), but also influenced Socrates (who once pertained to their circle) and his disciples (some of them, e.g. Antisthenes, had been pupils of the Sophists). Given the attitude of the Sophists towards the problem of (im)possibility to render and express the knowledge of the reality, we must admit that for the Sophists the dialogue was a natural and consequential form of educational (and philosophical) discourse. Within the circle of the Sophists the concept of *kairos* gained a special slant: this concept presented itself as multilateral and three-dimensional (at least). It means they elaborated a special way of communication between the teacher and his audience which was based on recognition of detachment of the subject of cognition from the world itself as it is and of dramatic role of language in communication of any experience of the world. In such circumstances a monologue of a teacher meant nothing: it would not convey any precise knowledge – the only possible way of communication was dialogue (according to special rules, or technics) which involved different interlocutors lead by a teacher. They were in search of a convincing truth. That is why the skills in rhetoric had such a significant role. One might say without exaggeration that the teacher and his pupils were engaged in the process of *weaving* a mutual context. In other words, they created a situation of communication where common concepts might be brought to light. We call this situation *kairotic*.

And now we concentrate our attention on an exemplar version of this genre – that is on the Socratic dialogue as represented by Plato.

The genre of philosophical dialogue demonstrates traits similar to the art of weaving: a composition, intertwining and interweaving of words, which constitute a network.

In the writings of Plato we encounter not only the form of dialogue as such, but also an intuition (and most probably – understanding) of suggestive power of the dialogue as a philosophical way to involve interlocutors (and readers as well – and this is of great import)

into a certain procedure which could lead them (sometimes via perplexity) to gather that the life of mind and reason is complicated and that philosophizing is a perpetual exercise and exertion, the aim of which is to make them (and us) perceive the Good and thus actualize the pursuit of happiness.

To this general consideration we should add another one which takes into account the figure of the ruler, of a politician. According to Plato's *Republic* (and *The Laws*) the ruler of a polis should be philosopher, in other words a person who understands the essence of the Good. The ruler knows how to combine all the necessary constituent elements in order to create the best possible political regime. To illustrate how it should work, Plato uses a metaphor which became a topos in the Greek literature – the metaphor of ship. Let us cite the relevant context (the Athenian touches the problems concerning the dissolution of a polity, Leg. c3–d1):

> πολλοὶ καιροὶ (1) πολιτείας λύσεώς (2) εἰσιν, καθάπερ νεὼς ἢ ζῴου τινός, οὓς ἐντόνους (3) τε καὶ ὑποζώματα (4) καὶ νεύρων ἐπιτόνους (5), μίαν οὖσαν φύσιν διεσπαρμένην, πολλαχοῦ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύομεν· εἷς δὲ οὗτος οὐ σμικρότατος καιρὸς (6) τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ διαλυθεῖσαν (7) οἴχεσθαι πολιτείαν (Plato, 1907: 403).

> "In fact, the case stands thus: – The dissolution (2) of a polity, like that of a ship's frame, depends upon many critical factors (1): these (in the case of a ship) though one in nature are separated into many parts, and we call them by many names–such as stays (3), under-girders (4), bracing-ropes (5). For the preservation, or dissolution (7) and disappearance, of a polity the office of examiner is such a critical factor (6), and that of the gravest kind" (Plato, 1926: 487, 489).

It is but accurate: *kairos* is translated here as "critical factors". Meanwhile the picture and the metaphor itself become more clear and appear in full light with all possible connotations if we interpret them in the terms of *kairos* as it has been demonstrated above, that is in the terms of the art of weaving. The vocabulary, used here by Plato, stands for it: καιροί/καιρός is a keyword of the context is surrounded by words which imply threads or cords: λύσις (dissolution, also used to describe the process of taking off the armor of a soldier), ἔνοτνος (stay, *a strong rope* used to support a mast), ὑποζώματα (under-girders, *belts*), ἐπίτονος (bracing-*ropes*).

Moreover, it looks like Plato himself supports this reading. To corroborate this thesis we adduce another context – *The Statesman* (305e sqq). Plato paragons the activities of the weaver and the politician. He writes that the art of politics is συνυφαίνουσα ὀρθότατα (τέχνη) (305e sqq), that is the art of weaving the threads together into one web.

The statesman, according to Plato, should pick up the best, the most appropriate. We shall cite again (not to indulge in citing Greek, we quote here the translation of B. Jowett):

STRANGER: But the science which is over them all, and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most deservedly we may call politics.

YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so.

STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyze politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would.

STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece. (…)

STRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes – she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the

works which she deems necessary for making the web.

STRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.

YOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said. (…)

STRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof – these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner.

YOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner?

STRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human cords. (…)

STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.

YOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect. (Plato, 1892: 523–530).

We have cited this context at length and underlined the words, pertinent to our explication, because it demonstrates the significance of the image of weaver and the art of weaving (called here royal) as a paradigm in Plato's philosophical discourse.

Until this moment we have considered the Poet (epic and lyric), the Sophist, the Politician as representatives of the art of weaving – the art of creating *kairos*. Now, taking into account Plato's dialogue *The Sophist*, we arrive at a crucial point (Plato, 1995: 401): chasing the sophist, the interlocutors develop a special procedure to attain an accurate result. They practice a method of strict distinguishing, which they compare in particular to the art of carding yarn (ξαίνειν), separating the web with a heddle-rod (κερκίζειν), drawing down the weaver sword, whose function is to beat the weft against the fell of the cloth (κατάγειν). The Stranger subsumes all these procedures, which constitute the art of weaver, under the art of separation and distinguishing (διακριτικὴ τέχνη, or διάκρισις). The abovementioned technics of separating yarn and threads serve to distinguish the better from the worse, the similar from the dissimilar. So the Stranger concludes that all the arts of distinguishing must be designated as purification (καθαρμός τις).

The masters of the same art – the art making fabric (in metaphorical sense, of course) – are philosophers, because they should be versed in the art of "yarning" and "weaving" concepts and ideas (λόγοι, ἰδέαι), which consists, on the one hand, in separating the right concept from the wrong one and, on the other – in interweaving the right ones, arranging them in the best possible order, or, if we put it another way, Plato holds the royal art of weaving for a paradigm of dialectics.

Cosmos and Polis are tissues, (con)texts created by Gods and wise men. In the perspective of a philosophical discourse the dialogue, being a context as well, constitutes, or better –

should constitute, a situation, which we, taking into account our analysis, call *kairotic*, that is a situation which involves not only the interlocutors as protagonists of a dialogue, but the reader as well. The reader is exactly the point where all the semantic lines encounter: he/she is the crucial point of any philosophical dialogue, the point where the meaning conveyed/intended comes to actuality.

Conclusions

We have undertaken a sort of archeological research not to destroy the tradition, but in order to reconsider it. We think that the interpretation of B. Gallet (Gallet, 1990) makes it possible to explain all the traditional meanings of *kairos* and even adds to them. This interpretation lets us reconsider the concept of *kairos* in a wider perspective and even introduce a new formula – *kairotic situation* or *kairotic logos* (as applied specifically to a philosophical discourse). *Kairotic situation* is a combination or conjuncture of elements. It involves 1) the author (an authoritative instance, responsible for creation of such a situation), who composes all the elements, 2) the narrator or protagonist, 3) his audience and interlocutors, and 4) the reader, or an extradiegetic audience, a witness of the drama of a dialogue. The realization of *kairos* depends on communication of these elements, on their intertwining, on their being interwoven one with another in the best possible way. *Kairotic situation*/*kairotic logos* is created by an author: poet (epic, lyric or dramatic), rhetorician (a Sophist), politician, and philosopher, such as Plato, philosopher and dramatist.

References

Alymova, E.V. (2008). Mimeticheskoe nachalo pojeticheskogo iskusstva [Mimetic origin of poetic art]. In *Antichnyj mimesis. Sbornik statej, posvjashhennyj pamjati professora Konstantina Andreevicha Sergeeva* [*Ancient mimesis. Papers in honor of professor Konstantin Andreevich Sergeev*], 8–28.

Alymova, E.V. (2015). Oderzhal li Sokrat pobedu nad Protagorom, ili agon logon v dialoge "Protagor" [Did Socrates get the upper hand on Protagoras or agon logon in "Protagoras"]. In *Tezisy dokladov XXII mezhdunarodnoi konferenzii "Universum platonovskoi mysli": "Korpus textov Platona v istorii ego interpretazii"* [*Proc. of the 22nd International conference "The universe of Platonic thought": Corpus of Plato's Texts in the History of its Interpretations*]. Saint Petersburg, June 24-25. 249 p.

Alymova, E.V. (2017a). Narratsiia i siuzhetoslozhenie kak iznachal'nye formy aktualizatsii kontsepta vremeni v grecheskoi mysli (nekotorye razmyshleniia v sviazi s traktovkoi vremeni v dialogakh Platona) [Narration and plot as initial structures, which actualize the concept of time in Greek thought (some ideas exposed in connection with the treatment of time in the dialogues of Plato)]. In *Tezisy dokladov XXV nauchnoi konferenzii "Universum platonovskoi mysli": "Platon I antichnaia nauka"* [*Proc. of the 25th International conference "The universe of Platonic thought": "Plato and ancient science"*]. Saint Petersburg, June 21-22. 169 p.

Alymova, E.V. (2017b). Jeshin iz Sfetta i tradicija sokraticheskogo dialoga [Aeschines of Sphettus and the tradition of the Socratic dialogue]. In *Platonovskie issledovanija* [*Platonic Investigations*], 7 (2). P. 97–116.

Chantraine, P. (1968–1980). *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots.* Paris, Éditions Klincksieck, 1368 p.

Diogenes Laertius (2008). *Vitae philosophorum*. Berolini et Novi Eboraci, Walter de Gruyter, 826 p.

Frisk, H. (1960). *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. In 2 Bde. Heidelberg, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Bd. 1, 938 p.

Gallet, B. (1990). *Recherches sur kairos et l'ambiguïté dans la poésie de Pindar.* Lille, Presse universitaire de Lille III, 404 p.

Hesiod (1878). Erga kai hemerai. In *Hesiodi Quae feruntur carmina*. Lipsiae, aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 56–87.

Hippocrates (1923). Precepts. In *Hippocrates.* In 8 vol. London, William Heinemann Ltd., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1, 303 – 332.

Homer (1910). *Ilias*, In 2 parts. Lipsiae, In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, Part 1, 249 p.

Homer (1911). *Ilias*, In 2 parts. Lipsiae, In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, Part 2, 264 p.

Homer (1984). *Odyssea*. Stutgardiae, Teubneri, 469 p.

Homer (1924-25a). *The Iliad*, In 2 vol. London, William Heinemann; New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, Vol. 1, 614 p.

Homer (1924-25b). *The Iliad*, In 2 vol. London, William Heinemann; New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, Vol. 2, 668 p.

Homer (1919a). *The Odyssey*. In 2 vol. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., Vol. 1, 499 p.

Homer (1919b). *The Odyssey. In 2 vol*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., Vol. 2, 478 p.

Jampolsky, M. (2007). *Tkach i vizioner. Ocherki istorii reperezentacii, ili O material'nom i ideal'nom v kul'ture* [*Weaver and visionary. Essays on a history of representation or About material and ideal in culture*]. Moscow, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 610 p.

Onians, R.B. (1951). KAIROS. In *Onians R.B. The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate: New Interpretations of Greek, Roman and kindred evidence also of some basic Jewish and Christian beliefs.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 583 p.

Pindar (1947). *Carmina cum fragmentis*. Oxonii, E typographeo clarendoniano, 291 p.

Pindar (1997). *Olympian Odes. Pythian Odes*. Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press. 386 p.

Plato (1907). Leges. *In Platonis Opera*. In 5 vol. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano, Vol. 5, 14–436.

Plato (1926). *Laws,* In 2 vol. London, William Heinemann; New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, Vol. 2, 596 p.

Plato (1995a). Sophista. In *Platonis Opera*. In 5 vol. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano. Vol. 1, 383–471.

Plato (1995b). Politicus. In *Platonis Opera.* In 5 vol. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano. Vol. 1, 473–559.

Plato (1892). Statesman. In *The Dialogues of Plato.* In 4 vol. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, Vol. 3, 429–530.

Trédé-Boulmer, M. (2015). *Kairos. L' à propos et l'occasion. Le mot et la notion, d'Homer à la fin du IVe siècle avant J.-C*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 361 p.

Сократический диалог как кайротический логос

Е.В. Алымова
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет
Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург

Аннотация. Статья посвящена сократическому диалогу как жанру античной философской прозы, представителями которой были ученики Сократа – так называемые сократики. Шедеврами этого жанра являются диалоги Платона. Оригинальность данного исследования заключается в том, что сократический диалог рассмотрен в свете одного из самых загадочных концептов античной философии, каковым выступает кайрос. Встречаясь весьма часто в различных контекстах (как в поэтических, так и в прозаических), он нигде не получает определения, зато спектр его толкований велик. Свидетельство этому мы обнаруживаем в том числе и в переводах: мера, удобный случай, возможность, обстоятельства, кризис, цель, подходящее время, «свой час» (М.Л. Гаспаров), «пора» (В.В. Бибихин, А.В. Ахутин), и этот ряд можно продолжить. Здесь термин подвергается реинтерпретации, в основании которой изначальная связь кайроса с искусством ткачества, которое, в свою очередь, предстает как парадигма для искусства плетения логосов и драматического сюжетосложения.

Ключевые слова: кайрос, логос, сократический диалог, философский диалог, сократики, искусство ткачества, Платон.

Исследование Socratic Dialogue as Kairotic Logos (Сократический диалог как кайротический логос) выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ по проекту № 17–03–00616-ОГН а: «Сократические школы как явление античной философии и культуры». 2017–2019.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1250–1263

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0639
УДК 17

Sorokin Pitirim Revisited. His Place in Social Philosophy as a Transdisciplinary Thinker

Alexander Yu. Antonovskiy*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 16.03.2020, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 11.08.2020

Abstract. The article reviews the contribution made by Pitirim Sorokin, Russian-American sociologist and philosopher, into the development of social thought during the Russian period of his work. It analyses the program of autonomation of sociology as a transdisciplinary science. It proves that Sorokin managed to anticipate many ideas of the system-communication theory being the most respected at the moment and to reveal the major conditions for crystallization of the modern communicatively differentiated society. With the achievements of science, psychology, philosophy, linguistics and evolution theory contemporary for him, Sorokin formulated a positive system-communication approach to social studies that was implemented and therefore verified in the theory of Niklas Luhmann only several decades after. The program included the analysis of the minimum manifestation of the society later referred to as "interaction", which we can rightfully equalize with our contemporary interpretation of communication.

Keywords: Pitirim Sorokin, Niklas Luman, system-communicative theory, social systems.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Antonovskiy, A.Yu. (2020). Sorokin Pitirim revisited. His place in social philosophy as a transdisciplinary thinker. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1250–1263. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0639.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: antonovski@hotmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-4209-8213

Introduction

Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin is one of the few Russian thinkers who could qualify for a classic in social theory (Jeffries, 2002, 2009). It should be remarked, however, that his theoretic contribution into the social thought development is mainly associated with the cultural and historical approach and his contribution to the organization theory (Peltonen, 2018) and religion studies (Uzlaner, Stoeckl, 2017).

Let us consider some ideas of Sorokin systematically presented in his book titled "The System of Sociology" written in the so-called positivist period of his work. The book published exactly 100 years ago during the civil war contained a project of development and disciplinary self-manifestation of a transdisciplinary social theory. Unfortunately, the book had never been translated into English, and the author later preferred to shift to the cultural-historical and cultural-sociological studies.

The centennial of this outstanding research celebrated in 2020 is a good reason to recall Pitirim Sorokin as a strict social theorist and to revisit the value and perspectives of this unfairly forgotten project. Moreover, it appears interesting to trace the Russian sociology development process which, represented and assisted by Sorokin, struggled to protect its autonomy, separate from the competing approaches and occupy its unique niche in the complex hierarchy of other academic disciplines.

Later, after immigration to America, Sorokin set up and chaired the sociology department of Harvard University. However, in the aftermath, a greater impact was made by the competitive structural-functional version of the social theory that was established as the major theoretical paradigm for many decades. Talcott Parsons, a young researcher who developed the theory, gathered a group of colleagues who formulated the comprehensive and transdisciplinary-oriented theory of society based on the achievements of cultural anthropology and social psychology. Sometimes covert, and sometimes overt (Buxton, 1996), the war of concepts between Parson's functional theory and Sorokin's cultural-historical approach finished with a complete and unconditional victory of functionalism. The irony of the situation is that the interaction concept previously developed by Sorokin (as admitted by Sorokin himself (Coser, 1977: 490)) laid the foundation, anticipated and, to a great extent, significantly forestalled the structural-functional theory, even though severely criticized by the thinker himself (Sorokin, 1963: 251).

It could not be unnoticed, however, that Sorokin's concept manifests congeniality with today's most authoritative system-communication version of the social theory (Luhmann, 1997; Stichweh, 2015; Beaker, 2006). Nevertheless, this temporal priority should be rather referred to Sorokin's late cultural-sociological discoveries[1] (Pitasi, 2014: 28).

Both structural-functional theory and the late Sorokin's theory dominated by it relied upon the *problem-oriented* setup justifying the theoretical sociological criticism of their objects. They did solve the theoretical problem of defining the object of sociological study but attempted to solve the problem of the society itself, to reconstruct the conditions of possible social order (the Hobbesian problem). But if Parsons justified his solution referring to actual reproduction of society through the universal AGIL functions, Sorokin spoke of some "spiritual and metaphysical sources of order" (Pitasi, 2014: 29).

In the meanwhile, in his early period, in "The System of Sociology" Sorokin justified the disciplinary rights of sociology differently, focusing not on the constituent problem, but the constituent object he referred to as "interaction". Below, we will attempt to reproduce the main postulates of this project, but "interaction" shall be interpreted as "communication". Our humble mission is to find the ideas of Sorokin formulated in his "Russian" period that anticipated the achievements of the modern social theory and its system-communication version in particular. Methodologically, we shall rely upon the modern studies of the disciplinary and trans-disciplinary structure of science developed by German sociologist Rudolf Stichweh (Stichweh, 2013).

[1] "Sorokin's concept of culture (which anticipates Luhmann for several decades) is more rigid than Luhmann's".

Struggle for the subject and autonomy of sociology

As soon as it was born, sociology found itself in the situation of King Lear, like the philosophy that lost its disciplinary domain many other social sciences struggled to occupy (economic science, social anthropology, social psychology etc.). It needed to defend its right to a segment of the continual cognitive space of the external world of science, at the same time qualifying sociology as a social discipline in its own right. Pitirim Sorokin accepted the challenge, even though he had to take it twice. *Theoretically,* in "The System of Sociology" he managed to "reserve" a unique and still vacant specific domain of "interaction". *Practically,* he brought the project to life by setting up the sociology department at Harvard University.

In our opinion, the unique situation when a Russian immigrant leads the institutionalization of American (and generally speaking, global) sociology is not naturally understandable and requires explanation. In any case, the subject matter is not a mere game of chance and may be described as "serendipity", a term invented by his "disloyal disciple" Robert Merton (Merton, Barber, 2004)). According to our hypothesis, this is the transdisciplinary nature of Sorokin's social theory and, consequently, the performative influence of the theoretic concept on other researchers of Harvard that explains the credibility of the scientific and organizational project of Sorokin and the support he got at Harvard.

In his early period, Sorokin tended to derive the disciplinary claims of sociology not from the key problem of social order, but the *uniqueness* of the subject. The subject was formulated as "interaction between people". Even though the subject matter is the relations between people, it is not the concept of an individual, but the "interpersonal relations category" that matters (Sorokin, 1920: 8). What is the ontological status of the "inter" prefix? Obviously, this "inter-personality" is not a person itself, it is not a representation of a social group or a social system; this denotes a unique class of interaction processes. This is a statement of reaching the trans-disciplinary border, as such "inter- relations" are considered by diverse fields of study (e.g. biosociology, phytosociology etc.).

Sorokin establishes the autonomy of sociology with a positivist statement of the "scientific nature" of sociology. Firstly, "sociology can and should be a theoretic discipline that studies the world of people as it is. Any normativism should be driven away from sociology as a science. The Truth must be separated from the Good, Justice and other principles" (Sorokin, 2020, IX). Secondly, it must remain objective[2] and "transform from a science of 'psychic realities' into a science that studies the observable and measurable phenomena with a definite external being". Thirdly, "sociology wishes to be an experienced and exact science, to stop 'philosophizing', to leave the philosophically constructive tractates behind" (Sorokin, 2020, X).

Sorokin attempts to "reserve" the autonomy borders by fighting back the expansive attacks of the competitor disciplines. He vigorously brushes away Ostwald's "energetic approach", where the relationships between individuals are reduced to the physical and chemical effects of Newtonian forces ("cooperation is a sum of forces" and "organization is a balance of forces"). He also throws aside other refined manifestations of "mechanism" including the works of Marx (as we remember, the key concept of the theory is "labour", i.e. mechanic work defined through time as the measure of its value) and all types of biological reductionism[3]. The claims of psychology to the sociology domain are rejected by Sorokin due to the difference in their subjects. Psyche and consciousness are the subjects of psychology, while "it is not interested in the inter-psychic processes of communication, mutual actions and reactions of people". "A sociologist does not care of what is going on in the soul of the insane" (Sorokin, 1920: 16). He is only interest-

[2] Remarkably, this positivist thesis was proclaimed by Sorokin almost at the same time with the famous (and conceptually similar) pamphlet of Max Weber "Science as a Vocation" (2019).

[3] "…representatives of the 'biologic school', … attempting to consider sociology as a part of biology, such as Waxweiler, have to separate the human interaction phenomena into an independent class, different from other kinds of interaction between organisms" (Sorokin, 1920: 11).

ed in the "symptoms based on which the society recognizes this person as insane and the social consequences of his insanity". Long before Michel Foucault, Sorokin expressed the idea of the social origin of many mental illnesses. This is the society that defines the standards for the normal and mentally deviant; therefore, the fact of a mental deviation is a community-based phenomenon, determined by social-theoretical and cultural-historical circumstances.

However, in the final frame of his "apology of sociology", Sorokin suddenly excuses the claims the other social sciences to the domain of sociology. "Whether we consider political economics, or the law science, or the religious studies, or any discipline focused on art, just like all other "social" sciences, all of them study the phenomena of human interaction" (Sorokin, 1920: 21).

Even in this paradoxical thesis, we see an obvious parallel with the key differential thesis of the system-communication theory. This theory studies the communication types listed by Sorokin (economic, legal, religious as the subjects of their specific disciplines ("communal economy", "communal politics", "communal science", "communal law", "communal religion", "communal art" etc. and includes them into its domain) (Luhmann, 1998). But does it mean that sociology is a multitude or a corpus of special discipline? "Is sociology a mere label that defines an aggregation of all social disciplines, or does it exist on its own, as an independent branch of knowledge that does not merge with any other social science?" (Sorokin, 1920: 22).

No, in the opinion of Sorokin, it maintains its unique range of subjects even after having been divided by the mentioned social disciplines. "Specialization and differentiation of sciences … do not exclude, but, on the opposite, require the science to be synthesized" (Sorokin, 1920: 19).

Petrażycki's theorem, second-order observation and the term of the transdisciplinary

Sorokin justifies this transdisciplinary "generalizing sociology" thesis, referring to Petrażycki's theorem. The latter claims that any special science requires and implies the presence of a metascience to pick an invariant subject or its model manifested in a multitude of special disciplines. For instance, botany and zoology are generalized by general biology as a supervising discipline. Here Sorokin formulates the concept of the second- and next-order observation. For example, according to Petrażycki, the theory of morals requires the theory of law, and the theory of law and theory of morals together need a generalizing theory, such as legal sociology etc.[4]

This idea of a generalizing, transdisciplinary-oriented science has been universally recognized in the system-communication theory of science that marks out *two types* of transdisciplinary sciences, "finding the invariants that make it possible to integrate the classes of problems studied by several disciplines that seemed heterogenous at first… On one hand, the subject matter is the models and notions (studied by formal disciplines, primarily mathematics and logic) that deal with the transcendent concept, raising the integration degree of a scientific system, ensuring the access to the progressive scientific knowledge and understanding of such… The second type of transdisciplinary concepts we find in the conceptual systems of 'structuralism' and 'general system theory' distinguished from the formal disciplines for having originated from the specific disciplinary contexts and specific phenomena origin areas (language, organisms) used as paradigm phenomena" (Stichweh, 2013: 25).

It is remarkable that proving his thesis, Sorokin referred to the achievements of the contemporary natural philosophy, contradicting his initial restriction on philosophizing. In particular, he turns to the Mach-Leibniz idea of the "economy of effort" or "economy of thought". Sorokin draws a direct link between the theoretic sociology and the mnemonic function, e.g. explicitly referring to the Newtonian laws interpreted by Ernst Mach, though,

[4] The theorem is formulated as follows: "If there is *n* types of related subjects, they require *n+1* theoretic sciences and theories in general; for example, for two types, it takes 2+1=3 theories" i.e. "plus one more discipline to formulate the principles typical for the common genus" (Petrażycki, 1905: 80).

for obvious reasons, does not mention the name of the latter.

"All Newton did was a transition from the forces between the bodies of finite dimensions to considering forces between infinitely little particles. The transition is associated with such an economy of mental energy" that compensates for the incapability of memory of "keeping every single settled fact" so that the "observation materials are encapsulated in a brief formula". Therefore, Mach's mnemonic and technical function of the "economy of effort" becomes the main alibi of sociology as a discipline claiming to be unique in this function and therefore autonomous on one hand, and a supervising meta-discipline "presenting" certain achievements and "single facts" produced by other social sciences on the other (Sorokin, 2020: 31-32).

However, the trans-disciplinary nature in Sorokin's works manifests its specificity, not being limited to generalizing different phenomena into the framework notion of *interaction*. A special focus is made on finding mutual dependencies between special disciplines (united by sociology): "Different categories of interaction phenomena studied by individual sciences, e.g. economic, religious, legal, aesthetic phenomena etc. are not separated in real life; they are inseparably bound together and influence each other…For instance, the salary of a worker, besides the demand and supply ratio, depends on the known moral ideas. … Division of labour is, to a certain extent, associated with the phenomenon of solidarity. … The economic organization of society often depends on common religious beliefs. Geographic conditions make a certain impact on the organization of production, family structure and customs of the nation…" This is why any "specialist in economy… has to act as a sociologist as well, otherwise, he would not be a 'specialist'… Thus, every specialist is always a sociologist" (Sorokin, 1920: 33).

Theoretic sociology structure

The main achievement of Sorokin's young opponent Talcott Parson is believed to be the synthetic nature of his theory that connected the microlevel of sociological analysis (theory of action in Max Weber's interpretation) to the macrolevel of the large-scale social systems (the idea of division of labour in society by Emile Durkheim). "That was Parsons who realized that an action could not be separated from the system" (Luhmann, 2002: 21).

However, this idea was first expressed and proven much earlier in "The System of Sociology", within the framework of Pitirim Sorokin's "social analytics".

"The subject of social analytics is the studies of the structure of a social phenomenon and its forms; this discipline falls into two main subdisciplines: 1) the social analytics that studies the structure of elementary social phenomena and their elements, the systematics of their main forms 2) and the social analytics that deals with the structure of compound social units formed by different combinations of the elementary social phenomena" (Sorokin, 1920: 38).

At the same time, as we have said above, Sorokin did not only anticipate the ideas of Parsons; he did the shift in the "system references" later done by Niklas Luhmann when he stepped from analysing the *system of action* as an elementary social phenomenon, accumulating in masses making up the social substrate, to analysing *communication* as an elementary form of existence of society. Thus, to our mind, speaking of "interaction", Sorokin speaks of communication in the way it was interpreted by Niklas Luhmann.

Structurally, Sorokin's "interaction" falls into the interacting persons (*Ego* and *Other* according to Niklas Luhmann). *Dynamically,* Sorokin's "interaction" falls into the sequences of "acts-stimulations" and "inner states-experiences". To our mind, this structure anticipates the system of variables which may in different anatomic combinations determine the forms of the communicative macrosystems (politics, science, economy, religion, art).

Before analysing the interaction system described by Sorokin, let us briefly revise Luhmann's approach to the communication macrosystems.

These systems use polar means to reduce the complexity of the external world. For example: while an Ego as a *politician* subordinates

	Ego experiences	**Ego acts**
The Other experiences	**Science (truth, values)** Experiences of the *Ego* (for example, the data of experiments that prove the trueness of theoretical theses) must be confirmed by experiences of any *Other*	**Intime system (love)** Using its *actions*, *Ego* tries to cause *experiences* of the *Other*
The Other acts	**Ecomomic system (money)** *Actions of the Other* (for example, claims to material benefits) do not cause an *act* response but are *experienced* by the *Ego* because the Other has ownership rights or money; Art system (work of art) **The artist acts, the spectator experiences;**	**Politic system (power)** *Actions* of the *Other* entail *actions* of the *Ego* if they are regulated by *Power*. Personal *experiences* must be withdrawn from the sphere of political and military communications.

Fig. 1

its actions to actions of a superior *Other*, an *Ego* as a scientist coordinates its experiences with experiences of the Other. No doubt, science consists of actions and communications but styles them as mutually authenticated experiences of the external world, as perceptions, observations, experiments. Science in this sense, together with value communication, is in the upper left square of the scheme of variables, or Luhmann's constellations: the Ego undergoes experiences in response to experiences of the Other. Politics is in the lower right square: the Ego acts, subordinating and reacting with its actions to actions of the Other.

Thus, four possible combinations of the four basic elements (experiences/acts, Ego/Other) are reproduced by Luhmann in the respective macrosystems, setting their typology (Fig. 1). This is a breakthrough idea of Luhmann connecting the structural constituents of *elementary* communication on the microlevel and the specificity of the communication *systems* on the macrolevel was anticipated by Pitirim Sorokin almost word by word referring to the notion of *interaction.*

"The people interaction phenomenon takes place when… the changes of the psychic experiences or external acts of one individual are caused by the experiences and external acts of the other (others)" (Sorokin, 1920: 44).

"The acting of B works Mrs A into a frenzy".
This example illustrates an elementary structure of communication:
The Other acts → The Ego experiences.

"The Decree issued by Commissar B calling A to arms makes him go to the Commissariat".
This example illustrates an elementary structure of political communication:
The Other acts → The Ego acts.

After that, Sorokin explicitly lists the mentioned elements or components of the "interaction":

"1) Presence of two or more individuals that determine each other's experiences and acts,

2) Presence of acts through which the mutual experiences and acts are conditioned,

3) Presence of conductors[5], transmitting the acts or stimulation of acts from one individual to another";

[5] In Niklas Luhmann's interaction variable model we could also see the respective "generalizing communicative media" (money, power, truth etc.) that integrated and assigned a meaning to the internal system communications (economics, politics, science etc.). In a similar conceptualization of the communication media, Sorokin identified them as "conductors". The concept of "conductors" will be considered below.

and then explicitly describes the transition from the elementary level of interaction-communication to the macrolevel of social life:

"Every researcher of whatever is classified as social life phenomena… should look for the most primitive case of their occurrence, a simplified and little model he could study to see more complicated facts as combinations of the elementary cases" (Sorokin, 1920: 87).

Sorokin's statement that the typology of macrosystems is set by constellations of communication ("interaction") variables was more than a revolutionary constructivist theory for that time, but, perceived by his contemporaries, could have set the foundation for the system-communication theory. Sorokin does not only suggest a nomenclature for the communicative macrosystems (economics, art, religion, law, science) but also points at some "immature" forms of sociality referred to today as social protest movements (Luhmann, 1996).

"All social relations, from economic to aesthetic, religious, legal and scientific, fall into the *interaction* relations…. Having decomposed the interactions into constituent elements, we happen to decompose the most complicated social phenomena… Any social phenomenon can be woven from a combination of the interaction process, from the mere humming of the crowd to the systematic struggle of the global proletariat" (Sorokin, 1920: 81).

This is the understanding of macro-micro-interaction that pushed Sorokin to a modern-looking idea of the system-communication sociology of science. This is about the capacity of communicative integration of the disciplinary heterogenous science relied upon its *elementary substrate basis*, on one hand, and the *layered hierarchic nature* on the other. The hierarchic nature of the scientific disciplines where the basic levels are occupied by the most authoritative physics, chemistry and biology and the top levels belong to the younger sociology and psychology enables the latter to use the previously proven methodological principles and forms of structural and role organization of the more authoritative disciplines. This is how Pitirim Sorokin formulates the connection between the elementary substrate-basis and the hierarchic nature of sciences:

"A sociologist … must use the experience of other sciences, such as chemistry and biology. Like a chemist who decomposes the entire colourful and complicated world of non-organic nature into atoms, like a biologist who studies the phenomena of life in a single cell, a sociologist must seek a "social cell" he could study to acquire the knowledge about the main properties of the social phenomena; moreover, like a chemist who explains the complex subjects and phenomena of the non-organic world through the combinations of atoms and their compounds, or molecules, or like a biologist who separates an organism into constituent cells to study the first as the combination of the second, the sociologist has to find the primitive component that would enable him to look at any social phenomena as a combination of such components" (Sorokin, 1920: 78).

One hundred years after, this disciplinary and integrative function of the "transfer of concepts" from the mature to the developing disciplines became the common point for the system-communication sociology of sciences: "The hierarchy of sciences… is an important factor for homogenization of the scientific field. The hierarchization of the disciplines intensifies the inter-discipline exchange and allows for transferring techniques, models and theories, typically, from predominantly hard-disciplines to soft-disciplines… As a rule, the transfer is directed from the more advanced to the less advanced disciplines, and the formal competences generated in one domain become significant in the new ones" (Stichweh, 2013: 30).

De-psychologization of the "internal conditions" and sociological anti-humanism

The most problematic pole in this multitude of the variable theory constituents ("experience/act, Ego/Other") is the "experience" or "internal condition", especially for the positivist-oriented social theory. The Russian stage of Sorokin's idea evolution is usually defined as positivist, but it appears to be simplified for us. His understanding of "experience" reminds of the later "identity theory" of Smart and Place's analytical philosophy of consciousness (Smart, 1959) and H. Putnem functionalist theory of

mind. In particular, Sorokin proves the thesis that any experience is in this or that way expressed externally, through behaviour and actions, and distinguishing between them is a mere consequence of interpretation or observation.

The process that opens to the experiencing party as a Qualia looks like a neurophysiological process to a foreign observer. Experience may be hidden from the observer, but it can anyway evoke a reaction of the Other, as "the psychic process and process in the mind are inseparable from each other" (Sorokin, 1920: 48).

Sorokin considers the ideas of Darwin, Lossky, Petrażycki and their proofs of the actors' capacity of intuitive reconstruction of foreign mentality as a sort of evolutionary achievement, as a condition for survival and natural selection of the human community. But still, agreeing with Bekhterev, he concludes that the "Other Ego" as such remains inaccessible. Neither intuitionism, nor analogy, nor projection guarantees any access. As a result, reconstructing any internal conditions, the actor has to use only speech, gestures and facial expressions as relatively reliable ways to express any internal conditions[6].

As we know, this discussion of the status of the mental conditions of actors ("interaction parties") in the form of a *subjectivism/objectivism* dilemma made a dramatic impact on the development of sociology. "Which party in this argument should we join? Which of the two trends should we follow?" (Sorokin, 1920: 63). The solution he suggested can be understood in an exclusively system-communication manner. Sorokin recognizes that the psychic condition as such is inaccessible to an external observer, but, unlike a typical behaviourist, he sees this *inaccessibility* as relevance for communication. This latency, on one hand, provokes interaction (=communication), but on the other hand, makes it possible to understand the acts of another interaction party. "…it would be irrational for a sociologist to ignore the subjective and psychic aspect of human activity… because now and then we tend to set diagnoses, such as 'H. is in bad spirits today'; 'U. looks sad'; 'L. is furious'; 'A. is excited'; 'S. is craving for sweets'; 'D. is plotting a dirty trick' etc. And our diagnoses prove right… and in the majority of situations, we understand each other. The routine daily facts demonstrate that we are capable of understanding the psychic experience of the others based on their external manifestations and frequently we do it right" (Sorokin, 1920: 68).

In the examples above the subject matter is a typical or functional condition (as understood by H. Putnem) that sets certain programs or algorithms of behaviour. Such algorithms connect and explain the past and future actions in terms of interaction, make it possible to forecast them, to plan one's responsive behaviour, and ensure the so-called "system recursion". Or, in terms of system-communication theory, this is about *social expectations.*

In this regard, such "psychic phenomena as love, affection, heavy and unexpected grief, the horror of loss" as standard social expectations act as a guideline for action in certain situations, when typical experiences evoke typical acts. These conditions are the missing variables, acting as the "key to decode" the signs and symbols manifested in the optic and acoustic forms.

Thus, the understood "internal experience" in the language of modern system-communication theory only performs the function of selecting *information in a message.* A contact request can only be understood if we refer to the internal condition to understand the connection of the message with its possible internally attributed interpretations. Are those the conditions of "Discontent, indifference and impulsiveness" behind the "get out" expression? Is the expression "Goddamn it!" caused by "frustration, fury, or amusement?" These are examples of decoding information from a message provided by Sorokin. This is the understanding of how this very connection of the *message* sent by the *Other* and the *information* decoded by some *Ego* relies upon the hypothet-

[6] Sorokin makes a remarkable reference to Pavlov who "never used psychological understanding of nervous activity for the success of his studies in 13 years" (Sorookin, 1920: 60). We may suggest that the subject matter is Pavlov's infamous experiments on children (Yushchenko, 1928) that were co-determined by the attitude to the "internal condition" of the children.

ic internal condition as a link between the message and the meaning derived from it.

At that moment, this is the uncertainty of the "internal condition" that creates the need for further interaction (in the form of inquiry, clarification, continue of the conversation), acting, at the same time, as the precondition of the diversity of external expressions, i.e. the freedom of acts. "The nervous system, – writes Sorokin, – is like a weaver's loom that sews according to standard templates, but can produce a different result to every impulse (depending on the weaver)" (Sorokin, 1920: 74).

Apriori-unreliable, ambivalent and unidentifiable from outside, such "internal conditions" are the preconditions and conditions for the free, but at the same time systematically-canalized nature of interaction (or communication). This postulates an underlying liberal idea of *free* communication excluding the situations like "The professor dictates, the secretary reproduces" (Sorokin 1920: 70). In the system-communication language, it would imply a clear definiteness of the information transmitted through the given message, that would, in its turn, result in the excessiveness of any communication and any understanding.[7]

Sorokin's conceptualization of the "internal conditions" as information keys to decoding the standard and hard-to-interpret messages ensuring understanding within the interaction yields the same "anti-humanistic consequences" the system-communication sociology is reproached for today (Schimank, 2005: 59-76).

"… individual as an individual can never be considered as a microcosm of the social macrocosm. He can never be because everything an individual may become is an individual and nothing of what we refer to as "society" nor "social phenomena"… individual as an individual creates no foundation for the existence of such special science as sociology. As a physical being, he is studied by physical and mathematic sciences; as an organism, he is studied by biology, as a creature with consciousness or psyche, he is studied by psychology. Since sociology has nothing to with an individual alone, it would have been unnecessary. An individual cannot be the sought model of what bears the title of social phenomena" (Sorokin, 1920: 79).

"Interaction conductors" or generalized communicative media theory

The idea of generalized communicative media is an essential part of the system-communication theory derived from the transdisciplinary adoptions from psychology and neurophysiology. The concept of media that has become a colloquial term was conceptualized in an expansive theoretic form by Austro-American psychologist Fritz Heider (in his report "Thing and Medium" in 1927) (Heider, 2005). In this interpretation, media have become an integral part of N. Luhmann's sociology (Luhmann, 1997: 190-413).

Sorokin develops his own transdisciplinary concept of media, where the transmitter role is assigned to the so-called "conductors". "Contact with receptors is not immediate and direct; it may only occur through the emanation of special forces (vibrations of air perceived by vision, oscillations of airwaves perceived by hearing etc.)" (Sorokin, 1920: 84). "Without conductors, psyche would have been non-transmittable. Even direct physical touches used to "transmit" these or those psychic experiences (such as caress, threatening moves, a "friendly smile" or a "kiss of love" etc.) do not translate the psyche directly; they do it indirectly, through the conductors, which, in this case, are the bodies of the contacting people and the acts of their organs" (Sorokin, 1920: 116).

In this situation, interaction can be conducted by anything (utterances, writing, printing, electricity, various acoustic or optic media). The typology of such conductors does not rely on the substrate, but the conceptual parameters of functions, and, first of all, the specific ways of covering distance and, particularly, time, in optimizing the dynamics of communication. Just like in system-communication approach, Sorokin distinguishes between the communication spreading media (making interaction more likely in long distances or spaced in time) and the communication success media (money,

[7] Futuristic ideas of such "non-communicative communication", where information would be unequivocally transmitted through the given message is considered today as a consequence of various neuro-computer interfaces (Backer, 2006: 37).

power etc.), providing interaction within the communication macrosystems.

Symbolic functions of conductors

In the first case, "people interact with each other both physically and mentally, regardless of the huge distances separating them and the time gap between them". "The living and the dead may communicate with each other. The will (act) of the dead evokes experience of the heirs" (Sorokin, 1920: 117). From this trivial circumstance, Sorokin derives the concept of the "symbolic meaning of conductors". There is no rigid connection between the physical shape of the message and its symbolic meaning (information). "A piece of red cloth is a message, but the meaning it bears depends on the context: time, community, and subject" (Sorokin, 1920: 121). This is the symbolic meaning of the medium that causes both behaviour and experience. The causal role is rather played by the *social expectations* associated with the symbols and triggered by the red flag, than the initial psychic condition of the person who displayed it. As the bearers of crystallized meanings, these expectations are social structures providing the answers given by the perceiving parties, i.e. canalizes the interaction in a non-random way.

The generalizing function of conductors

Conductors are capable of generalizing not only by symbolizing and typifying the situations, setting the frameworks and contexts for communication; they do not only extract standard meanings or pieces of information from messages with their symbolism. Such extracted meaning must be regularly reproducible; this is the only condition for generalizing or integrating this or that community: "there is one more additional condition, the presence of a more or less homogenous manifestation (symbolisation) of the same experiences by the interacting individuals, thereby opening an opportunity of a correct and regular interpretation of the symbolic units by each of them" (Sorokin, 1920: 122).

This is where the key problem of sociology, i.e. the problem of social order is solved. Neither the closedness of the psyche nor the variability of interpreting symbols, nor message meanings prevent the arrangement of interactions and maintenance of the social order. "It is clear that human heart is a mystery and revealing one's true feelings is not an easy task, while external symbols can be always interpreted in different ways, which we can see, for instance, in the judicial pleadings of the parties. The defence attorney and prosecutor create pictures of opposite experiences based on the same symbols and deeds of the accused" (Sorokin, 1920: 123). Understanding and consensus are underlaid by *symbolism* and *reproducibility* of the rule (in this case, rule of law).

This is how Sorokin arrives at the understanding of the *symbolic generalizing communication media,* the key concept of the contemporary system-communication theory.

Differentiation of the interaction forms depending on the media form

From the function perspective, the concept of *conductor* is similar to the concept of *media* in the system-communication theory. They reinforce the "weak connections" between big masses of events. In both cases, these two concepts characterize huge masses of simultaneously executed and *poorly connected* elements or events (sentences of a language, masses of communications, orders, payments, truth-related utterances, artistic acts etc.). Or, quoting Sorokin, "The social life of people as a whole looks like an enormous, continuously circulating flow of words and their combinations streaming from one person to another, from one group to another" (Sorokin, 1920: 127).

For this totality of social interactions to be arrangeable and differentiable in separate macrosystems, these masses of possible events need to be limited by these or those special "conductors" performing the function of transmitting the interaction (e.g., acoustic conductors): "Any encounter, any conversation, any meeting, whether it is an academic lecture, a political meeting, a parliament or court session, a religious sermon, communication between a teacher and students, conversations within the family, at the market etc. are illustrations acoustic conductors playing their social role" (Sorokin, 1920: 128).

Today's system-communication theory reconstructs the social development and communicative transformations as a reaction to the transformations of the communicative media (starting from mutual perception, spoken language, writing, printing, telecommunication and the modern social media on computers). Within this theory, the expansion of any new media is considered to be a solution to a given integration task to minimize the preceding conflicts, which does not deny the generation of the new ones. New media translations provoke the so-called "cultural catastrophes". One of such catastrophes was associated with the emergence of the optic media, i.e. writing, that "shook the ancient world of secrets and taboos". Another catastrophe was triggered by book printing that caused religious wars and social revolutions (Baecker, 2006: 11)[8]).

According to Luhmann, writing and printing allowed for neutralizing the conflict-generating potential of the acoustic media, i.e. spoken language. The conflict potential relies upon the fact that as the language develops and shifts from the "picture-like", i.e. analogous presentation of reality, to higher abstraction, to more dynamic forms of description, new social and dynamic opportunities were crystallized and shaped. On one hand, new resources of the language (verb tenses etc.) made it possible to describe various processes and changes, but on the other hand, the form of a sentence provided the tools for denial, for saying no, and, therefore, for rejecting the suggested contact requests (Luhmann, 1997: 205-291).

This is the domain where Sorokin develops his concept of conductors. The acoustic conductors of the tribal societies translated the analogous ("picture-like") images that created a *static* picture of perception rich in elements but did not express any processes. The words were used to denote constant phenomena, and in this sense, could be equalized with things. All difficulties of interaction transformation were associated with this circumstance.

"The languages of the primitive communities always express the ideas of objects and acts as though these objects and acts were perceived by eyes and hearing; … there are no words or gestures for expression of the abstract experiences and ideas, but there are words and gestures to denote absolutely certain, singular things and events; this explains the abundance of the prehistoric language in nouns, prepositions and verbs; the language was a picture-like work of art, a drawing of an object or an event" (Sorokin, 1920: 172).

The simultaneousness and coincidence between the perception and spoken expression in such tribal societies were the guarantee of consensus, as there were no significant differences between the world of the interacting individuals. The language itself would not let them break the borders of the given perception of the environment. With regard to the interaction constituents, it meant that the identity of the experiences (internal conditions) and verbal expressions ensured the identity of the Ego and the Other, the objects and symbols, experiences and acts (including message acts). In other words, the primitive languages of small communities guaranteed mutual confidence of the words, acts and coincidence with the thoughts and acts of the Other, i.e. the confidence in social consensus.

Only the new optic medium (the "light and colour conductors" in Sorokin's terminology) made it possible to distinguish a subject and its verbal representation. In other terms, words became the variables of the natural language, and, therefore (besides hiding the intentions) the communicating parties acquired the opportunity of using them in a free manner, of modelling the words separately from the things they could present without "damaging" the world of subjects.

As the complexity of society requiring more global spaces and times was growing, the spoken language lost its function of social integration. It was writing that performed the compensating integrating function, or, to be more precise, the written law, written decrees of the authorities, artistic and academic texts,

[8] "Writing blows up the world of these taboos by making the moralising … obvious and hence provides reasons, with an eye to whoever is sending the message. … Printing is the next catastrophe, because now texts can be compared with each other and hence systematically criticized thanks to their reproduction, so that 'criticism' on a wider scale than ever before becomes a new form of heuristics".

and money that connect people regardless of the huge distances.

The keepers of the optic media ("light conductors") and the social memory accumulation spots (and, in this regard, an essential cultural and historical milestone, ensuring the "interaction" through space and time in a long-term perspective) are libraries. They were the factor that undermined the stability of the ancient world. They facilitated the crystallization of the communicative success media, making new types of incredible interactions or communications possible since they appeared. This outstanding social and integration role of the optic conductors and libraries as their storage places is stated by Sorokin. "From this point of view, every library can be regarded as a huge and complex telephone station where through the books hundreds of people find their connection with living and dead authors every day and find themselves in a quiet conversation with each other" (Sorokin, 1920: 130).

One hundred years ago this idea of the optic media as a condition for crystallization of the modern system-differentiated society became commonly recognized. "The guarantees of stability in the society of printing cannot lie any longer in families and in the regions. No dynasty and no territory is a match for this sort of restlessness. In its place, certainly without making them redundant, there step in, according to Luhmann, the libraries and the functional systems. The librarians provide the rubrics, under which politics can and must recognise itself as politics, business as business, science as science and then also art as art and religion as religion" (Baecker, 2006: 14).

Writing (as optic media in general or the "light conductors") changes the structure of social time and drives the interactions beyond the limits of the lifetime of an individual or his personal memory. This is the phenomenon of telecommunication in the broadest sense, where the communication parties are texts (i.e. the communications themselves), and people with their spatial and temporal limits find themselves to be the "links in a chain of conductors", ensuring the transmission of the communication texts through the chain. Writing and printing generated new media as means of communicative success (authority, truth, money etc.) that underlaid the emergence of macrosystems. Sorokin reconstructs these processes further in his work "The System of Sociology", but here we have to finish reconstruction of the trans-disciplinary project of Pitirim Sorokin. Sorokin managed to anticipate many ideas of the universalist theory of society, being the most credible theories today, and to record the main preconditions for crystallization of the contemporary communicatively-differentiated society. With the achievements of science, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, evolution theory contemporary to him, Sorokin formulated a positive program for the system-communication approach to the social studies, which was applied and therefore verified only several decades after, in the system-communication theory of Niklas Luhmann. The program included the analysis of the minimum manifestation of the society denoted with the term of "interactions", that we can rightfully equalize to today's notion of communication. The respective constellations of the elements of this "social atom" created the typology of the global society macrosystem, and the correlations found between the micro- and macrolevels were credibly described and justified. Sorokin suggested his own theory of "communication translation media" he referred to as "conductors". Je developed a typology, described the functions and properties of the symbolic tools and conditions for communication later denoted as "communication success media".

The priority of Sorokin in the mentioned fields of knowledge should be restored, which requires further work on the reconstruction of his heritage with a special focus on the Russian period of his work.

References

Jeffries, V. (2002). Integralism: The promising legacy of Pitirim Sorokin. In *Lost Sociologists Rediscovered*. New York: Mellon Press, 99–135.

Jeffries, V. (2009). *The scientific system of public sociology*: The exemplar of Pitirim A.

Sorokin's social thought. In *Handbook of Public Sociology.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 107–122.

Uzlaner, D., Stoeckl, K. (2017). The legacy of Pitirim Sorokin in the transnational alliances of moral conservatives. In *Journal of Classical Sociology,* 18 (2), 133-153.

Peltonen, T. (2018). Revisiting the sociological origins of organization theory: the forgotten legacy of Pitirim Sorokin. In *Origins of Organizing.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

Buxton, W. (1996). Snakes and ladders: Parsons and Sorokin at Harvard. In *Sorokin & Civilization: A Centennial Assessment*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 31–44.

Coser, L.A. (1977). *Masters of Sociological Thought*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Pitasi, A. (2014). The Sociological Semantics of Complex Systems. In *Journal of Sociological Research,* 5 (1), 203-213.

Merton, R.K., Barber, E. (2004). *The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity. A Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Petrazhitskiy, L.I. (1905). *Vvedenie v izuchenie prava i nravstvennosti: Emotsional'naia psikhologiia*, St. Petersburg, 311 p.

Stichweh, R. (2013). *Wissenschaft, Universität, Professionen*. *Soziologische Analysen*. Transcript-Verlag: Germany.

Luhmann, N. (2002). *Einführung in die Systemtheorie*. Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag, Heidelberg.

Luhmann, N. (1996). *Protest*. *Systemtheorie und soziale Bewegungen*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.

Smart, J.J.C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. *In Philosophical Review*, 68, 141–156.

Yushchenko, A.A. (1928). *Conditioned reflexes of the child*. Moscow: State Publishing House.

Baecker, D. (2006). Niklas Luhmann in the Society of the Computer. In *Cybernetics & Human Knowing: A Journal of Second-Order Cybernetics, Autopoiesis, and Cyber-Semiotics,* 13, 25-40.

Schimank, U. (2005). Luhmanns analytischer Anti-Humanismus: Eine halbierte Theorie der modernen Gesellschaft. In *Differenzierung und Integration der modernen Gesellschaft*. Springer.

Heider, F., Baecker, D. (2005). *Ding und Medium*. Kadmos Verlag.

Питирим Сорокин как трансдисциплинарный мыслитель. Забытое наследие и место в традиции

А.Ю. Антоновский
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. В статье реконструируется вклад русско-американского социолога и философа Питирима Сорокина в развитие социальной мысли в российский период его творчества. Анализируется программа автономизации социологии как трансдисциплинарной науки. Обосновывается, что Сорокину удалось предвосхитить многие идеи наиболее влиятельной на сегодняшний день системно-коммуникативной теории, зафиксировать важнейшие предпосылки кристаллизации современного коммуникативно-дифференцированного общества. Используя достижения современного ему естествознания, психологии, философии, лингвистики, эволюционной теории, Сорокин сформулировал позитивную программу системно-коммуникативного подхода к исследованию общества, которая реализовалась и тем самым верифицировалась лишь десятилетия спустя в рамках теории Никласа Лумана. Эта программа включала в себя анализ минимального проявления общества, которое получила название взаимодействия, а мы с полным правом можем отождествить с современным понятием коммуникации.

Ключевые слова: Питирим Сорокин, Никлас Луман, системно-коммуникативная теория, социальные системы.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1264–1274

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0640
УДК 130.3:316.73:316.752

Socio-Cultural Determinacy of Human Loneliness

Igor A. Belyaev and Maksim N. Lyashchenko*
Orenburg State University
Orenburg, Russian Federation

Received 19.04.2019, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 12.08.2020

Abstract. The article justifies the socio-cultural determinacy of human loneliness. Philosophical and cultural discourse has been developing through synthesis of heterogeneous and diverse theoretical positions. The formula by Karl Marx, which shows that the unity of human relationship with nature is determined by the unity of relations between individuals, was of paramount importance for the study. The existence of society and community was considered as two dialectically interrelated forms of sociality, the lack of coordination between which leads to the emergence of human loneliness. The statement of the synergetic paradigm on the non-equilibrium nature of social structures has become heuristically valuable for conducting the research. Relying on the information about age-related peculiarities of human development based on the concept of E. Erickson, allowed to obtain the desired result. The philosophical and cultural interpretation of these and related provisions made it possible to establish that loneliness can be recognised as a consequence of the decreasing community level in the course of interaction between individuals and the impossibility of maintaining its high level, which is expressed in the Meeting of the Self and the Significant Other (one's own Other). It was revealed that: community with a Significant Other is a measure of actualising the integrity and wholeness of the person's being; the more diverse and wider the area of Significant Others, the more harmonious the person's being; the person who has broadened the horizons of the Meeting as fully as possible is truly authentic; an increase in the depth of integration of the person with the processes and phenomena that are natural for each age stage passed, reduces the likelihood of loneliness, and, therefore, makes them more rooted in the existence.

Keywords: loneliness, culture, society, community, Meeting, human integrity.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Belyaev, I.A., Lyashchenko, M.N. (2020). Socio-cultural determinacy of human loneliness. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1264–1274 DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0640.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: igorbelyaev@list.ru, megamax82@rambler.ru
ORCID: 0000–0003–4072–2342 (Belyaev); 0000–0001–7193–5610 (Lyashchenko)

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR, Russian researchers, including philosophers working on cultural and anthropological problems, found themselves in a deep and protracted methodological crisis, first of all, caused by discrediting the previously unambiguously dominant dialectical materialism. The harsh criticism of the Marxist philosophical doctrine that unfolded in the first post-Soviet years, with the simultaneous recognition of its cognitive inconsistency and incompatibility with other approaches and paradigms, made it almost inevitable to abandon it. The variety of Western philosophical approaches and trends that became available in these years has become and still remains the dominant methodological basis for cultural and human studies. Therefore, the philosophical and culture-focused understanding of human loneliness in the context of the teachings of K. Marx with its heuristic value reinforced by the research orientation towards the use of interdisciplinary connections, should deepen the prevailing ideas concerning this phenomenon and contribute to the identification of socio-cultural patterns of its occurrence and existence.

The formula by K. Marx

A critical analysis of the notions of the human loneliness indeterminacy allows us to assert that loneliness is, first of all, a socially and culturally determined phenomenon with its foundations found in the formation of society as a socio-cultural organism, reproducing, developing and functioning at the level of actively interconnected individuals. Karl Marx wrote, "the social history of people is always only the history of their individual development, whether they are aware of it or not" (Marx, 1962: 402-403). Any individual creative and transforming activity is a social activity, which is impossible without the involvement of an individual in relationships with other individuals. Therefore, in this way "man produces man – himself and the other man; ... just as society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him" (Marx, 1956: 589). It is the analysis of sociality (community with Others) and its forms that, in our opinion, contains the key to understanding the existential being of a person and the phenomena associated with it (including loneliness).

In our theoretical analysis, we first turn to the concept of Karl Marx, the key and constitutive basis of which is a well-known formula: *the unity of man's relationship with nature is determined by the unity of relations between individuals.* The features of this formula have already been considered more than once (for example, by V.A. Gert, E.S. Il'enkov, M.S. Kagan, B.F. Porshnev and others). Given these circumstances, it makes sense to emphasise the following: all the variables of this formula are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, but the determining (that is, the independent variable) in this scheme is still the relationship of man with man. There is no doubt that changes to the independent variable result in changes to the dependent variable. Thus, the relationship between human and nature is determined precisely by the relationship between individuals, and not vice versa. Moreover, we believe that one of the consequences of changes in relationships between individuals is loneliness. It turns out that the key to successful avoidance of loneliness is maintaining balance (harmony) between the 'variables' of this formula.

Following the formula under discussion, it can be argued that the fundamental human need is to be surrounded by their own kind and have communication with other people. All other spiritual and social needs, for example in self-fulfilment, identity, knowledge, ideals, values, etc. are built on its basis. With a high degree of certainty, it can be argued that a similar point of view was characteristic of Plato, Aristotle, L. Feuerbach, K. Marx, M. Buber, M.M. Bakhtin and other famous thinkers for whom community with the Others, in the words of the same Karl Marx, seemed to be *'the greatest wealth'*, rightly opposed to the imaginary (material) wealth, which, in reality, is not capable of giving integrity and wholeness to human existence.

Community as the basis for existence of the Meeting

Representatives of cultural anthropology (in particular, F. Tönnies, K. Levi-Strauss) consider community as a basic and fundamen-

tal form of sociality, which contributes to the growth of social forms of sociality out of its needs (society, social systems, social institutions) (Levi-Strauss, 1985; Tönnies, 2002). One cannot but agree that community (being with the Significant Other), being a form of sociality, in the spiritual-existential understanding is primary in relation to society as being with the Other. Therefore, it is more desirable for the Self to be with the Significant Other (one's own Other) than with the Other. However, community without society is meaningless and cannot exist, like the Significant Other without the Other. Moreover, the Other potentially conceals one's own Other. A necessary condition for the implementation of all this is the Meeting.

It is noteworthy that these two forms of sociality are interconnected and interdetermined. Mismatch and deharmonisation of relations between them is a condition for the emergence of loneliness and various forms of deviation and addiction. Failures, deformations, damage and restructuring that occur in society will certainly (and usually negatively) affect the integrity and self-identity of the community. Therefore, the harmonious coherence of community and society is a condition that almost completely excludes the likelihood of loneliness and various deviant types of behaviour. However, according to the synergic paradigm, objects existing in the world, in the overwhelming majority of cases, should be recognised as non-equilibrium systems. Thus, according to A.P. Nazaretian, society is a non-equilibrium system, the specificity of which is that structural deformations, disorganisation and destabilisation are inevitable in it; its stability is provided by mediating mechanisms (culture) (Nazaretian, 2012: 62).

Man is, first of all, "*directly a natural being, ... suffering, dependent and limited*; that is to say, the objects of his impulses exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects of his need – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers" (Marx, 1956: 631). Having an object outside himself (and it cannot be otherwise, at least according to K. Marx), a person becomes an object for another being, as he seeks to fulfill his essence outside, which conditions the formation of connections between him and other people (Marx , 1956: 632). K. Marx states, "non-objective being is an impossible, absurd being" (Marx, 1956: 632), which basically cannot have a place in existence. Thus, in the process of joint activity, individuals enter into communication, forming a certain type of connection with each other, which becomes "a structure of society" i.e. a system of social relations that determines the activity of an individual, including his communication with other individuals, his inherent states and behavioural strategy (Kagan, 1988).

Mainly, the purpose of society, its structural organisation and institutions is to *achieve and maintain community between individuals and ensure its high level – the Meeting*, where a person's being acquires spiritual and personal integrity, wholeness and self-identity.

Culture as a prerequisite for maintaining community and openness between people

Next, our focus falls on the culture. However, specialists have different understanding of it. Let us list some versions of the concept of this phenomenon that appear in the works of authoritative Russian philosophers. L. N. Kogan, in particular, interprets culture as a process which serves as a framework for the essential forces of man to be formed and fulfilled (Kogan, 1981: 41). M.S. Kagan sees in culture something that produces specific historical forms of communication and ensures their implementation (Kagan, 1988). D.V. Pivovarov believes that culture is the ideal-forming aspect of human life (Pivovarov, 1996: 50). V.S. Stepin understands culture as a 'genetic code' developed by society ensuring the reproduction and development of forms of human life (Kuda idet rossiiskaia…, 2009). Yu.M. Lotman considers culture as a special activity aimed at the reproduction and development of human social being (Lotman, 2002).

Despite all the discrepancies in the above and other theoretically consistent definitions, there is something that unites all of them, serving as their common denominator: culture is *the content of the community's vital activity*

(F. Tönnies, K. Levi-Strauss) *aimed at hominisation and formation of the necessary qualities for living together, becoming the next mechanism of evolution of human existence after nature* (Markov, 2009: 24). Presumably, only when this circumstance is taken into account can one understand why culture:

– *produces ideals (traditions, notions, values)* not only ensuring the continuity of public behavioural patterns, but also 'contouring' *the horizons of man's seeking to go beyond the limits of the present existence;*

– guarantees the continuity and duration of human transformative activity, and, accordingly, the continuity between generations, thereby linking the time horizons of the past, present and future into a single whole;

– sets a value-semantic determination, which expresses the relevance of the growth of autonomous and integral individuality to some extent relieving a person from external circumstances and from their own impulses and needs (Gert, 2016: 300); accordingly, culture acts as *a kind of measure of spiritual and moral self-improvement of a person and his self-construction as a person*;

– is a *value-semantic space* that binds and connects *man, society and nature into a single whole*; entering a value-semantic space with a Significant Other through the Meeting allows a person to find integrity, completeness and self-identity of his being; at the same time, culture is the *world "between"* (M. Buber), *connecting and fastening man with other people, man with nature, etc*.;

– ensures emergence and development of the dialogue between man and the world; when man enters culture, he becomes its living particle and develops a dialogue with the surrounding world by its means; culture, in its turn, *encodes* the surrounding world by means of meanings and values, which man in the process decodes, internalises setting new value-semantic horizons (i.e. re-encodes them);

– prepares the entry of a person into the world of people, *the Meeting with Significant Others*; culture, accordingly, is *the only possible way man's existence in a humanised form*, in which the spiritual heights of being are available to him, making him free in a predetermined and acquired integral spiritual and moral image;

– conditions *man's disclosure of himself to other people, being together with them*, which allows him to feel and realise the spiritual and personal integrity and wholeness of all being.

Sociolisation as a prerequisite for preserving and maintaining the wholeness of community

At the same time, the spiritual-personal (cultural) human development takes place in various social environments, within the framework of communities, in which specific communication develops and a spiritual space is formed, where he meets a Significant Other (his Other). Initially, the individual is included in the microenvironment formed by family and relatives, then in the macroenvironment – society, thereby acquiring participation in the entire social world. The essence of each individual person, which is the result of the entire world history, cannot be separated neither from the essence of previous generations, nor from the essence of his contemporaries, with whom he actually interacts (Marx, 1955: 44-45). In other words, from the very birth, circles of connectedness are formed around an individual, which, in the course of his growing up, spiritual and personal formation, tend to expand and include an increasing number of Significant Others (family members, friends, loved one, people close in spirit, etc. etc.), i.e. all those the individual feels true community with. It must be assumed that this is precisely the Meeting regulated on the basis of L. Feuerbach's anthropological principle, according to which man cannot exist without man, since people are the highest value for each other.

The expansion of the circles of connectedness is, in fact, the expansion of the inner world of a person himself and the inclusion of an increasing number of Others, becoming dominants of his inner world, together with which alone it is possible to gain integrity and feel the fullness of being, i.e. to become truly happy. Community with the Significant Other, in our opinion, expresses the measure of the integrity and wholeness of the person's being. The

more diverse and wider the area of the person's Significant Others, the more complete, holistic and harmonious his being. *An authentic, truly wholesome* (Belyaev, 2011: 633-643) *is the person who maximally expanded the horizons of the Meeting.*

An important condition for a person's Meeting with a Significant Other is his exploration of social (socialisation) and cultural (enculturation) space. It is widely believed that the process of socialisation is aimed mainly at the acquisition of socially significant qualities by an individual that he needs to become a person. In general, this should not be denied. However, the process of socialisation, like the process of enculturation, carries a deeper and more important task: to create from a living organism an integral and authentic person capable of treating humanly everything around him, and, most importantly, his own kind (Il'enkov, 1984: 330-331), rising to the level of value attitude towards everyone and everything. K. Marx saw this as the main prerequisite for preserving community between individuals, as well as a 'treatment' against loneliness and various forms of deviation and addiction arising from the interaction of individuals (Marx, 1961: 62). A lonely person, according to K. Marx, cannot *discern himself in the Other, and therefore, cannot find one for himself.*

At the initial stages of an individual's development, the dominant role in including him into the community is played by family, which represents both a community and a social institution responsible for the first stage of the individual's socialisation. It directly depends on the type of family and the nature of family relationships whether the person entering life will encounter the experience of loneliness or will pass it by, since "without exception, all human modes of activity aimed at interaction with another person and any other object, a child learns from the outside" (Il'enkov, 1984: 331). In other words, the child at the initial stages of development is completely dependent on Others. Therefore, at early age, he is likely to experience loneliness. An argument confirming the correspondence of this statement to the real state of affairs can be the fact revealed by Z. Freud: the first phobias that children get are the phobias of darkness and loneliness (Miiuskevich, 1989: 62). The reason for this is, presumably, in the child's love and emotional closeness to his parents (especially his mother), who are Significant Others for him, and therefore to all adults who, de facto, personify accessible fragments of existence for him.

Let us note that the successful development of a child, the formation of his consciousness, self-awareness and inner world as a whole depends on his significance for Others and, over time, their significance for him. Loss of community at early age, involuntary stay outside its limits due to prevailing objective circumstances in the process of spiritual and personal development leads children to experience loneliness in an acute, painful form. For example, children with broken lives, in particular, abandoned by their parents at early age. The experience of loneliness at early age either suspends the formation of a harmonious spiritual and personal integrity of a person, or it can significantly deform it, that is, prevent a person in the future from fully revealing in himself and developing his spiritual and personal potential.

Along with the family, primary social groups (classmates, friends, etc.) have a decisive influence on the formation of an integral spiritual and personal image of a child, especially one in adolescence. They can create both favourable conditions for the socialisation of individuals, as well as unfavourable ones. The emergence of the latter is due to a whole complex of interrelated factors, which include: the erosion of the value foundations of family relations, the incompleteness of the family or its disintegration, material distress, a painful spiritual and psychological climate in the family, inattention of parents to the problems of the child due to the preference of their own interests (career, health, entertainment), the child's inability to find a common language with peers, lack of community of interests with them, and much more. Each of them is a microfactor that charts certain paths to loneliness. However, under certain conditions, any of these microfactors can develop and acquire a macrofactural structure, which will become the basis for the person's experience of loneliness in adolescence.

G.M. Tikhonov notes the high variability of loneliness among young people (Tikhonov, 2005). This can be explained not only by socio-cultural factors, the objective nature of which is undeniable, but also by subjective-personal factors (low self-esteem, social immaturity, moral instability, self-doubt, apathy, timidity, sense of meaninglessness, etc.) (Tikhonov, 2005). Therefore, young people are ranked among weak social groups, very often prone to loneliness and vulnerable to social shocks and crises that significantly affect the spiritual and mental state of a person.

Adolescents and young adults often exhibit addictive and deviant behaviour, which can be caused by various socio-cultural and personal factors. In this case, that is, when other people lose their significance and value for a person, degradation of the personal structures of his integrity occurs along with the emergence of various forms of addictive and deviant behaviour, which is a direct path to loneliness. Quite indicative are the words said by people with addictive behaviour cited by Ts.P. Korolenko and T.A. Donskikh in the book "Seven Ways to Disaster. Destructive Behaviour in the Modern World". Here is one of examples, "I feel embarrassed and even ashamed in front of my loved ones, who do not see, do not understand that I am not the person I used to be. Some part of me remains the same, but on the whole I have changed, I have become alienated and indifferent to the feelings and sufferings of my loved ones" (Korolenko, Donskikh, 1991: 24). Addictive behaviour accompanies the ambivalence of a person's consciousness into a proper and real self and a false and unworthy Other inside me, diverting me from the Others, leading to loneliness. Deviant behaviour is a type of orientation at the expense of the Other, which ultimately leads to *being without Others*, i.e. loneliness, which can find its extreme form expressed in the state of *existence in oblivion (full type of loneliness*).

It is noteworthy that young people with deviant and addictive behaviour, who have not changed and do not want to change the way of life that has become habitual, may never properly engage in normal social life, i.e. they may not go through the stages of integration and work activity, which play a decisive role at the stage of maturity. A situation of this kind is usually typical for some young people exposed to the influence of subcultures that initiate the emergence and maintain the existence of temporary 'communities', which are based not on the relationship between one's Self and the Significant Other, but the relationship between one's Self and the Other as Myself (inauthentic Significant Other). At the same time, all other individuals who do not have signs of belonging to this subculture are not recognised. Otherness and individuality in the subculture are denied by their kind. Falling out of the boundaries of a subculture leads to a crisis, a temporary loss of meaningfulness, a feeling of alienation from the surrounding world and loneliness. A similar outcome can be associated with the de-actualisation of the subculture in socio-cultural reality, and with its replacement by some other subculture. The same and quite obvious outcome will appear in the case of young people's involvement in subcultures that turn them against other members of society.

Maturity as a critical stage of development of an individual

Maturity as a period in a person's life is important not only due to its relatively long duration (30-40 years if we follow the concept of E. Erickson), but also (again according to E. Erickson) due to the fact that it contains the peak of man's social and creative activities ensuring his integration into the social environment and closeness with other members of society, i.e. his willingness to "merge their identity with the identity of others (Erikson, 2000: 252). A person at this age 'learns' to take care of the Other and to be responsible. Undoubtedly, the age period can be considered the key one in all plans, since the features of the final stage of human development – old age characterised by summing up the results of all life lived – depend on it. E. Erickson emphasises that "fashionable persistence in exaggerating the dependence of children on adults often hinders from us the dependence of the older generation on the younger one. A mature person needs to be needed, and maturity needs stimulation and encouragement from those whom it has giv-

en birth to and whom it should take care of" (Erikson, 2000: 255). In our opinion, the German-American psychologist is right about this; an individual who has not done anything for the people around him, who is accustomed to taking care only of himself, at the end of his life turns out to be spiritually insolvent, personally inconsistent and lonely, experiencing a feeling of hopelessness and uselessness of the past years. He comes to understand the irreplaceability of the lost, the impossibility of correcting the mistakes made in the past and regret about the meaninglessness of the ending life. But what does a person who finds himself in such a situation really regret? Surely, among his regrets is that he did not meet a Significant Other for himself on his way.

However, old age does not mean that loneliness is inevitable. On the contrary, many older people are closely connected with their family members and actively participate in social life, as they feel their responsibility for the lives of future generations. They acutely feel closeness, community with Others. Of course, the level of health plays a very important role at this age as it influences the ability of carrying out social and educational activities.

Further, it makes sense to pay attention to the fact that the mature stage of human development is critical, transitional and especially sensitive to changes in society. For this reason, mature people tend to be lonely. It is no coincidence that E. Erickson speaks about the most severe age crisis of a person, which occurs at the age of about 40 years. It is worth noting, however, that all transitional ages are quite rightly considered vulnerable human states, within which the spiritual and personal components of his integrity are unstable and subject to transformation. Therefore, loneliness often accompanies crises generated by the transition of a person from one age to another. Age crises are caused both by socio-cultural changes in society and by spiritual and psychological factors in the formation of a personality. These crises also largely depend on the social and spiritual age of an individual, i.e. on the level of his social and spiritual achievements, approving him in value-semantic orientations, linking him to certain activities and deepening his integration with other individuals. Therefore, this allows to come up with a pattern: *the deeper the integration (that is, an increase in the level of community) of a person with each passed age stage the less he is prone to loneliness, and, therefore, his being is more integral, harmonious and full.*

It should also be emphasised that the stage of maturity is basically the process of labour integration, when a person takes root in socio-cultural reality through his work. Taking this circumstance into account allows us to understand the reason why people at a given age are especially vulnerable to loneliness and experience it in an acute form. The middle age, which is maturity, is characterised by the *borderline position* of an individual, when much, which until recently was the 'firm' foundation of his life, sometimes collapses overnight, crossing out further life prospects, making the plans impossible to fulfill. Thus, the connection between the past, present and future is interrupted, which contributes to the consolidation of a person in 'timelessness' and uncertainty. Important, really influential factors at this stage can become, especially within the framework of market relations, the deterioration of the general socio-economic situation in the country and an increase in the unemployment rate, as well as political and social revolutions. The latter lead to significant system shifts in the structural organisation of society, a comprehensive restructuring of relations between individuals on new socio-economic and socio-cultural foundations. Moreover, such transformations have a particularly strong effect on the unprotected segments of the population and weak groups (the elderly, the disabled, etc.); often they become sufficient grounds for the emergence of loneliness among representatives of these strata and groups.

When these systemic and structural shifts unfold, society is plunged into an anomical state, i.e. into a state of value and normative crisis (Pokrovskii, Ivanchenko, 2008: 10). At the same time, the social system is characterised by a low degree of social 'cohesion' and the relativity of socio-cultural values and norms that have lost the status of universal-

ity and obligation for individuals with a simultaneous loss of their regulatory power, as a result of which they cease to be a 'fetish' (Sorokin, 1992: 168-170). The current state of Russian society, the attribute of which is "disorientation of the social functions of culture, a shift in priorities and value orientations" (Koptseva et al., 2012), is difficult not to recognise as anomical.

Such systemic and structural shifts are a powerful generator of alienation processes in society and determine the deformation of the former foundations of socio-cultural reality, which cease to be something internally justified for individuals. As a result, we observe the spread of loneliness or an increase in the level of self-destruction in society due to the filling of "social space with deviant values" (Pokrovskii, Ivanchenko, 2008: 10).

Based on the foregoing, it makes sense to outline three groups of socio-cultural factors that contribute to the emergence of loneliness:

– microfactors (family, peers, friends, etc.);

– mesofactors (socio-cultural conditions, social groups, subcultures, etc.);

– macrofactors connected with large-scale social processes and events;

Loneliness as a result of the lost balance between the variables of K. Marx's formula

The necessity for a person to constantly create conditions for his own life support (social, cultural, technical, etc.) in the process of object-oriented activity presupposes going beyond himself (fulfillment of his essence outside himself). The product produced by a person in the course of object-oriented activity and serving as a proof of the assertion of his essence allows not only to overcome his uniqueness, but also to consider him as a historical being (K. Marx) It is this moment that becomes the starting point of the Meeting of the Self and the Significant Other, giving rise to a common value-semantic world that they accept, through which not only the Self and the Other turn out to be significant for each other, but the content of this world around which they unite also acquires significance for each one of them.

Essential components of conscious transformational activity, which include culturally significant values and meanings, become an internal property of the person himself, inseparable from his being. Therefore, even the outcomes of spiritual activity must receive approval by the Other. By legitimising the processes and results of material, practical and spiritual exploration of nature through involvement, the Other himself acquires significance for the Self.

Herewith, on the one hand, nature is the subject of human activity to satisfy his needs, affirming his life, on the other hand, it turns into objectivity, man's other being, becoming the internal content of socio-cultural processes, thereby ensuring the stability of connections and relationships between participants in object-oriented activities. Being the basis of connections between individuals nature acquires a certain value and significance in them and through them. Let us clarify this idea. Nature turns out to be a value for a person not as it is, but being mediated by the socio-cultural context, as a carrier of the function of connecting it with other people (Marx, 1956: 589-590). Consequently, the relationship between man and man in the process of transformative activity, which determines his attitude to nature, and hence his involvement in interhuman relations, can be recognised as the main semantic component of his inherent internal value-semantic world. For example, if utilitarian-pragmatic relations prevail in society, which is a clear indicator of a low level of development of spiritual culture, then, accordingly, people will consider nature only as something external, as an object of exploitation, and not as the direct basis of their own life and activities. The fact of the mass enslavement of people by the processes of externalisation (when a person stops saying You and establishing a dialogue with nature) was noted by M. Buber, who eventually came to the disappointing conclusion about the universal cosmic homelessness of man ('unparalleled loneliness') (Buber, 1995: 38).

Therefore, socio-economic structure of society, alienating from individuals, "rises above them" and becomes alienated acquiring "an independent existence of social reality" (Ka-

gan, 1988: 138). It makes sense to talk about the phenomenon of 'institutional alienation', in the presence of which impersonal social structures become full subjects of social activity. In this case, the personal component takes over the spiritual one in human integrity, completely subjugating the human nature, embodying the prevailing conditions of current social existence, limited by the present, localized outside the past and future. In other words, there is a deformation of the highest level of integrity of the person himself, decreasing the 'degree' of the spiritual and moral component, which makes it impossible for him to go beyond the established system of inter-human relations. To some extent, he himself becomes a tool for the existing social structures. *As a result, the human world becomes alienated and hostile to man, while relations between people lose their truly human nature, and the man himself turns into an alienated and lonely being.*

Conclusion

Despite the fact that loneliness, as we can see, is a destructive phenomenon of a person's being, which makes it difficult to expand the boundaries of his spiritual and personal integrity (incomplete loneliness) or exhaustively leads him to degradation (complete loneliness), being de facto not immanent to his being, arises at certain stages of an individual's development, which is largely due to the specifics of the present state of socio-cultural reality. The more intense the impact exerted by external (socio-cultural) factors, the faster the boundaries of the integrity of the Meeting shrink, and the faster the processes of degradation of human integrity unfold. Under the influence of socio-cultural processes, the boundaries of spiritual and personal integrity and the inner world of a person are 'compressed' to such an extent that they cease to fulfill the functions of life support.

References

Belyaev, I.A. (2011). Human Being: Integrity and Wholeness. In *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences*, 5, 633-643.

Buber, M. (1995). *Dva obraza very.* Moscow, Respublika, 464 p.

Erikson, E. (2000). *Detstvo i obshchestvo* [*Childhood and society*]. Saint-Peterburg, OOO Rech', 416 p.

Gert, V.A. (2016). *TSelostnost' i sub"ektivnost' individual'nogo bytiia cheloveka* [*Intergrity and subjectivity of individual being of a person*]. Thesis of the Doctor of Philosophy, CHeliabinsk, 381 p.

Il'enkov, E.V. (1984). *CHto zhe takoe lichnost'? S chego nachinaetsia lichnost'* [*What is Personality? What does personality start with?*]. Moscow, Politizdat, 319-358.

Kagan, M.S. (1988). *Mir obshcheniia: problema mezhsub'ektnykh otnoshenii* [*The world of communication: the problem of intersubjective relationships*]. Moscow, Politizdat, 319 p.

Kogan, L.N. (1981). *Vsestoronnee razvitie lichnosti i kul'tura* [*Comprehensive development of the personality and culture*]. Moscow, Znaniye, 63 p.

Koptseva, N.P., Bakhova, N.A., Zamaraeva, J.S., Kirko, V.I. (2012). Problema sotsiokul'turnykh issledovaniy v sovremennoy gumanitarnoy nauke [The problem of socio-cultural research in modern humanities]. In *Sovremennyye problemy nauki i obrazovaniia* [*Modern problems of science and education*], 3, 323-323.

Korolenko, T.S., Donskikh, T.A. (1991). *Sem' putei k katastrofe. Destruktivnoe povedenie v sovremennom mire* [*Seven ways to a catastrophe. Destructive behaviour in the modern world*]. Novosibirsk, Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 224 p.

Kuda idet rossiiskaia kul'tura? [Which way is the Russian science going?] (2016). In *Voprosy filosofii* [*Issues of Philosophy*], 9, 3-60.

Levi-Strauss, K. (1985). *Strukturnaia antropologiia* [*Structural Anthropology*]. Moscow, Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 536 p.

Lotman, Yu.M. (2002). *Stat'i po semiotike kul'tury i iskusstva* [*Articles on semiotics of culture and art*]. Moscow, Akademicheskii proekt, 544 p.

Markov, B.V. (2009). Filosofskaia kontseptualizatsiia cheloveka [Philosophic concetualisation of man]. In *Analitika kul'turologii* [*Analytics of culture studies*], 15, 17-26.

Marx, K. (1956). *Iz rannikh proizvedenii* [*Early works*]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 632 p.

Marx, K. (1955). *Sochineniia*: v 50 t [*Collected works*: in 50 volumes]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 3, 630 p.

Marx, K. (1961). *Sochineniia*: v 50 t [*Collected works*: in 50 volumes]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 23, 908 p.

Marx, K. (1962). *Sochineniia:* v 50 t [*Collected works:* in 50 volumes]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 27, 536 p.

Miiuskevich, B. (1989). Odinochestvo: mezhdisplinarnyi podkhod [Loneliness: interdisciplinary approach]. In *Labirinty odinochestva* [*Labirinths of loneliness*]. Moscow, Progress, 52-87.

Nazaretian, A.P. (2012). *Antropologiia nasiliia i kul'tura samoorganizatsii: Ocherki po evoliutsionno-istoricheskoi evoliutsii* [*Anthropology of violence and culture of self-organisation. Notes on historical evolution*]. Moscow, LIBRIKOM publishing house, 256 p.

Pivovarov, D.V. (1996). Religioznoe samoopredelenie cheloveka v kontekste kul'tury [Religious self-determination of a person within the framework of culture]. In *Filosofiia samoopredeleniia* [*Philosophy of self-determination*]. Orenburg, 41-70.

Pokrovskii, N.E., Ivanchenko, G.V. (2008) *Universum odinochestva: sotsiologicheskie i psikhologicheskie ocherki* [*Universum of loneliness: sociological and psychological notes*]. Moscow, Logos, 424 p.

Sorokin, P.A. (1992). *Chelovek. Tsivilizatsiia. Obshchestvo* [*Man. Civilisation. Society*]. Moscow, Politizdat, 543 p.

Tönnies, F. (2002). *Obshchnost' i obshchestvo. Osnovnye poniatiia chistoi sotsiologii* [*Community and Society. Main concepts of pure sociology*]. Saint-Peterburg, Vladimir Dal', 452 p.

Tikhonov, G.M. (2005). *Odinochestvo: stereotipy real'nost'* [*Loneliness: stereotypes and reality*]. Izhevsk, IzhGTU publishing house, 374 p.

Tikhonov, G.M. (2013). Fenomen odinochestva: ekzistentsial'nyi aspect [Phenomenon of loneliness: existential aspect]. In *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul'turologiia iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki* [*Historical, philosophic, political and judicial sciences, culture studies and art history. Issues of theory and practice*], 1, I, 183-186.

Социокультурная детерминированность одиночества человека

И.А. Беляев, М.Н. Лященко
Оренбургский государственный университет
Российская Федерация, Оренбург

Аннотация. В статье представлено обоснование социокультурной детерминированности одиночества человека. Философско-культурологический дискурс развертывался посредством синтеза разнородных и разнохарактерных теоретических положений. Первостепенно важной для исследования явилась формула К. Маркса, согласно которой единство отношения человека с природой определяется единством отношений между индивидами. Учитывалось существование общества и общности как двух диалектически взаимосвязанных форм социальности, отсутствие согласованности между которыми способствует возникновению одиночества человека. Эвристически ценным для проведения изысканий стало положение синергетической парадигмы о неравновесном характере общественных структур. Получению искомого результата способствовала опора на информацию о возрастных особенностях развития человека, почерпнутую из концепции Э. Эриксона. Философско-культурологическая интерпретация указанных и сопряженных с ними положений позволила установить, что одиночество допустимо признать следствием понижения уровня общности во взаимодействии между индивидами и невозможности обеспечить поддержание ее высокого уровня, находящего свое выражение во Встрече Я и Значимого Другого (своего Другого). Выявлено: общность со Значимым Другим есть мера актуализации целостности и полноты бытия человека; чем разнообразнее и шире ареал Значимых Других, тем гармоничнее бытие человека; по-настоящему полноценен тот человек, который максимально расширил горизонты Встречи; повышение глубины интеграции человека с процессами и явлениями, естественными для каждой пройденной возрастной стадии, снижает для него вероятность оказаться в одиночестве, а следовательно, крепче укореняет его в бытии.

Ключевые слова: одиночество, культура, общество, общность, Встреча, целостность человека.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1275–1288

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0641
УДК 165.3

Overcoming Word-Centrism: Towards a New Foundation for the Philosophy of Language

Sergey Yu. Boroday*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 23.03.2020, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 11.08.2020

Abstract. This article attempts to rethink the understanding of language as a "set of words" that correspond to the "objects" of external reality, which is characteristic of Western philosophy and lay perception. The following arguments are offered against this approach: the concept of "word" (like the actual division into morphology and syntax) has no metalinguistic status; the classification of parts of speech is language-specific, so that the prototypical referential function of a "noun" cannot lay claim to the status of a universal linguistic function; and the idea of language as a "set of words" only reflects the specific metapragmatic awareness of speakers of European languages. Through examining the facts of linguistic diversity and linguistic functions in light of grammatical typology, the author shows that the most adequate interpretation of the relationship between language and reality is an understanding that characterizes language as a large-scale device for forcing its users towards a specific depiction of events. The author also emphasizes the fundamental specificity of the grammatical structure and usage models of each concrete linguistic system. In order to promote a philosophical understanding of language, it is necessary to move from a naïve model that operates with "*word – reference – object*" to a more realistic model involving "*language* (as a set of morphosyntactic patterns of conceptualization) – *correspondence* – *event* (as a complex situation involving meaning)."

Keywords: philosophy of language, cognitive linguistics, linguistic typology, word, reference.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Boroday, S.Yu. (2020). Overcoming word-centrism: towards a new foundation for the philosophy of language. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1275–1288. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0641.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: sergey_boroday@inbox.ru

There is a widespread opinion in philosophy that the referential function of language – the function of relating a "word" to the "object" of extra-linguistic reality – is particularly significant. This approach, whereby language is implicitly conceived of as a "collection of words" corresponding to external objects, is also popular in everyday understanding. Using Michael Silverstein's theory one could say that it reflects the "metapragmatic awareness" of speakers of Indo-European languages about how their own linguistic system functions. However, can this view lay claim to universality? The answer to this question is a resounding no. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, as Silverstein has shown, versions of metapragmatic awareness differ from language to language: the way a speaker of one language understands the mechanisms whereby his language functions are different from how a speaker of another language understands them, although here one can also identify certain universal semiotic tendencies[1]. Hence it follows that a speaker of a language with a fundamentally different structure would probably identify as significant functions that do not seem relevant for speakers of European languages (or which simply have no analogy in them).

Secondly, reference in the classic sense reflects the basic function of the noun, whereas the linguistic system also contains other parts of speech that fulfill other functions; even if one recognizes that the function of the noun is prototypical, a doubt still arises concerning the possibility of interpreting it as a universal linguistic function because, as Leonard Talmy has shown, there is an important typological difference between object-dominant and action-dominant languages, that is, between languages that use prototypical nouns to denote objects and substances and languages that use prototypical verbs for these ends (cf. "*Hailstones came in through the window*" vs. "*It hailed through the window*")[2]. One must add, too, that it is doubtful whether the "noun" is a universal metalinguistic category.

Thirdly, although motor interaction with "things" plays a huge role in the process of ontogenesis, the concept of "object" as it forms in the adult consciousness is not independent of language but acts as a complex perceptual-conceptual-linguistic construct that differs from language to language and from culture to culture. Consequently, one cannot automatically use it to describe a universal linguistic function.

Fourthly, the actual concept of "word" cannot lay claim to metalinguistic status but is a language-specific concept (see below for more on this).

This represents only part of the arguments that could be adduced against an understanding of the essence of language as being a correspondence between "words" and "objects". If this understanding is limited and circumscribed by linguistic ideology of a certain type, how should one approach the problem of language in such a way as to attain a maximally broad perspective? In this article, an attempt will be made to briefly examine this problem in light of some typological variations that we are familiar with. We will attempt to show that understanding language as a "set of words" and cross-language differences as differences in the classification of words and their meanings is wrong. In fact, 1) the concept of "word" (like the division into morphology and syntax) has no metalinguistic status but is applicable only to a specific language; 2) every language comprises an original classification of meaningful elements ("parts of speech") that must be examined on the basis of criteria applied to the language in question, with due consideration of language-internal relations; 3) the difference between the lexical and the grammatical is also language-internal; 4) grammaticality in the broad sense includes lexical, discursive and referential obligatoriness, and the combination of all the types of obligatoriness forms the unique rhetorical style of language; 5) in the final analysis, language, due to limitations imposed by it on the means of expression, must be understood as a large-scale device for forcing its users towards a specific depiction of events.

[1] Silverstein, Michael (1981). The Limits of Awareness. In *Working Papers in Sociolinguistics*. No. 84. Austin: Southwestern Educational Laboratory.

[2] Talmy, Leonard (2000). *Toward a Cognitive Semantics*. Vol. I: Concept Structuring System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, P. 43–46.

In considering these theses, one can make the following conclusion, which is important for the philosophy of language: one must move from a naïve conception of language as a correspondence between "words" and "objects" to the idea of language as a set of morphosyntactic structures and usage models that have a limited and mandatory character and that do not correspond to discrete "objects" but rather to complex *events*, which are subject to a different implicit conceptualization depending on features of the concrete linguistic system. This scheme allows one to better understand the nature of language and the way it really functions. Moreover, it follows from this that in the philosophy of language (at least at first) the emphasis should be placed on a typology of linguistic functioning based on actually existing natural languages and not an abstract "language as such", which is all too often just an eviscerated and lifeless version of the researcher's native language, which is nearly always Indo-European (and in our time, English)[3].

The word

In psychology, philosophy and many other fields of the humanities, the concept of "language" has a solid association with the concept of "word". A similar association can also be observed in everyday understanding. The general idea could be expressed as follows: language is words and words are denotations of objects; as a set of words language lies somewhere between thought and objects. It is noteworthy that a similar model was developed as far back as Aristotle. The theory of reference, from medieval thinkers up to Chalmers, also works with the "word". The titles of major treatises in philosophy often include the concept of "word": one need only recall Quine's "Word and Object" or Foucault's "Words and Things" ("Les mots et les choses"). All this definitely has a certain intuitive clarity. However, the problem of the "word" – when translated into the professional linguistic and typological dimension – is not as simple as might seem at first glance. Let us begin with the fact that the actual meaning of "word" is absent in cultures of the archaic type[4]. In European languages the designation for "word" developed from the designation for "name" or "utterance" (Rus. *slovo*, Eng. *word*, Fr. *mot*; in Proto-Indo-European there was the lexeme **h$_3$nomn̥-* "name", but there was no lexeme meaning "word").

In many Structuralist schools, "word" was not a part of formal analysis. Throughout the 20th century, numerous formal definitions were proposed but none of them was completely satisfactory. The reason lurks in the fact that by all accounts there simply is no universal definition. However, if that is the case, then the concepts of "morphology" and "syntax" are problematic, as both of them are defined using the "word". If one looks at the concept of "word" from the viewpoint of typology, it appears that there are no reliable criteria for identifying it as a metalinguistic concept. None of the criteria put forward in the literature (potential pauses, free occurrence, external mobility and internal fixedness, uninterruptibility, non-selectivity, non-coordinatability, anaphoric islandhood, non-extractability, morphophonological idiosyncrasies, deviations from biuniqueness) can be considered universal[5]. Given that we are talking of the formal, or *grammatical*, status of "word", phonological criteria should not play a decisive role in this instance.

If "word" is not a universal concept, it might be a language-specific component. This possibility was examined by certain structuralists. The term "word", in this case, potentially has as many meanings as there are languages; this would also be true of the terms "morphology" and "syntax". Roughly speaking, "word" is an element occupying

[3] In this article we present in general form ideas that were argued for in detail in our monograph devoted to the problem of linguistic relativity and the question of the place of language in the cognitive architecture: Boroday, Sergey (2020). *Iazyk i poznanie: Vvedenie v Postrelativism* [*Language and Cognition: An Introduction to Post-Relativism*]. Moscow: OOO "Sadra", LRC Publishers. An English summary of the main ideas appears in the book in Appendix No. 2 and can be accessed at https://www.academia.edu/42617503/Language_and_Cognition_A_Post-relativist_Research_Program

[4] Dixon, Robert, Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2002). Word: A typological framework. In *Word: A cross-linguistic typology*. Ed. by R.M.W. Dixon, A. Aikhenvald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 3.

[5] Haspelmath, Martin (2011). The indeterminacy of word segmentation and the nature of morphology and syntax. In *Folia Linguistica*, 45 (2), P. 31–80.

an intermediate position between the minimal sign and the phrase. Although this approach has meaning when analyzing a specific language, on the typological level it is better to emphasize minimal morphosyntactic combinations with different degrees of tightness, while examining the specifics of each of these combinations using the example of each particular language. One can agree with Martin Haspelmath's conclusion that concepts like "word", "morphology", and "syntax" are not too relevant for linguistic typology[6].

On the other hand, the attribution to the word in traditional conceptions of purely orthographic reality is too bold a step. Despite the fact that from the perspective of grammatical typology the language-specific interpretation of "word" does not make much sense, it is relevant for *psycholinguistics* and *semantics*.

This is supported, on the one hand, by the data concerning aphasia, and on the other hand by native speaker's intuitions. Even uneducated people feel that there are complex and stable elements that are located in the morphosyntactic continuum between the morpheme and the phrase. In different languages the set of such elements is different, and even within a single language several variations are possible here. However, in all cases there are elements that have a certain *propositional* and *psychological* relevance for the speaker. This is what language-specific "words" are.

From the *propositional* point of view the "word" is an element fitted for prototypical reference. This fitness is probably linked to the realities of language acquisition. First acquired are complexes of signs which are best suited for reference. They comprise a basic foundation, which is stored in the memory and which is used at the holophrastic (word-sentence) stage. Next, using regularities in these complexes and under the influence of external speech we see the abstraction of what is usually called "grammar". In a later period, children can already independently fill out missing forms, which is connected with the active insertion of grammar into cognition. Thus, the initial content acquired by the child reflects the referential practice of a given community. Unfortunately, it is impossible to trace the evolution of referential practice directly. The question of why certain complexes are used as minimal in certain communities while others proceed differently is connected with the problem of language development, particularly the theory of grammaticalization.

From the *psychological* point of view, the "word" is an element that forms the basis of linguistic memory. In taking this definition on board, one should bear in mind that linguistic memory is language-specific. For example, speakers of synthetic languages remember not just words but also phrases, constructions, idioms, separate affixes and so on. However, the nucleus of this memory is actually made up of "words", that is, elements acquired for prototypical reference. The psychological status of the word might also be influenced by non-linguistic factors. These are capable of increasing/decreasing the psychological relevance of the word or other combinations of morphemes.

Thus, although from the perspective of grammatical typology the concept of "word" is not relevant, one can still speak of the "word" in the psycholinguistic and semantic sense. Still, one must keep in mind that one is always speaking of a *language-specific* concept.

Parts of speech

The basic classification contained in language is the division of meaningful language-specific elements into *parts of speech*. The expression "parts of speech" is a calque from the Latin *pars oratiōnis*. In English-language literature now the most widespread terms are *lexical categories* and *word classes*. These terms are believed to better capture the desired meaning. Actually, by *parts of speech* one should understand an implicit group of meaningful elements which is formed intuitively by speakers and expressed in the linguistic system at the grammatical level. As a rule, the problem of parts of speech is linked with the problem of word divisions, as the classified elements are most commonly language-specific words. However, in some cases the basic element might be a morpheme; in principle

[6] Ibid. P. 62.

one can posit classifications which also include roots, affixes and combinations of morphemes, so that recognizing the reality of parts of speech does not always involve recognizing words and does not always require a clear-cut definition of the "word".

All languages are based on an implicit categorization of meaningful elements. Put differently, there is no language in which words or morphemes could be completely homogenous on the functional level, that is, in which they could potentially receive all possible morphological, syntactic and distributional characteristics. Nonetheless, languages differ in how they make internal demarcations in the lexical sphere: from dozens of categories to several categories. The principles of internal division are also different: for example, meaning conveyed with a "noun" in one language might be encoded with a "verb", "adjective", and so on, in another. At the same time the concept of "noun", "adjective" and "verb" are used here only in an approximate sense, as there is every reason to believe that these categories are language-specific. The potential uniqueness of internal categorization makes the question of parts of speech extremely topical.

Turning now to the history of the study of parts of speech, we see a solid Eurocentrism, which to this day has not been overcome. Among Western thinkers a preliminary classification had already been made by Plato and Aristotle, and this was later perfected by Hellenistic scholars, especially Chrysippus and Dionysius Thrax. In professional linguistics, beginning with the Humboldtian school and ending with structuralism, a belief in the language-specificity of parts of speech was dominant, while the development of the generative school can be seen as reviving the universalist interpretation. In early generative grammar the question of how to identify parts of speech was not even posed, as it was accepted *a priori* that the division into noun, verb and adjective exists in all languages (if one does not assume this division, nearly all the syntactic structures with a claim to universalism proposed by Noam Chomsky are irrelevant). To this day the universalistic interpretation is dominant in this branch[7]. It is worth mentioning that in functional typology since Joseph Greenberg comparative "parts of speech" are interpreted semantically, rather than formally and grammatically. Modern typologists and authors of grammars (though not all of them) use the concepts of "noun", "verb" and "adjective", but hardly anyone believes that a "verb" in English is the same thing as a "verb" in Nootka or Adyghe. Thus, the use of these terms reflects tradition and their meanings are conditional, although also connected to a propositional-referential prototype. It is important to understand that the use of terms like "verb" and "noun" often involves an implicit comparison with the researcher's native language, and this can allow a distortion of the realities of another language when describing it. That is why it seems more consistent to take the position of typologists who emphasize the language-specificity of these categories and insist on the necessity of identifying and describing them using the internal relations in a given language. This neostructuralist tendency has become particularly prominent in recent years.[8]

There are several criteria for identifying parts of speech in a particular language. Most attention had been given in linguistics to morphological, syntactic and semantic criteria. In fact, the most adequate classification within a particular language involves a combination of several criteria. Primarily, it should consider native speakers' intuition which, as a rule, senses the functional heterogeneity of words/morphemes stored in memory. It is precisely this feeling that lies behind the traditional classifications: the European model essentially reflects the realities of Indo-European languages, while other linguistic traditions – for example, the Japanese and Chinese – reflect the realities of the languages on which they are based. Heterogeneity of words is also confirmed by

[7] Cf., for example., Baker, Mark (2002). *Lexical Categories: Verbs, Nouns, and Adjectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[8] Cf.: Haspelmath, Martin (2012). How to compare major word-classes across the world's languages // UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics, Theories of Everything, 17, 109–130; Hengeveld, Kees, van Lier, Eva (2008). Parts of speech and dependent clauses in Functional Discourse Grammar. In *Studies in Language*, 32 (3), P. 753–785.

the data of aphasia. Morphological and syntactic criteria then need to be combined with the psycholinguistic criterion. However, in every concrete case the value of the latter two criteria is relative, so that one can say that the identification criteria for lexical categories are themselves language-specific. Thus, in Nahuatl the noun and the verb receive a strong morphological, but not a syntactic, differentiation; in Kabardian and the Salish language, Comox, this opposition can be observed but it is weakly marked; in the Tahitian language it is characterized by small differences in morphology and syntax, although syntactic differences can be neutralized; in the Iroqoian language Cayuga there is a difference at the root level, which is neutralized in incorporations; in Tagalog this difference is absent at the syntactic level but fairly noticeable in the morphology.

If one consistently applies several identifying criteria, parts of speech, or psychologically and grammatically meaningful groups of lexemes, can be observed in any language. As has already been noted, there are no languages in which morphemes/lexemes are completely homogenous in the functional sense. However, there are languages which get close to this "ideal" – at least in the sphere of categorematic words. Such a model has been proposed, for example, for Archaic Chinese[9].

So implicit classifications of lexemes are language-specific and the criteria by which these classifications are produced are also language-specific. What then do the terms "noun", "verb" and "adjective" mean? And in what sense can one speak of the existence of "nouns", "verbs" and "adjectives" in specific languages? Earlier we noted that the use of these terms for metalinguistic analysis is conditional as no one really believes that these categories refer to the same thing in all languages. If we look at these concepts as metalinguistic, we stumble on the rather absurd situation noted by Haspelmath: formulas like "Does this language have adjectives?" or "Do all languages have a difference between nouns and verbs?" are simply meaningless. They are comparable to questions like "What is the order of inheritance to the German throne?" and "How many states are there in France?"[10]. Division into parts of speech is completely language-specific, although one can also identify several general "informal" tendencies[11].

One needs to move from the problem of "word classes" as categories to the problem of "morpheme classes" as comparative concepts. The definition of these classes must be established on a semantic basis, while also partly using propositional criteria. It is this position that is taken by William Croft[12]. According to Croft, "verb", "noun", and "adjective" are typological prototypes that can be described using semantic and propositional criteria: the prototype of a noun is characterized by object semantics and referential function, the prototype of a verb is characterized by a semantics of action and the predicative function, the prototype of an adjective is characterized by the semantics of quality and the function of modification. It seems to us that this approach is acceptable if we exclude "adjective" from the prototypical concepts, as this concept is not universal and its semantics is rather vague.

Evidently, the universality of the prototypes of the noun and verb is linked to the cognitive prominence of stable objects and transitory actions. From a general typological perspective there is the following tendency: we see a class of lexemes whose core comprises denotations of stable objects and plays a crucial role in the act of reference, and a class of lexemes whose core comprises denotations of actions and plays a crucial role in the act of predication[13]. Sometimes these differences are

[9] Bisang, Walter (2008). Precategoriality and Argument Structure in Late Archaic Chinese. In *Constructional Reorganization*. Ed. by J. Leino. Benjamins, P. 55–88.

[10] Haspelmath, Martin. How to compare major word-classes across the world's languages.

[11] However, the actual division into "form" and "semantics" is not clear-cut and universal. In psycholinguistics the formal "expression" of meaning for a native speaker is also significant (cf. in this regard the extensive discussion on "grammatical semantics" and "codability"). But this is a separate topic which we won't dwell on here.

[12] Croft, William (2001). Radical Construction Grammar. Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[13] We are speaking here only of a *tendency*. The real picture might be very different from the general scheme – and here one should mention the typological breakdown of languages proposed by Talmy into object-dominant and action-dominant.

barely noticeable, but there is still not a single language which lacks them entirely. Some authors propose to talk of a *bipolar continuum* whose poles are made up of a prototypical "noun" and a prototypical "verb". Between the two poles other categorematic classes are located, and considerable variation is possible within this interval. There have been attempts to describe languages using this "non-discrete" understanding of parts of speech: for example, in this approach the Australian language Murrinh-patha is said to contain, in addition to nouns, adjectives and verbs, verb-nouns (*vouns*) and noun-verbs (*nerbs*)[14], while Cayuga has six intermediate categories in addition to its nouns and verbs[15]. It seems to us that on the descriptive level the continual understanding of lexical classes is the most suitable.

Thus, parts of speech, or grammatical groups of lexemes/morphemes must be identified for specific languages on the basis of several criteria. Preference for certain approaches to identifying lexical categories depends on the structure of the language, so that the choice of an approach is language-specific. The parts of speech themselves are completely language-specific, although there are always limits on variation, and they are best described using the concept of a bipolar continuum. Comparative analysis of parts of speech is impossible, as they are incommensurable at the structural level. A common field of analysis includes "denotational" semantics and the type of proposition. Thus, every language presents an original classification of meaningful elements which must be examined on the basis of criteria applying to the language in question and taking into account internal linguistic relations.

Functional structure

Above we emphasized that natural language is characterized by a unique internal categorization: such categorization assumes, on the one hand, the formation of psychologically meaningful complex elements ("words"), which are located on a morphosyntactic continuum between the morpheme and the phrase; and on the other hand, it assumes the grouping of lexemes according to grammatical class. The characteristics of the typical word, the principles of grouping, and the results of grouping all depend on the specific language. Now we will examine another important feature of natural language – *functional structure*, or *grammar*. Grammaticality can be interpreted in at least two ways: in the narrow sense it means a grammatical system, that is, a system formed by meaningful elements whose main feature is *obligatoriness*; in the broad sense, grammaticality in language is anything that is needed for expression.

Formal grammaticality, or grammaticality in the narrow sense, is the skeleton of the linguistic system. The problem of separating the grammatical from the non-grammatical is complex. It is a subject for discussion in theoretical linguistics and there are no generally agreed upon criteria here. This situation is undoubtedly connected not so much to the theoretical feebleness of linguists as to real linguistic diversity: criteria that are suitable for languages of one structure are often absolutely inadequate for languages of another structure. Nonetheless, it seems that the most pragmatically suitable definition of grammaticality is the definition of Franz Boas. In his opinion, the main characteristic of grammatical meaning is *obligatoriness*. Grammatical meaning, unlike lexical meaning, *cannot not be expressed*, and furthermore, what characterizes obligatoriness is not so much the particular meaning as the grammatical category as a whole. Lexical meaning as opposed to grammatical meaning is not obligatory and categorical. A meaning that is grammatical in one language will certainly not always be grammatical in another language. From the theoretical point of view any semantic domain can be grammaticalized, that is, any collection of homogenous meanings can take on the features of categoricality and obligatoriness. For example, in the North American language Nootka grammatical features are given to the meaning "physical flaw

[14] Walsh, Michael (1996). Vouns & nerbs: A category Squish in Murrinh-Patha (Northern Australia). *In Studies in Kimberley languages in honour of Howard Coate*. Ed. by W. McGregor. München. P. 227–252.

[15] Sasse, Hans-Jürgen (2001). Scales between nouniness and verbiness. In *Language typology and language universals: An international Handbook*. Vol. 1. Ed. by M. Haspelmath et al. Berlin; New York. P. 498–499.

of the subject (= a type of deformity)"; the expression of this meaning takes place through a special suffix which is attached to the verb, with phonetic changes also sometimes occurring within the word-forms. The following meanings are included in the grammatical category: "normal", "fat", "small", "crooked/bent", "hump-backed", "lame", "left-handed"[16]. In addition to the grammaticalization of exotic semantic fields, one should also note the existence of several exotic grammemes within completely typical grammatical categories. For example, in Kwak'wala we find the evidential marker "to dream something", in Korafe there is an absolute tense (or type of temporal distance) meaning "between yesterday morning and today" and in Anindilyakwa we find a grammaticalized noun class which includes only objects that reflect light. Cases of exotic grammemes within a typical semantic domain are fairly common, while cases of the grammaticalization of exotic semantic fields are rare and usually require further investigation. In grammatical typology, the dominant opinion is that there are universal semantic domains that undergo grammaticalization: in more moderate form this idea implies the existence of general tendencies in the grammaticalization of different fields.

Therefore, the main feature of grammatical meaning is obligatoriness. A grammatically expressed concept is used automatically and unconsciously. The difference between the grammatical and non-grammatical status of a concept implies a whole group of cognitive oppositions: used vs. pondered, automatic vs. controlled, unconscious vs. conscious, effortless vs. effortful, fixed vs. novel, conventional vs. personal[17].

In linking grammaticality to obligatoriness one should bear in mind that obligatoriness is gradual. Evidently, one can speak of a *scale of obligatoriness*, on which different grammatical meanings are located. For example, the category of tense in the Russian verb has less obligatoriness than the category of mood, as tense must only be expressed in the indicative mood. Grammatical obligatoriness is sometimes subject to limitations. It can be blocked by another grammatical category: so in Russian, present tense blocks the expression of gender, while past tense blocks person. Grammatical meaning can also be blocked by lexical features: for example, in Russian not all verbs have a perfect aspect, and in English not all verbs are used in the present continuous. Finally, a grammeme can be blocked by discursive and cultural circumstances. Thus, in calling the principle of obligatoriness the main feature of grammatical meaning, one should remember that it rarely manifests in its complete type and that this is linked to deviations that are present in any linguistic system. *Formal grammaticality must be defined for each language separately.* This thesis is fair, too, for the semantics of grammemes, as grammemes always have polysemous and functional features. This is even more relevant for the manner in which grammemes are expressed, as there are hardly any identical manners of expression for all languages, and it is not even clear what would be meant by "identical" if, as we have already noted, formal categories must be defined from language-internal relations.

In addition to the type of obligatoriness just examined, there is also what might be called *lexical obligatoriness*. Lexical obligatoriness is an effect of categoricality and the creativity of denotation. As language classifies and structures experience in a specific manner, it invariably imposes lexical limitations on ensuing conversations about the world. For example, the domination in the Australian language Guugu Yimithirr of an absolute frame of reference ("north"/"south", "east"/"west") makes a description of spatial relations in terms of a relative frame of reference impossible, forcing its users to use lexis of an absolute type. The presence in many languages of the color term "green-blue" ("grue") without separate terms for "green" and "blue" forces a user to describe both colors identically. The absence of a word for "child of the same parents" forces Russian speakers to specify whether this means a "sister" or a "brother", while English speakers who

[16] The classic study on this topic is: Sapir, Edward (1949). Abnormal types of speech in Nootka. In *Sapir, Edward. Collected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture and Personality.* Berkeley: University of California Press. P. 179–196.

[17] Lakoff, George (1987). *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P. 320–322.

actively use the word "sibling" do not have to do this. In most cases language does not determine speech fully as descriptive formulas or paraphrases can be used. Still, language allows one to automatically and actively use the meanings that exist in the lexical set. Paraphrase involves further reflection and a cognitive load, so that it is required only in specific circumstances. One should add that very often one encounters an even deeper form of limitation: a language might totally lack the means to express certain concepts. So in languages with a defective numeral system ("one"/ "few"/ "many") precise numerical meanings cannot be expressed. In languages with a two-part color system ("light"/ "dark") many colors from the Munsell color system cannot be given stable names. A number of languages lack abstract concepts like "tree", "plant", "animal", "instrument" and so on. Interestingly, even when such concepts are present there are different strategies for naming sub-types included in the category: in Russian and English an unknown plant will be designated as "plant", while in Upper Chinook a hyperonym cannot be used for hyponymic meaning, and it will simply remain unnamed. Thus, examples of lexical obligatoriness are highly diverse. Lexical obligatoriness is a logical effect of limitations on forms of expression. Generally, one can represent it in three forms: the necessity of making additional demarcations ("brother" or "sister" vs. "sibling"); the impossibility of making additional demarcations ("grue" vs. "blue" and "green"); and the impossibility of saying something ("to the right of the house" or "pink").

In addition to formal-grammatical and lexical obligatoriness there is also *discursive obligatoriness*. Discursive obligatoriness implies that one particular meaning and no other should be used in a particular situation. It relates to how the linguistic system is embodied in real speech practices. If we understand "language" in a maximally broad sense, discursive obligatoriness is connected with its usage and is a part of language. The simplest example can be found in Russian where there are two forms of the 2nd person singular pronoun, "ty" and "Vy". As is well known, the pronoun "Vy" is more polite and is used for respected or unknown people. Shifting to "ty" in certain situations can produce disrespectful or even aggressive connotations. In using "ty" or "Vy" the Russian speaker demonstrates his relationship to the interlocutor. This sort of discursive obligatoriness is not an issue for speakers of English, which lacks the 2nd person singular polite form. In Japanese, Javanese, Acehnese and other languages, there are three degrees of politeness, which are expressed not just in the system of pronouns but in other lexis as well. There is a situation in which in nearly every utterance the speaker must express his relationship to his interlocutor (usually, pejorative, neutral or respectful). Discursive obligatoriness is also manifested in situational and sociolectal limitations: the speaker must adapt his speech to the status, degree of familiarity with the people around him, and degree of formality of the event. In many languages there are "female" sociolects with special grammatical and lexical features. In Indo-Aryan languages there is evidence of caste sociolects which have special phonetic features. In Australian languages there are many special forms used in the presence of the parents of one's wife or husband (so-called "avoidance languages"). Discursive obligatoriness often affects grammatical categories. A good example is Upper Chinook, in which a future tense of the perfect form can only be used if the speaker can vouch that the event will take place; in other situations a future tense of a non-perfect type must be used. We have given only a few possible examples, which clearly attest to the fact that language is not simply a categorical system of meaningful elements, but also an understanding of how meanings should be realized in speech practice.

To these types of obligatoriness we also need to add *referential obligatoriness*. Reference – at least, the real reference that is familiar to us from our own experience – always takes place within the framework of a particular language and on the basis of a particular language[18]. The language-specific nature of reference has several dimensions. Firstly, we always start from the lexical-morphemic set given by language. To say that this tree is a "tree"

[18] Here we understand the word "reference" in the broad sense – as "correspondence" to non-linguistic reality.

is already to use an existing designation. This situation is not that simple when one considers that one cannot replace a hyponymic meaning with a hyperonym in all languages (as mentioned above). Another aspect of naming a tree a "tree" is that as speakers of a synthetic language (e.g. Russian) we are using a lexeme consisting of a stem and ending, a lexeme which is also in the nominative case and neuter gender (Rus. *derevo*). We are also using a lexeme of a particular class, the class of nouns. Finally, we are using the *lexeme*, "word", that is, an element that is psychologically significant for us, which occupies an intermediate place between the morpheme and phrase in the morphosyntactic continuum. Referential obligatoriness is derived from the language-specificity of any utterance. It consists of the fact that reference *implicitly involves the whole structure of the language*. In discussing the correspondence between "words" and "things" one always needs to specify which language is being implied. The particular nature of reference might require from the speaker of that language to express not case or gender but, for instance, tense and the form of the noun (as in the case of nominal tense, noun classes and numeral classifiers). Despite the fact that reference is prototypically connected with "nouns", it is permissible to have situations where use of a "noun" is blocked; in that case, one cannot speak of a tree as a "tree", but one has to say, for example, "to be a tree", or "to tree". Ivanov gives a similar example: "A native American who was teaching me the Iroquois language Onondaga refused to translate the English word *tree*, saying that a morpheme with such a meaning exists only as part of the verbal form"[19]. Considering the language-specific nature of "word", reference can include from one to several morphemes – everything depends on how complex a typical "word" is in a particular language. In general, variations in this field are many. Different languages push one towards different models of reference, so that to speak unreflectively of unqualified reference, of "reference in general", would mean to involuntarily universalize reference, basing oneself on the researcher's native language. Unfortunately, this is the very path that many theoreticians have chosen since the times of Plato and Aristotle.

Thus, the meaningful elements of a linguistic system are not homogenous in the functional sense. They are characterized by different degrees of obligatoriness and conventionality. The types of obligatoriness presented above are linked to each other and it is not always easy to subsume a particular example to a particular group. The combination of all types of obligatoriness forms the unique *rhetorical style* of a language.

Conclusion:
towards a reflective philosophy of language

So what understanding of language does the above analysis lead us to? In what follows we will summarize in thesis form some ideas that sketch an understanding of "language" which takes account of the real breadth of typological variation and can become the basis for a reflective philosophy of language:

- Language can be understood as the internal organization of meaningful elements which enables the categorization of external experience, i.e. its conceptualization; this formulation does not prevent the existence of many other definitions of language, as any definition emerges from the position from which we look at the phenomenon.
- Languages *organize meaningful elements* differently, and the content of these elements is also specific to each linguistic system.
- Designation is the *categorization* of experience; categorization implies abstracting over several features, schematizing them, identifying the prototype, forming a particular category and its opposition to other categories.
- Languages do not just interact with previously given domains of experience but are also capable of *constructing* original semantic spaces; in other words, in a number of cases, designation is creative.
- Creativity and categoricality of designation result in the uniqueness of several meanings; such meanings cannot be fully conveyed in another language; however, one cannot rule out the fact that any meaning in any language –

[19] Ivanov, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich (2004). *Lingvistika tret'ego tysiacheletia* [*Linguistics of the Third Millenium*]. Moscow: LRC Publishing. P. 52.

due to its unprecedented distribution – is psychologically unique.

• The *semantic dimension of language* includes both categorization and partial construction; furthermore, it is dynamic, hierarchical and non-homogeneous; all this results in the originality of semantics in every language.

• Dynamism, hierarchy and non-homogeneity of the semantic dimension is established by what is usually considered the *formal aspect of language*, or *internal form*; there is every reason to assert that every language is characterized by a unique immanent structure.

• Of particular psychological relevance for the native speaker is the element located in the morphosyntactic continuum between the morpheme and the phrase; from the propositional point of view, this element – the *word* – is a unit comprising the main basis of linguistic memory; on the formal level the "word" is completely language-specific, just as the opposition between morphology and syntax is also language-specific.

• The basic classification embedded in a language is the division of language-specific words into *parts of speech*, or *lexical categories*; to identify parts of speech in a particular language requires a combination of several criteria; firstly, one needs to consider the intuitions of native speakers who, as a rule, sense the functional non-homogeneity of the words/morphemes stored in memory; psycholinguistic criteria should be taken together with morphological and syntactic criteria, but the optimal relationship between these criteria depends on the structure of a particular language; from the typological perspective significant parts of speech (or categorematic words) are best described using a bipolar continuum.

• In addition to the implicit grouping of lexemes, each language has an *internal functional organization*, which involves formal grammaticality, lexical obligatoriness, discursive obligatoriness and referential obligatoriness.

• *Formal grammaticality* is enabled through a set of grammatical categories formed by a series of mutually exclusive meanings, or grammemes; meaning which is grammatical in one language may not be grammatical in another; theoretically any semantic domain can be grammaticalized in any language, but there are general tendencies in the grammaticalization of certain fields; the opposition between grammatical/non-grammatical should be thought of as gradual; in addition, grammatical obligatoriness is sometimes subject to lexical, formal, discursive and cultural limitations; all these factors should be looked at separately for each language, as the organization of grammatical meanings is language-specific.

• *Lexical obligatoriness* is an effect of the categoricality and creativity of denotation and is conditioned by limits on the means of expression; in the most general sense it can be conceived of in three forms: the necessity to make additional demarcations, the impossibility of making additional demarcations, and the impossibility of saying something in a particular language.

• *Discursive obligatoriness* concerns how the linguistic system is realized in real speech practices; it means that in a particular situation precisely this meaning should be used and no other; discursive obligatoriness involves both separate lexical-grammatical meanings as well as whole sociolects.

• *Referential obligatoriness* derives from the language-specific nature of any utterance; it consists of the fact that the act of reference implicitly involves the whole structure of the language; real reference is always realized within a particular language and using its tools.

This sketch differs sharply from the popular opinion of language as a set of "words" that are linked to "objects" in the outside world. The understanding of language in the context of a correspondence between "word" and "object" (what one might call the onomathetic metaphor, or "word-centrism") is an essential distortion of the real situation. On the basis of the ideas presented above, one must take a different viewpoint. From this perspective language can be characterized as a *large-scale device for forcing its users towards a specific depiction of events*. Language forces one to express an event through the use of limited means, and compels one to construct and conceptualize each event in a special manner. This is the *rhetorical style*

of a particular language or, in Whorf's words, its *fashion of speaking*[20]. It is important to emphasize that we do not simply mean the use of specific lexemes or a unique model for relating lexemes and objects/situations. Rhetorical style is formed on the basis of the organization of meaningful elements in language as a whole, and this organization concerns basic components like "word", "morphology", "syntax", "parts of speech", "obligatoriness", "functional application", and so on. When we emphasize the specificity of rhetorical style, we mean its *fundamental specificity*, which concerns the whole structure of a given language – from "word" to the idiomatic means of expression used in concrete speech situations[21]. Thus, every language presents a unique and limited model of categorization, construction and description of the field of sense.

What does this mean for philosophy? First and foremost, one must accept that, when looking at the essence of language, it is wrong to start from the idea of a correspondence between "words" and "objects". Undoubtedly, every language in some way *corresponds* to the world, but the nature of this correspondence is different from the simplified picture depicted in the classic approach. Firstly, a language corresponds not to discrete objects (and even ontogenetically this correspondence is not universal, as attested by the fact that the process of acquiring a language depends heavily on its lexical-grammatical structure) but to complex *events* (or *situations*), which can be divided and understood in an objective, processual, singular, discrete manner, through the use of different models of action and causality, and so on – the rich illustrative material concerning this problem can be found in the works of cognitive linguists (cf. the diversity of construal operations); in other words, in language itself the method of imagining what language corresponds to possesses the features of *constructivity*. Secondly, in the act of correspondence a big role is played by features of the particular language – the models contained within it for categorizing experience, dividing elements by degree of tightness, language-specific criteria for identifying words, parts of speech, patterns of formal, lexical, discursive and referential obligatoriness; in other words, what is important is that organization of meanings and usage models are imposed by a particular language (of course, the degree of imposition differs depending on what component of language we are considering). Thirdly, the very character of correspondence between language and event can differ from language to language, which is a result of the permanent influence of language on cognitive operations, especially selective attention, perception, working memory, and so on. In other words, language in some sense forces us to choose and submit to categorization that with which (and how) it must be brought into correspondence. Thus, in the schema "language-correspondence-event" language-specificity is relevant for all three components. In addition, from the above it should be evident that the *linguistic sign* – due to its involvement in a network of heterogenous and multifunctional relations within the linguistic system – cannot be understood as a particular instance of a more general conception of the *sign* – at least without damaging its essential features. Despite Saussure, *linguistics is not a part of semiotics*.

Let us once more emphasize this: we are looking at the real situation of *how* the act of relating language and reality takes place, that is, we are trying to identify the most general and universal features that characterize this act. In this regard the question may arise: is it right to limit the philosophical position to the position of the speaker of one particular language or is a person capable *in principle* of overcoming the limitations imposed on him by a specific natural language and to understand the essence of language in general? This must be answered as follows. Of course, to limit one's philosophical position – by definition, a position that strives for universality – to the position of the speaker of one particular language is wrong. But this is exactly what the whole of European philosophy has been doing

[20] Whorf, Benjamin Lee (1956). *Language, Thought, and Reality*. Cambridge: MIT Press. P. 158–159.

[21] This fundamental specificity has been conceptualized in any detail in only one theory of language, which also takes account of the breadth of typological variation – namely, the Radical Construction Grammar of William Croft.

throughout its history. The typical Western theorist judges the essence of language *unreflectively*, looking at this essence in connection with the naïve schema of "word-object". The reflective position consists in fact of looking at the function of language from a broader typological perspective. It then turns out that humanity *in principle* is capable of overcoming the limitations imposed on it by its particular native language (or several languages), and of posing the question of the essence of "language as such" – of what is characteristic of natural language as language. However, this has not yet been done in the philosophy of language. We hope that the first steps in this direction, which have been outlined in this article, will ultimately lead to a more perfect understanding of the nature of language.

References

Baker, Mark (2002). *Lexical Categories: Verbs, Nouns, and Adjectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bisang, Walter (2008). Precategoriality and Argument Structure in Late Archaic Chinese. In *Constructional Reorganization*. Ed. by J. Leino. Benjamins. P. 55–88.

Boroday, Sergey (2020). *Jazyk i poznanie: Vvedenie v Postrelativism* [*Language and Cognition: An Introduction to Post-Relativism*]. Moscow: OOO "Sadra", LRC Publishers.

Croft, William (2001). *Radical Construction Grammar. Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dixon, Robert, Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2002). Word: A typological framework. *In Word: A cross-linguistic typology*. Ed. by R. M. W. Dixon, A. Aikhenvald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 1–41.

Haspelmath, Martin (2012). How to compare major word-classes across the world's languages. In *UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics, Theories of Everything*, 17, 109–130.

Haspelmath, Martin (2011). The indeterminacy of word segmentation and the nature of morphology and syntax. In *Folia Linguistica,* 45 (2), P. 31–80.

Hengeveld, Kees, van Lier, Eva (2008). Parts of speech and dependent clauses in Functional Discourse Grammar. *In Studies in Language*, 32 (3), P. 753–785

Ivanov, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich (2004). *Lingvistika tret'ego tysiacheletia* [*Linguistics of the Third Millenium*]. Moscow: LRC Publishing.

Lakoff, George (1987). *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sapir, Edward (1949). Abnormal types of speech in Nootka. In *Sapir, Edward. Collected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture and Personality*. Berkeley: University of California Press. P. 179–196.

Sasse, Hans-Jürgen (2001). Scales between nouniness and verbiness. *In Language typology and language universals: An international Handbook*. Vol. 1. Ed. by M. Haspelmath et al. Berlin; New York. P. 495–508.

Silverstein, Michael (1981). The Limits of Awareness. In *Working Papers in Sociolinguistics*. No. 84. Austin: Southwestern Educational Laboratory.

Talmy, Leonard (2000). *Toward a Cognitive Semantics*. Vol. I: Concept Structuring System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Walsh, Michael (1996). Vouns & nerbs: A category Squish in Murrinh-Patha (Northern Australia). In *Studies in Kimberley languages in honour of Howard Coate*. Ed. by W. McGregor. München. P. 227–252.

Whorf, Benjamin Lee (1956). *Language, Thought, and Reality*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Преодолевая словоцентризм: на пути к новым основаниям философии языка

С.Ю. Бородай
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. В статье представлена попытка переосмыслить характерное для западной философии и бытового сознания понимание языка как «набора слов», соотнесенных с «объектами» внешней действительности. Против такого подхода приводятся следующие аргументы: понятие «слова» (как и само деление на морфологию и синтаксис) не имеет металингвистического статуса; классификация частей речи лингвоспецифична, так что прототипическая референциальная функция «существительного» не может претендовать на статус универсальной языковой функции; представление о языке как «наборе слов» отражает лишь специфическую метапрагматическую осведомленность носителей европейских языков. Рассматривая факты языкового разнообразия и языковых функций в свете грамматической типологии, автор показывает, что наиболее адекватной интерпретацией соотношения языка и действительности является такое понимание, которое характеризует язык как масштабный аппарат по принуждению к определенному изображению события. При этом подчеркивается фундаментальная специфичность грамматической структуры и узусных моделей каждой конкретной лингвистической системы. Для продвижения философского осмысления языка необходимо перейти от наивной схемы «слово – референция – объект» к более реалистичной схеме «язык (как набор морфосинтаксических паттернов концептуализации) – соотнесение – событие (как комплексная смысловая ситуация)».

Ключевые слова: философия языка, когнитивная лингвистика, лингвистическая типология, слово, референция.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1289–1297

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0642
УДК 17.01; 17.02

Moral Philosophy and Ethics: The Demarcation Line

Abdusalam A. Guseynov*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 02.03.2020, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 11.08.2020

Abstract. The paper proposes an idea that moral philosophy and ethical theory are congruent with each other in their subject, but differ in their methods: the first one grasps a human act from the inside in its primary moral genesis, while the second one studies morality in its outward objectified forms. The author bases this view on his own interpretation of Mikhail Bakhtin's moral philosophy, presented in his early works «Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Author» and «Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity». The opposite sides of an act, which is rooted in a living individual with one side and in culture with another one, acquire the inner character and entirety through personal moral responsibility.

Keywords: moral philosophy, ethics, act, responsibility, Mikhail Bakhtin.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Guseynov, V.K. (2020). Moral philosophy and ethics: the demarcation line. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1289–1297. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0642.

The first sentence which ethics begins from, a kind of a key that unlocks its door, is as follows: ethics is a doctrine of morality. There is a misconception in the statement that "ethics" and "morality" are different concepts. Since the word "moral" is the Latin translation of the Greek word "ethics", the original definition should be as follows: ethics is the doctrine of ethical. Indeed, having called some of his works ethics, Aristotle denoted the very subject area he studied in these works: something related to people's ethos. In much the same way as the science of physics studies physics and the doctrine of the soul studies the soul, ethics studies ethics. The word "moral" appears later. Cicero translated the Aristotele's term into Latin and called ethics "moral philosophy."

There is a historically developed tradition of combining Greek and Latin words in one meaningful sentence: ethics is the science of morality, as if they had different semantic loads. This is how the fate of these words developed in the modern Russian and other European languages. This mixture of languages,

* Corresponding author E-mail address: guseynovck@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000–0002–0817–7869
Translation of an article published in Russian: Guseynov, A.A. (2019). Nravstvennaya filosofiya i etika [Moral Philosophy and Ethics]. In *Eticheskaia mysl'* [*Ethical Thought*], 2, 5-16.

which makes it possible to call the science (ethics) which studies a certain subject area, and this subject area (morality) itself differently, cannot but affect understanding of the essence of the matter. The existence of different terms (words) to denote the same concept can become a factor that provokes differences in meanings. In addition, there was another extra point here.

Cicero not only specified a new subject area with the Latin word "moral", but he also pointed out that it was a field of philosophy and called ethics moral philosophy. It is obvious that Aristotle also considered ethics to be a part of philosophy, however, there was no such indication of the generic trait in the term itself. With his translation, Cicero enriched the concept of ethics, as if the father's name was added to the son's given name. As a result, "ethics" received the second name "moral philosophy." Although both terms – "ethics" and "moral philosophy" – express the same concept, and are, basically, identical, having appeared as a result of a simple translation, nevertheless, over time, neither of them was considered as redundant. There is an obvious difference between them and, although they mean the same subject, nevertheless, the term moral philosophy focuses on the generic trait, and ethics – on the species difference.

On the one hand, ethics deals with various morals (norms, actions, assessments, etc.) that people actually practice in society, and on the other hand, it considers people's behaviour from the point of view of what they should do to make their life perfect. It is one thing when people build their relationships in accordance with their interests, circumstances, opportunities and consolidate them in a shared social experience, another thing is when they are guided by what is dictated to them by true philosophical reason. This divergence between the objective external logic of morality itself and its philosophical normative programme, the divergence known to us as the is-ought problem, is the internal tension of ethics, which it has dealt with in various forms throughout its history and which has not been overcome until now[1]. Let us go further and consider moral philosophy and ethics not as two different levels (aspects) of the same discipline, but as two different disciplines. This understanding underlies the philosophy of the act by M.M. Bakhtin, who believes that moral philosophy and ethics deal with the same subject – morality, but differ in methods: moral philosophy belongs to the domain of philosophy, and ethics – to the domain of science, and is a kind of theoritism as any other science[2].

***

Ethics emerged and historically developed as an integral part (aspect) of philosophy; it is still considered as a synonym for practical philosophy, which is seen as philosophy in its application to the field of human freedom. To the extent that human freedom is identical to person's morality, practical philosophy can be called moral philosophy and philosophy of morality. What is morality or what refers to morality and is the general subject of our science?

With all the variety of opinions on this issue in special literature and among ordinary people who practice morality and have their own ideas about it, although they do not theorise about it, a number of its common indisputable features can be distinguished. It is a category of practice and activity, which constitutes its immanent property of dividing the entire subject diversity of the world into two large classes: good and evil. This division results from the purposeful

[1] I would like to draw your attention to the discussion which took place 10 years ago. It was about specific features, due to which ethics is a philosophical science. It, in particular, contains the point of view that to the extent that ethics offers its own moral normative programme, it can be substantiated in the context of philosophy in general: it is rooted in metaphysics and ends in non-ethical sphere. Ethically ought grows from the depths of philosophy itself (Ref.: Guseinov, A.A., Razin, A.V., Brodskii, A.I., Lobovikov, V.O., Apressyan, R.G., Gelfond, M.L. (2012). "Filosofskaia etika i ee perspektivy v sovremennom mire (Kruglyi stol k 10-letiiu ezhegodnika "Eticheskaia mysl'")" [Philosophical Ethics and Its Perspectives in Modern World: Round-Table to the 10th Anniversary of the Yearbook, Eticheskaia Mysl (Ethical Thought)]. In *Eticheskaia mysl'* [*Ethical Thought*], 12, 5-33).

[2] Ref.: Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). "K filosofii postupka" [Toward a Philosophy of The Act]. In *Bakhtin M.M. Sobranie sochinenii v 7 tomakh* [*Collected Works, 7 Volumes*], Vol. 1, Moscow, 7–68; Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). "Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti" [Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity]. In Bakhtin, M.M. *Sobranie* sochinenii [*Collected Works*], Vol. 1. Moscow, 69–263.

nature of human activity, from the fact that its causality is set as the purpose which an acting individual is guided by. It does not refer to what exactly is good and evil and, accordingly, a positive or negative purpose of activity, but to the very ability and necessity to build your activity along these axes. It is consolidated in an individual by the mechanisms of duty and conscience, which give him/her a special dignity of a moral subject. The very concepts of good and evil, conscience, duty, dignity, as well as the behavioural schemes behind them, are not called by anyone into question (even by those who consider them fake) as the markers that enable the identification of the space of morality. Morality, therefore, denotes that special aspect of human practice, which consists in the fact that when acting an individual proceeds from him/herself, that he/she cannot but orient him/herself in the coordinates of good and evil and cannot but bear the traces of how an individual does it him/herself.

Whoever has the choice has the torment (wer die Wahl hat, hat die Qual), says a German proverb. People have noticed, and at the level of everyday consciousness recorded, that their desire for good often turns into evil, the soul is tormented by the stings of remorse when, it would seem, it should jump for joy, the duty becomes a heavy burden. It turned out that being rooted in the will of an acting subject, morality is also associated with truth, and has its own objective parameters. By the logic of being itself, a person is faced with the problem of how to orient him/herself in the world and, above all, among people, through relations which he/she only deals with the world, so that his/her desire for good does not turn into evil? What rules and moral law does an individual need to follow for this? The pinnacle, to which moral practice has risen in search of an answer to this question, is a rule that is represented in all world (and not only world) religions and cultures and which, in our market era, is called the Golden Rule: (*do not) treat others* in *ways that you would (not) like* to be *treated*.

To be the cause of one's own judgments and actions, connecting a person to other people and creating their own human world, means to be moral. Briefly, morality could be defined as a kind of an individually responsible way of an individual's existence in the world of people, which gives a person a new concreteness, peculiar only to him/her. It is a specific type of an individual's connection with other people, the essence of which is that an individual considers the world of people, which he/she lives in, as *his/her* world, as if it were created by his/her actions. According to this disposition, an individual divides his/her own actions into two large and very general classes – into good (virtuous) and evil (vicious), denoting, respectively, their positivity and negativity: what an individual should do and what he/she should not do when building his/her own relationships with others. Everything that an individual does, and all the forms of his/her conscious activity fit into these rubrics, and due to this an individual's existence acquires a moral nature. An individual cannot but strive for good, for good is what he/she strives for, and in the same way an individual cannot but avoid evil, for evil is what he/she avoids. It is arguable that there has not been such evil in the world that would not have pretended to be good.

***

Moral acts are not a specific class of acts, but a specific perspective of their consideration, a specific dimension of everything that an individual does consciously, emphasising their reference to this individual as their cause, as the authority that is responsible for them. In the strict sense of the word, moral acts do not exist as independent objects; in this sense, the Stoics, who distinguished a correct, equal to itself effort accompanying the vital activity of an individual from this very activity in its material (empirical) content, or Kant, who doubted the possibility of acting for the sake of duty, expressed a real singularity of the inclusion of morality into human existence. The concept of a moral act is, in a sense, a conditional expression: in fact, we are talking about a specific aspect of any act, indicating its personal origin, and answering the question of who committed it. It is necessary to distinguish the genesis of an act, with a particular living individual behind it, from its objective

content: in one case it is about who committed an act, who brought it into the world, and in the other one – about its content and how it fits into the world. This difference was perfectly expressed by Bakhtin, saying that an act, like an ancient two-faced god of entrances and exits, "looks in two opposite directions: it looks at the objective unity of a domain of culture and at the never-repeatable uniqueness of actually lived and experienced life." [3] It is possible to conduct such a mental experiment and mentally subtract (take out of the brackets) from a person's relationships to other people all their diverse objective content and everything connected with an issue in connection with what they are built and by virtue of which they acquire concreteness, becoming sibling, business, friendly, romantic, personal, official, financial, territorial, civil, political, scientific, criminal, and so on and so forth. The question, what will remain after such a subtraction, arises. Nothing but the most abstract reference to others. It is this pure idea of connectedness with others that is the moral attitude that precedes all possible concrete relationships with them, which, if we use the metaphor of weaving art, constitutes the basis on which the knots of individual actions are tied and the drawing of life is embroidered.

The key (central) issue of morality is as follows: how to harmonise the subjectively given moral orientation of actions with their objective content to endow it with a socially significant meaning? How can an individual cope with the responsibility that lies on him/her (imposed by his/her being) to behave in such a way that his/her actions were continued in the actions of others? What needs to be done so that an individual's desire for happiness does not turn into a great misfortune, as it happened with King Croesus, so that the javelin thrown by the athlete during the competition does not kill Epitimus of Pharsalus, as happened in the case, which, according to Plutarch, was discussed all day by Pericles with Protagoras, so that the philosophers who talk about all this would not be expelled from the town like Protagoras, not executed like Socrates, and not sold into slavery like Plato? The problematic situation created by the emergence of morality became one of the main reasons that laid the foundation for ethics as a specific field of theory, and for the key themes, that determined the direction of its research efforts. If we try to give a general consideration to the development of European ethics, how it has developed since antiquity, it is possible to single out its undoubted prevailing tendencies in the issue of our interest. In all the originality of individual teachings, the difference and even polarity of the established traditions, and their internal polemics, ethics has been developing as a theoretical discipline, it considered the world of human acts as some givenness, tried to generalise it in stable regular connections and find ways to bring human aspirations in line with these regularities. Ethics tried to find a universally valid truth of practical reason and, in most cases, it formulated a programme of proper (correct, worthy) behaviour itself. In this sense, it was on the side of society, on the side of truth, and was as a teacher for living individuals, acting, as they say, at their own peril and risk, bearing the burden of life responsibility. It pretended to think for them and tell them what they should do. Although many philosophers endowed their ethical theories with a personal morally binding meaning and built their lives according to their own teachings, – their individual experience, nevertheless, acquired the value of a theoretically significant argument. Diogenes lived in a barrel, but let us not forget that this barrel was in a crowded city square and, in this sense, he practiced as a theorist, giving his life the value of an argument.

***

From an extremely general retrospective position of the development of ethics, it should be noted that, in general, at all stages and in all varieties, it understood morality as practical relationships between a person (an individual) and other people. This gave and gives it an objective unity. In the concrete

[3] Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). *K Philosophii postupka* [*Toward a Philosophy of the Act*], 7. Bakhtin, M.M. (1993). *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*. Ed. Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press. P. 2.

interpretation of these relationships, there were, of course, quite important differences. In particular, it is possible to distinguish two tendencies that were neither clearly identified nor clearly formulated, but, nevertheless, were always represented in real ethical teachings to the extent the latter were a part of philosophy. They can be conditionally designated as philosophical-individualising (personalistic) and scientific-generalising, which (but again) very conditionally corresponds to the division into individual ethics and social ethics. However, these differences, like many others ones, for instance, the difference between the ethics of happiness and the ethics of duty, remained within the framework of the general view of ethics as a theory of morality and the general desire to give it a universally valid evidence-based interpretation. Morality was considered as something given, objectified, subject to comprehension and generalisation like any other subject. If it concerned a moral act, it became the subject of ethics in the aspects that could be fixed and described – motives and results. If it concerned norms, the issue of their general nature and binding force in relation to individuals was at the foreground. Individuals, the relationships between whom morality was supposed to cement, were considered as units, equal in their striving for good, and their relationships were an independent good. Ethics tapped into thinking about the problem which individuals solved in the real experience of living together, in particular, how to combine and unite their own, each time individual aspirations for the good with the binding common good. It claimed to be a reputable neutral authority in moral issues to teach people the correct strategy of social behaviour, acting on behalf of a virtuous person, a wiseman, an ideal kingdom, or a safe and harmonious society.

Ethics faced a number of dilemmas which indicated that moral problems could not be solved following scientific (theoretical) interpretation it had chosen. Let us recall only a few of them.

– The view of morality as a givenness presupposed that it must be inscribed in the causality of the world, it should be given a certain basis for its motives and norms that would sanction their legitimacy and explain their binding character. But this contradicted the original intention that proceeded from the inherent value of morality, excluding the very idea of the justification of morality.

– According to Kant, the main question of morality is: "What should I do?" Not only according to Kant, but also in essence, since this is exactly what interests a person in morality. In morality an individual wants to speak on his own behalf, in the first person. But both in the past and in the present, ethics answers another question: "What should you do?", "What should a person do in general to comply with his/her purpose, the common good, etc.?" It dealt with the abstraction of a person, but not with a living and acting individual.

– The driving force of morality is practical reason. While formulating general canons of behaviour, whether they are norms, virtues, or evaluative criteria, ethics replaces it with theoretical reason, talking about what is the best, while it is expected to answer the question of how to choose the best.

– The problem of free will should be necessarily added to the dead ends of ethics, which is oriented toward the explanation what it is and proving its existence, although it is obvious that the proof of the existence of free will would mean that it actually does not exist.

Ethics objectifies morality, looks at it outwardly, from a distance, from the point of view of the general, while it is fundamentally subjective and personal; it regards the moral problem as scientific, while, in fact, it is existential. It deals with the traces of a meteorite and its pieces scattered on the ground, but not with the mesmerising fiery stream flying from above. An ethical scientist speaks of morality, taking himself out of brackets, as if with this supposedly neutral position he himself does not express a certain moral position of people and institutions who want to deal with other people's problems instead of dealing with their own. The history of ethics, to the extent it naturally came to the present state, leads us to the idea that for an adequate understanding of morality it is necessary to change the method, and from reasoning in the third person shift to

talking in the first person, from the knowledge of morality shift to its self-consciousness, and from the science of morality shift to the philosophy of morality.

***

To understand morality as a matter of philosophy, as practical reason, it is necessary to understand philosophy itself as a moral position, as the point of view of practical reason. Nobody argues that as a way of cognition of the world, philosophy also considers issues of the meaning of human life. The question is how these aspects relate to each other: what is primary – knowledge about the world or our position in life in relation to it. The three-part division of philosophy into physics, logic and ethics is well-known, and it exhaustively sets its general structure. Ethics in philosophy was considered as the last, final, the third step of the ladder, Descartes placed it on the branches of a tree, the root of which is metaphysics, and the trunk stands for physics. In what sense is ethics the third step: in the sense that we reach it only after we have passed the first two, such as, for instance, a dessert that we receive as a third course? It seems that, as a rule, the place of ethics in philosophy is understood in this way, this is the way it is taught in our courses, following ontology and epistemology, and ethics as a specific science of morality arose from this understanding; hence the idea of the value neutrality of knowledge. But ethics can also be understood as the third and last part in the sense of the goal, which, being finite in reality, is initial in activity and indicates the path one must go to achieve it. In order that ethics remained the third part of philosophy, its way out into practice, philosophy itself must be a kind of practice, an ethical project. Such a view can be found in the Bakhtin's philosophy of the act, or, to put it more carefully, in how his philosophy of the act can be understood.

It should be especially emphasised that the Bakhtin's philosophy of the act is not just a doctrine of an act, it claims to be the first philosophy. An act is a category of practical reason, not one of the manifestations (characteristics) of a person, but a way of being, inherent in him/her. The world and his/her own being in it are given to a man as an opportunity, which he/she transfers into reality through his/her life. Being is not given to a person but something-to-be-accomplished. A person has no alibi in Being, he/she is in a sympathetic attitude towards it and has to do something with it, has to give it certainty, has to act, cannot but act, "has to ought", since this is the way of a person's life. More specifically: a) everything in a person is an act: and a thought, and a feeling, and a deed, any manifestation of his/her activity – a conscious life, taken at its every given moment; b) an act is directed to the future, it is something new that a person brings into the world and what he/she does with the world; c) an act is individual, one-and-the-only, it is committed by a given specific individual, from the place that is occupied only by him/her, a specific space and time and, therefore, no one else can commit it; d) a living individual, not a subject, not a rational being, not a representative of a dynasty, etc. is at the origins of an act, this living individual is endowed with consciousness and with his/her own name in the undivided whole of all his/her forces, due to which he/she lives, he/she is not the one who commits an act, but the one who comes into being in an act, he/she does not exist before an act itself, as well as an act itself does not exist without him/her; e) an act is the unity of an individual (life) and the world (culture), it reflects itself in two directions – in the acting (doing) individual, who is responsible for the very fact of the act and its being in the world, and in the world that determines the content of the act, gives it the meaning; an act exists in integrity and in the unity of both aspects; f) the unity of an act is not achieved when moving from the content of an act to an act as a fact, since the objective necessity of an act does not entail its subjective necessity (using the concept of love it is impossible to explain why Desdemona fell in love with Othello), but the fact of an act necessarily includes its content as a constituent moment and is primary in relation to it (having fallen in love with Othello, Desdemona enters the space of love and using the available experience enriches it herself).

Unity and integrity of an act is achieved by its responsibility. Not the responsibility that

we know from dictionaries and textbooks when someone is responsible to someone (a citizen to the law, a son to a father, a husband to his wife, a moral individual to public opinion and his conscience, deputies to voters, etc.), although it is also included in the content of an act as one of the moments, but a specific responsibility that is immanent in an act itself and is its human core. We act while living, and we live while acting. An act is committed finally, irrevocably, it is a moment of life itself, in much the same way as by eating we support ourselves physiologically, so, by acting we live a human (conscious) life. By acting, we put our human dignity on the line, and is there a higher degree of responsibility than the dignity of life, which we could be accountable to?! In accordance with the two-part nature of an act, responsibility is also two-sided: moral responsibility for the fact of an act and special responsibility for the content of an act. The correlation between them is the same as between the fact (Being) of an act and its content: special responsibility is a constituent moment of moral responsibility. As a matter of fact, when deciding to commit an act, an individual only specialises his/her responsibility and takes responsibility for its content, one thing does not exist without the other: this means that an individual is responsible for everything he/she does, for all thoughts, judgments, feelings, actions, views and his/her life – on the solitary and irrevocable ground that these are *his/her* thoughts, *his/her* judgments, *his/her* feelings, *his/her* actions, *his/her* views, and *his/her* life. Everything that an individual can call "mine", and this can and must be said about everything what he/she is connected with by his/her actions, what is included in the sphere of an individual's moral responsibility, and not by his/her choice and desire, but by the necessity of existence, due to the unconditional fact that he/she has no alibi in Being.

***

Although acts do not have common definitions and each of them is independent, they all have common architectonics, they all have the same structure and are built according to the same relationship scheme: I and the other. In Bakhtin's moral universe, the centre, the sun from which all rays emanate is I. Others are like planets; they shine with the reflected light of the sun. The other is not the same as I, he/she is exactly the other, moreover, he/she is not I. They are fundamentally different, they cannot be equalised, since this would require a third one, and this would destroy the space of an act, and I and the other would turn from the only ones into singular; they are also not mutual, since reciprocity requires a mediating norm. Their relationships are unidirectional (from I to the other) and based on the centre. "The relationship of 'I and the other' is absolutely irreversible and given once and for all."[4] "These basic moments are I -for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other. All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed…"[5]

An act is singular, but this does not mean that an actor is lonely. Quite the opposite, since an act that is with one side rooted in an individual, in "I" (in "I" not as a synonym for self-consciousness, not as a rational subject, but in "I" as an actual living and acting individual), and with another one in the world of other people. Thus, it is initially and existentially connected with other people. According to Bakhtin, two voices are the minimum of life and the minimum of Being. The social nature of man is not a secondary result of individuals' activity, no matter how this activity is interpreted, but a primary fact, a specific feature of his/her mode of existence. The connection of I and the other (others) is not the result of ethical decisions, but the initial moral something-to-be-achieved of individuals' being, which, in fact, do not exist beyond this yet-to-be-achieved (not to be confused with the sociological problem of communication in individualised societies of

[4] Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). *Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti* [*Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity*], 130. Bakhtin, M.M. (1990). "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity". In *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*. Ed. Michael Holquist, Vadim Liapunov. Austin, University of Texas Press. P. 52.

[5] Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). *K Philosophii postupka* [*Toward a Philosophy of the Act*], 49. Bakhtin, M.M. (1993). *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*. Ed. Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press. P. 54.

the Modern era). The nature of this connection is determined by the structure of an act: more specifically, I is in the centre, it is the centre of the event of being, of the whole new configuration of the world which is created by an act, the other is secondary and derivative, connected with I due to the content, the meaning of an act. Although the central point in the lines "I and the other" is I-for-myself, this in no way should be interpreted as selfishness. It only means that I live from myself, as the centre that organises the eventual definiteness of Being. The entirety of life from myself is realised in a position that Bakhtin calls an absolute self-exclusion.

Since an act (every act!) is unique and one-and-the-only, and this is its basic characteristic, it cannot be generalised, interpreted in a concept, and made the subject of theory and scientific generalisation: all these procedures eliminate individuals in their uniqueness. The foregoing does not mean that they cannot be talked about, it is possible, but not in a descriptive, generalising impersonal language, but in a situational language, taken in all the diversity of conceptual, figurative and expressive, as well as emotional and volitional means.

***

Thus, philosophy is a focus on an act from the inside, the position of an actor as if an actor was a philosopher himself, it considers an act in its personally expressed genesis and uniqueness, as an individually responsible way of being in the world, which is determined, not chosen, but is precisely determined, rigidly and unambiguously set by the ontological status of a person. The philosophy of the act affirms the active nature of human Being, the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical one, and acts as the first philosophy, which, thereby, turns out to be moral. Moral philosophy proceeds from the fact that the very being of a person, due to his/her individually expressed uniqueness and singularity at all moments of life, is responsible, and cannot but be such. It differs from ethics, which is guided by the canons of scientific rationality, deals with already committed, objectified actions, looks at them from the outside, through the prism of the concepts of good and evil, and expresses the point of view of public morality. As for the relationship of *I-the other* that is the core of morality, ethics declares itself as a third one, claiming for the role of an objective arbitrator between them. This, the fact that ethics introduces a third one into the relationship between "I and the other" ("correct point of view", "common good", "universal norm", etc.), and moral philosophy does not allow any gap between "I and the other" since "I" does not have alibi in Being – the gap that gives an opportunity to tear away from "the other", to look at him/her from the outside, – this is exactly what distinguishes moral philosophy from ethical theory. The first one, moral philosophy, speaks in the first person about what I should do, what I should ought, it affirms me in my spontaneous vitality, the second one, ethical theory, says what we should do in accordance with general concepts and the canons that are dictated by science in accordance with its objective theory; the first one looks at the world and culture from within the necessity of my only life, the second one looks at my life outwardly, from what someone thinks is right for me; the first one puts me on the line and reveals Being as personal responsibility, the second one teaches how to be rational and make the right choice; the first one puts me in the centre, forcing me to live from myself, the second one teaches me to equalise myself with others and to measure my own good with the good of others.

References

Bakhtin, M.M. (1990). "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity". In *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*. Ed. Michael Holquist, Vadim Liapunov. Austin, University of Texas Press. P. 4-256.

Bakhtin, M.M. (1993). *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*. Ed. Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press. 133 p.

Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). K filosofii postupka [Toward a Philosophy of the Act]. In *Sobranie sochinenii v 7 tomakh* [*Collected Works, 7 Volumes*], Vol. 1. Moscow, Iazyki slavianskoi kul'tury Publ., 7–68.

Bakhtin, M.M. (2003). Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti [Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity]. In *Sobranie sochinenii v 7 tomakh* [*Collected Works, 7 Volumes*], Vol. 1. Moscow, Iazyki slavianskoi kul'tury Publ., 69–263.

Guseynov, A.A., Razin, A.V., Brodskii, A.I., Lobovikov, V.O., Apressyan, R.G., Gelfond, M.L. (2012). "Filosofskaia etika i ee perspektivy v sovremennom mire (Kruglyi stol k 10-letiiu ezhegodnika "Eticheskaia mysl'")" [Philosophical Ethics and Its Perspectives in Modern World: Round-Table To The 10th Anniversary of the Yearbook, Eticheskaia Mysl (Ethical Thought)]. In *Eticheskaia mysl'* [*Ethical Thought*], 12, 5–71.

Нравственная философия и этика: линия разграничения

А.А. Гусейнов
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. В докладе академика А. А. Гусейнова высказывается идея, согласно которой нравственная философия и этическая теория совпадают между собой предметом, но отличаются методами: первая схватывает поступок изнутри в его первоначальном моральном генезисе, вторая исследует мораль в ее внешних объективированных формах. Автор опирается на собственную интерпретацию нравственной философии М. М. Бахтина, изложенной в его ранних произведениях «К философии поступка» и «Автор и герой в эстетической деятельности». Противоположные стороны поступка, уходящего одним концом в живого индивида, и другим – в культуру, обретают внутренний план и целостность на базе персональной нравственной ответственности.

Ключевые слова: моральная философия, этика, поступок, ответственность, М. М. Бахтин.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1298–1309

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0644
УДК 1-17

Ontology of the Multitude and Heterarchy of the Common

Tapdyg Kh. Kerimov and Igor V. Krasavin*
Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin
Ekaterinburg, Russian Federation

Received 11.04.2019, received in revised form 06.07.2020, accepted 11.08.2020

Abstract. This paper explores ontology of multitude, reflecting the General Intellect theory by A. Negri, M. Lazzarato, P. Virno, M. Pasquinelli and others. General Intellect is used as a synonym of the cognitive capacity of society, that may either liberate it from capitalism or be exploited by the capitalistic organisation of society. In this paper, General Intellect is analysed as a property of a social connection structure, hereinafter referred to as heterarchy. The connection structure heterarchy forms different kinds of singularities, i.e. aggregations consisting of statistical repetitions of relations and individual egos creating values through their goal-setting and other intellectual activities. The article argues that though General Intellect may denote capacity for the self-organization of society to a certain extent, it is difficult to identify with the only particular institutional organisation or political regime. General Intellect manifests itself in any type of social structuring through self-organising processes.

Keywords: general intellect, heterarchy, singularity, complexity, aggregate, multitude, ego.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Kerimov, T.Kh., Krasavin, I.V. (2020). Ontology of the multitude and heterarchy of the common. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1298–1309. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0644.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: krasavin.i@gmail.com, kerimovt@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000–0002–2286–8412 (Kerimov); 0000–0003–0733–9114 (Krasavin)

Introduction

This paper is based on the methodology of heterology, inherent to contemporary continental philosophy and social sciences. The reference to heterology entails a radical transformation of social ontology. This transformation is twofold: firstly, ontology transforms into ontogenesis, studying the becoming of various systems and phenomena; secondly, ontology transforms into heterogenesis, studying the becoming as the development of difference, plurality and multiplicity (Kerimov, 2012: 83). In a heterological sense, becoming always implies the development of difference and multiplicity. The problem that arises is how multiplicity, being heterogeneous, nevertheless organises and reproduces itself in the variable social order.

The convergence of social relations and its machinic organisation, developing by the post-operaist movement within the theory of General Intellect have become a central point of many recent discussions. The notion was prompted by K. Marx as he observed machine-aided labour organisation: labour organisation properties represent, in fact, a kind of a social "machine". According to A. Negri, "The general intellect is a machinic productive force, constituted by the multitude of corporeal singularities that form the topos of the common event of the general intellect. With the generation of the general intellect, we enter the epoch of the man-machine" (Negri, 2003: 205–206). Since communication has a multiple nature, the creative productivity of the General Intellect is expected to overcome the limitations imposed by the capital and grant the society a political and economic freedom (Lazzarato, Negri, 1991; Virno, 2004). It is important to clarify that General Intellect is also a virtual body or a machine, topologically composed by social connections produced "by the multitude of corporeal singularities". With this virtual body being a "social brain" (Wolfe, 2010: 366–374), it is not only its implicit creative capacity we are interested in but the particular form of the structure it is organized through.

As the initial metaphor for General Intellect was based on a comparison of machinic organisation of labour to the knowledge of a human mind materially produced by brain, we may extend it and use the notion of *heterarchy* originated in the early artificial neural network theories to define both the connection structure and the value formation principles. Despite its heuristic value, the concept of heterarchy is not clearly defined and is not frequently used. The main commentary was provided by W.S. McCulloch (McCulloch, 1945: 89–93), the author of the first theoretical artificial neural network model, in his brain neurones research. McCulloch associated the heterarchy of values with the concept of the whole, different parts of which tie together every single whole and contribute to its changes.

Concerning our research, heterarchy is a multitude of hierarchies connected by networks, thus composing aggregations of actors and relations. This structure is heterogeneous, which means that actors and relations are exterior to each other. For such a property of heterarchical relations, we use the term of *exteriority* as applied by M. Delanda to the analysis of multiplicity and social complexity (Delanda, 2006: 8). According to Delanda, exterior relations form the objects through assemblage, i.e. a process of cross-connecting relations, and heterarchy is a form of structure emerging through such a cross-connection.

We argue that being a structure of General Intellect, heterarchy may clarify its composition and properties as general for the society and its capacity to be intellect. Without this, General Intellect remains nothing but a beautiful metaphor. Further, with the help of the heterarchy concept, we will show that though General Intellect may denote capacity for self-organisation of society as an aggregate, it is difficult to identify with the only particular institutional organisation or political regime. General Intellect appears in any type of social structuring through self-organising processes.

Ontology of Multitude:
Connection Structure as a Process

First of all, we need to analyse ontology of multitude as a domain of social cognition and organisation to find how multiple relations may ontologically form social orders. Negri writes: "In contrast with the concept of the people, the concept of multitude is a singular multiplicity,

a concrete universal. The people constitute a social body; the multitude does not, because the multitude is the flesh of life. …the multitude is an active social agent, a multiplicity that acts. Unlike the people, the multitude is not a unity, but as opposed to the masses and the plebs, we can see it as something organised. In fact, it is an active agent of self-organisation" (Negri, 2002: 36). This kind of organisation has no centre, no exact border (an ontological "apartheid" between more and less real entities) or aim. Here Negri advocates Deleuzian understanding of multiplicity.

There are two fundamental aspects of multiplicity that should be highlighted here: firstly, its elements are virtual, and secondly, their mutual differential relations, corresponding to singularities, determine this virtuality, or potentiality. There is an opportunity for the differential ontology of multiplicities, one dealing with the virtual transforming into the actual. This ontology is incompatible with the concepts of the One and the Many: a multiplicity, in contrast to plurality, excludes any unitary instance. Ontologically, as pointed out by Deleuze and Guattari, parts and whole are the same, since parts may form many different wholes of the same relations (Deleuze, Guattari, 2000: 42–50). Since every movement causes a transformation of the whole, the whole as such should always be open. In other words, it is impossible to identify the whole with a kind of integrity or closeness of the system. If the whole is not the one, the reason is its being open and continually changing or contributing to the emergence of something new; in a word, becoming.

Here we are dealing with a dynamic structure which is always in the process of becoming. This structure is relational, as multitude is singular, related to the one and the many. However, how may social order(s) emerge? Negri states: "…Multitude is an ensemble of singularities whose life-tool is the brain and whose productive force consists in co-operation. In other words, if the singularities that constitute the multitude are plural, the manner in which they enter into relations is co-operative. How can the plurality and the co-operation of singularities express governance of the common, in so far as they form the constitutive power of the world? Within the teleology of the common… ontological transformation frees us from sovereignty" (Negri, 2003: 225–226).

Whereas the relations between the one and the many are determined by being (static ontology of unity), the relations between common and singularity are determined by becoming, that is, an ontology of multitude. The co-operation of singularities within the common produces new relations (or singularities) which, in turn, feed back into the (newly constituted) common engaging itself into co-operation with (newly modified) singularities, and so on. It is in this sense that co-operation of singularities in the common is produced and producing. Dynamic social structure is driven by the "teleology of common" where the common is a name for cooperation. It is here the first controversy arises. Negri writes that the common (which is a "living labour") is singular, differently affecting each member of the multitude (Negri, 2003: 182). Ironically, this means that the common, as well as the cooperation, does not belong to the multitude, so the common is simply not common, but the exterior, i.e., not only shared but also divided. The commonality of the common is formal, providing different actors with different fruits of labour. Therefore, it is difficult for the common to unify a plurality by imposing a teleology of common cooperation. If we wish to have a dynamic, singular structure of relations, which is in continuous motion of self-organisation without a command centre, we would suggest that the order (as the constitution of the whole) is recursive and comes from the exterior. Literally, this means that order comes from other people as individuals and groups (singularities), being plural and impossible to be completely subjugated to any kind of goal, including the goal of common cooperation. The latter is a multiple process organised from all aspects of the issue, which makes teleology impossible.

Heterarchy may provide an interpretation of structure as a multiple order designed from the exterior, without unifying the *common* as transcendent grounding or transcendental pre-supposition of the structure. Heterarchy holds the whole and its parts as immanent mul-

tiple entities with different meanings depending on the environment and recursively combining different wholes co-existing together. No parts are exclusively predisposed to constituting a whole, and no whole is a transcendent grounding, exclusive goal or meaning for any organised parts, because each of them emerges simultaneously. Otherness, or exteriority, is extremely important here, as it would be not enough to say that heterarchy is just a multiple structure. For such a case, it could be a polyarchy or a network, and would not need inventing a new concept.

Heterarchy reflects the fact that relations and their meanings are not only multiple; they are also singular, i.e. have endless ways of embodiment. This means that the same relation for a particular group or an individual may contain many different meanings, and link these people to another group, organising an automatic causation process. Statistical multitudes emerge in a relational activity of some individuals. And as they emerge, not guided, the structuration process begins from the outside for any part and the whole of relations, evoking diverse meanings and agencies tied without the "common" intention. The forbiddance of transitivity proposed by McCulloch is the condition that explains how the exterior whole and parts may avoid a vicious circle of the teleology of common cooperation. It means that no particular relation or meaning can be taken as universal. Any composition of relations appears local, and a multiplicity of relations is topological. The more valuable are the relations, the more frequent and dense connections between them are made, the faster is the social time, the more complex is the social space and vice versa.

This is not surprising if we remember that neuron connections in the brain are structured in the same manner, i.e. the more frequent is the act (and the corresponding signals), the more dense neuron connections are formed. Negri reminds that "If we wish to give to the common name the direction of the arrow of time and place it in relation to its irreversibility without losing its singularity, it is necessary then that the common name is grasped as an act or *praxis* of temporality" (Negri, 2003: 160). Therefore, heterarchical relations take place in real time and imply process as their constitutive aspect. This proposition leads us to a paradox of a structure that appears as a process. Though the notion of structure is usually associated with stability and rigidity of order, here we have an order emerging through overlapping relations and different sequences of relations that give rise to different orders structured by the same heterarchical principle. In turn, if forbiddance of transitivity leads to the emergence of a processual structure, this structure is nothing but an embodied experience, or history of an object's becoming and its path dependency. This statement may be further articulated as an experience of irreversible time is the absolute requirement for the structuration of relations in a multiple environment.

How is it possible for the parts to be equally significant to the whole and for the order to come from the process but not an initial intention or idea? A solution was suggested by G. Tarde who described a model of multiple social relations without an initial intention, i.e. without a rational goal imposed on individuals or groups. Tarde called this process an imitation, which produces subjectivities through similarity and difference of partial and common attributes: individuals reflect features of their groups, just as groups are organised as compositions of the individuals' attributes, and not as subjects representing a social whole (Tarde, 1903: 37–43). Abstractly, these singular objects, organised by relations without intentions, may be referred to as fractals. Omitting the mathematical definition of fractals, it can be said that social fractality is an undeniable full or partial similitude of relations. Fractality reflects the above-mentioned properties of recursiveness of the whole and its parts, with the meaning of relation dependant on the interaction and creation of different orders and structures through a process. Being fractals, they are constituted by the mimesis of the wholes and their parts through difference and repetition. In other words, the source of social diversity is at the same time the source of order. Social relations are not only singular; they are also typical and differ by various patterns of organisation, coordinated by the processes of relations themselves through association in

irreversible time. The organisation of society implies reproduction and change of the assembling localities, and the virtual heterarchical structure is the order for the temporal sequence of topological allocation of social relations.

Since individuals and groups, as Negri asserts, become singularities i.e. relational objects, they cannot be completely identified with a particular attribute, rationality, profession, ethnicity, etc. Identifications become processual, and reproduction of new attributes means their recursiveness in the networks of singularities. Overlapping networks of relations produce recursive hierarchies that emerge on multiple associations of singularities. Multiplicity, therefore, is the origin of hierarchy as well of the network. Multiple networks accompany hierarchies and recursive hierarchies accompany networks. Aggregations of singularities reproduce themselves through simulation of unity in a fractal way as a similitude of the diverse. Such a quality acquired by singularities may be usually observed in small groups where a group submits its members. As Delanda shows in his social complexity theory, at the macro scale we may see the properties of the unique individuals, taken in statistical aggregations and spread in time and space, appear as the collective ones, aimed toward the goals that individuals are not aware of. Yet, being statistical sets, general singularities continue to be individual ones with their own path in time and a place in space of relations (Delanda, 2006: 16–18). Whether it is a group, a community, or a nation, any collectivities that detect their identifications *post-factum,* are examples of this process.

Therefore, we may say that the establishment of any singular network is pre-supposed by a hierarchy of aggregation as a whole and vice versa, a hierarchy is pre-supposed by networks. Relations remain multiple in networks but localized by matching hierarchies. Any hierarchy is aggregated by overlapping neighbouring networks of singularities and its description will therefore always imply connections and meanings of contiguous entities. It is a singular actor of networks and an element of hierarchies, thus combining the macro and micro scales of relations. Singularities actualize interactions to the extent to which they are elements of a more general hierarchy and a relevant order other than themselves. Relations of singularities are not based on the only hierarchy or network; they involve relationships with other hierarchies of more general and local orders, as well as relationships with contiguous networks. As a result, elements of two different hierarchies can interact only within the boundaries of a third, partially common or differentiated hierarchy. A network from one hierarchy cannot be moved into the space of another or establish an equal relationship with it. In a manner of speaking, hierarchies multiply in the process of network differentiation. That is why social relations tend to be conservative, whilst the elements of one hierarchy remain passive in their relations with elements from other hierarchies.

Nevertheless, networks of singularities, but not hierarchies of identities, prove to be a tool for the multiplication of ordered systems. By singular nature of the social, activity spreads through mobile networks, making it impossible for a heterarchy (as a social connection structure) to subjugate to a particular institutional order (Krasavin, 2017: 138). All this considered, social relations are network-forming hierarchies, heterarchical organisation of which automatically emerge on the activity of singularities. Such relational assemblage is metastable, so the positions of singularities in a connection structure, the forms of their subjectivity and the forms of their activity are mutually dependent. Their connections line up through the topological distribution and the temporal irreversibility of ties. Time is irreversible, but relations are reversible. Types of relations are finite, but the variety of situations is infinite.

Transformations of Multitude and General Intellect

The connection structure proposed above should help us to clarify whether metaphysics of the ‘common’ of multitude described in (post)operaismo may form General Intellect acting as a means of liberation from the shackles of capitalism. For this purpose, we have to analyse the social order-determining capacity of the organisation of multitude and Gener-

al Intellect, keeping in mind the properties of heterarchy described above. The multitude is the main concept of General Intellect theory as the only visible, material part of general cognition. Borrowed by A. Negri from A. Matheron, it means a decentralized organisation of relations, representing the process of association that forms social groups from the sets of individuals (Matheron, 1988; Negri, 1991: 109, 140.). The multitude members become singularities, structurally located between the particular individuals and the general collectivity of society.

Since being promoted by Negri, the notion of the multitude has faced various criticisms. P. Macherey and E. Laclau found that the heterogeneous nature of multitude was the main obstacle for its political use. In their opinion, interpreting multitude as a political body implies subjectivity as a general volition towards a certain goal, which turns society into a single entity. Acting as a political body and making decisions requires unity and a guiding hegemonic force to emerge on the initial social multiplicity. This means a miraculous transformation of singularities at the moment when a political decision is made by some political activists united at least by common values of revolution or something else (Laclau, 2005: 153). Being united, as E. Balibar suggests, the multitude becomes ambivalent, since silent obedience is at least as frequent as a spontaneous rebellion. As multitude lacks 'internal political criteria', it may equally guide social solidarity both to peaceful and aggressive actions (Balibar, 1993: 3–38). Without any circumlocution, S. Zizek and A. Badiou issued a verdict that multitude is a political force of domination mirroring decentered organisation of the capital (Badiou, 2003: 125; Zizek, 2006: 261–267). In other words, the multitude may easily appear to be the origin of the capital despotism, as well as a democracy may turn out to be an ochlocracy.

Responding to this criticism, Negri interprets the multitude differently, describing it is as a network of whatever actors, ties, values etc. In this case, the multitude becomes a kind of rhizome (Negri, 2002). Then, interpreting society as a multitude means that there are many different foundations and forms of sociality united only by the fact of their relation to some object. The meanings of these relations can be different for many actors, and it is enough to be considered a part of a social whole. Anyone is considered a part of the multitude and contributes to 'the primary fount of the valorisation of the world' by intellectual activity. Singular multitude continually strives between the activities of individual singularities and the activities of bigger wholes, general singularities known as social groups and communities (consisting of persons and organisations). The flow of becoming singularities makes the multitude an irreversible continuum of relations. Irreversibility of multiple relations overcomes any institutional restriction. It equally establishes and destroys ties of individual and general singularities. For Negri, this is a hope for emancipation, but again, an ontological presence cannot be equally turned to the political order. In other words, irreversibility does not aim toward a particular singularity, capitalistic or communistic.

What unites multitude without unification is General Intellect; social communication that produces subjectivities and knowledge. The latter requires another mode of organisation and another type of actor rather than singularity or an aggregate. Another type of actor is an *ego* seeking goals and producing knowledge; another mode of organisation is a hierarchy. As pointed out above, a hierarchy emerges through the recursiveness of relations in overlapping networks of singularities. Each of the social conditions overlaps with others, turning the multitude of special features into a community of singularities. Besides, hierarchy does not only appear to be a means of exterior organisation; it is also a mode of interior reproduction of singularities. Due to the recursion of relations, they can be temporally and finitely manipulated for the sake of a common goal. Hierarchy reduces multiplicity to the simulation of unity through the coincidence of reasons and goals of relations and the point of coincidence is hierarchy itself. Therefore, through the delay and operation of time, it interiorises the relations and properties of singularities, and with the help of hierarchy, singularities mediate processes, assemble ties and synthesise values

(senses), i.e. act as goal-seeking *ego*s that are different to aggregations.

We may see that aggregate and *ego* supplement each other, while the latter represents the development of the former, though remaining exterior. This power of *ego* is more successful when supported by fluctuations of aggregates. *Ego* and any hierarchical institutions are limited by their finite goals and capacity of volition, which, at the macro scale, make them similar to aggregates, actuated by repeated relations. That is why an irreversible motion of aggregates can overcome the power of *ego*. The process, in which *ego* and aggregate correspond to each other, is a "living labour", or "the common", the multiple and singular that in any particular case overcome exploitation by a particular mode of relations (Negri, 2003: 225–235).

As a social cognitive capacity, General Intellect comes from the living labour, or the common, produced by the multitude in the form of information and knowledge. Here we see that analysis of social relations leaves the rigid institutional structures, certain modes of production and means of their evaluation behind. "Living" means variability of labour, absence of strict means for evaluation, i.e. ones to be reified in the model of discrete material objects or institutions. If information and knowledge cannot be ultimately located, they also cannot be manipulated through attribution to certain properties. They are displaced, remaining at the same place; the one who gives it does not lose it. These properties of information and knowledge have been known for a long time, but our task is to understand the relations that produce and organise information and knowledge as the common, into General Intellect as a whole.

Though the common cannot be reified, it can, nevertheless, be structured in some way. Information and knowledge differ from each other as they form different objects. As a collection of data, information is an aggregation or an aggregative state of knowledge. As such, information has only quantitative properties, but no qualitative ones. Information becomes knowledge when it is attributed to the *ego*, i.e. to the actor with certain goals and actions. Therefore, recognition of some data as information or as knowledge depends on the actor. It would not be exaggerated to say that knowledge defines one's capacity of having goals and consequences of actions, therefore subjectivizing an actor. Thus, being an aggregate of properties and qualities, the actor turns into an *ego* with its goal-setting. Of course, we may continue that every *ego* is a part of more general aggregates, and some of them (as groups, organisations) also possess some properties of *ego*.

Depending on the environment and configuration of ties, individual singularity transforms information to knowledge in different ways and uses it differently as well. Information also naturally circulates within particular communities. Through the organisational hierarchy, community acquires better cognitive capacities actualized in goal setting activities. This contributes to the concealment of information and the growth of knowledge. Acting as an *ego*, as a mediator, an institutionally reproducing community may exploit the "structural holes" (Burt, 1992, pp. 30–37) in the social whole to acquire benefits and power. In its turn, power, especially the power of capital, excels by governing social ties as aggregates. Here we face two sides of operation of aggregates; on the one hand, an opportunity for the *ego* to exploit them means that the inequality will be never overcome. On the other hand, the lack of total control of aggregates by the *ego* means the inevitable overcoming of any totalitarianism, which always remains temporary and partial. This means that "making a multitude" and exploitation of a multitude is a process that never comes to an end. General Intellect provides opportunities for both sides of the issue and may be used equally for liberation and hegemony.

General Intellect, Heterarchy and New Forms of Organisation

Let us now examine some opportunities and limits of exploiting General Intellect using the example of "living labour" management in IT companies and the possible threats to society. Corporative sociology (after followers of Gramsci) has already become aware of cognitive organisation and provided some reasoning on the subject. In his research, D. Stark writes

about a new kind of managerial organisation in terms that are almost indistinguishable from the concept of General Intellect given by P. Virno (Virno, 2007). This new organisation represents an organisational form of a "distributed intelligence in which units are laterally accountable according to diverse principles of evaluation" (Stark, 2011: 19). According to Stark, this happens in the processes of brokerage and entrepreneurship among organisations when specific individual and hierarchized organisations mediate the work of other actors or include them in their system of relations. In other words, one hierarchical organisation, which has access to another, can contribute to the establishment of a certain joint structure of relations. For Stark, this structure presents an "organisation of dissonance" making social complexity work for different accounts of worth. For Virno (and Negri definitely would agree with this), the differently evaluated "distributed intelligence" is that very General Intellect he associated with emergent variable social structure. Surprisingly, the corporate management theory inspired by the example of Silicon (V)Alley with its typical style of communication between programmers, came to the same conclusions as the Italian Operaismo thinkers. What is more surprising, the name for the new kind of structure given by Stark was heterarchy.

Put into practice, this organisation method could solve the main problem of social theory, the issue of difference between structure and action, or, in the context of this paper, between action and cognition. Stark proposes to merge aggregative social complexity and goal-setting activity of *ego* in an organisational structure. However, this technique is just an exception to the rules; in social practice, heterarchy (and its promising economic prospects in the form of distributed intelligence) is hardly susceptible to formalization. The irreversibility of time and topological distribution of processes, leading to the complexity of relations, is the main impediment. Every hierarchic organisation is a kind of *ego* limited by its own goals. A liner merger usually interrupts their work. Of course, they can establish a kind of mediator, but that organisation, being an *ego* itself, will also be limited by its own finite goals. If it merges the previous two organisations and redistributes their tasks and results, we will see a hierarchy, not heterarchy. The presence of goals and values points at the finitude of organisation, subordinated to a hierarchical order, whereas a heterarchy, being multiple, overcomes particular order through establishing many different orders as aggregations of singularities. Different hierarchies belong to different situations (localities in the heterarchichal space of relations), while their connections establish the third situation, which is not associated with the targets of the first two and so on. This change is endless and heterogeneous.

In the case of relatively small organisations like start-ups and other forms of petty bourgeois business, diverse principles of evaluation are possible, but the multitude of petty bourgeoisie (usually called market) naturally produces large hierarchical organisations that sublate original heterogeneity (or operate it in the process of project management). Any organisation exists as overlapping communities, i.e. an aggregative multitude and as a recursive hierarchy with finite and perpetuate goals. These two contradict each other; indeed, they may exploit each other, but they cannot merge. Their general intellect does not automatically emerge; it sporadically appears in local situations.

It is important to remember the other side of General Intellect mentioned earlier in this article, which is the potential of exploitation and control over the society. As Verscellone and Pasquinelli already put it, the development of IT may increase the surveillance capacity of power and capital (Vercellone, 2007, Pasquinelli, 2013: 49-68). Any technological innovation that eases aggregation of relations in the form of data will sooner or later lead to the growth of control over the multitude. This will happen even if the initial idea of innovation was exactly the reverse. The Internet itself is one of the best examples of this case. Initiated as a libertarian community, now it provides opportunities for shadowing. The blockchain technology that traces all the motions of transactions on the Internet is even a better example. Using this innovation, people can control

their money and properties and trust each other, which means that they do not need mediators for their financial operations anymore. Does it mean that banking will soon disappear and communistic libertarianism will emerge? There is a particular technology that makes all aspects of this issue possible. It will be used not only by private individuals and small enterprises; it will be used by big corporations to control all the transactions to combine their technical and financial power. Acting as *ego*s, several supercompanies will compete with the multitude of other singularities, and the results of this competition cannot be predicted in advance. As power and capital are exteriorly organised hierarchies of networks, aggregation of these networks of singularities is used not only to overcome them but also to help them reproduce.

The last thesis about exteriority of power and capital, however, may clarify the limits to which exploitation of General Intellect extends. Exteriority of power means that it comes rather from an agreement of obedient bodies than from charisma or special intentions. Of course, surveillance gives lots of opportunities for control and manipulation of life, knowledge and human communication, but it does not mean that the forces of exploitation have a programme for our lives and communication. Such totalitarian projects have already happened in recent history and proven to be utopian. Capitalism is survivable precisely because of the absence of additional ideology except for the simple idea of "buy cheap to sell dear". It serves and exploits any kind of social organisation which accepts any privacy. If mere life and human communication become the origins of the accumulation of capital and the form of institutionalized power, so multiplicity and exteriority of their organisation putting a limit to the authoritarianism of power and egoism of capital. Total subordination of heterarchical structure of social ties is impossible, which also causes impossibility of subordination of the General Intellect that changes in the relations and choices of singularities. Like heterarchy, General Intellect is perceived as a virtual entity; can a virtual entity be exploited by the powers of domination or liberation? Like heterarchy, General Intellect excels any hierarchic order with goals, let them be imposed by liberation or exploitation.

As a connection structure, heterarchy reveals properties that make opportunities for exploitation of General Intellect or using it for overcoming capitalism (or any other social order) very limited. General Intellect is seen as the development of relations established by ties of singularities and, therefore, combines the attributes of *cogito* and *conatus*. Total subjugation of General Intellect to whatever goals is impossible for, being an aggregate of a social whole, it retroactively affects all the singularities of the multitude. Due to irreversibility of time and topological configuration of ties, any particular singularity, an aggregate or *ego* with its political or economic goals will always be dependent on its location in the connection structure. Heterarchy and General Intellect provide opportunities for the emergence of aggregation and formation of *ego*s, but no more. It does not serve for particular social order as it produces all the orders simultaneously.

As the brain does not suspect of the *ego*, the General Intellect made by social heterarchy is not aware of cognitive or any other capitalism. Due to the difference between aggregates and *ego*s, General Intellect is not *ego*-centred, so it cannot be subjugated though it is partially possible to operate its self-organisation. Even if General Intellect is assimilated to the assemblage of information machines, as Pasquinelly put it, such an exegesis will be insufficient. Information machines are organised around certain functions and have no *ego*, i.e. do not appear as a species, that makes a decision (transforms information to knowledge) on its own in the process of irreversible time. If there is no common *ego* – there is no General Intellect seeking particular goals, there is only the General Intellect as self-organisation of aggregations of singularities.

Conclusion

The model of heterarchy provides opportunities and imposes limitations on social relations and therefore casts light on the extent to which the phenomenon of General Intellect can be embodied in the virtual structure of

social connections and a specific institutional organisation. In this case, it is important to remember that the introduction of the notion of *heterarchy* by S. McCulloch was directly connected with his theoretical artificial neural network model in which the transitivity law is forbidden. The restriction imposed on the law of transitivity proves useful here since it prohibits the scaling of any property without alteration of objects or relations. That is, it refers to the capacity for thinking as well as connection to a social institution. Therefore, heterarchical structure inevitably implies complexity and increasing multiplicity in irreversible time, which the human mind and program code constantly face. If General Intellect is something more than a metaphor, then the restriction of transitivity and uncontrollable complexity should become its inherent properties.

A heterarchically-structured society is always a General Intellect since it organises itself in irreversible time through the association of heterogeneous relations. Machines and media accelerate communication, making it more visible and partially computable, but they do not replace or reproduce it, since they do not see it as the reason for existence as people do. Of course, the actions of people and organisations are limited by their goals and functions but unlike machines, they make decisions on their own.

The multiple structure of heterarchy provides society with the experience and automaticity of action but denies its reflection as a source of organisation. Some opportunities provided by the General Intellect can be used, but it cannot be forced to conform to a specific institutional order. Control and variation have the same source: hierarchies of relations proliferate in a heterarchy while networks are a tool of proliferation. Along with control and application methods, the General Intellect produces methods of liberation, which come laden with new limitations. By destroying industrial institutions, network organisation has brought new hierarchies of control. This process is irreversible and only partially controllable: the processes and composition of topological distribution can vary while self-organisation of multitude will always remain exterior to any social order.

References

Badiou, A. (2003). Beyond Formalization. In *Angelaki*, 8 (2), 111-136.

Balibar, E. (1994). Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: the Fear of the Masses. In *Masses. Classes. Ideas.* New York: Routledge, 3-37.

Burt, R. (1992). *Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 313 p.

Delanda, M. (2006). *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.* London: Continuum. 150 p.

Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (2000). *Anti-Oedipus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* London: Continuum. 712 p.

Kerimov, T.Kh. (2012). Philosophy Concepts in the Contemporary World. In *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences*, 5(1), 76-85.

Krasavin, I. (2017). Heterarchy of the Multitude. In *Logos*, 3, 173-198.

Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason.* London: Verso. 288 p.

Lazzarato, M., Negri, A. (1991). Travail immateriel et subjectivite. *In Futur Antérieur*, 6, 86-89.

Matheron, A. (1988). *Individu et Communaute chez Spinoza.* Paris: Minuit. 647 p.

McCulloch, W.S. (1945). A Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Sets. In *Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics*, 7, 89-93.

Negri, A. (1991). *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 277 p.

Negri, A. (2002). Approximations towards an ontological definition of the multitude. In *Multitudes,* 9, 36-48.

Negri, A. (2003). *Time for Revolution*. New York: Continuum. 288 p.

Pasquinelli, M. (2013). Italian Operaismo and the Information Machine. In *Theory, Culture & Society,* 0(0), 1-20.

Pasquinelli, M. (2009). Google's PageRank Algorithm: A Diagram of the Cognitive Capitalism and the Rentier of the Common Intellect. In *Deep Search: The Politics of Search Beyond Google.* London: Transaction Publishers, 152-162.

Stark, D. (2011). *The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 264 p.

Tarde, G. (1903). *The Laws of Imitation.* New York: Henry Holt and Company. 450 p.

Vercellone, C. (2007). From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect: Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive Capitalism. In *Historical Materialism*, 5 (1), 13-36.

Virno, P. (2004). *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life.* New York: Semiotext(e). 117 p.

Virno, P. (2007). General intellect. In *Historical Materialism,*15 (3), 3-8.

Wolfe, C. (2010). The Social Brain: a Spinozist Reconstruction. In *Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science.* Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 366–374.

Zizek, S. (2006). *The Parallax View.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 429 p.

Онтология множества и гетерархия общего

Т.Х. Керимов, И.В. Красавин
Уральский федеральный университет им. первого Президента России Б.Н. Ельцина
Российская Федерация, Екатеринбург

Аннотация. В статье исследуется роль онтологии множества в обосновании гетерархической структуры общего. Это обоснование конкретизируется в определении ряда понятий и методологических средств теории общего интеллекта, которая развивается в интеллектуальном движении (пост)операизма. В данной теории общий интеллект используется для обозначения когнитивной способности общества, которая может освободить человека или быть эксплуатируема капитализмом. Общий интеллект является способностью общества к анализу, постановке целей, производства и одновременно виртуальным телом, топологически составленным социальными связями «телесных сингулярностей множества». В данной статье общий интеллект анализируется в качестве свойства структуры социальных связей (соединений), названной здесь гетерархией. Гетерархия в качестве структуры связей формирует различные виды сингулярностей: агрегаты (совокупности), производимые статистическими повторениями отношений, и индивидуальные эго, полагающие значения через постановку целей и другую интеллектуальную деятельность. Основной аргумент статьи заключается в том, что хотя в некоторой степени общий интеллект может обозначать способность к самоорганизации общества, его трудно отождествить только с одной конкретной институциональной организацией или политическим режимом. Общий интеллект появляется в любом виде социального структурирования посредством процессов самоорганизации.

Ключевые слова: общий интеллект, гетерархия, сингулярность, сложность, агрегат, множество, эго.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1310–1316

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0643
УДК 37.014.529

The Book as an Element of Atheistic Upbringing Through the Example of the Atheist Guide Series

Mariia V. Kolmakova*
Institute of Human Philosophy
Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia
St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Received 18.04.2020, received in revised form 27.07.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. The article concerns a series of *Atheist Guide* books, published by the Omsk publishing house within the period from 1983 to 1989. The books represent a developed atheist education system, which takes into account the peculiarities of the religious life in Omsk and the Omsk Region. The material of the books may be of interest to religious theorists and historians as a source of additional information about atheistic upbringing in Siberia. The authors of the series view religion as a naturally developing social phenomenon that evolves under various factors. At the same time, these texts consider religion to be a form of manifestation of the Omsk citizens' low education level. In general, the books in the series not only call for overcoming religious misconceptions but also for regarding religion as a phenomenon that plays an important role in the lives of Soviet people.

Keywords: scientific atheism, science of religion, USSR, Omsk, book series.

The research is funded by RFBR, project No. 19-311-60008.

Research area: Philosophy of Religion and Religious Studies. Art history and cultural studies.

Citation: Kolmakova, M.V. (2020). The book as an element of atheistic upbringing through the example of the atheist guide series. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1310–1316. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0643.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: kolmakovamv@yandex.ru
ORCID: 0000-0002-2859-7473

Introduction

In the 1980s, scientific and atheistic propaganda in Omsk was spread widely and covered almost all parts of the region. After the release of Resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (On Further Improvement of Ideological, Political and Educational Work (dd. April 26, 1979) and On Strengthening the Atheistic Upbringing (dd. September 22, 1981)), the pace and quality of the work increased, and Communist party officials, university and school teachers, students, journalists, and many others joined it with great diligence. Propaganda departments and the regional Scientific Atheism House widened the scope of their activities too. They hosted open lectures and discussions along with many other events.

The publication of methodical and supplementary literature for propagandists and lecturers was also one of the types of atheistic upbringing. These kinds of books always had several objectives, the primary goal being to increase the educators' public speaking proficiency and, consequently, the quality of education the listeners or students received. In the 1980s, a number of such publications had a quite obvious character of atheistic upbringing. Until the end of the 1980s, religion appeared in these texts as an undesirable part of the public life, with which the readers were urged to fight relentlessly.

Related Works

At present, there is a growing interest in the history of religious science in the USSR, and especially in the question of the place religion took in the Soviet people's life. Relatively recently, St. Petersburg (Smirnov, 2013; Shakhnovich, Chumakova 2014; 2016 etc.) and Moscow (Mitrokhin, 2008; Antonov, Vorontsova, Kolkunova, 2015 etc.) colleagues released great comprehensive publications on this topic. Modern bibliographic and historiographical analysis of texts published in the second half of the 20th century will significantly help to supplement the available information about the specifics of this scientific field development. Publications devoted to the history of religious science development in Siberia represent an important and in its own way unique experience coupled with a variety of regional and cultural specificities and thus are of special interest (Dashkovskii (ed.), 2007–2016; Khomushku, 2005; Dashkovski, 2011).

Book Series Analysis

In this article, we are going to consider four examples of brochures for teachers and educators united in the *Atheist Guide* series that was published in the period from 1983 to 1989 by the Omsk publishing house. The series had a recognizable design. The books were small in size (164 * 130 mm; about 5 printed sheets in volume) and were published in a soft colored paper cover, the style of which symbolized the transition of an enlightened person from the "darkness of religious ignorance" to the "light of atheistic knowledge". The book circulation was very impressive by today's standards: 5,000 copies. The list of authors included CPSU officials, scientists, university professors, representatives of the media, and other educators. The back of the title page of each book in the series contained an abstract with a keynote idea of "overcoming religious ignorance". Bearing the self-explanatory title *Atheist Guide*, the series can be very interesting for religious theorists, as the material represented within the covers of books is a striking example of educational literature for the scientific atheist workers, at the same time containing interesting facts about the religious life in Omsk and the region.

The first book, *Guiding a Person* (Zharinov et al., 1983), was published in 1983 and represented a collection of articles written by V.I. Zharinov (Head of Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Regional Committee of the CPSU), Iu.M. Shalaev (Associate Professor of Omsk State University, Candidate of Sciences in Philosophy), L. Shnyreva (Head of Propaganda and Agitation Department of Lubinsk Regional Committee of the CPSU), L. Zhilich (Deputy Editor of the Vechernii Omsk newspaper), A. Guchenkov (Senior Lecturer at Omsk Higher Militia School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Ph.D), G. Tatarinova (Head of CPSU related department of the Omskaia Pravda newspaper, M. Borovikov (Director of

the regional Scientific Atheism House). The publication's general tone was embodied in the title of its first article: Atheistic Upbringing Is an Important Task for Communist Party Organizations (Zharinov et al., 1983, 3–13). The author devoted a lot of attention to the history of the Omsk Region and the formation of its multi-confessional throng of believers: "Long before the Great October Socialist Revolution, a large number of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Germans moved to Western Siberia in search of a better life. The settlers often came in entire religious communities. Kazakhs sought refuge in Russian West Siberian steppes from their feudal lords called bais. In this way, Islam came to be close to the original Orthodoxy, Judaism – to the doctrine of Baptists and some sectarian communities, including Mennonites, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Adventists, etc. This kind of religious diversity has survived in the region to this day. There are eleven religious denominations in its territory" (Zharinov et al., 1983, 3–13). We should also note the conversational language of the narrative, which was rather conversational than popular scientific and thus solved one important task: easy and intelligible presentation allowed to draw into ranks of readers both potential atheistic education activists and all Soviet citizens en mass, that were interested or curious about religious matters. Obviously, these books were not intended to provide a general reader with deep theological knowledge of religious organizations' activity in the territory of the Omsk Region. Instead, they embodied the strategy of the government in relation to religion in general.

As in scientific researches of the 1980s, the first book of the *Atheist Guide* series fixed the idea that believers were not always anti-social elements, and there were also some known believers among model Soviet citizens: "relative to such people, as it was stressed at the Plenum, our methods should include education, persuasion, and propaganda" (Zharinov et al., 1983, 4). The book also emphasized the necessity of a respectful attitude to a person's feelings and beliefs: "patient, benevolent educational work, involvement in public life, promotion of active attitude to life, filling the labour activity with high social meaning. This is the way of spiritual liberation, restructuring of believers' consciousness, transition to the materialistic worldview position, and getting rid of religious illusions" (Zharinov et al., 1983, 4–5). The author claims that this approach allows achieving more significant results by minimizing conflicts with local residents, encouraging religious organizations to register their activities with the relevant authorities, etc.

The second book in the *Atheist Upbringing* series (Shalaev, 1986) was published in 1986. The monograph of Iu.M. Shalaev, Candidate of Sciences in Philosophy and Omsk State University professor, consists of two chapters: Real Socialism and Religion and How to Raise a Committed Atheist? It is important that the author concentrates not only on "overcoming religious prejudices" and repeatedly notes that "In atheistic work, we need to pay special attention to people, who have fallen under the influence of religious extremists… We must more actively involve believers in social and political affairs, expand their horizons, deepen their knowledge, and satisfy their 'secular' interests" (Shalaev, 1986, 45). Certain recommendations are offered regarding the content of atheistic upbringing, which should include "critical consideration of religion as a social phenomenon, scientific and materialistic explanation of laws of its origin, evolution, and ways of overcoming, as well as modern activities of religious associations" (Shalaev, 1986, 49). The book abounds in examples of conversations between atheistic lecturers and believers during lectures, as well as successful and unsuccessful answers to certain questions related to religion. It should be noted that Iu.M. Shalaev was actively engaged in scientific and educational work, exploring religions of Omsk and the Omsk Region (Shalaev, 1964, 1970, 1984, 1985 etc.), participating in a number of scientific and practical conferences and editorial boards of several publications, which in one way or another concerned the topic of religion and Soviet people (Sadretdinov (ed.), 1986; Vetoshkin (ed.), 1988). His texts testify to a deep understanding of the life of believers of different faiths in the city of Omsk (Filatov, 2006).

The third book, *The Overcoming* (Ol'khov, Ianev, 1988), logically continues the

narrative of the first two books. As we can see from the title, the book urges to "overcome religious prejudices" and to "form a scientific worldview", which is confirmed by the content of chapters *What Is a Modern Believer Like?*, *What Are the Priests Calling For*, *Do Religious Prejudices Do Harm*, etc. A special feature of the publication is frequent references to statistical data of scientific researches on the quantitative and qualitative composition of believers in Omsk and the region, with authors also citing the data of various sociological surveys conducted among the believers. The authors emphasize: "Moreover, these differences ultimately determined by social causes are also influenced by some form of religion, traditions and customs, way of life, historical and local conditions, which can in each case be very different. This once again confirms the need for their careful study" (Ol'khov, Ianev, 1988: 18). The book pays special attention to the opposition between the ritual, ideological positions inherent in the representatives of various religious and Soviet organizations. The priority in all cases is naturally given to the latter. It is important that the book is, on the one hand, a repetition of the main theses presented in the previous books of the series (heterogeneity of the composition of believers, history of the religious expansion in Siberia, the need of collective effort to "overcome religious misconceptions", etc.), while, on the other hand, it prepares the reader for the content of the fourth book, in which the main place would be given to a believer's personality.

The fourth book, *The Way to the Heart and Mind* (Foigel', 1989), terminates the cycle of narratives about working with believers. This book is a guide to individual work with each believer and clearly shows the scheme of actions for an atheistic educator to undertake in various situations arising in his/her educational work. It is important to note that the main theme of the entire presentation is a respectful, but very persistent, attitude to believers: "Without imposing obvious analogies on a believer, one can make them think about the main question: how does the God of their religion differ from the God of a different religion?" (Foigel', 1989, 74). In addition to direct "overcoming", a special role is given to securing the achieved result, i.e. creation of 'atheist conviction': "It is very difficult for a person, who has just broken up with religion, to move on to a materialistic understanding of social processes. After all, they are leaping from one level of knowledge to another, and if there is no one to help, such persons will not be able to do it on their own" (Foigel', 1989, 81). The author also mentions the pertaining dangers. Some of them are very curious, like the belief in science: "For example, the idea of science in the service of mankind is beautiful. However, assuming that belief in it on this basis is beautiful too would be wrong, because science requires studying and knowledge, rather than belief. An atheist should tactfully call the attention of a former believer to every misstep of this kind" (Foigel', 1989, 82). The authors note that the ultimate understanding for any atheistic educator is the idea that a believer is, first of all, a Soviet citizen, who requires the same support and development as any other member of the society, who can benefit the common goals. The goal of atheistic upbringing was to organically include believers in the well-functioning mechanism of the Soviet society.

Conclusion

The *Atheist Guide* series is a complete supporting package of materials for the atheistic upbringing that, according to the authors, included four levels for a student: 1) awareness of religion as an undesirable component in the Soviet people's life; 2) balancing the world outlook priorities in accordance with atheistic propaganda; 3) overcoming religious prejudices through the involvement of believers in activities of the Soviet society; 4) replacing the religious component with the atheist. The four small books contain the whole atheistic upbringing system based on actual knowledge about features of religious life in Omsk and the region. The authors of the series consider religion as a naturally developing phenomenon that evolves under various factors of people's daily life and changes depending on the social and political environment. While scholars in their researches increasingly revealed the failure of the idea of the com-

plete overcoming of religious views through the results of scientific achievements (Kapustin, 1984; Elenskii, 1989; Mitrokhin, 1973 et al.), the authors of the considered books did not demonstrate such views (here, we need to take into account the nature and the target audience of publications). At the same time, the authors of the series still perceived religious faith as a lack of education on the part of citizens, which required methodical educational interventions. A large number of scientific and statistical materials significantly enriched the content of these books, and their specific language made the texts accessible (primarily in their meaning) to a wide range of educators and students.

As a result, the book series views religion as a complex social phenomenon dependent upon a number of historical and regional features, having its own causes of origin and development, and in general playing an important role in the life of Soviet people.

References

Antonov, K.M., Vorontsova, E.V., Kolkunova, K.A. (2015). *"Nauka o religii", "Nauchnyi ateizm", "Religiovedenie": aktual'nye problemy nauchnogo izucheniia religii v Rossii XX – nachala XXI v.* [*"Science of Religion", "Scientific Atheism", "Religious Studies": Actual Problems of the Scientific Study of Religion in Russia of the XX – Beginning of the XXI Century*]. 2-nd ed. Moscow, Orthodox St. Tikhon Humanitarian University, 263 p.

Dashkovskii, P.K. (ed.) (2007–2016). *Mirovozzrenie naseleniia Iuzhnoi Sibiri i Tsentral'noi Azii v istoricheskoi retrospective* [*The Worldview of the Population of Southern Siberia and Central Asia in Historical Retrospective*]. Barnaul, Azbuka.

Dashkovskii, P.K. (2011). *Mirovozzrenie kochevnikov Saiano-Altaia i sopredel'nykh territorii pozdnei drevnosti i rannego srednevekov'ia (otechestvennaia istoriografiia i sovremennye issledovaniia)* [*The Worldview of the Nomads of the Sayan-Altai and Adjacent Territories of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Russian Historiography and Modern Research)*]. Barnaul, Altai State University, 243 p.

Elenskii, V.E. (1989). *Protestantskoe sektantstvo v sovetskom obshchestve: analiz adaptivnykh protsessov* [*Protestant Sectarianism in Soviet Society: an Analysis of Adaptive Processes*]. Kiev, 17 p.

Filatov, V.I. (2006). O kafedre filosofii [On the Department of Philosophy]. In *Ocherki istorii Omskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta v vospominaniiakh, dokumentakh, litsakh* [*Essays on the History of Omsk State University in Memoirs, Documents, Faces*]. Omsk, 131–132.

Filist, G.M. (1986). *Urbanizatsiia i sektantstvo* [*Urbanization and Sectarianism*]. Minsk, 126, [2] p.

Foigel', A.M. (1989). *Put' k serdtsu i razumu* [*Way to Heart and Reason*]. Omsk, Omsk Book Publishing House, 110, [2] p.

Kapustin, N.S. (1984). *Osobennosti evoliutsii religii: na materialakh drevnikh verovanii i khristianstva* [*Features of the Evolution of Religion: on the Materials of Ancient Beliefs and Christianity*]. Moscow, 222 p.

Khomushku, O.M. (2005). *Religiia v kul'ture narodov Saiano-Altaia* [*Religion in the Culture of the Peoples of Sayano-Altai*]. Moscow, Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation, 227 p.

Mitrokhin, L.N. (1973). Khristianstvo v epokhu nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii. Stat'i 1–3 [Christianity in the Era of the Scientific and Technological Revolution. Articles 1 to 3]. In *Nauka i religiia* [*Science and Religion*], 6, 28–34; 8, 9–14; 11, 29–35.

Mitrokhin, L.N. (2008). *Filosofskie problemy religiovedeniia* [*Philosophical Problems of Religious Studies*]. St. Petersburg, Russian Christian Academy of Humanities, 1046 p.

Ol'khov, O.P., Ianev, I.G. (1988). *Preodolenie* [*Overcoming*]. Omsk, Omsk Book Publishing House, 109, [3] p.

Sadretdinov, G.K. (ed.) (1986). *Problemy ideino-politicheskoi bor'by v stranakh Zapadnoi Evropy v novoe i noveishee vremia* [*Problems of the Ideological and Political Struggle in Western Europe in Modern and Recent Times*]. Omsk, Omsk State University, 100 p.

Shakhnovich, M.M., Chumakova, T.V. (2014). *Muzei istorii religii Akademii nauk SSSR i rossiiskoe religiovedenie (1932–1961)* [*The Museum of the History of Religion of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Russian Religious Studies (1932–1961)*]. St. Petersburg, Nauka, 458 p.

Shakhnovich, M.M., Chumakova, T.V. (2016). *Ideologiia i nauka: izuchenie religii v epokhu kul'turnoi revoliutsii v SSSR* [*Ideology and Science: the Study of Religion in the Era of the Cultural Revolution in the USSR*]. St. Petersburg, Nauka, 367 p.

Shalaev, Y.M. (1964). *Sovremennoe pravoslavie i nauka. O bogoslovskikh popytkakh primireniia religii i nauki* [*Modern Orthodoxy and Science. On Theological Attempts to Reconcile Religion and Science*]. Moscow, Mysl', 87 p.

Shalaev, Y.M. (1970). *Osobennosti sovremennogo etapa bor'by nauki i religii* [*Features of the Modern Stage in the Struggle of Science and Religion*]. Omsk, 29 p.

Shalaev, Y.M. (1984). Ekzamen na zrelost' [Maturity exam]. In *Sovetskaia Rossiia* [*Soviet Russia*], 21 March.

Shalaev, Y.M. (1985). Rol' predmeta "Osnovy nauchnogo ateizma" v formirovanii nauchno-ateisticheskogo mirovozzreniia studencheskoi molodezhi [The Role of the Subject "Fundamentals of Scientific Atheism" in the formation of the Students' Scientific and Atheistic Worldview]. In *Aktual'nye voprosy teorii i praktiki kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia studencheskoi molodezhi. Tezisy dokladov i nauchnykh soobshchenii oblastnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii* [*Actual Issues of the Theory and Practice of Communist Education of Student Youth. Abstracts of Reports and Scientific Reports of the Regional Scientific and Practical Conference*]. Omsk, 81–84.

Shalaev, Y.M. (1986). *Vospitat' ateista* [*To Raise an Atheist*]. Omsk, Omsk Book Publishing House, 108, [4] p.

Smirnov, M.Y. (2013). *Religiia i religiovedenie v Rossii* [*Religion and Religious Studies in Russia*]. St. Petersburg, 365 p.

Vetoshkin, A.P. (ed.) (1988). *Chelovecheskii faktor v mekhanizme uskoreniia obshchestvennogo progressa: vospitanie i obrazovanie: Tezisy dokladov nauchnoi konferentsii "Chelovecheskii faktor v mekhanizme uskoreniia obshchestvennogo progressa: problemy formirovaniia aktivizatsii"* [*The Human Factor in the Mechanism of Accelerating Social Progress: Upbringing and Education. Abstracts of the Scientific Conference "The Human Factor in the Mechanism of Accelerating Social Progress: the Problems of the Formation of Activation"*]. Omsk, Omsk State University, 229 p.

Zharinov, V.I., Shalaev, Y.M., Shnyreva, L., Zhilich, L., Guchenkov, A., Tatarinova, G., Borovikov, M. (1983). *Pomoch' cheloveku* [*To Help a Person*]. Omsk, Omsk Book Publishing House, 68, [4] p.

Книга как элемент атеистической воспитательной работы на примере серии «В помощь атеисту»

М.В. Колмакова
Институт философии человека
Российский государственный педагогический университет им. А.И. Герцена
Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург

Аннотация. Статья посвящена серии книг «В помощь атеисту», опубликованных в период с 1983 по 1989 год в Омском книжном издательстве. Книги содержат четко разработанную атеистическую воспитательную систему, учитывающую особенности религиозной жизни г. Омска и области. Материал, заключенный в книгах, может быть интересен религиоведам и историкам в качестве вспомогательного комплекса сведений об атеистическом воспитании в Сибири. Авторы серии рассматривают религию в качестве закономерно развивающегося социального явления, эволюционирующего в соответствии с различными факторами, но в то же время религия в этих текстах является одной из форм проявления низкого уровня образованности граждан. В целом, книги серии призывают не только «преодолевать религиозные заблуждения», но воспринимать религию как феномен играющий важную роль в жизни советских людей.

Ключевые слова: научный атеизм, наука о религии, СССР, Омск, книжная серия.

Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ в рамках научного проекта № 19–311–60008.

Научная специальность: 09.00.14 – философия религии и религиоведение. Искусствоведение и культурология.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1317–1337

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0647
УДК 101.1

Theological and Epistemological Principles of Ancient Natural Science

Natalia P. Koptseva and Ksenia V. Reznikova*
Siberian Federal University
Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation

Received 29.07.2020, received in revised form 05.08.2020, accepted 12.08.2020

Abstract. The article discusses methodology of ancient natural science based on the analysis of the fragment 29cd from Plato's "Timaeus" and Comments on this fragment, which were written by Proclus Dyadochus. Particular focus is on the Plato's views on science as "plausible myth", "probable narration", εἰκότα μῦθον. The authors also consider the concept of διάνοια, "dianoetic virtue" in the "Nicomachean Ethics" by Aristotle and Aquinas' Comments on fragments of the"Nicomachean Ethics" where "dianoetic virtues" are examined. Scientific and medical treatises of the great ancient physician Claudius Galen are defined in this article as universal standard of scientific knowledge. The second chapter of the Galen's Treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" is seen in more detail so that the main constituents of the Galen's scientific method get a full coverage.

Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Proclus Dyadochus, Claudius Galen, "Timaeus", "Republic", "Nicomachean Ethics", ancient science, the scientific method of Galen, Comments on "Timaeus", Comments "On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato".

Research area: philosophy; culturology.

Citation: Koptseva, N.P., Reznikova, K.V. (2020). Theological and epistemological principles of ancient natural science. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1317–1337. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0647.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: axu-ta@mail.ru; decanka@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000–0003–3910–7991 (Koptseva); 0000–0003–0889–4582 (Reznikova)

Theological and gnoseological origin of ancient natural science

The development of ancient natural science is closely connected with the development of ancient philosophy, with the study of the possibilities of human cognition, with the search for tools for a correct, accurate understanding of the Cosmos and Nature. Ancient Greece is considered the ancestor of modern natural science. This succession is probably rooted in certain cultural and religious customs of ancient Greeks, which distinguished them from neighbouring nations. For instance, the religious thinking of ancient Greeks includes an understanding (along with the concepts of gods, demons, heroes, a variety of animated elements and other religious objects) that there is a universal law, which even gods are subject to. Moreover, these are the gods who establish this universal law for people and monitor how they obey it. Most often it is obviously a moral law. In poem "Works and Days" Hesiod writes: "You kings! Guard against these things and make straight your words, you devourers of gifts! And put crooked *dikai* out of your mind completely"[1].

Hesiod cites the universal law of *dikē* – truth. This law is recognized by Zeus and the other gods. All men follow the universal law. This is not the law of violence, but the law of Truth. An ancient Greek poet and lyricist Theognis of Megara appeals to Zeus himself and asks him why this universal law of Truth is not observed among the people that Zeus rules:

> 373 Dear Zeus! I marvel at Thee. Thou art lord of all, alone having honour and great power; well knowest Thou the heart and mind of every man alive; and Thy might, O King, is above all things. How then is it, Son of Cronus, that Thy mind can bear to hold the wicked and the righteous in the same esteem, whether a man's mind be turned to temperateness, or, unrighteous works persuading, to wanton outrage? <…> he endureth much shame and yieldeth to Want who teacheth all evil, both lies and deceits and baleful contentions, even to him that will not and to whom no ill is fitting; for hard is the perplexity that cometh of her[2] (Theognis of Megara)

The desire to know the exact organization of the Cosmos with the aim to understand the universal law governing this Cosmos and human fates creates a need for cognition. This

---

[1] ἡ δέ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα,
κυδρή τ᾽ αἰδοίη τε θεῶν, οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.
καί ῥ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄν τίς μιν βλάπτῃ σκολιῶς ὀνοτάζων,
αὐτίκα πὰρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι
260γηρύετ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον, ὄφρ᾽ ἀποτίσῃ
δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων, οἳ λυγρὰ νοεῦντες
ἄλλῃ παρκλίνωσι δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες.
ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι, βασιλῆς, ἰθύνετε †δίκας
δωροφάγοι, σκολιέων δὲ δικέων ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθεσθε.
265οἶ γ᾽ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,
ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.
πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας
καί νυ τάδ᾽, αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσ᾽, ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει,
οἵην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει.

Then there is the virgin *Dikē*, born of Zeus.
She has great esteem and *aidōs* among the gods who abide in Olympus.
Whenever someone does her harm, using crooked words,
right away she takes her place at the side of Zeus son of Kronos,
[260] and she proclaims the *noos* of men that is without *dikē*, with the result that the people have to pay retribution
for the deeds of recklessness committed by their kings. These kings, having baneful thoughts in their *noos*,
pronounce *dikai* in a crooked way, making them veer and go astray.

You kings! Guard against these things and make straight your words,
you devourers of gifts! And put crooked *dikai* out of your mind completely.
[265] The man who plans misfortune for another man is planning misfortune for himself.
A bad plan is the worst plan for the one who planned it.
The Eye of Zeus sees all and takes note of all in his *noos*.
If he so wishes, he will watch over the present situation. It does not escape his notice
what kind of *dikē* this present *dikē* is that the *polis* holds within itself.
(Hesiod, "Works and Days" 2019)

[2] 373 Ζεῦ φίλε, θαυμάζω σε· σὺ γὰρ πάντεσσιν ἀνάσσεις
τιμὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν·
375 ἀνθρώπων δ' εὖ οἶσθα νόον καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου·
σὸν δὲ κράτος πάντων ἔσθ' ὕπατον, βασιλεῦ.
πῶς δή σευ, Κρονίδη, τολμᾶι νόος ἄνδρας ἀλιτρούς
ἐν ταὐτῇ μοίρῃ τόν τε δίκαιον ἔχειν,
ἦν τ' ἐπὶ σωφροσύνην τρεφθῇ νόος ἦν τε πρὸς ὕβριν
380 ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοισ' ἔργμασι πειθομένων;
οὐδέ τι κεκριμένον πρὸς δαίμονός ἐστι βροτοῖσιν,
οὐδ' ὁδὸν ἥντιν' ἰὼν ἀθανάτοισιν ἄδοι.

religious and moral need gives birth to philosophy and natural science. Ancient natural science cannot be considered separately from mysterial practices and/or philosophy. Natural science can be seen as an intellectual practice and as a craft, as the activity of people who direct the process of the world cognition based on the inner structure of the world itself. It is hardly possible to grasp a specific method of the scientists of the ancient world without taking into account integrity, logical reasoning and consistency of the ancient world understanding.

The origins of natural sciences in the ancient world lie in the mysterial religion. The ultimate goal of cognition is the achievement of immortality, the transformation of a mortal man into an immortal deity. The goal for both natural science and religion is the same, i.e. *θέωσις*. There are different ways to succeed in that:

> 5 I've broken free from an ill-fated, painful circle,
> Like a quick-legged runner, I've reached the longed-for crown.
> 6 I plunged into the bosom of the Lady, of the Underground Queen.
> "Blessed and happy, you will be God instead of a mortal!
> (Orphic tablet)

The striving to transform a mortal man into an immortal deity and the search for effective ways to bring a man to *θέωσις* beget the whole Hellenic system of cognition, including religious-mystical, philosophical and natural-scientific types of learning. The distinctive features of the natural-scientific cognition of Antiquity are these:

1) rationalism, the study of human abilities in their effort to understand the true structure of the Cosmos;

2) desire to single the signs of the Sacred Unity within the sensual Cosmos, to confirm that even in the untrue and fragmented reality the theologian and philosopher is able to find an incremental way to the Unity;

3) making Good on the anthropological level of being, multiplying the benefits, exchange of good deeds by people, practical orientation of cognition.

Skepticism is evidently important for natural science, it is typical of ancient scientists and their works are steeped in it. Thus, the famous Treatise "Περὶ ἱερῆς νόσου" ("On the Sacred Disease") from Hippocratic Corpus begins with a very emotional assessment of those who do not distinguish between "sacred' and "charlatanism": "With regard to the disease called sacred I may say it seems to me neither more divine, no more sacred than others, but rather it has the same nature of origin as other diseases. Its nature and cause are called by some a divine case because of their inexperience and wonder, because it is not at all similar to other diseases"[3] (Hippocrates, 1936). Although Galen believed that this work belongs not to Hippocrates himself, but any of his followers, nevertheless he highly valued this text (Hippocrates, 1936: 494).

Theology, philosophy and practical utility were the ancestors of ancient natural science. Theology sets goals for natural science, it gives meaning to its intellectual and other practices, philosophy implies methodological support, and practical activity allows natural science to reproduce the good at the anthropological level of existence. There is a firm belief that the origin of natural science is in magic. A detailed study on this issue was made by G.E.R. Lloyd (1979). Natural science emerges as a kind of magic with the perfected method of obtaining knowledge and with the result that can be reproduced many times (ideally, ad infinitum) in similar starting conditions. This initial connection of theology, philosophy and natural science was destroyed in the New Age science, when metaphysical questions were not regarded within scientific experiments and judgments. However, this does not mean that

[3] Περὶ μὲν τῆς ἱερῆς νούσου καλεομ ένης ὧδ'ἔχει· οὐδέν τί μοι δοκέει τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱερωτέρη, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχει ἣν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ νουσήματα, ὅθεν γίνεται. Φύσιν δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ πρόφασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐνόμισαν θεῖόν τι πρῆγμα εἶναι ὑπὸ ἀπειρίης καὶ θαυμασιότητος, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν ἑτέρῃσι νούσοισιν· καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπορίην αὐτοῖσι τοῦ μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ θεῖον αὐτῇ διασώζεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίην τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἰήσιος ᾧ ἰῶνται, ἀπόλλυται, ὅτι καθαρμοῖσί τε ἰῶνται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσιν

this connection has disappeared. Even today no one questions paradigmality of scientific knowledge.

In the Foreword to the work "Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science" Alexei Fyodorovich Losev writes about the commensuration of ancient science and modern science:

"Has science ever experienced such an acute crisis and change of physical worldview, as the one we observe now? And has there ever been a debate in science about such fundamental concepts? It is no wonder that many of the physical theories of antiquity emerge, but only in the shell of precise knowledge" (Losev, 1993: 63).

He also points out that ancient science is to be deduced of mystical mythology. By defining Greek philosophy as a logical construction of myth (Losev, 1993: 76), A.F. Losev also introduces the ancient science into this logical construction, into the dialectics of myth. The origin of the conceptual construction of the myth is "Infinity", Ἱερός λόγος, "Sacred Word". A.F. Losev gives the shortest formula for dialectics (both ancient and modern): "The dialectical method consists in consistently distinguishing 'one' and 'another', 'definite' and 'infinite" (Losev, 1993: 104). This restriction is implemented through a number, ἀριθμός.

A.F. Losev states that ancient science is the dialectics of Cosmos, which has 4 origins, 4 sources: 1) "Ether", Monada, Nus; 2) Dyad, primordial matter, apeyron and matter together; 3) Time, Χρόνός, Soul (according to Plotinus); 4) Inevincibility (Ἀδραστεια), Necessity (Ανγκη), Revenge (Δίκη), World Law (Νόμος) (Losev, 1993: 77-79). Thus, it is possible to evince the wholeness of the ancient knowledge and to understand the ancient natural science as a necessary constituent of the eternal mystery, the dialectics of the limit and the limitless (infinite) which unfolds in the Cosmos itself and in the man who comprehends Cosmos's eidos and merges with it.

Theory and practice were merged in ancient natural science, which is clearly seen in the example of medicine. For the first time the high status of a doctor was described by Homer in "Iliad":

> "A wise physician skill'd our wounds to heal, Is more than armies to the public weal"[4] (Iliad, 11, 514-515).

It is a different matter that Plato esteemed the development of courts and hospitals not an exuberance, but rather a decline of the state, as this development shows that neither soul nor body of the state citizens are healthy thanks to proper education and upbringing; that citizens need external coercion and treatment.

> "It is not the body that is treated by the body, otherwise it would be impossible that doctors themselves could have a bad bodily condition, no, the body is treated by the soul, but it cannot be treated well in such a way. If the doctor's soul is bad or has become such" (Plato, State, 408e).

Cicero, who believed that he should become a Roman Plato, used the image of a doctor along with the image of a helmsman three times in his dialogue "De re publica" ("On the State"); it was done in order to show the meaning of the ruler (Emperor) in the State. For instance, one of the participants in the dialogue, Scipio, while arguing that the state should be ruled by the few best people, tells his interlocutor:

> "Just as a fair voyage is the intention of the helmsman, the ship is to be entrusted to one helmsman, health of the sick is to be entrusted to one physician (if they both are masters in what they do), it is more rightful than to entrust these things to many" (Cicero, 1994: 77).

Comparison with the helmsman and the physician is repeated by St. John Chrysostom, though it is not the governor he compares with the helmsman and the physician, but the God:

> "Those travelling by the ship do not give stern orders to the helmsman how to hold the helm in a known way and to direct the ship, but, sitting on the deck, they trust his

[4] ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων
οὑς τ' ἐκτάμνειν ἐπί τ' ἤπια φάρμακα πάσσειν.

> mastery not only when the sea is calm and the ship sails safely, but also when there is a threatening situation; but only in God alone, who cares for us, they are not eager to trust; they can be likened to a sick man, who asks a doctor to give him /her not what stops the disease, but what nourishes the matter which is the mother of the disease" (Chrysostom, 12, 576 (The Word of Diseases and Doctors)).

Either St. John Chrysostom knew Cicero's works well, or the comparison with the doctor and the helmsman may have spread everywhere and was at the time understood by every reader. Therefore, in different epochs this comparison was used either for describing the Emperor (Cicero), or God (St. John Chrysostom), signalling the transformation of the Roman state in the Christian one.

Medical research is a kind of the core of ancient natural science. It brings together the natural, human and divine, here the courageous spirit can find its room in a healthy body:

> "…your prayer must be that you may have a sound mind in a sound body.
> Pray for a bold spirit, free from all dread of death;
> that reckons the closing scene of life among Nature's
> kindly boons; that can endure labor, whatever it be…"[5] (Juvenal, 2010: 356-359).

Hippocrates believed that medicine had already evolved both in terms of method and content. Having its own methods and content, it provided room for further improvement.

> "From olden times medicine has had every means available, it has found both the origin and the method, thanks to which in this long period of time, much wonderful has been discovered and the rest will be found, if someone, being thoroughly prepared and knowing the already found, will strive for the research based on the knowledge got" (Hippocrates, 1936, 147, "On Ancient Medicine").

There are all the major characteristics of science: method, specific content, openness to further development. Is it good or bad for medicine to be treated as a science? After all, the same Hippocrates calls it art and says that it has its own artists.

The most important question remains unclear, what was the status of natural sciences in Antiquity? The status of science was to be perceived as "a plausible myth" and "nothing more". Hence the dialogue "Timaeus" outlines the result of application of human cognitive abilities and the sum of knowledge received with their help, i.e. εἰκότα μῦθον, a plausible myth (a fairy tale, a fable). Is it possible to surmise that during more than a thousand years of history of Ancient Greece, Hellenism, Ancient Rome, Late Antiquity, the status of natural science remained unchanged? The time may not have come to answer the second question yet, nevertheless, the first question is actively discussed in the academic environment.

Suffice it to say that P.P. Gaidenko believes that Plato's reasoning about the "plausible myth" in the dialogue "Timaeus" is a reasoning about natural science, about physics, which cannot claim to be called science to the full extent (Gaidenko). The word "plausibility" is frequent in this dialogue when the astronomer and mathematician Timaeus narrates a story of the Universe from the idea of demiurge and its incarnation in a living being of the Universe to the appearance of people in the Universe. The direct modelling of the Universe in the dialogue "Timaeus" is preceded by the insistent reminder that this modelling is nothing more than εἰκότα μῦθον – a probable, believable story:

> "On the contrary, we should rejoice if our reasoning turns out to be no less plausible than any other, and at the same time remember that both I, the reasoner, and you, my judges, are only people, and therefore in such circumstances we have to be con-

[5] Órandúm (e)st ut sít mens sán(a) in córpore sáno.
Fórtem pósc(e) animúm, mortís terróre caréntem,
Quí spatiúm vit(ae) éxtrem(um) inter múnera pónat
Náturáe, qui férre queát quos cúmque labóres

> tent with a plausible myth, not demanding more"[6].

The English translation (by R.D. Archer-Hind) for rendering the expression μῦθον μῦθον uses the term "likelihood", i.e. probability, Thomas Taylor in his translation writes "probable narration"; the German translation (made by Franz Susemihl) contains the term "Wahrscheinlichkeit", i.e. probability, likelihood, plausibility, in the translation by S. S. Averintsev we see "a probable myth" (Averintsev, S.S. Timaeus, 29d). Thus, Plato defines science as "probabilistic" knowledge, as "plausible story", εἰκότα μῦθον.

S.V. Mesiats first drew attention to the importance of this definition of science as "a plausible myth", μῦθον μῦθον, in her article "Modern Science and Plato's Myth". She asserts that Plato "has guessed all the main features of New European science" (Mesiats, 2007). It is possible that M. Heidegger also thought about science in ancient understanding as an imperfect form of knowledge; he called philosophy after Plato a mistake, which, however, could not have been avoided and which had led European nations to the technical dimension of being" (Heidegger, 1993).

It is known that the dialogue "Timaeus" has been abundantly commented by the Neoplatonians of Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance, as well as by Arab thinkers. The contemporary of Heidegger, the great German physicist Werner Heisenberg, addressed the dialogue in his article "The Meaning of Beauty in Exact Sciences". Heisenberg, as the creator of quantum mechanics, testifies that in the historical debate about the primary elements the winner is Plato with his mathematical ideal forms, and not Democritus, who understood the mainstay of the world as a substance (Heisenberg, 1987: 267-282). That being said Plato for modern science is not so much the author of a successful hypothesis about the primary elements, but the creator of scientific meta-theory, philosophy, where the place of scientific natural science is defined in a sufficiently accurate way.

To understand the essence of the theological and philosophical methodology of ancient natural science there shall be analysed the commentary of Proclus Dyadochus on a fragment of the dialogue "Timaeus 29cd", where Plato depicts scientific knowledge as a "plausible myth", probabilistic knowledge, εἰκότα μῦθον.

Comments on the Dialogue "Timaeus" by Proclus Dyadochus, fragment 29cd. A plausible myth

A.F. Losev refers to Marinus's remark in Proclus's biography that Proclus was 27 years old when he wrote his commentary on Plato's Dialogue "Timaeus", and that this was probably the first work by Proclus:

> "13 By an intense and unresting labor by day and night, he succeeded in recording in writing, along with his own critical remarks, the doctrine which he heard discussed, and of which he finally made a synoptic outline, making such progress that at the age of twenty-eight years, he had composed many treatises, among others a Commentary on the Timaeus, written with utmost elegance and science. Through these prolonged and inspiring studies, to science he added virtue, increasing the moral beauty of his nature" (Marinus of Samaria, 1925).

But A.F. Losev, having indicated that Proclus's commentary contains references to almost all the ancient commentators of this dialogue, supposes that this comprehensive and thorough work, in terms of its coverage of commentators, was hardly written by Proclus in some definite period of his life: "Such a unique work in the history of philosophy, of course, cannot fit into any chronological framework" (Losev, 1988: 37).

Losev highlights that the Proclus's judgment that the dialogue "Timaeus" is a direct continuation of the dialogue "State", and this is very important in the context of the study of platonism as a gnoseological basis of ancient natural science (Losev, 1988: 53).

[6] μὴ θαυμάσῃς· ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένους ὡς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ [29d] ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν.

The commentary by Proclus's Dyadochus on Plato's "Timaeus" was highly appreciated by Thomas Taylor, an outstanding British researcher and the first translator of Proclus's Dyadochus into English. In the preface to the publication of this commentary T. Taylor posits:

> "Of that golden chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato, Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link" (http://meuser.awardspace.com/Neo-Platonics/33700322-Proclus-Commentary-on-the-Timaeus-of-Plato-all-five-books.pdf).

Studies of Proclus Diadochus's comments on Plato's "Timaeus" were carried out by the following Western researchers: K.E.A. Schmidt (De Timaeo Platonis ex Procli commentariis restituendo. Stettin. By Gedruckt bie H.G. Offenbart, 1842. 45 p.), Giorgio De Santillana (The origins of scientific thought (from Anaximander to Proclus, 600 D.C. to 300 A.D.). New York. Published by New American Library of World Literature, 1961, 320 p.), Thomas Whittaker (The Neo Platonists a Study in the History of Hellenism. Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Pub., 2005, 485 p.), Alain Lernould (Physique et theologie. Lecture du Timee de Platon par Proclus. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, c2001. 405 p.), John Phillips (John Phillips Order from Disoder. Proclus Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition. Series editors: Robert M. Berchman (Dowling College, Bard College), and John F. Finamore (University of Iowa), 280 p., Published July 20, 2007 by Brill Academic Publishers), Marije Martijn (Proclus on nature (philosophy of nature and its methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus). Leiden; Boston: Brill, c2010. IX, 360 p.)

Fragments of the commentary have been translated into Russian by A.V. Petrov (http://centant.spbu.ru/plat/proklos/works/tim_1/000.htm) and in 2012 line by line "Commentary on "Timaeus" (translated from Greek) was published in Russian (Mesiats, 2012). However, the fragment 29cd which is interesting to us has not been published in Russian yet.

Proclus Dyadochus in his commentary on "Timeaeus", 29d, gives a detailed interpretation of this important for understanding ancient natural science thesis of Plato about human science as a probabilistic knowledge, a plausible myth and nothing more. First and foremost, Proclus Dyadochus reveals the gnoseological obstacles associated with the materially incarnate Cosmos. The physical, material Cosmos has been fragmented into many things, the essence of which is just being formed and is not realised within this Cosmos in a holistic and indivisible way. Being an object of cognition, the material Cosmos is not in its true state, but rather in the state of alleged fragmentation, the dissociation of individual things:

> "107A Timaeus reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accuracy in physical discussions; first, from the essence of the things. For from immaterial natures becoming material, from impartibly partible, from separate natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming individual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms"[7] (translated by T. Taylor).

The second gnoseological obstacle is related to the cognitive abilities of man, which consist of both sensual sensations and the mind reasoning. Inconsistency, the difference between the form of knowledge and the form of things is the second explanation for the lack of scientific knowledge, according to Proclus Dyadochus:

> "But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any

[7] 107 A. Διχόθεν ὁ Τίμαιος τὸ μὴ ἀραρὸς μηδ' ἀκριβὲς τῶν περὶ τῆς φύσεως λόγων ὑπέμνησεν, ἔκ τε τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσίας –ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀύλων ἔνυλα γενόμενα καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμερίστων μεριστὰ καὶ ἀπὸ χωριστῶν ἐν ἀλλοτρία ἕδρα καὶ ἀπὸ καθολικῶν ἄτομα καὶ μερικὰ τὸν ἐπιστηνονικὸν καὶ ἀνέλεγκτον οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται λόγον, ὅς τοῖς καθόλου καὶ τοῖς ἀύλοις ἐφαρμόζει καὶ τοῖς ἀμερίστοις εἴδεσι

> thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge coordinate to them"[8] (translated by T. Taylor).

Direct human knowledge is sensual knowledge, says Proclus Dyadochus: αὕτη δὲ αἴσθησις (28).

Proclus Dyadochus provides rationale for that human nature alone cannot produce intelligent, pure, holistic knowledge that constitutes unity with things learned. Anthropological forms of knowledge are always distorted by the material substrate through which the cognitive process takes place. It is conceivable that in the material Cosmos there are divine levels of Being, where knowledge and object coincide, nonetheless it is not an anthropological space of Cosmos, but divine one:

> "And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and darkened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that B which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they intellectually perceive them after the abovementioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known"[9] (translated by T. Taylor).

Proclus Dyadochus brings to a logical conclusion his idea of the impossibility of cognition in anthropological status. He maintains that the very thirst for knowledge, the desire to know something is but testifying to the initial and inexpugnable inability of man to know the essence. In true quality, the cognizable and the cognizant are inseparable. Their separation is a distortion per se. In this separation, no cognition can be genuine. Even at the level of gods, cognition is not absolutely genuine, because every god has his own character, his own personality, which distorts the essence, as soon as this essence appears external to the cognizant:

> "Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word "mythos" a fable [used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature"[10] (translated by T. Taylor).

What is particularly significant here is the "circular" form of commentary on 29d. Proclus Dyadochus, upholding the intermediate conclusion of his interpretation of "the divine Plato", returns to Plato's characterization of scientific cognition as μῦθος ἐνδείκνθται and lays down that this is a kind of human destiny, and it is necessary to forgive people for that we are able to create only more or less plausible myth, a fictitious story about the Cosmos and its things, as this is human nature.

Proclus believes that Plato's physics in the dialogue "Timaeus" is superior to Aristotle's. He sees Aristotle's physics as the work of a diligent student who copies the master's work and tries to surpass it:

> "It also appears to me that the daemoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the

[8] καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ἀδυναμίας· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει τι γνῶναι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔδει τὴν σύστοιχον αὐτοῖς περιβαλεῖν γνῶσιν

[9] ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν ὄντες ἴσως ἧττον ἂν ἠπατήθη- μεν, ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ (30) παντὸς κατφκισμένοι καὶ πορρωτάτω ὄντες ἐκείνων παχέως καὶ ἡμαρτημένως τῆ αἰσθήσει χρώμεθα. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν οὕτω· φύσιν γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνην ἐλάχομεν· ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις συνεισφέρει τὴν ἔνυλον ζωὴν τὴν ἐπιπροσθουμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, τὴν μεριστήν,(5) τὴν δεομένην καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων γνώσεων. αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ γενητὸν ἀγενήτως καὶ τὸ διαστατὸν ἀδιαστάτως ἐγνώκασι καὶ τὸ μεριστὸν ἀμερίστως καὶ τὸ ἔγχρονον διαιωνίως καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀναγκαίως· αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν πάντα γεννῶσιν, ἃ δὲ γεννῶσιν, ἐκ τῶν ἀμερῶν καὶ αἰωνίων (10) καὶ ἀύλων εἰδῶν γεννώσιν· ὥστε καὶ νοοῦσιν αὐτὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. μὴ γὰρ οἰηθῶμεν, ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γνωστῶν φύσεσιν αἱ γνώσεις χαρακτηρίζονται, μηδ' ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀραρὸς οὐκ ἀραρὸς ἐστι παρὰ θεοῖς

[10] ὥστε εἰκότως καὶ μύθοις ἐοικότας ἐροῦμεν λόγονς· πολλῆς γὰρ τῆς παχύτητος καὶ τῆς ἀλογίας, ἣν ὁ **μῦθος ἐνδείκνθται**, ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐστὶν ἀναπεπλησμένος, καὶ δεῖ τῆ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσει συγγινώσκειν

> doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concerning nature" (1, 2, F 21-24)[11] (translated by T. Taylor)

Naturally Proclus believed that Aristotle's physics is grandiose in its conception and execution, but the physics set forth by Plato in the dialogue "Timaeus" has no analogues even in Aristotle's creations (Helmig, Steel, 2012).

The nature science-specific cognition is accomplished by means of certain cognitive abilities, which were analyzed by Plato in the VI book of the dialogue "State" (509d-511e). Plato calls these cognitive abilities διάνοια, in English this term is translated as "thought", in Russian as "reason" ("rassudok") (A.N. Egunov), in German as "Verstandeserkenntnis".

In the dialogue "State" Plato documents cognitive ability, which produces scientific knowledge. Traditionally, διάνοια has been considered a cognitive ability, which is realized through the use of mathematical tools. Plato places it on the second stage after "mind" (νόος). This cognitive ability indeed occupies an intermediate position between sensual cognition, where sensual images are created, and mental comprehension, where eidoses get to the mind. On the basis of sensual images, διάνοια does not descend to the lower things, but since it is "burthened" by the sensual images, διάνοια does not rise into the sphere of "pure", devoid of images cognition. Διάνοια is knowledge based on the sensual image of a fathomable idea. This knowledge which feeds on impulses, assumptions, hypotheses and does not cross their borders, also does not sever itself from these impulses, etc., and from hypothetical sensual images of fathomable eidoses. Plato notices that this is the knowledge of "geometricians" (State, 511d). The intellectually comprehensible knowledge is closest to the Infinity, it does not merge with it, but departs from it in order to formulate logical laws of dialectics and pure abstract concepts for the manifestation of the Infinity.

Thus, the gnoseological principles of the ancient natural science were postulated by Plato in his theological and philosophical physics, which he articulated in the dialogue "Timaeus" (it is not without reason that on the fresco "The School of Athens" Rafael painted Plato next to Aristotle, who is holding his book "Metaphysics").

Ancient science is not only a way to document the regularities of the outer world, but also a guidelines of moral behaviour of people, an activity in which the unity of Knowledge and Good is manifested. That is why διάνοια gets moral dimension in "Nicomachean Ethics" of Aristotle.

Διάνοια and "Nicomachean Ethics" by Aristotle

While διάνοια in Plato's dialogue "State" means a certain ("average") educational ability of a human being, in the "Nicomachean Ethics" by Aristotle it presents a generic concept for a certain category of virtues:

> "Virtue is divided according to this difference, for we call some virtues intellectual, others moral. Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while liberality and sobriety are called moral. When speaking of man's good morals we do not describe him as wise or intelligent but as mild-tempered or sober. We do praise a person for acquiring the habit of wisdom since praiseworthy habits are called virtues"[12] (Nichomachean ethics, 1(A), XIII 1103a 5-10).

Dianoetic virtues are associated with purely human mental activity, with those processes where a person constructs his / her own judgment. Aristotle distinguishes between the mental activities in which 1) virtue can show by order, encouragement and/or punishment; 2) virtue can arise as a result of a person's own

[11] Δοκεί δε μοι και δαιμονιος Αριστοτέλης την του Πλάτωνος διδασκαλίαν κατά δυναμιν ζηλωσας ουτω διαθείναι την οληρ περί φυσεως πραγματειαν τα μέν κοινά πάντων των φυσει συνεστωτων ίδον

[12] Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς (5) μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς (10) λέγομεν.

efforts and is therefore purposeful. Moral qualities of the second kind stem from cognitive ability – διάνοια and are emanation of διάνοια.

In his Commentaries on "Nicomachean Ethics", Thomas Aquinas emphasises Aristotle's division of the soul into two parts: rational and irrational:

> "243. Then [C], at "Virtue is divided," he divides virtue according to this difference in the parts of the soul. He says that virtue is designated or divided according to the above-mentioned difference in the parts of the soul. Since human virtue perfects the work of man which is done according to reason, human virtue must consist in something reasonable. Since the reasonable is of two kinds, by nature and by participation, it follows that there are two kinds of human virtue. One of these is placed in what is rational by nature and is called intellectual. The other is placed in what is rational by participation that is, in the appetitive part of the soul, and is called moral. Therefore, he says, we call some of the virtues intellectual and some moral. Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while liberality and sobriety are called moral.
>
> 244. He proves this point from human praises. When we wish to praise someone for good morals, we do not describe him as wise and intelligent, but as sober and mild-tempered. We do not praise a man for good morals alone but also for the habit of wisdom. Praiseworthy habits are called virtues. Therefore, besides the moral virtues, there are also intellectual virtues like wisdom, understanding, and some others of this kind. Thus ends the first book.[13]
>
> (Commentary on the "Nicomachean Ethics" by Thomas Aquinas, translated by C.I. Litzinger, O.P. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1964, in 2 vols, Book 1, Lecture 20).

In fact, Thomas Aquinas simply translates Aristotle into Latin in this comment. But what Aquinas calls "two kinds of reasonable" is crucial here. These two kinds are revealed through analysis of the motives for action of this or that person. A person can act rationally (intellectually) and morally, but because of coercion or habit. And also a person can act rationally and morally in accordance with one's own judgment. We see that Aristotle himself also gives great prominence to this distinction.

In such a way Aristotle and Aquinas introduce into European moral philosophy the distinction between two motives for rational (intellectual) and moral behaviour. In the future, this distinction will be fully elaborated by Immanuel Kant in his theory of hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

The other problems studied by Aristotle and Aquinas are related to the emphasis on the unity of reasonable and moral action, which today sounds like a problem of the moral foundations of science and ontological foundations of truth.

Διάνοια is "the thinking part of the soul" and it is the only one that defines the "self" of a human being, says Aristotle. He makes this judgment with reference to who the actions of the "good" person are directed at. They are directed at these people themselves, deems Aristotle. Dianoetic qualities of a person make

[13] (243) Deinde cum dicit determinatur autem virtus etc., dividit virtutem secundum praedictam differentiam potentiarum animae. Et dicit quod virtus determinatur, idest dividitur, secundum praedictam differentiam partium animae. Cum enim virtus humana sit per quam bene perficitur opus hominis quod est secundum rationem, necesse est quod virtus humana sit in aliquo rationali; unde, cum rationale sit duplex, scilicet per essentiam et per participationem, consequens est quod sit duplex humana virtus. Quarum quaedam sit in eo quod est rationale per seipsum, quae vocatur intellectualis; quaedam vero est in eo quod est rationale per participationem, idest in appetitiva animae parte, et haec vocatur moralis. Et ideo dicit quod virtutum quasdam dicimus esse intellectuales, quasdam vero morales. Sapientia enim et intellectus et prudentia dicuntur esse intellectuales virtutes, sed liberalitas et sobrietas morales.
(244) Et hoc probat per laudes humanas: quia cum volumus aliquem de moribus suis laudare, non dicimus quod sit sapiens et intelligens, sed quod sit sobrius et mitis. Nec solum laudamus aliquem de moribus, sed etiam laudamus aliquem propter habitum sapientiae. Habitus autem laudabiles dicuntur virtutes. Praeter ergo virtutes morales, sunt aliquae intellectuales, sicut sapientia et intellectus et aliquae huiusmodi. Et sic terminatur primus liber. Available at: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics1.htm#20

them understand the need for good deeds, which they do for themselves:

> "For he is consistent with himself, always desiring the same things with his whole soul; he wishes for himself both genuine and apparent goods, and produces them. Indeed it is the mark of a good man to take pains to achieve the good, and he does this for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual part which seems to be a man's real self.
>
> Likewise, he desires his own life and preservation and especially that of his thinking faculty. For existence is a good to a virtuous man and everyone wishes what is good for him. No one would choose to have everything which exists at the price of becoming someone else. (God even now possesses the good, but he always is what he is at any time.) And it seems that the thinking part of man is the man himself or at least the most important part"[14] (Aristotle, Book 9, IV (1166a, 15-19)).

In Aristotle's ethics, dianoetic cognitive abilities predetermine the reasonableness of moral choices, i.e. these very cognitive abilities that make moral behaviour possible as free and responsible in itself. It is worth mentioning that this fragment also reveals a similarity with the Kantian thesis that theoretical reason does not lead to truth (cognitive abilities do not reveal a thing-in-itself), but practical reason directed at itself is capable of acting according to a categorical imperative that turns moral judgment not to the outside but to the inside of a person. The Socratic principle of the unity of mind and morality, knowledge and good is unfolding in the integration of Plato's philosophy of cognition and Aristotle's ethics:

> "1804. Next [1, c], at "For he is consistent," he clarifies his principal proposition. First [c, i] he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what is proper to beneficence; second [c, ii], what is proper to goodwill, at "Likewise, he desires etc."; third [c, iii], what is proper to concord, at "Such a man etc." He says first that the virtuous man desires for himself both genuine and apparent goods, for these latter are identical with genuine goods for him; the reason is that he wishes the goods of virtue, the real good of man. Nor is this desire ineffective in him, but he produces these goods for himself because it is a mark of a good man to labor for the achievement of good.
>
> 1805. We said in the second book that virtue makes its possessor good and his work good (222, 307, 309) And the virtuous person wants this and acts for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual element which is foremost in man. Indeed everything seems to be especially what is foremost in it. But the virtuous man strives always to do what is reasonable. It is evident then that he always wishes for himself the absolute good[15] (Ibid. Book IX. Properties of friendship, Lecture 1. Proportionate Properties in Friendship).

In his Commentary on these fragments of the "Nicomachean Ethics" Aquinas uses Aristotle's reasoning to justify the "naturalness" of man's desire for absolute good. This is the naturalness of the mind, the intellectual aspect of our soul. Aquinas especially accentuates Ar-

[14] οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται (15) δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα

[15] 1804. Deinde cum dicit: iste enim etc., manifestat principale propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod virtuoso convenit respectu suiipsius id quod pertinet ad beneficientiam. Secundo id quod pertinet ad benevolentiam, ibi: et vivere autem vult etc.; tertio id quod pertinet ad concordiam, sed et convivere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod virtuosus maxime vult sibiipsi bona et vera et apparentia. Eadem enim sunt apud ipsum vera et apparentia bona. Vult enim sibi bona virtutis, quae sunt vera hominis bona; nec huiusmodi voluntas in eo est vana, sed huiusmodi bona etiam operatur ad seipsum, quia boni hominis est ut laboret ad perficiendum bonum.
1805. Dictum est enim in secundo, quod virtus facit habentem bonum, et opus eius etiam reddit bonum. Et hoc etiam vult et operatur gratia suiipsius, idest gratia intellectivae partis quae est principalis in homine. Unumquodque autem videtur id maxime esse, quod est principale in eo, virtuosus autem semper ad hoc tendit ut operetur id quod est conveniens rationi. Et sic patet, quod semper vult sibi bonum secundum seipsum.

istotle's desire to remove the "burden" of virtue from a person. This is not a heavy cross, but personal self-determination, as dianoetic virtue is directed by the mind and it is directed to the mind back. A person who cultivates such a dianoetic virtue as rationality multiplies his/her beneficence by becoming a rational, reasonable person who minimizes errors in one's own actions.

In this regard, there is an analogy with the current discussion about the status of the university. Certain participants in this discussion have daresaid that a medieval university as a monastery of intellectuals should be replaced by a profitable university-corporation. From the point of view of both Aristotle and Aquinas, the value in itself is the existence of people whose minds predetermine their moral choice in favour of virtue. When such people enter any community this community immanently changes and its overall moral status grows. If such consequences have no monetary equivalent, it does not mean that the university in its original "medieval" sense has no place in modern times.

Plato's thesis that scientific knowledge is an intermediate form of knowledge, "plausible myth", "probabilistic knowledge", **εἰκότα μῦθον,** which will (or will not) be transformed into higher forms in the future cognition by means of philosophy and theology, along with Aristotelian principle of transformation of rational knowledge into practical virtue were taken in by Claudius Galen, the greatest scientist of Antiquity and Middle Ages. Galen's widely known statement that a true doctor/physician is a philosopher without any doubt goes back to Plato, whom Galen revered as a prophet giving the seekers of the Truth all the necessary guidelines. That is why in the treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" ("On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato", "De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis") Galen integrates Plato's theology and philosophy with Hippocratic medical science to prove his own position that mental activity is inherent not only in human, but also in animals, and that the physiology of the higher nervous activity of man is connected not with the heart, but with the brain. Galen's opponent was stoic Chrysippus of Soli, author of the treatise "About the Soul", which is known only from Galen's quotation.

The Treatise "De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis" has not been adequatrly studied in both Russian and foreign science. K.J. Elliott refers in passing to the influence of Plato on Galen, saying that it was huge and requires a separate study. According to L. Edelstein, Plato and Hippocrates were like gods for Galen, who likewise worshipped Aristotle. L.T. Pearcy reckons that for Galen Hippocrates and Plato were the founders of real philosophical and medical knowledge. This is also theorized by F. de Lasi, who doubted that Galen's thinking should be attributed exclusively to Platonism. W.D. Smith examines the influence of Hippocrates on Galen, too. I.V. Prolygina only mentions this treatise, noting its more philosophical nature in comparison with other, more practical medical works of Galen. L.T. Pearcy, B.S. Eastwood, N. Arikha, T.J. Tracy, E.A. Puchkova, G.C. McDonald. D.A. Balalykin, A.P. Shcheglov, N.P. Shock study to the very Treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" and figure that Galen is the last element in one of the two main methodological and gnoseological lines of the development of ancient natural science: Plato – Hippocrates – Aristotle – Galen (the other line: Leucippus – Democritus – Epicurus – Asclepiades); they presume that the study of Galen in Russian academic environment is complicated by the small number of treatises of the Roman philosopher translated into Russian. In particular, they say that there are only translations of the work on the usefulness of the parts of the body.

Preliminary analysis of Galen's Treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" has evinced that this is a brilliant example of ancient natural science knowledge, a universal standard of presentation of scientific ideas and their proofs. The greatest advantage of this treatise is the integration of philosophical methodology and empirical evidence, which Galen obtained with the help of his huge anatomic practice. Even main ideas of this treatise cannot be presented in this small article, so only Book 2 was chosen for the further analysis of Galen's scientific method.

Galen's "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων", Book 2

In Book Two, Galen begins with the natural science method. He cites his treatise "On Evidence" and says that each statement must be based on reliable sources and strict method. Galen enters in polemics with Chrysippus, who, in order to "verify" that the human soul (i.e. mental activity) has the source in heart, resorts to "strange" arguments – quotes from poets, etymology of words, as well as the physical movements that accompany pronunciation of the words "I", "ego". According to Chrysippus, these movements of a mouth and jaws point downwards, to the chest, where the heart is. In spite of Galen's rejection of this method of proof, he avers that it is possible to refute Chrysippus himself with such reasoning. For example, when people want to express their consent, they nod their head. Why, Galen quirks, should one pay attention to the direction of that nod down and not up? And why should we pay heed to the movements that make up this nod and not to the fact that it is the head that moves, not another part of the body? So, by rebutting Chrissippus's arguments in their essence, Galen nevertheless tries to "speak the language of the interlocutor" and deflates it in the way that his opponent applies.

But then, disaffirming this method of "proof", Galen constructs his own reasoning and at the same time reveals to us the framework of his scientific thinking. Galen assumes that in order to explore the essence, one must look at how this research was conducted by the "ancient" authors. The essence is not somewhere, but in what is the direct object of research:

> "The controlling part of the soul, with which many can agree, is a source of feelings and ability to volitional actions. Therefore, the proof that the heart possesses the controlling part of the soul should not proceed from any other premise than the fact that any conscious (volitional) movement of any part of the body starts in it, and all the feelings return to it" (Galen, 2005: 3, 4-5).

Next Galen goes straight on to the proof that he considers indisputable: anatomical incision exposes the heart and makes it possible to see (if there is one) a certain vessel that connects the heart to those organs that are in motion:

> "…the method of scientific evidence has made clear that it would be more useful to cut through the animal's flesh and directly observe which and how many varieties of structures originate in the heart and spread to all other parts of the animal; and to observe these very structures, of which there are so many in number and varieties; this one, for example, is responsible for a feeling or movement, or both at once, that is in charge of something else, and thus we can reach an understanding of what forces in the body have their source in the heart" (Galen, 2005: 3, 7).

Galen points out that the base of his scientific method is Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics", which states that knowledge of new should be based on knowledge obtained earlier. Both the previous knowledge and the new knowledge must be directly related to the subject itself, with its internal properties.

Galen begins his research on whether the heart is the source of the physiology of higher nervous activity with a brief theoretical discussion about which arguments are scientific and which are unscientific in their nature. He attributes to unscientific arguments such varieties as "rhetorical" and "sophistic". Moreover, Galen supposes that "scientific" arguments, which are based on knowledge about the heart, should be analyzed in a special way.

Among other things, there is an argument that the heart is anatomically in the middle of the human body. On this Galen opines that neither the fact that heart is in the exact middle of the human body nor the fact that the brain occupies the highest position in the human body are arguments to choose the heart or brain as the sources of sensation and motor activity of a living being.

Further, Galen explores the tenet that the heart and lungs situated near the heart give

rise to human speech. Galen's arguments are purely experimental in nature. He tells about an experiment with a severed trachea in an animal and a wounded person. If the trachea is cut, says Galen, and the heart and lungs are left untouched, the animal and the man will stop making sounds. The source of sounds is the larynx. And although air is involved in the production of the voice, Galen concludes, it is inside the larynx where air makes the sounds. Without the larynx, air movement is involved only in breathing, not in sounds and speech.

Galen's next argument is also an experimental and empirical one. He sees it as an undeniable fact that certain muscles are involved in the production of sounds and speech, and it is their tension which sends air into the trachea. But even earlier, the tension of these muscles creates a nerve that is everywhere, in every muscle. If you cut this nerve, the muscles will never strain and will never create the possibility of movement for the air flow.

Finally, the third experimental and empirical argument is conditioned by the fact that pushing air into the larynx may involve different sets of muscles, depending on the mental state of the person. If a person is calm, then the speech production is connected with the activity of one "set" of muscles, if a person is anxious, the air is pushed into the larynx by other muscles. Galen goes on to say that at the same time this process can be shown by means of anatomy: if you cut certain nerves, then neither muscle will move, although the heart, lungs, trachea, and the other organs will be in full order. Additionally, Galen is very precise in specifying which nerves can be cut at the neck or head, or while pressing the brain or the left ventricle of the heart, so that the corresponding muscles will lose their ability to move.

Galen exemplifies it by describing the behaviour of animals being sacrificed. When their hearts are removed, they are still able to make sounds, scream, and move, although they will die of blood loss very quickly. Conversely, if you cut the bull's spinal cord where it connects to the brain, even though the animal's heart is perfectly fine, it loses the ability to move, breathe and pronounce any sounds.

Then Galen advances many other arguments and dissents with a number of scientists who argue that it is not the brain that is the source of sensations, and that since the heart is the source of meaningful speech, it is the heart that generates thinking. The thing which is noteworthy here is confidence of both Galen and those with whom he argues that intelligent thinking is a form of meaningful and structured speech.

Galen takes a very detailed look at the "sophistic" argument of Zenon, the founder of Stoicism, who insists that if a voice arises when the air flow passes through the respiratory throat, it is not the brain that sends it there and, therefore, it is not the brain that is involved in the production of meaningful speech, eventually, it is not the brain that is the human mind organ. As opposed to Zenon's sophism Galen formulates his own medical sophism: "If urine was sent by the heart, it would not be pushed through the genitals". He invites his opponents to consider this thesis as applied to their own claims about the brain and larynx.

What draws attention is the way Galen combines logical reasoning and experiential and empirical data. For example, he decomposes the argument that it is the heart which controls our senses, because the senses are very close to the heart. And Galen demolishes similar arguments about the brain – like that the brain is the source of visual and auditory sensations, because the eyes and ears are close to the brain. For Galen, the means of proof are no less important than the conclusions drawn from this evidence. The proximity of different organs cannot indicate that some neighbouring organs are a source of sensations that occur in other organs close to the former. Galen asserts that the "close proximity" argument violates the universal law of logic:

> "The proximity of location, misleading both sides, accredits the preconditions with the facade of science and evidence; but this is not the truth. Take a man who believes that the heart is the source of all things, the remoteness of his eyes from heart will not prevent him from having faith in that they too receive the sensation and move-

> ment from the heart being the source of any sensation and movement; and a man who claims that the source is the brain insists that no one of the other organs is the source of movement in the respiratory and speech organs, and so it is the brain that begets a volitional movement in them as in everything else.
>
> It turns out that the universal statements we have been taught as regards the methods of evidence are true only in particular cases and this is true for every subject of study. Prerequisites shall incorporate only the properties relevant to the problem instead of the truthful data on all the properties of the object" (Galen, 2005: 5, 44-47).

Teaching and practice, Galen says, are the main sources of truth. Using logical reasoning, he spent a lot of time and wrote a lot of pages on debunking the arguments of Zenon, Diogenes and Chrysippus, representatives of Stoic psychology. Galen reprehends not doctors who have anatomical and treatment practices, but philosophers who do not rely on medical facts in their thinking. He fights them with their own weapons, revealing the logical inconsistency, sophistry of their pseudo-reasoning; primarily he draws the arguments of medical practice and the logicality of adducing proofs.

Galen was very critical about Chrysippus's claim that the heart could transmit impulses to the brain so that the brain, which controls all the nerves, could cause this or that sensation. Previously, Galen had referred to his previous writings and arguments set forth in other treatises. In this treatise, we can trace the course of his research and methods directly, as Galen reproduces the course of this research in fine detail.

1st step. The experimental stage with designing the experience

> "The number and nature of the structures that connect the heart to the brain must be determined when cutting the animal; then each of these structures in the neck region shall be cut or flattened or bandaged with the ligature to observe the effect this action will have on the animal" (Galen, 2005: 6, 3-4).

2nd step. Using previously obtained reliable knowledge about the subject of the study

> "The heart is connected to the brain by three types of vessels that are common to the whole body: veins, arteries and nerves; the veins are the so-called jugular veins, arteries, carotid artery, and the nerves that are located outside these arteries" (Galen, 2005: 6, 4-5).

3rd step. Validation of basic knowledge in practice (anatomical)

> "You cannot just cut the jugular vein or carotid artery as we do with nerves, because the animal will quickly die of heavy bleeding; it is better to start by bandaging them with good ligatures in the upper and lower parts of the neck, and then make cuts between ligatures, thus avoiding bleeding. As for the nerves, whether you wish to flatten them or bandage with ligatures, or clamp them with your fingers, all these operations will have the same effect on the animal: it will immediately lose its voice, but no other activity will be disturbed; neither immediately nor later. Having experienced bandaging with the ligature or cutting of the arteries in the described way, the animal will lose neither voice nor sensitivity, as most of the proponents of Hippocrates wrote, because of their wrong cuts, but all the arteries over the wound will lose heartbeat. Again, even if you clamp the veins with ligatures or if you cut them in the way described above, you will not see that any activity (function) is hurt" (Galen, 2005: 6, 5-8).

4th step. Reasoning built on logical laws, based on different preconditions and on that a certain assumption may lead to

> "that the heart does not have a leading source of its strength in the brain, you would learn from the fact that when all the above mentioned nerves are either cut or tied by ligatures, the animal only loses its voice; this animal inhales and exhales without any trouble concerning both inhalation and exhalation, which were mentioned earlier, and even now keeps moving all its four limbs, as well it hears, sees, and feels

> as before. It happens, as we said, when the nerves along the arteries are cut and only the animal's voice is hurt" (Galen, 2005: 6, 10-12).

5th step. Discussion, rebuttal or confirmation of the opinions of scientists and philosophers who expressed certain views on the subject

> "All those doctors and philosophers who believed that by cutting or clamping the mentioned arteries in the described way, the animal loses its sensitivity, and who further concluded that the heart excites the sensitivity and movement to the brain, should be seen as having made a mistake in their study of the phenomenon, though they had made an accurate conclusion based on their assumption" (Galen, 2005: 6, 13-14).

6th step. In the course of the discussion, Galen singles out in the opinion of opponents both a rational grain and a delusion, then he approaches the evaluation of opposite opinions in a constructive way, chooses in them what can be used to confirm his own position.

> "The truth is that we cannot perceive sensually that the controlling part of the soul is enclosed either in the chest or in the heart, and therefore I praise the original statement of Chrysippus, in which he acknowledges the truth, but I do not welcome his statement in which he gives a false description of the sensual perception" (Galen, 2005: 6, 15-16).

7th step. Concrete scientific knowledge is transformed into philosophical one, because in the course of the research it has demonstrated its limitations and stochastic approximation; to transform concrete scientific knowledge into philosophical one Galen refers to the universal concept of Plato's soul found in the dialogues "State" and "Timaeus"

> "I am going to prove that the rational (endowed with mind) part of the soul, which Chryssipus himself calls the "controlling part", the "mind" and the "supreme controlling part of the soul" are in the brain. Once this has been proven, if we see that there is another power in the heart that does not come from any other source, we will get a clear idea of the first (main) two principles and then, as a consequence, we will discover the third in the same way" (Galen, 2005: 6, 20-21).

Thus, the medical and anatomical part of Galen's research passes through to the philosophical part, where he makes his own comments on Plato's dialogues "State" and "Timaeus". Previously, there was made an assumption that these Plato's dialogues were the main methodological-philosophical basis for Galen and maybe other researchers who have got ahead in the ancient natural science. It is possible to hypothesise that the real ancestor of modern natural science is more Plato than Aristotle, as it is commonly believed in modern science tradition. Galen's comments on Plato's "Timaeus" and "State" dialogues are not included in Book 2 of the Treatise being analysed now and should be the subject of further research.

From the beginning to the end the whole Book 2 is devoted to the logically constructed arguments of Galen, who has set himself the goal to prove the following thesis:

> "The rational (endowed with the mind) part of the soul, which Chrysippus himself calls the 'controlling part', the mind and the supreme controlling part of the soul are in the brain" (Galen, 2005: 7, 20).

Galen's reflection over his evidence (as well as his opponents' consideration on the matter) is of great interest. He distinguishes 4 types of evidence:

> "The first type I called scientific and demonstrative, the second – useful for training and, as Aristotle would say, dialectical, third – persuasive (motivating, stimulating) and rhetorical, and the fourth – sophistical; and I have shown that the prerequisites, which are based on the qualities and characteristics of the heart, which are directly related to the very essence of the problem under study, belong to the class of scientific prerequisites, and all the others are dialectical; those prerequisites which are taken from external evidence are rhetorical, and those that deceptively exploit homonyms or forms of expression are sophistical" (Galen, 2005: 8, 2).

Galen sees as scientific evidence those that are based on a direct study of the object, which are related to the clarification of its internal, inherent properties:

> "As for the scientific prerequisites relevant to any issue, they are very few and easy to count, but those that are useful for training, are numerous, they are formulated based on any quality and properties of the thing" (Galen, 2005: 8, 3-4).

Book 2 ends with another rede by Galen, where he scrutinizes the argument of his rivals in a discussion about whether the "controlling soul" is in the heart or the brain. Galen formulates the argument of his opponents in the following way:

> "The organ from which the animals' originating source comes also contains a reasonable part of the soul; the animals' originating source is in the heart; hence the part of the soul which reasons and thinks is also in it" (Galen, 2005: 8, 33-34).

Galen refutes this argument with the following premises:

1) he points out that the thesis about the heart as an originating source (of power) has not yet been proved by anyone and that the previously unproven thesis should not be used as an argument; Galen reports that the corroboration about the source of power will be made in the next books of this Treatise;

2) he constates that there is no direct connection between the originating source and the part controlling the will;

3) then he examines probable quality of this connection, e.g., the argument that it is the heart that is the first to consume the power; this is a false argument, which Galen proves with numerous examples; the mouth, oesophagus, stomach, are the first to be fed / to get the power, besides, air flow comes first not to the heart but to the mouth, throat and lungs;

4) and finally, in the arguments of his opponents Galen chooses what is able to prove his own position; indeed, what is important is not the food itself, but the controlling centre, which will lead to our willingness or unwillingness to eat.

5) Book 2 of the treatise concludes with a clear indication by Galen that it is not speculation that should be taken into account, but "anatomical observations".

Ultimately, Galen's Treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" is not first and foremost a *philosophical* work; Galen clearly distinguishes between "dialectical" and "scientific" prerequisites. And he formulates his task in a very accurate way: to conduct purely scientific research based on a specific scientific (in this very case – anatomical) methodology. One can see that the entire second book of this Treatise is devoted to the anatomical experience and even experiment. In the part where Galen makes assumptions about which organs are actually connected with the movement and will of a living being, he proposes to perform various medical operations with the organs of the animal and monitor what this or that anatomical doctor's action will lead to.

Galen's philosophical arguments in this Treatise are "diffused" among his inferences. They predetermine a clear logical order of his reasoning. He himself is attracted to the "ancient" authors (which for him are Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle) with their clarity and logic of their philosophical constructions and conclusions. The second book fortifies that Galen conducted sufficiently developed medical experiments related to cranial trepanation, spine transection, he knew which parts of the brain are responsible for the movements of living beings.

In Galen's works, ancient natural science has reached its peak of development. The combination of philosophical method of reasoning, reliance on experience and experiment, the ability to organise a rational discussion with opponents, including singling out of arguments to defend his position from the opponents' claims, a fastiduous analysis of scientific methodology and reliance on the perfect logic of great thinkers, all these qualities put Galen above all other thinkers in the discussed space of ancient natural science.

Further research of the Treatise "Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων" will

help to clarify Galen's methodology on the solution of other scientific problems, as well as to reveal his role as a philosopher with thorough consideration of his particular comments on the Plato's dialogues "Timaeus" and "State".

Summing it up, though it is a well-known fact that Galen's ideas influenced the development of medicine, and this influence had been felt for at least for about one and a half thousand years, the works of this late antique author are also important for the formation of science as a whole. Galen's Treatise under study is a model of natural application of scientific method, based on empirical data and philosophical methodology. Practically, Galen's Treatise is nothing but the standard of scientific cognition embodied in the text, syncretism of purely practical component and philosophical, moral principle. Here scientific cognition is no longer a plausible myth, but, relying on the logic of philosophy and setting its goal the good for a human being, it is transformed into other knowledge, which helps making a concrete step towards θέωσις.

Referral to ancient thinkers is as natural for Galen as his incessant references to the results of anatomical studies. The Aesculapian in Galen's perception is certainly a philosopher; representatives of any other scientific spheres as well must have shared the idea of this inseparable unity of universal worldview goal setting and empirical foundation.

References

Aquinas, Th. *Kommentarii k "Nikomakhovoi etike" Aristotelia* [*Comments on the "Nicomachean Ethics" by Aristotle*]. Available at: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics1.htm#20

Arikha, N. (2008). "Just Life in a Nutshell": Humours as Common Sense. In *The Philosophical Forum Inc.*: 303-314.

Aristotle. *Nikomakhova etika* [*Nicomachean Ethics*].

Balalykin, D.A., Shcheglov, A.P., Shok, N.P. (2013). Naturfilosofskaia traditsiia antichnogo estestvoznaniya i aleksandriiskaia shkola v III veke. Chast' I. [The natural philosophy tradition of ancient natural science and the Alexandrian school in the 3rd century. Part I]. In *Filosofiia nauki* [*Philosophy of Science*], 2 (57), 157-175.

Balalykin, D.A., Shok, N.P., Shcheglov, A.P. (2013). Sootnoshenie dukhovnogo i fizicheskogo v ponimanii Galenom zdorov'ia i bolezni. Chast' I (na primere raboty "Sposob raspoznavaniia i lecheniia strastei liuboi, v tom chisle i svoei sobstvennoi dushi") [The ratio of the spiritual and the physical in Galen's understanding of health and illness. Part I (on the example of the work "A way of recognizing and treating any passion, including of one's own soul")]. In *Istoricheskie nauki* [*Historical Sciences*], 7. Available at: http://www.online-science.ru/m/products/istori_sciense/gid888/pg3/

Braginskoi, N. (1997). *Filosofy Gretsii* [*Philosophers of Greece*]. Moscow: Publishing house EKSMO-Press.

Chrysostom, J. (1895, 1906). *Tvorenia sv. ottsa nashego Ioanna Zlatousta, arkhiepiskopa Konstantinopol'skogo, v russkom perevode* [*The creations of St., Our Father John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople, in Russian translation*], 1-12. St. Petersburg.

Cicero Marcus Tullius (1994). *Dialogi "O gosudarstve", "O zakonakh"* [*Dialogues "On the State", "On the Laws"*]. Moscow, "Nauka".

Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics by Thomas Aquinas, translated by C.I. Litzinger, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964, 2 volumes, Book 1, Lecture 20. Available at: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics1.htm#20

Eastwood, B.S. *Galen on the Elements of Olfactory Sensation*, 268-290. Available at: http://www.rhm.uni-koeln.de/124/Eastwood.pdf

Edelstein, L. (1967). *Ancient Medicine.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Elliot, K.J. (2005). *Galen, Rome and the Second Sophistic*. Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Gaidenko, P.P. "History of Greek Philosophy in its connection with Science". Chapter 5.17. In *Kosmologiia i fizika Platona. Poniatie materii* [*Cosmology and Physics of Plato. The Concept of Matter*]. *Kos-*

mologiia i fizika v dialoge Platona "Timey" [*Cosmology and physics in Plato's "Timaeus" dialogue*]. Available at: http://philosophy.ru/library/gaid/62.html

Galen (1978-1984, 2005). *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, edidit, in linguam Anglicam vertit, commentatus est Ph. De Lacy, CMG 4,1,2,3 vol., Berlin 1978-1984; vol. I: edition tertia lucis ope expressa, vol. II: edition altera Lucis ope expressa, vol. III: edition altera lucis ope expressa addendis corrigendis aucta, Berlin.

Green, Ch.D. (2003). Where did the Ventricular Localization of Mental Faculties Come from? In *Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 39 (2), 131–142

Heidegger, M. (1993). Evropeiskii nigilizm [European nihilism]. In *Martin Khaidegger, Vremia i bytie (seriia "Mysliteli XX veka")* [*Martin Heidegger, Time and Being (series "Thinkers of the 20th century")*]. Moscow, Publishing House "Respublika".

Heisenberg, W. (1987). *Shagi za gorizont* [*Steps beyond the horizon*]. Moscow, Publishing House "Progress".

Helmig, Ch. and Steel, C. (2012). Proclus. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/proclus/

Hesiod. (2019). *Works and Days. Translated by Gregory Nagy.* Center for Hellenic Studies. Harvard University. Available at: https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/display/5290

Hippocrates (1936). *Izbrannyye knigi* [*Selected books*]. Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo biologicheskoi i meditsinskoi literatury [State publishing house of biological and medical literature].

Homer (1903). *Iliad. Book 11.* Transl. by Alexander Pope. In Complete Poetic works. Available at: https://www.sparknotes.com/lit/iliad/full-text/book-xi/

Juvenal (2007). *Satire 10.* Translated by L. Ewans (1889). Formatted and with notes by C. Chinn (2007). Available at: http://pages.pomona.edu/~cmc24747/sources/juvenal/juv_10.htm

Lacy, P. de (1972). Galen's Platonism. In *AJP,* 93, 27-39.

Lernould, A. (2001). *Physique et theologie. Lecture du Timee de Platon par Proclus.* Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

Liubishchev A. (2000). *Linii Demokrita i Platona v istorii kul'tury* [*The traces of Democritus and Plato in the history of culture*]. St. Petersburg, Publishing House "Aletheia".

Lloyd, G.E.R. (1979). *Magic, Reason and Experience. Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science*. Cambridge University Press.

Losev, A.F. (1988). *Istoriia antichnoi estetiki. Poslednie veka (VIII-VI veka)* [*History of ancient aesthetics. Recent centuries (8-6th centuries)*]. Moscow, Publishing House "Iskusstvo", 447 p.

Losev, A.F. (1993). Antichnyi kosmos i sovremennaia nauka [Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science]. In *Bytie. Imia. Kosmos* [*Being. Name. Cosmos*]. Moscow, "Mysl'", Russian Open University.

Marinus of Samaris (1925). *Prokl, ili O schast'e* [*Proclus or Concerning Happiness*]. Translated by Kenneth S. Guthrie. Available at: http://www.plato.spbu.ru/TEXTS/diogenl/marin01.htm

Martijn, M. (2010). *Proclus on nature (philosophy of nature and its methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus).* Leiden; Boston, Brill.

McDonald, G.C. (2009). *Concepts and Treatments of Phrenitis in Ancient Medicine*. Thesis L9158. Newcastle University.

Mesiats, S.V. (2007). *Sovremennaia nauka i platonovskii mif* [*Modern science and the Platonic myth*]. Available at: http://www.plato.spbu.ru/CONFERENCES/2002/10-2.htm

Mesiats, S.V. (2009). Nachala metafiziki Prokla [origins of Proclus' metaphysics]. In *ARKHE*. In *Trudy kul'turologicheskogo seminara* [*ARCHE. Proceedings of a cultural seminar*]. Vol. 5. Moscow, Russian State University for the Humanities, 203-235.

Mesiats, S.V. (2012). *Proclus's Dyadochus. "Timaues" Commentary.* Book 1. 17a-27b. Moscow, "GDK", 385 p.

Orficheskaia tablichka [*Orphic tablet*]. Fragmenty sochinenii rannikh grecheskikh filosofov [Fragments of the writings of early Greek philosophers. Pp. 43-44. A 1 Zutz (1 B 18 DK = F 32c K.), Furia (Southern Italy), between 400 and 350 BC].

Pearcy, L.T. (1983). Galen and Stoic Rhetoric. In *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies,* 24, 259-272.

Phillips, J. (2007). *Order from Disorder. Proclus Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition)*, Brill Academic Publishers.

Plato. (1994). *Gosudarstvo* [*State*]. Translated into Russian by A.N. Egunov. Moscow, "Mysl'", 79-420.

Plato. *Timey* [*Timaeus*].

Proclus Dyadochus (2012). *Kommentariy k "Timeiu". Kniga 1* [*Commentary on "Timaeus". Book 1*]. Moscow, Greco-Latin Cabinet.

Proclus Dyadochus. In *Kommentariy na "Timeia" Platona* [*Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*]. Available at: http://centant.spbu.ru/plat/proklos/works/tim_1/000.htm

Prolygina, I.V. (2011). *Galen Pergamskii i ego traktat "O tom, chto nailuchshii vrach est' takzhe filosof". Antichnaia i srednevekovaia filosofiia* [*Galen of Pergamon and his Treatise "The Best Doctor is Also a Philosopher". Ancient and medieval philosophy*], 82-92. Available at: http://iph.ras.ru/uplfile/histph/yearbook/2011/hphy-2011_prolygina.pdf

Puchkova, Ie.A. (2013). Aleksandriiskaia Shkola i dogalenovskiye teorii v meditsine [The Alexandria School and pre-Galen theories in medicine]. In *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul'turologiia i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki* [*Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art history. Issues of theory and practice*]. Tambov, "Gramota", 12 (38), 1, 153-156.

Santillana, G.De (1961). *The origins of scientific thought (from Anaximander to Proclus, 600 D.C. to 300 A.D.)*. New York, New American Library of World Literature.

Scherbenske, E.W. (2009). *Canonizing Paul: Ancient Editorial Practice and the Corpus Paulinum*. Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Schmidt, K.E.A. (1842). *De Timaeo Platonis ex Procli commentariis restituendo*. Stettin.

Slovar' Antichnosti [*Dictionary of Antiquity*] (1989). Moscow, "Progress".

Smith, W.D. (2002). *Hippocratic tradition*. Electronic edition.

Solopova, M.A. (2012). Vita brevis: k tolkovaniiu pervogo aforizma Gippokrata [Vita brevis: on the interpretation of the first aphorism of Hippocrates]. In *Filosofskii zhurnal* [*Philosophical journal*], 1(8), 5-25.

Theognis of Megara (1931). Translated by J.M. Edmonds. Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0479%3Avolume%3D1%3Atext%3D11%3Asection%3D1)

Tracy, T.J. Plato, Galen and the Center of Consciousness. In *Illinois Classical Studies*, I. 43-52.

Visconti, J.G. (2009). *The Secrets of Health; Views on Healing from the Everyday Level to the Printing Presses in Early Modern Venice 1500-1650*. Dissertation in History.

Whittaker, T. (2005). *The Neo Platonists a Study in the History of Hellenism*. Whitefish, Mont., Kessinger Pub.

Теоретические и эпистемологические принципы античного естествознания

Н.П. Копцева, К.В. Резникова
Сибирский федеральный университет
Российская Федерация, Красноярск

Аннотация. В статье рассматривается проблема методологии античного естествознания на материале анализа фрагмента 29cd «Тимея» Платона, Комментариев к данному фрагменту, которые были написаны Проклом Диадохом. Особое внимание уделяется пониманию науки в философии Платона как «правдоподобного мифа», «вероятностного знания», εἰκότα μῦθον. В связи с этим рассматривается понятие «διάνοια», «дианойтические добродетели» в «Никомаховой этике» Аристотеля и Комментарии Аквината к фрагментам «Никомаховой этики», где говорится о дианойтических добродетелях. Труды великого античного врача Клавдия Галена определяются как универсальный эталон научного познания. Более подробно анализируется вторая глава трактата Галена «Περι των Ιπποκράτογς και Πλατωνος δογματων», рассматриваются основные элементы научного метода Галена.

Ключевые слова: Платон, Аристотель, Аквинат, Прокл Диадох, Клавдий Гален, «Тимей», «Государство», «Никомахова этика», античное естествознание, научный метод Галена, комментарии к «Тимею», «Об учениях Гиппократа и Платона».

Научные специальности: 09.00.00 – философские науки; 24.00.00 – культурология.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1338–1355

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0645
УДК 125, 215, 572

The Dialogue between Theology and Science as an Open-Ended Hermeneutics of the Human Condition

Alexei V. Nesteruk*
University of Portsmouth
Portsmouth, Lion Gate Building
Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy
St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Received 06.02.2019, received in revised form 25.07.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. This paper represents a direct continuation and development of my stance on the sense of the dialogue between theology and science as it is seen through the eyes of phenomenological philosophy and its extension towards theology. I further interpret the paradoxical position of humanity in the world (being an object in the world and subject for the world) to be the cause in the split between science and theology. Since, according to modern philosophy, no reconciliation between two opposites in the hermeneutics of the subject is possible, the whole issue of the facticity of human subjectivity as the sense-bestowing centre of being acquires theological dimensions, requiring new developments in both theology and philosophy. The intended overcoming of the unknowability of man by himself, tacitly attempted through the "reconciliation" of science and theology (guided by a purpose to ground man in some metaphysical substance), is not ontologically achievable, but demonstrates the working of *formal* purposefulness (in the sense of Kant). Then the dialogue between theology and science can be considered as a teleological activity without a purpose representing never-ending hermeneutics of the human condition.

Keywords: creation, dialogue, hermeneutics, human condition, man, philosophy, science, subject, theology.

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant "PH Philosophy In Neopatristics: New Figures And New Interpretations" from The National Science Centre, Poland (DEC-2018/31/B/HS1/01861).

Research area: philosophy of science and technology.

Citation: Nesteruk, A.V. (2020). The dialogue between theology and science as an open-ended hermeneutics of the human condition. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1338–1355. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0645.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: alexei.nesteruk@port.ac.uk
ORCID: 0000-0001-6318-7907

Introduction:
Man's Unknowability at the Inception of the Dialogue between Theology and Science

This paper represents a direct continuation and development of my stance on the sense of the dialogue between theology and science as it is seen through the eyes of phenomenological philosophy appropriated theologically (Nesteruk, 2018). Summarising our previous discussion of formulating the difference in the *modi* of the *given* in the natural sciences and theology, we have established that it amounts to the difference in the underlying ontology in the sciences (physical substance and biological formations) *versus* ontology of events (in theology), that is *modi* of phenomenality of that which is given within the structures of subjectivity. We have pointed out that in spite of the explicitly ontic features of theological propositions (as distinct from the ontologically rooted natural sciences), the very ontic needs to have an ontological basis (as a corporeal basis of a subject), whereas the ontological condition must be elucidated ontically through the structural path of its constitution by the subject. Thus the strict demarcation between theology and science on the basis of the opposition between ontic and ontological can hardy be achieved, contributing to the two-fold argument that a naïve positing of experience of the Divine outside the material conditions of the possibility of its expression, represents *de facto* faith without reason (whose existential and soteriological meaning remains obscure), whereas, at the same time, any physical reductionism in the constitution of humanity also fails without an appeal to theology of humanity's creation. The mediation between theology and science does not represent any metaphysical necessity but represents events of life, that is those dimensions of the human will and reason that cannot be deduced on the grounds of causality pertaining to the world. The facticity of the dialogue points to the fact that it represents the event-like phenomenon related to life's self-affectivity, so that its interpretation demands a philosophy that deals with the phenomenon of man as "event" of Life, the phenomenon that has a "meta-ontological" status, ordaining and justifying the very possibility of the philosophical as well as scientific knowledge of the world (Nesteruk, 2018). However, this "event of life", or, simply saying, the human phenomenon, being given to humanity, does not receive any further elucidation by man himself. The self-imposed question "What is man?" remains unanswered. Seen from this standpoint, all human activities, including those of science, as well as religious experience, originate in one and the same man in the conditions that this very man does not understand its own essence. Then both theology and science, as well as the dialogue between them, are functioning in the conditions of man's self-incomprehensibility. The sciences and religions are efficacious on the level of phenomena since they describe the facticity of life and explicate the sense of humanity through never-ending hermeneutics of the world. In a way, human activities give a witness to that which is unknowable in man contributing to a view of humanity as an "infinite task" for itself. By quoting K. Jaspers, "We cannot exhaust man's being in knowledge of him, we can experience it only in the primal source of our thought and action. Man is fundamentally more than he can know about himself (Jaspers, 1954: 63, 66)." The sciences, philosophy and theology, all, pose questions to man about man himself that cannot lead to any definitive answer, thus provoking further questions (Moltmann, 1974: 2). Correspondingly the dialogue between theology and science, as particular modus of the human enquiry in the nature of things, contributes to further explication of the riddle of man with no aim of creating any metaphysical concept of man. The seeming dualism in comprehension of reality, either on the grounds of the sciences or through theological insights, explicates the dualism in the human condition between *being* and *having*: "We are, but we do not possess ourselves" (Plessner, 1961: 7), that is we are, but it is not us who created us. One can say that man has its own "I" as a co-participant of the infinite all-embracing being; however, it is because of the infinite character of such a communion with being that man cannot comprehend the sense of this

communion's contingent givenness. As the sciences explicate the modus of "we are", that is the outward way of our existence as things (objects), they do not explain as to "why we are?", that is, why humanity is given to itself in such a way that the detection of the "we are" is possible at all. The drama of not being able to create himself is transferred by man to the cosmological scale when man is not being able to understand his place in the universe.[1] Being groundless in the universe humanity does not *have* its own home not only in the sense of space, but also in the sense of the laws which it cannot control.[2] Theology clarifies this issue of man not being able to possess himself by transforming it to the issue of participation *in* and communion *with* that which escapes the limits of metaphysical definitions.

The sciences play a twofold role in comprehending and formulating the sense of man's unknowability and groundlessness in the universe. It is science that makes it possible to bring on board outward aspects of man's unknowability through its insignificance in the physical universe. Without a scientific refinement of the predicaments of the human condition man would not be able to understand the scale of its *epistemological significance* for comprehending the universe and developing an articulated capacity of longing for the ultimate ground of its existence either in the world or beyond it. The ontological groundlessness of humanity is exactly that intrinsic part of the human condition which provokes humanity for searching grace or "blessing" for its existence from that which is beyond the world and man himself.

The predisposition of transcending the sphere of the unconcealed relies on participation and communion with that which is beyond the visible and sensible. This transcending, even if it is not initiated by the sciences, is reactivated in man and made existentially dramatic through cooperation with the sciences. One cannot assert that the sciences are paving the way to a theological apprehension of the world, but at least one finds them refining the delimiters of the human condition, turning to a theological looking for the sense of existence. It is in this sense that the unknowability of man by himself, endorsed by scientific knowledge, becomes a factor of engaging with theology through abandoning any straightforward attempts to overcome this unknowability on the grounds of metaphysical concepts. The implicit hope and longing for overcoming the unknowability of man by himself, present in the modern sciences and some branches of philosophy, forms a hidden *purpose* implanted in the core of the human condition. This *purpose* is to acquire "home" in being, to ground man in that which he always transcends. This *purpose* is not ontologically achievable[3], so that the whole process of knowledge is driven by this *purpose* only *formally*, that is as a *teleological activity without a material purpose*.[4] The latter implies that the "reconciliation" between science and

[1] Not dwelling long on the sense of this claim, but referring to a common knowledge of our insignificance in vast space portrayed by modern cosmology, we nevertheless quote S. Frank, invoking a rather nostalgic description of the cosmic homelessness as a loss of the "motherland": "Contrary to deceptive appearances which man had trusted for thousands of years, his native abode, the earth, proved to be not the centre of the universe, but a mere speck, a part of a planetary system which itself was only an insignificant appendage of one of the innumerable stars lost in boundless space" (Frank, 1965: 190-191).

[2] In E. Fromm's words "He [man] is set apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into the world at an accidental place and time, he is forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware of himself, he realises his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He visualises his own end: death. Never is he free from the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his body as long as he is alive…" (Fromm, 1967: 40).

[3] "If he [man] ever finally got 'behind himself', and could establish what was the matter with him, nothing would any longer be the matter with him, but everything would be fixed and tied down, and he would be finished. The solution of the puzzle what man is would then be at the same time the final release from being human" (Moltmann, 1974: 2).

[4] The terminology of formal purposiveness originates in Kant's "Critique of Judgement" and can briefly be defined, using his words : "[] An object, or state of mind, or even an action is called purposive, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose, merely because its possibility can be explained and conceived by us only so far as we assume for its ground a causality according to purposes, i.e. in accordance with a will which has regulated it according to the representation of a certain rule" (Kant, 1951: 55) (Emphasis added)).

theology could not be achieved so that the dialogue between theology and science can be considered as a teleological activity without a *material purpose*. Theologically, this activity could be understood as a *mediation* between moral divisions between his sense of creaturehood in the midst of the physical world and, at the same time, his being in communion with that which is beyond this world.

Paradox of Subjectivity and the Dialogue between Theology and Science

The unknowability of man by himself can easily be explicated through the so-called paradox of subjectivity[5] whose concise formulation is: "We can describe the relations between subject and world as purely intentional relations as opposed to (objective) spatial, temporal, and causal relations. We can appeal to the distinction between belonging to the world of objects and being a condition of the possibility of the world of objects (as meaning). Perhaps the broadest terms for these relations would be the *transcendental* relations and the *part-whole* relation" (Carr, 1999: 116), or "It is necessary to combine the recognition of our contingency, our finitude, and our containment in the world with an ambition of transcendence, however limited may be our success in achieving it" (Nagel, 1986: 9).

The paradox, as co-existence of two attitudes to hermeneutics of the subject appears to be a structural element of the human subjectivity in general. Self-givenness and self-affectivity of "the subject" implies the question of facticity of consciousness which is missing from any articulations of the world. As was expressed by M. Merleau-Ponty, "…consciousness attributes this power of universal constitution to itself only if it *ignores the event which provides its infrastructure and which is its birth*. A consciousness for which the world 'can be taken for granted', which finds it 'already constituted' and present even in consciousness itself, does not absolutely choose either its being or its manner of being." [6] It is because of the inexplicability of facticity of consciousness in metaphysical terms, it can be considered as "event"[7], event of existence of man. The temptation to find that missing foundation of its own realization in existence leads consciousness to transcendence in a theological direction, which exceeds the scope of philosophy, but, at the same time, extends philosophy towards appropriation of those realities which escape the phenomenality of objects.[8] Then the paradox of subjectivity cannot have metaphysical explanation and falls under rubrics of *event*, that is something as given with no recourse to its possible metaphysical justification. In this case, the reconciliation of the terms in the paradox is equivalent to the elucidation of its very appearance in the subject, that is appearance of a personal subject, which is treated as *event* in the sense that no metaphysical explanation for existence of this subject is possible. Theology inevitably enters the discourse for, as we argued before, events are a "natural" domain of theology (Nesteruk, 2018). The problem of origin of the paradox

[5] The formulations of the paradox are abundant. See e.g. (Kant, 1959: 260); (Husserl, 1970: 179); (Merleau-Ponty, 1982: 71-72); (Scheler, 1994: 160) etc. The review of different formulations of the paradox can be found in (Nesteruk, 2015: 136-161). See also (Carr, 1999).

[6] (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 453) (emphasis added). As a matter of analogy one can quote B. Carr who comments on a similar situation in physics whose picture does not contain that same consciousness which generates the content of physical theories: "That physics has little to say about the place of man in the universe is perhaps not surprising when one considers the fact that most physicists probably regard man, and more generally consciousness, as being entirely irrelevant to the functioning of the universe" (Carr, 1998: 152).

[7] *Event* can be described as the consummation of that, whose essence did not give the possibility of its foreseeing as if one could foresee the inconceivable impossible from the perspective of the conceivable possible (that is from within metaphysics with its principle of causality). See details on phenomenology of events in (Romano, 1998). A careful distinction of phenomenality of objects and phenomenality of events is made in (Marion, 2010: 243-308).

[8] In general the term "phenomenality" describes the quality or state of a phenomenon. For example phenomenality of mundane things corresponds to their being perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience. This constitutes the notion of the phenomenal world, as the world of visible, empirical phenomena. One can talk about phenomenality of objects as entities being constituted according to the rubrics of "I think", so that such a phenomenality can be described in four rubrics: quantity, quality, relation and modality. The phenomenality of objects is different from the event-like manifestations, whose phenomanlity cannot be reduced to the stated four rubrics and where there is the excess of intuition over the discursive faculty.

is reduced to the existence of the pre-predicative world, the life world, which in its sheer givenness is not reducible to anything in the natural world. Its interpretation proceeds from the theology of creation of life connoting with the Life understood as Divine Being. In words of M. Henry "I am not only for myself, i.e. this individual appearing in the world, a thing among things, a man among men…. In order to relate everything to oneself, one must first of all be this Self to whom everything is related, one must be able to say *I am me*. But the point is that this *I am me* is not at all originary... A Self such as that of man, a living transcendental Self – such a Self is only ever to be found in the 'Word of life' of the first letter of John, whom Paul describes as a 'First Born among many Brothers' (Romans, 8: 28-30)" (Henry, 2003: 104). In other words, the transition from the philosophical paradox to its theological sense can only be made by reducing the facticity of the paradox to the impossibility of its metaphysical description, that is to "event", manifesting God's creation of that which is metaphysically impossible (and hence unexplainable).

Theologians of the past expressed the paradox in terms explicitly containing a reference to that which is beyond the world, that is to the fact that the paradox explicates the condition of creaturehood. In his Epistles to Romans apostle Paul recapitulates man's paradoxical created condition by contrasting his serving to God's Law with his mind, and serving to the law of sin with his unspiritual nature (Rom, 7: 25). Maximus the Confessor advocated that God's image in man made him capable to mediate between moral divisions in himself and in creation in general, for example between the sensible (visible universe) and intelligible (invisible (for example an image of the world's wholeness in consciousness)): "As a compound of soul and body he [man] is limited essentially by intelligible and sensible realities, while at the same time he himself defines [articulates] these realities through his capacity to apprehend intellectually and perceive with his senses." [9] The Russian philosopher V. Soloviev explicitly referred to God in his description of the human ambivalent condition: "Man comprises in himself all possible oppositions, all of which are reduced to one great opposition between the unconditional and conditional, or between the absolute and eternal being, and a transient phenomenon, an illusion. Man is *deity* and *nothing* at the same time" (Soloviev, 1989: 113). Another Russian philosopher and theologian V. Nesmelov expressed the paradox in different words: "all particular contradictions of thought and life arise from man's aspiration to fulfil the ideal image of the unconditional in the necessary boundaries of the external conditions" (Nesmelov, 1905:246); and "In knowledge of ourselves we know truly, that although our own person exists only in the necessary conditions of the physical world, by its nature it manifests not the world, but the true essence of the very Infinite and Unconditional" (Nesmelov, 1905: 269).

Now it is reasonable to pose a question on whether the impossibility of metaphysical explication of the paradox of subjectivity (that is unknowability of man) characterises something fundamental in the human condition which as such represents an element of its constitution in reflection. The philosophical impasse here *may* be elucidated through an appeal to theological anthropology relating the present human condition to the event of the Fall. In other words, the question can be posed like this: does the paradox of subjectivity in its outward formulation manifests the essence of that which represents a consequence of the event of transgression from union with God granted to the first man at the moment of his creation (implying that the first man wan knowable to himself)? If this would be true indeed, the consequence for our topic would be also manifesting and conclusive: the dichotomy between a scientific and theological vision of the world would originate in the Fall and the very *telos* of reconciliation between them can be treated as the healing and redemption of sin which ultimately would resolve the paradox and thus unified theology and science. In addition to such a conclusion one could argue that the split between science and theology encapsulates that characteristic feature of the post-lapserian condition of man and the world

[9] Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua* 10:26, PG 91, 1153B [ET: (Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware, 1986: 277)].

which a contemporary Greek Orthodox thinker C. Yannars emphatically described in terms of "evil". According to Yannaras, the paradox of subjectivity is a particular form of explication of "evil":

"All the laws of nature, the fundamental constancies of the natural world, its 'arbitrary' arithmetic values, constitute a single holistic phenomenon that tends organically from the outset toward the creation of conditions for its self-knowledge, that is to say, for intelligent life….And yet the way nature operates within the conditions prevailing on earth also manifests in a parallel fashion an autonomy (a mechanistic 'indifference') with regard to the intelligent existence of the human subject, its creative uniqueness and otherness… In this autonomy of nature, we human beings see a challenging 'absurdity' (a violation of our own rational conception of *meaning* in the world), an absurdity that we can only characterize as *evil*" (Yannaras, 2012: 16).

Yannaras' reading of the paradox through his understanding of man (as a creature longing for immortality but facing a defeat by the laws of nature) (Yannaras, 2011), contributes to the longstanding discussion of the paradox by philosophers, qualifying it as an expression of the basic *anxiety* of humanity in the world, its despair and non-attunement to the world, depriving man of understanding of the sense of existence.[10] Can thus the paradox of subjectivity (implied in Yannaras' quote) be treated as a definition of "evil", related to the human incomprehension of his own condition, that is to the condition after the Fall? Or the notion of "evil", invoked by Yannaras, has a sense independent from the Fall and inherent in the condition of creaturehood as such? I would incline to defend the second option because of one striking theological observation, namely *that the unknowability of man by himself (entailing the paradox and the sense of the autonomy of nature in him) is part of his Divine image*. The fact that human nature is unknowable follows from its being an image and likeness of God, that is of that One Who is unknowable. A classical excerpt from patristic texts is that one of Gregory of Nyssa: "Since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator, evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness the incomprehensible Nature."[11] This entails that any attempted resolution of the paradox of subjectivity, as a search for the answer to the question "What is man?", qualifies such an attempt (in which man defines himself in terms of something which is less than God) as a distortion of the Divine image[12]. One can suggest that for the first man the question of "What is man?" did not exist in the same form as it is posed by us because of his union with God, as following God, keeping him free form anxiety of existence as creaturehood. In this case the event of the Fall can be characterized as the loss of the primordial "privilege of unknowing" and the lapse in the state of anxiety and homelessness in the world. Then the paradox (as an encapsulated "response" to the question "What is man?") explicates in a positive fashion the essence of the ambivalence of the human condition: it exists subject to the physical conditions of the world, but yet in the Divine image, that is in communion (not union!) with God. Then the question is: what is meant by evil in Yanaras' reformulation of the paradox? Since the assertion of unknowability of man is based, *de facto*, on a premise that he cannot create himself whilst, as a creature, holds the Divine image, the Fall can mean only a change of attitude to this inherent creaturely condition. In this case that evil to which Yannaras refers is related not to ontology of the created world, but to evil in man as the loss of the privilege of being in *union* with all creation

[10] Anxiety as a modus of the human existence was indirectly introduced in the context of the paradox by J.-P. Sartre and M. Heidegger.

[11] Gregory of Nyssa, *De hominis opificio* [ET: (Schaff, Wace, 1996: 397). See on the unknowability of man an article (Marion, 2005), as well as a chapter from (Marion, 2010: 21-86).

[12] J.-L. Marion in his (Marion, 2010: 41), quotes a passage from St Augustine's *De Trinitate* 10.5.7, in which, as Marion claims, a phenomenology of sin is represented through describing the human soul as turning away form God, "slithering and sliding down into less and less, which is imagined to be more and more". What is implied by this, is that any attempt of man to define himself on the basis of the human only is tantamount of denying life as the gift of that other than man, that is God, through resemblance with whom man resembles himself, and thus is only capable of defining himself.

and God, resulting in his separation from the world and seeing it just as a medium of necessity and slavery, an obstacle in man's ambition for transcendence. In this sense the drama of the paradox, as well as the tension between science and theology, represent such an attitude to the sense of existence in which the basic condition of creaturehood (as a premise for being in communion with God-Creator) is forgotten. This makes it possible to treat Yannaras's interpretation of the paradox in terms of evil in a *moral*, but not ontological sense, explicated in similarity with those moral divisions in creation which were at the center of Maximus the Confessor's theology of deification as mediation between these divisions and, ultimately, mediation between the created and uncreated, between the world and God. Seen in this perspective, we argue, that the paradox explicates the basic predicament of the human condition as being *a creature in communion with God*. But, as we will discuss below, it is this predicament that paves the way for man's deification: to be deified, one must be created.

If the conditions of "evil" in Yannaras's sense correspond to the moral tensions related to the apprehension of the world, and man's inability to comprehend its facticity through the corporeal cognitive faculties, one can argue that the sciences help humanity to adapt to the conditions of "evil" in man himself, that is their primary task is to articulate, although indirectly, particular aspects of this "evil". One needs to see "evil" in order to develop an impetus for transcending its conditions. In fact, even to articulate the ambivalence in the human condition as "evil", one needs *grace*, as that move which positions "evil" in man beyond his natural condition. In view of this one reasonably comes back to the question of the sense of the dialogue between theology and science. Science articulates the conditions of "evil" in man although silently, not giving any moral judgment on whether nature (as being recapitulated in man) is good or bad for humanity. The moral judgment comes from theology which contrasts the ends of nature with the ends of humanity and which Yanaras described as the "autonomy of nature [that] we human beings see a challenging 'absurdity' (a violation of our own rational conception of *meaning* in the world)" (Yannaras, 2012: 16). In his desire to subordinate the ends of nature to the ends of himself, man exercises his archetypical "likeness" to God by knowing and judging things according to his free will.[13] However, man's actual incapacity to transform nature and first of all his own nature in the manner of its creator, is determined by the fact of creaturehood. Correspondingly, that notion of "evil" which is invoked in Yanaras's quote, can be treated as a certain misuse of the Divine image in man who attempts to tame the ends of nature (in order to define himself) not through his privilege of creaturely communion with God, but through his illusion of the unlimited power of controlling the material world through reason. This ambition of man is his moral problem related to the oblivion of the fact that his privilege of the Divine image is the result of otherness with respect to God, that is creaturehood in communion.

The overcoming of this "evil" in man, that is mediation between moral tensions between parts and aspects of creation in man himself, cannot be done metaphysically, that is no philosophical concept is possible which would resolve the riddle of man or without referring it to the theology of creation. The sense of creaturehood arrives only through grace in communion, which *de facto* means existential transcendence. The possible overcoming of the difference between the human ends and the ends of nature can only be seen in terms of soteriological purposiveness, avoiding any ontological reference either to the natural state of man, or to any particular modus of the natural in the world, which would allegedly manifest the achievement of such a purpose. The theology of Maximus the Confessor on man's mediation between moral tensions (divisions) in creation always warned its readers that no ontological bridge between creation and its cre-

[13] The analogy comes from St. Maximus the Confessor's discussion on whether God knows created things according to their nature. His answer is negative: God knows things according to his will: "…he neither knows sensible things sensibly nor intellectual things intellectually. For it is out of question that the one who is beyond existent things should know things in the manner proper to beings. But we say that God knows existent things as the products of his own acts of *will*…" (*Ambigua*, 7, PG 91, 1085B) [ET: (Blowers, Wilken, 2003: 61-62)].

ator will be possible through mediation and deification. In other words, the ends of nature will never be subordinated to the ends of humanity on the ontological level. On the moral level, the ends of man and the ends of nature can be reconciled through such a transfiguration of the spiritual insight in man that will ease the drama of nature's autonomy and make humanity free not from the conditions of nature, but from anxiety of creaturehood.

One can summarize that the unknowabilty of man by himself, expressed through the paradox of subjectivity, encapsulates the essence of the moral division in man between his limited created position in the physical world and his intellectual and spiritual capacity to transcend the world and to long for the unconditional and eternal. The dialogue between theology and science then represents a future explication of man's drama of creaturehood providing us with the open-ended hermeneutics of man's created existence in communion with God.

The Unknowability of Man as Oblivion of Origins

The paradox of subjectivity, or the mystery of the ambivalent position of man in the universe can be considered in the context of the issue of *beginnings*. One implies the beginning of that consciousness in man which is responsible for man's reflection upon its standing in front of the universe in the conditions of the paradox. The reflecting consciousness always slides back to the mystery of its beginning because the hidden nature of this beginning is the very simple and primordial manifestation of man's unknowability by himself.[14] Man, although not being able to explicate its own beginning, always faces this beginning as a problem that is implicitly present in his consciousness as that which cannot be "looked" at; as that which is inescapable from the very fabric of the human condition and that which can hardly be distinguished from experience of life. This situation is explicated in a phenomenological treatment of birth, understood as coming into existence of hypostatic human beings, that is persons.

The problem is that I can experience my birth[15] only through its delayed consequences: I did not see my birth and I must rely on the account of my parents or other witnesses in order to attempt to grasp my birth as that occurrence which affects me through all my life, but I will never be able to reconstitute this event as a phenomenon. The phenomenon of birth gives itself without showing itself because it comes to pass as an event, that is something without foundation, ground, as origin but which is non-originary.[16] The exceptional status of this event follows from the fact that birth gives itself together with that, that it gives *me to myself*. This is a mechanism how my birth phenomenalises itself, for without this giving me to myself I would not be able to realise that it is me who is affected by birth. The phenomenon of birth thus exemplifies the condition for any phenomenon: the possibility of phenomenalisation of all things lies in the extent by which it gives itself: the phenomenon of birth is the first phenomenon which initiates the possibility of receiving all other phenomena. The phenomenon of birth as a phenomenon *par excellence*, not being reducible to any preceding causes and being incommunicable and indemonstrable, forms that excess in human perception of life which is always allows for unpredictable future, for an indefinite series of commentaries and insights on the sense of this birth which extends forward in time while being interpreted retrospectively. Not being a phenomenon given to myself, I always experience an intention to look at birth as a phenomenon which initiated me, my identity, my spiritual growth, ultimately my hypostatic uniqueness. Birth as an existential premise is always silently encoded in all my actions, which attempt to reconstitute it in order to come to terms with the fact that I was born without my consent and can do nothing about it. In a way, my birth can be seen as the never-ending continuation of my experience of life, but it is

[14] C.f. the already quoted passage from (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 453).

[15] For the purposes of simplicity we use first person language in this section.

[16] See on phenomenology of birth (Marion, 2003), as well as his (Marion, 2002: 41-44). See also (Romano, 1998: 95-112), and (Henry, 2003: 123-42).

still inaccessible as a phenomenon to my direct gaze. My appropriation of birth is always delayed because any retrospective reflection contains as its basic element a condition of a delay: delay between the occurrence of my birth and innumerable intuitions of its meaning. In this sense me as an original being, does not have an *originary origin*, that is a metaphysical ground to which I can refer in order to deduce the occurrence of my birth from a chain of the worldly events. In fact, the very idea of a possibility of grounding my birth in the chain of such events signifies a fundamental reduction or deprivation of the phenomenality of birth of its excessive primordiality. It is exactly because my birth is in the foundation of all derivative intentions to construct a chain of historical or cosmological transformations, which as antecedents would conclude in my birth, that all articulations are overwhelmed initially and irreducibly by the intuition of this incomprehensible and indemonstrable event of birth.

How then can my birth as a phenomenon, while not showing itself, affect me radically in the sense that it produces my unique existence? How can the origin of myself, which is present in all following events of my life show itself in such a way that, effectively, it is indemonstrable? The answer to these questions comes from the realisation that this showing has an "eschatological" character because the past of my birth is being shown to me only through its *anticipation* as directed to the future. My birth has sense only as an "event" which phenomenalises itself by endowing me with future. Being an indemonstrable phenomenon birth reveals itself as an "event" that was never present to me in orders of "presence in presence" and always already imbued with the qualities of the having passed, but never irrelevant for the present and outdated. But even in this "eschatological phenomenalisation" my birth does not allow any demonstrability in a sense of communication: my birth for me is an event which cannot be grasped as a fact and correspondingly described in rubrics of thought and demonstrated, being irreproducible and surpassing any expectation and prediction.

The event of birth (if one regards it as coming-into-being of persons) as an event is not accountable on the level of *sufficient* conditions of its happening: its outcome is unpredictable and unforeseeable: given the normal physical conditions birth (conception) might not happen at all. However, the necessary conditions for this event to happen lie in the sphere of what preceded it, the physical plan. In this sense, in spite of its sporadic and unique character an event of birth as physical incarnation contains in itself that something which made the happening of this event possible. And when one says that birth gives itself in an unmediated and indemonstrable way, that is not to say that it does not contain in itself and does not manifest the hidden conditions for it to take place. These conditions come with birth and follow birth in the same unmediated and indemonstrable way. This means that in no way can I treat myself as an absolute beginning. I can oversee the limits of my origin and look objectively at it, that is to formulate for myself the necessary conditions which made it possible. My personal story can easily be extended to that "before" which lies in the foundation of my incarnation not only on the level of my parents as a biological species, but that "before and out there" which make it possible for life to exist at all. One means here physical conditions and ultimately the universe. Thus, my act of birth entails not only an unbreakable communion with my parents but an unbreakable communion with the universe where I was born and which is an implicit premise of the very possibility of my articulations with regard to both my birth and the universe as a whole. I did not choose the universe where to be born; the universe then is mine in an absolute sense. I cannot disregard the universe in my life because its presence is implanted in my birth: I am in communion with the universe from the very moment of inception of my body and consciousness.

The phenomenological concealment of the sense of birth as coming of man into existence makes this unique and personal existence incomprehensible, thus contributing to the radical unknowability of man by himself. Since the paradox of subjectivity in its philosophically articulated form is possible only for persons, the unknowability of man's personhood cascades toward the incomprehensibility of con-

tingent facticity of the paradox itself. Since the event of birth endows man with a future, so that birth's explication goes on continuously as a process directed to the future, the hermeneutics of the paradox as an inherent feature of the human condition goes on endlessly. This explication includes the dialogue between theology and science which, as an activity directed to the future, contributes to the elucidation of the sense of birth as being created.

From the Paradox of Subjectivity to the incarnational archetype: the sense of the dialogue as it is seen theologically

The approach to the question "What is man?" through the notion of communion receives its Biblical justification through the answer which God gives to Moses "I will be with you" (Exodus, 3:12). Paraphrasing, it is that who can say "I am who I am" (Exodus, 3.14) that tells to Moses that he will be with him. The whole essence of the question "Who am I?" as a concrete incarnation of the question "What is man?" entails, through the encounter with God, the answer which is not a direct response on that which is asked, but an indication that the implied sense of the response can only be given via an invitation of man into God's midst through the way of life. Communion is thus following the same imperative of God "I will be with you" on the side of man: "I will be with You by following You". By accepting God's communion man does not receive any answer on what he can or cannot know, what he ought or does not owe to do, what he may or may not hope for: thus he does not receive an answer to the question of "What is man?" as it was formulated by Kant. For God indicates to man that this question cannot be addressed and responded in abstraction simply because without communion with God it does not have sense and cannot be clarified. "Man is man only in communion with God" means that God offers man the way, which is man's history as the endowing him by the future. There is no being of man as such, devoid of the inaugural event of communion with God enabling man to have future, that is life. In other words, the "knowledge" of man by himself as such turns out to be the unfolding of his history towards that for which this history was created: man receives the sense of his *telos* formulated not in terms of those potentialities which are implied in the three Kant's questions, but through the definition of communion. It is only by following this God-given (through communion) purpose that man can indefinitely unfold and constitute the sense of its own existence knowing in advance that the ultimate union with God, phrased theologically as deification, will yet leave untouched an inerasable difference (*diaphor*a) between a creature and the Creator. It is a dedication to this *telos* that releases man from the incessant idolatry of his images of himself, thus effectively removing all dramatism of the unanswerable nature of the question "What is man?", through which God releases man from any search for rootedness in the rubrics of the world by constantly pointing to him that while being in the world, man is not *of* the world (C.f., e.g., (Berdyaev, 1944, 94-95)). Man's anxiety of his contingence and homelessness in being, entailing the question of "What is man?", is intended to be replaced by offering home in God's midst, that is through being introduced to communion with God, who will be with him on all his ways.[17]

Then the refusal of following God, which meta-historically associated with the Fall, meant that man imagined that he can attain to himself by choosing to resemble something less than God. This is rather a paradoxical situation: to be man in communion with God is to remain in the conditions when man's Divine Image is detected, but not defined. If man attempts to define himself in some metaphysical terms pertaining to the world, that is if he denigrates his existence from the transcendent

[17] A similar thought was expressed by V. Nesmelov: "Man aspires not only to the explanation of his situation in the world, but also to knowledge of that way *through which he could indeed overcome this situation*… To reach knowledge of the eternal mystery of being means the same as to, *de facto, remove* this mystery in being, that is to produce the *true way* for accomplishment by man of his destiny in the world and to give him *true possibility* for the accomplishment of this destiny. It is about this way and this possibility that Christian teaching tells man. It communicates to man that knowledge without which man cannot manage, but which he, unfortunately, cannot create" (Nesmelov, 1905: 418).

communion to some immanent attribution, he effectively commits *sin* because he co-relates his humanity to something which is less than God. By not following God and introducing into its own definition something less than God, man predisposes himself to despair and homelessness in being because there is nothing in being which gives man a dwelling place and the comfort of reciprocity.[18]

However, as the Bible teaches us, the invitation to communion with God, in order to ease the feeling of despair and anxiety, does not find a straightforward response in man: it represents an existential difficulty, because communion transcends the limits of the empirical, which is accessible to the senses and logical thinking. Certainly, there always was a temptation to treat the idea of communion as an abstract ethical ideal leading to a sort of religious humanism. In reality, this invitation to communion never implied any abstract teaching on how to answer basic questions, previously quoted from Kant. It implied to see God in creation and hence to be in communion with him. This "did not prevent men from wallowing in error" (Athanasius, 1996: 42), so that the invitation to communion, not recognised by men, was reactivated through the descent of God towards man when God assumed reality of the human flesh. This became God's self-response to his longstanding invitation to men to be in communion.

On the one hand God's descent to the poverty and miserableness of the human condition, entering friendship with the wicked and sinful, brought nothing new to man in terms of its own explanation. The vulnerable condition of the human affairs in the world with all horror and atrocities of the humans with respect to themselves, was not explained and healed away. Christ himself, by being crucified and passing through the brutal attitude of humans to humans, did not imply to teach them from the Cross on what *is man*. He did not attempt to teach of man along the lines of the Greek ideal of beauty and kindness. He rather confirmed to them through his witness to the Father that they "do not know what they do" (Lk 23:34). By rephrasing a response to the Kantian question, Christ demonstrated to man that without receiving Christ as the Son God, and as the Son of Man, "man does not know what to do, and what to hope for, he cannot avoid despair and uncertainty of not being able to approach the mystery of the his existence." Through his parables, Christ inaugurated the Kingdom of God, which was available to all, not only to those ideal men of the Greek philosophy. For anxiety and despair, groundlessness and non-attunement to the world, expressed through the the paradox (as an implicit longing for immortality), can be healed in man himself only through abandoning the idea of finding its own foundation in that "substance" of the world which, in spite of being created by God, yet is in a state of indifference to man and his affairs, a state which was described above as a primary "evil" (Yannaras, 2012: 16). Being a creature, man cannot receive any hope of elucidating his condition from a creature which is not hypostatic. However, man can confess unconditional love by imitating God who created the world with no hope of reciprocal love from the world. But to exercise such a love man ought to follow his archetype through God's promise of being in communion with man. In this sense the Kantian questions received practical (not abstract philosophical) answers explicat-

[18] As a corollary to what we have discussed on the paradox of subjectivity, it turns out to be that any possible overcoming of the paradox of subjectivity would correspond to the diminution of the human (as being in communion but in the conditions of unknowability) in man, that is an imminent spiritual lapse into the state of deprivation of communion. However here is an intrinsic counter argument made by the same consciousness which attempts to resolve the ambiguity in the paradox. This argument is simple: the facticity of consciousness precedes any particular modus of reflection upon the ambiguity of man in the universe. This means that the resolution of the paradox (as finding a metaphysical ground for it) is impossible on the grounds of its contingent facticity that enters any human life as an event which saturates intuition and blocks its discursive apprehension. Hence the language of resolving (or overcoming) the paradox becomes irrelevant. The intended "overcoming" can be posited as a formal *purpose*, without implying that the actual achievement of this purpose has any metaphysical sense, as if man would find the ultimate source of this paradox (its own explication) in the world. As a result, one can conclude that the knowing of the world in the conditions of the paradox, when this paradox itself becomes a purpose of explanation, represents a purposeful activity where the *purpose* is only formal (See our comment on the idea of formal purposiveness in ref. 4).

ing the sense of the offered communion: "As an image of God, man cannot *know* himself. He can know things of the world only in the delimiters of his own unknowability. Correspondingly to avoid anxiety of this unknowabilty man *ought* to follow Christ (= to be in history) in order to see the world through "his eyes", where the chasm between the uncreated and created was removed through the Incarnation of the Son 'begotten before all ages'. Only in this case man may *hope* for the union with God in his Kingdom, but without explication of the miracle of its own creation". Communion thus becomes such a change in the *tropos* (the way) of existence, when the world loses its sense of a hostile terrain and the source of "evil" (where man is crushed under the weight of astronomical facts (Marcel, 1940: 32). This change invokes (in Pascal's manner) man's understanding that it is the universe that is capable of killing him, and that the universe itself does not understand this (Pascal, 1959: 78, 39).

Christ, being fully human, experienced the same predicaments as all created men, but unlike all men, he knew that coping with these predicaments proceeded from his being the Son of God. The Son of God enhypostasised himself in the conditions of the physical world and, as being fully human, he knew what it meant to be a creature and he transferred to humanity knowledge of this. The key point to the manifestation of Christ's creaturehood was his Crucifixion that showed the whole scale tragedy of being subjected to the law of death. The way to be "man in communion with God" is to follow Christ through his life in the created human condition and comprehending the whole universe through his Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension and ever being on the right hand of the Father. The major point here is experience of being created in the conditions of communion, or to be chained to the physical world whilst longing for freedom from the conditioned (and immortality) on the grounds of man's archetype in Christ. Thus, the human predicament expressed in the paradox of subjectivity receives its elucidation from the Christ-event, being the only possible theological reference in the hermeneutics of the ambivalent created condition of humanity.

In spite of Christ's moral teaching through centuries of the recent history, the Incarnation of God is not an accidental event which happened in order to heal human faults (for example, human inability to see the creator through creation[19], thus not following God). As that part of creation which has been envisioned by God from the beginning, the human predicament of the ambivalent existence in the universe was implanted in the very logic of creation by confirming once again that the main delimiter in answering the question "What is man?" proceeds from his creaturehood. Man cannot answer the question "What is man?" because he cannot create himself. By understanding this he is predisposed to communion and acquisition of Grace that confirms that man is not only a natural being, but a Divine image.

And it is through science, which is particular modus of the Divine image in man, that man understands the dimensions of his created condition not from the side of the negative connotations of the paradox of subjectivity, but, in fact, related to the whole logic of creation. It is science that makes possible to understand that it is the descent of God into the universe that predetermines the contingent facticity of the universe which accommodates man. For the Word-Logos of God to assume human flesh, there *must be* this flesh. Since modern physics and biology are clear with respect to the necessary conditions of existence of such a flesh requiring at least ten billion years of cosmological evolution, it seems evident that for the Incarnation to take place the *necessary* physical conditions must have been fulfilled. To have a body of Christ and his Mother (Virgin Mary) the universe must have had from the beginning the propensity to produce them. Correspondingly the ontological aspect of the Incarnation[20] is always present in the reversed history of the universe as it is described in modern cosmology.[21] Ac-

[19] See, for example Athanasius. In *On the Incarnation*, 3: 11, 12 (Athanasius, 1996).

[20] The ontological view of the Incarnation can be seen through a modern theological development called "deep Incarnation" (Gregersen, 2001).

[21] These conditions are summarised in various versions of the Anthropic Principle (AP), which detects consubstantiality of the physical stuff of the universe and human corporeal beings.

cording to T. Torrance the whole surrounding world, being created *freely* in the act of Love between the Persons of the Holy Trinity, exhibits *contingent necessity* related to its physical structure, its space and temporal span, encoding the motive of the Incarnation (and hence man) in the fabric of creation (Torrance, 1998). These observations change a stance on the position of man in the cosmos, releasing him from the mediocrity and insignificance of its physical existence. The question "What is man?" receives its elucidation through adoption of a new vision that the very existence of man is "implanted" in the fabric of creation, whose logic presupposes bringing creation to communion with God through man. If the motive of the Incarnation is linked to the logic of creation, man as a particular segment of creation becomes inextricably intertwined with the rest of creation. Since the actual historical Incarnation happens in the midst of the human subset of the universe (recapitulating the universe on the level of consubstantiality and epistemological acquisition), its proper sense can be directly related to the constitution and meaning of the cosmos, in which humanity itself is not positioned anymore on the periphery of the created universe, but in its centre as immanent intentionality of creation. [22] However one must not treat the Incarnation and the very existence of intelligent humanity as metaphysically predetermined in the creation. One can only assert that; indeed, the logic of creation contained the *necessary* conditions for existence of intelligence and hence the Incarnation. The *sufficient* conditions for both, human intelligence or the Incarnation can only be detected through the actual happening of the Incarnation, thus providing us with their transcendent references (*paradigmatic*). The *sufficient* conditions for the Incarnation are not part of the underlying ontology of the world and here the *revelational* aspect of the Incarnation that enters the discussion framed in terms of the inauguration of the Kingdom of God. This is to say that the Incarnation is not part of the *natural conditions* in the world. Even if the world was created by God in order to attain the union with God, it is humanity which is granted the means of such an attainment through a special call. The possibility of such an attainment effectively contributes to the definition of man: only in communion with God man becomes "himself."[23] In this sense man, in spite of being consubstantial to the visible creation[24] and having solidarity with it, is a special creation whose essence requires *grace*, and the mechanism of acquiring this grace proceeds through the Incarnation. Then one can see that the proper theological input in the dialogue of theology with the sciences originates exactly in the archetypical predisposition (endowed by the incarnate Christ) of relating the visible universe to its transcendent foundation, given to humanity through the grace of the "giver of life." If one generalises this, the dialogue between theology and science, as co-existence of different attitudes to the created world, has its archetype in the Incarnate Christ for whom the predicament of the dialogue did not exist because this dialogue was Christ's own creation in the same sense as the world and its scientific exploration were created by him. The difference in attitude to the world (present in theology and science) was introduced by Christ in order to teach man about the *meaning of creaturehood in the conditions of communion with God*. Being in human flesh, Christ as the Logos-creator, had to hold the image of the physically disjoint universe in one single consciousness as an intelligible (noetic) entity. Thus, the unity of the created world, being split in itself as the sensible and intelligible, becomes the pivotal indication of the sense of the created. This split in representation of man by himself (as the composite unity of the empirical and intel-

[22] Maximus the Confessor, for example, refers to man, created in the image of God, as a key to understanding creation in his process of divinization when he may elevate it to the supreme level of its full soteriological comprehension. See e.g. (Thunberg, 1985: 76) referring to Maximus' *Questions to Thalassius 35*.

[23] As was expressed by J. Zizioulas, one cannot identify man through a syllogistic formula "man=man" which, if one follows a philosophical logic, contains a pointer beyond itself towards the definition of man as "man=man-in-communion-with-God" (Zizioulas, 2006: 248).

[24] According to modern cosmology human body, consisting of atoms, effectively interacts only with 4% of all matter of the universe, remaining de facto non-consubstantial to the rest 96% of the allegedly existing Dark Energy and Dark Matter.

ligible) indicated in the paradox of subjectivity cascades towards the split between science and theology, pointing towards a simple fact that neither empirical nor theoretical knowledge of the universe can receive any justification of their contingent facticity if the ultimate source if this facticity is not sought in the logic of creation. Thus, the dialogue between theology and science can be treated as an outward manifestation of the radical createdness of humanity wrestling with its own incapacity to control its own ends, as well the ends of the world. It is not difficult to guess that such a dialogue is an open-ended enterprise, having no metaphysical accomplishment and hence having sense only as contributing to the infinite hermeneutics of the created human condition.

One can be tempted to link the unknowability of man by himself, and the paradox of subjectivity, not to the issue of creaturehood, but to the conditions of the Fall as if the ambivalence in the human condition formulated in the paradox proceeds from the loss of memory of "all in all" (Eph. 4:6) in the post-lapserian state. Correspondingly, the resolution of the paradox could be associated with the acquiring back the state of the first man Adam. However, this cannot be true, because the first man was also created and his knowledge of "all in all", implanted in his Divine likeness, did not guarantee him being able to reproduce himself in a manner he was created by God. The crucial moment in explicating man's unknowability is Christ who, by being God and fully human, elucidates to man the sense of man's created condition, the sense which, as such, was obscured by the Fall. The traditional link between the Fall and the Incarnation is that the latter is treated as a redeeming act of God towards saving the transgressing humanity. However, Orthodox theology points towards a connection between creation and the Incarnation, as being, *de facto*, a *necessary and sufficient* condition for the created to be brought to union with God. In other words, the motive of the Incarnation is linked to the aim of creation.[25] According to Maximus the Confessor, the creation of the world contained the goal for which all things were created: "For it is for Christ, that is, for the Christic mystery, that all time and all that is in time has received in Christ its beginning and its end."[26] It is in this sense that the motives of creation and the Incarnation are inextricably intertwined and this, theologically (and in addition to the cosmological findings), points to the fact that the phenomenon of man is intrinsically linked to the motive of creation. Man was created in the universe, and because of its createdness he experiences his Divine image through unknowabililty and ambivalence of existence. From here one can conclude that *the dichotomy between theology and science is thus an inevitable characteristic of man's creaturehood, so that the sought reconciliation of theology and science is impossible in the human condition to the same extent as the overcoming of the ontological (not moral) division between creation and God in the process of deification*.

By linking the motive of the Incarnation to the intrinsic logic of creation of the world by God, Orthodox theology extends the scope of the Incarnation beyond the opposition Fall-Redemption, towards a more wider span of the plan of salvation as related to the deification of man and bringing the whole creation to the union with God. The lesser arch of the Fall-Redemption becomes a tool in restoring the greater arch Creation-Deification.[27] A famous phrase

[25] According to G. Florovsky, "It seems that the 'hypothesis' of an Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology and fits as well enough in the mainstream of Patristic teaching. In *An adequate answer to the 'motive' of the Incarnation can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of Creation.*" (Florovsky, 1976: 170) (Emphasis added) (The discussion of "*Cur Deus Homo?*" has never been a part of the canonical corpus of Orthodox literature and constituted, in words of G. Florovsky, a *theologumenon* (theological opinion)).

[26] Maximus the Confessor. In *Questions to Thalassius*, 60.

[27] (Louth, 2007: 34-35). In this sense the conditioning of the Incarnation by the human concerns would be a mistake: "Christ is not a mere event or happening in history. The incarnation of the divine Logos was not a simple consequence of the victory of the devil over man…The union of the divine and the human natures took place because it fulfilled the *eternal* will of God" (Nellas, 1997: 37) (emphasis added)), so that it "…showed us that this was why we were created, and that this was God's good purpose concerning us from before ages, a purpose which was realised through the introduction of another, newer mode" (Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua*, PG 91: 1097C [ET: (Constas, 2014: 131-133)], that is the entrance of "the incorporeal and incorruptible and immaterial Word of God [into] our world" (Athanasius, 1996: 33).

from Athanasius that God "assumed humanity that we might be made God"[28] implies that humanity, being created, has a potential to be in union with God (not based in the natural laws related to creation). One can say stronger that creaturely modus of existence becomes unavoidable for the very possibility of deification. Correspondingly, if God's plan "consists in deification of the created world" (some parts of which imply salvation), the plausibility of the plan of deification is rooted in the fact that man is ontologically united with the created nature. Man is the "microcosm who resumes, condenses, recapitulates in himself the degrees of the created being and because of this he can know the universe from within" (Clément, 1976: 90). In this sense Orthodox theology links the Incarnation to humanity as that subset of the created universe which is capable of conducting a mediating role in overcoming moral tensions between different parts of creation, creation and God.[29] The mediation between moral divisions in creation explicates the sense of being created and the delimiters of deification: the union with God through these mediations does not remove the basic ontological difference (*diaphora*) between the world and God thus not removing the riddle of man, retaining his basic definition as being *a creature in communion* with God.

The reader may be puzzled by such a paradoxical situation: indeed, if one talks about deification as the union with God, and deification is possible through the Incarnation, why man cannot achieve through this deification that state that was pertaining to Christ the Incarnate? The answer is: Christ hypostatically remained the Logos of God and was controlling his enhypostasisation in Jesus by being able to explicate its own human, that is created nature. However, this is not given to man, so that the Incarnation remains an archetype of the human (Divine image/physical flesh = uncreated/created) predicament. At the same time the Incarnation brings a kind of a *natural division* in our understanding of communion. According to Maximus the Confessor the Incarnation brought the division in the temporal span of evolution of the universe onto two fundamentally different aeons: "…God wisely divided 'the ages' between those intended for God to become human, and those intended for humanity to become divine."[30] This excludes a possibility of treating the movement from creation to deification through the Incarnation as a "natural process" inherent in the fabric of creation. On the one hand created things participate in God through the fact of their existence, that is through "being in communion." However, when Maximus enquires in the human capacity of deification, he stresses that it does not belong to man's natural capacity.[31] By separating the aeons before and after the Incarnation Maximus makes a difference between the participation in God which is bestowed to man by creation and that participation which is bestowed by deification. Said differently, the aeon after the Incarnation corresponds to the movement of man to God, whose very possibility was effected by the Incarnation, and whose actual exercise demands not only *communion through existence*, but *communion through grace*. Grace is not implanted in the natural conditions of existence, but is bestowed by God on the grounds of man's personal extent of perfection.[32] It is this grace that makes possible for man to realise his ambivalence in the universe originating in creaturehood. It is this grace that makes possible to enquire in the contingent facticity of the sciences thus initiating their dialogue with theology. It is this grace that makes theology possible as that constituent of knowledge that explicates the sense of the created humanity.

[28] Athanasius. In *On the Incarnation* 54 (Athanasiius, 1996: 93).

[29] See, for example (Thunberg, 1995: 387-427).

[30] Maximus the Confessor, *Ad Talassium* 22 [ET: (Blowers, Wilken, 2003: 115)] This point sheds the light on the inclusion of the lesser arch of Fall-Redemption into the greater one of Creation-Deification as the different degrees of participation in God.

[31] "…what takes place would no longer be marvellous if divinization occurred simply in accordance with the receptive capacity of nature" (Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua 20* [ET: (Constas, 2104: 411)].

[32] L. Thunberg with reference to Maximus asserts: "There is in man no natural power that can deify him, but there exists on the other hand a reciprocal relationship between God and man that permits him to become deified to the degree in which the effects of the Incarnation are conferred on him" (Thunberg, 1985: 55).

Conclusion
The Dialogue between Theology and Science as open-ended hermeneutics of the human condition

The duality in hermeneutics of the subject which is transpiring through the dialogue between theology and science receives its elucidation from the basic feature of man related to its creaturehood: man exists through communion with God by the fact of its createdness, but he does not "possess" himself entirely in the world even in tendency, because the conditions of *communion through grace* are not part of the world. Indeed, by detecting his ambivalent position in the world (the paradox of subjectivity), man discovers himself in the conditions of an intellectual impasse, that is incapacity of understanding the contingent facticity of such a paradox as the delimiter of his embodied consciousness. Through attempts to find the metaphysical grounds for himself, man produces instead infinite hermeneutics of its own predicament thus sensing that the very means of interrogation of himself by himself cannot be existentially clarified. Here, an inerasable Divine image in man invokes the latter to seek for God's help and thus following God, that God who once descended in the world to teach man about his creaturehood in order to be deified. How all this relates to the problem of this paper about the dialogue between theology and science?

The sciences implicitly articulate the outward sense of existence in communion (that is being created) through their very contingent facticity, that is through the fact that they are. The underlying foundation of the sciences is man, whose sense, nevertheless cannot be completely explicated either by the sciences or by philosophy. The sciences function in the conditions man's unknowability by himself. Theology encounters the sciences (and philosophy) in order to release man from an intellectual impasse of unknowability and to invite him to learn from his archetype in Christ that in spite of his creaturehood, he remains in communion and has a potential to achieve the union with God for the sake of understanding that the unknowability and paradox remain the basic theological delimiters in man's self-awareness of his creaturehood.

This brings us to the final conclusion that the dialogue between theology and science represents open-ended hermeneutics of the created human condition. The discourse of the paradox of subjectivity and that of oblivion of origins (phenomenology of birth) provide the delimiters for any of such hermeneutics. Since the riddle of unknowability of man by himself cannot be resolved in terms of metaphysical concepts, cascading down towards the irresolvable nature of the paradox, the dialogue between science and theology cannot hope to have any material goal as its accomplishment. The moral tension between man's created condition and its Divine image, as well as a capacity of receiving grace of deification, retains the dialogue active and alive always and forever, just confirming a simple existential truth that both – science and theology – originate in one and the same man, created in communion with God, but living in a moral tension between the sense of his created limitedness and graceful longing for the unconditional and immortal.

References

Athanasius (1996). *On the Incarnation*. Crestwood: St Vladimir's Seminary Press.

Berdyaev, N. (1944). *Slavery and Freedom*. London: Centenary.

Carr, B. (1998). "On the Origin, Evolution and Purpose of the Physical Universe". In *Modern Cosmology and Philosophy,* ed. J. Leslie. New York: Prometheus, 140-159.

Carr, D. (1999). *The Paradox of Subjectivity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clément, O. (1976). "Le sense de la terre" *Le Christ terre des vivants. Essais théologiques spiritualite orientale,* n. 17. Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellfontaine.

Florovsky, G. (1976). "*Cur Deus Homo?* The motive of the Incarnation". In *Creation and Redemption*. The collected works of Georges Florovsky, vol. III, Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 163-170.

Frank, S. (1965). *Reality and Man*. New York: Taplinger.

Fromm, E. (1967). *Man for Himself. An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Gregersen, N. (2001). "The Cross of Christ in and Evolutionary World", *Dialog: A Journal of Theology*, 40 (3), 192-207.

Gregory of Nyssa (1996). *De hominis opificio* [ET: *On the Making of Man*]. In *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace. Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 5, 387-427.

Henry, M. (2003). "Phenomenology of Life", *Angelaki* 8(2), 100-110.

Henry, M. (2003). *De la Phénoménologie. Tome I. Phénoménologie de la vie*. Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Jaspers, K. (1954). *Ways to Wisdom*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kant, I. (1951). *Critique of Judgement*, Tr. J. H. Bernard. London: Hafner Press.

Kant, I. (1959). *Critique of Practical reason and Other Works on The Theory of Ethics*, Tr. T. K. Abbot. London: Longmans.

Louth, A. (2007). "The place of *Theosis* in Orthodox theology", in *Partakes of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, Eds. M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 32-44.

Marcel, G. (1940). *Du Refus a l'Invocation*. Paris, Galllimard.

Marion, J.-L. (2002). *In Excess. Studies of Saturated Phenomena*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Marion, J.-L. (2003). "The Event, the Phenomenon and the Revealed". In *Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion*, ed. J.F. Faulconer, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press), 87-105.

Marion, J.-L. (2005). "Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing". In *The Journal of Religion* 85 (1), 1–24.

Marion, J.-L. (2010). *Certitudes negatives*. Paris: Bernard Grasset.

Maximus the Confessor (1986). "Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice". In *The Philokalia*: *St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. Makarios of Corinth,* Eds. G.E.H. Palmer, P. Sherrard, and K. Ware, vol. 2. London: Faber].

Maximus the Confessor (2003). *Ambigua* 7. ET: P.M. Blowers, R.L. Wilken, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*. *Selected Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor.* Crestwood NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 45-74.

Maximus the Confessor (2003). *Ad Talassium* 22. ET: P.M. Blowers, R.L. Wilken. In *On the cosmic mystery of Christ* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 115-118.

Maximus the Confessor, (2014). *Ambigua*. ET: *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers. The Ambigua*. 2 vols., Ed. and tr. N. Constas, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1982). *Sense et Non-Sense*. Evanston: Norhwestern University Press.

Moltmann, J. (1974). *Man*. *Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present*. London: SPCK.

Nagel, T. (1986). *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nellas, P. (1997). *Deification in Christ. Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person*. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.

Nesmelov, V. (1905). *The Science of Man*. Kazan: Central Printing House.

Nesteruk, A. (2015). *The Sense of the Universe*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Nesteruk, A. (2018). "Philosophical Foundations of the Dialogue between Science and Theology". In *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences*, 11 (2), 276-298.

Pascal, B. (1959). *Pensées*. Selections. Tr. & ed. Martin Jarret-Kerr. London: SCM.

Plessner, H. (1961). *Conditio humana*. Berlin.

Romano, C. (1998). *L'événement et le monde*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Scheler, M. (1994). *Die Stellung Des Menschen im Kosmos*. Moscow: Gnosis.

Soloviev, V. (1989). *Readings on Godmanhood*. Moscow: Pravda.

Thunberg, L. (1985). *Man and the Cosmos*. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.

Thunberg, L. (1995). *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*. Chicago: Open Court.

Torrance, T. (1998). *Divine and Contingent Order*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.

Yannaras, C. (2012). *The Enigma of Evil*. Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press.

Yannaras, C. (2011). "The Church in Post-Communist Europe", *The Meaning of Reality. Essays on Existence and Communion, Eros and History*. Los Angeles: Sebastian Press & Indiktos, 123-143.

Zizioulas, J. (2006). *Communion and Otherness*. London: T&T Clark.

Диалог между богословием и наукой как нескончаемая герменевтика человеческого состояния

А.В. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута
Великобритания, Портсмут
Российская христианская гуманитарная академия
Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург

Аннотация. Эта статья о развитии представлений о смысле диалога между богословием и наукой в рамках феноменологической философии и ее богословского расширения, предпринятого автором в ранних работах. Автор отстаивает мнение, что причиной напряженности во взгляде на природу реальности в науке и богословии служит парадоксальное положение человека во Вселенной, являющегося, с одной стороны, объектом мира, а с другой стороны, его субъектом, т. е. артикулирующим сознанием. Поскольку, согласно современной философии, устранение двойственного положения в герменевтике субъекта невозможно, проблема фактичности человеческой субъективности как смыслообразующего центра мира приобретает богословское измерение, требующее развитие как богословия, так и философии. Показано, что желаемое преодоление непознаваемости человека самим собою (выраженной в указанном выше парадоксе), неявно подразумеваемое в попытках "объединения" науки и богословия, невозможно онтологически, но как таковое демонстрирует работу формальной целесообразности (в смысле Канта) в человеческом сознании. Отсюда вывод: диалог между богословием и наукой представляет собой целесообразную активность сознания без достижения материальной цели и тем самым вносит вклад в бесконечную герменевтику человеческого состояния.

Ключевые слова: богословие, герменевтика, диалог, наука, субъект, философия, человек, человеческое состояние.

Эта публикация стала возможной благодаря гранту «PH Философия в неопатристике: новые персонажи и новые интерпретации», предоставленному Национальным Научным Центром Польши (DEC-2018/31/B/HS/01861).

Научная специальность: 09.00.08 – философия науки и техники.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1356–1369

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0646
УДК 17

Under the Eye of Others (the Socialized Interpretation of Shame in the History of Ethics)

Andrei V. Prokof'ev*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 20.03.2020, received in revised form 04.08.2020, accepted 12.08.2020

Abstract. The main purpose of the article is to reconstruct the development of a socialized interpretation of shame in the Western philosophical tradition from antiquity up to the 17th century. Along with the standard methods of conducting research in the history of philosophy (critical, comparative, hermeneutical, etc.), the author resorts to a strategy of identifying the historical sources and rudimentary forms of contemporary theoretical approaches to understanding moral phenomena. With regard to shame, there are three such approaches, or three interpretations: socialized (identifying shame with negative feelings about a real or imagined loss of face), anthropological (identifying shame with a painful reaction to the generic imperfection of a person in the sphere of corporeality) and desocialized (identifying shame with negative feelings of an individual generated by the awareness of the worthlessness of his own moral character). Studying the development of each of them requires an understanding of how they historically interacted with each other. The first detailed description of shame from the socialized perspective was proposed by Aristotle. In it, shame appears as a fear of disrepute or suffering from it, that is, a negative feeling that presupposes that other people know that an individual has committed an objectively vicious act or that he does not have some objectively valuable quality. Aristotle viewed shame as a less perfect moral trait than virtue (in contemporary socialized conceptions of shame, guilt is usually its more perfect alternative). Thomas Aquinas relies on the Aristotelian understanding of shame, but: a) connects it with the anthropological interpretation proposed by Augustine, b) makes a special emphasis on the fact that shame is appropriate only in the case of the sinfulness of the act. The early modern socialized conceptions of shame are characterized by a movement from doubt about the reasonableness of this feeling to its partial or complete rehabilitation. At the same time, R. Descartes, B. Spinoza and J. Locke, unlike Aristotle and Thomas, approve of shame not only because it is an imperfect counterpart of virtue, but also in connection with its positive social role (as a means of social discipline and an expression of sociability). Although early modern thinkers discuss moral emotions of self-assessment that are not mediated by the "eye of others" (repentance, remorse), they do not oppose them to shame.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: avprok2006@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000-0001-5015-8226

Keywords: morality, ethics, shame, socialized interpretation of shame, virtue, guilt, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, J. Locke.

Research area: ethics.

Citation: Prokof'ev, A.V. (2020). Under the eye of others (the socialized interpretation of shame in the history of ethics). Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1356–1369. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0646.

Problem statement:
major contemporary interpretations
of shame and their historical roots

Shame is the important psychological mechanism of moral experience fulfilling a double function. It aligns behaviour with moral values and requirements, and it is one of the emotional correlates or one of the forms of negative self-esteem. In the latter case, shame means a specific moral emotion which, along with repentance, guilt, self-disappointment, self-contempt, etc., accompanies the violation of moral requirements and disregard for moral values. In the perspective of ethical theory, this emotion can be viewed as one of the moral sanctions – internal and ideal. Understanding the nature of shame is important both for a general theoretical description of moral experience and for evaluating the particular forms that it takes.

There are several interpretations of shame in contemporary philosophy and human sciences. Empirical studies of psychologists and sociologists as well as phenomenological and conceptual analysis carried out by philosophers, equally contributed to the formation of each of them. This article will focus on one of these interpretations. It identifies shame with a negative emotional reaction of the agent to a real or possible and imagined condemnation of his actions by other people. Such condemnation is a painful blow to a person's reputation, a serious loss of face. Shame, understood in this way, can be expressed in the experience of real disgrace, in the discretion arising from imagining the possible consequences of an action for relations with other people, or even in the vague and unconscious anxiety that accompanies planning and performing an action. But in any of its manifestations, shame turns out to be shame "before someone", it is an experience, the essential characteristic of which is being under the "eye of others" in the words of Agnes Heller. For contemporary versions of this interpretation of shame, guilt is the key alternative to this emotion, or the alternative moral sanction. Guilt is independent of the opinions of other people (autonomous). Typically, this autonomy is seen as the advantage of guilt. Another widely discussed advantage of guilt is its potential independence not only of other people's opinions, but also of the evaluative standards they use. These standards in many cases may be far from the core of moral values and requirements. In what follows, I will call this interpretation of shame socialized[1].

At least two other interpretations vie with the socialized interpretation of shame. One of them also retains the significance of the "eye of others" (and in this sense is also socialized), but at the same time it is closely tied to human corporeality and sexuality. The openness of some manifestations of corporeality for other people, in the presence of additional conditions, causes intense negative feeling in those who are under the eye of others. This feeling is interpreted by theorists as a reflection of a person's subconscious understanding of his imperfection (the inability to control spontaneous bodily impulses, the immersion of a unique personal being in a unified and unifying world of animality, the insecurity of an embodied individual from objectification by other people). In this understanding of shame, it functions as a sanction of a specific part of morality associated with sexual relations (more broadly, with the regulation of various manifestations of corporeality), but tends to expand to other violations of moral

[1] In contemporary sociology, this position is most vividly represented by Thomas Scheff (Scheff, 2003), in contemporary philosophy – by Agnes Heller (Heller, 1982) and Cheshire Calhoun (Calhoun, 2004).

norms. The contrast between shame and guilt is not critical in this case. Without a claim on being terminologically precise and given the role that arguments about the imperfection of human nature play for the supporters of this interpretation, I will call it anthropological[2].

The third interpretation of shame severs the connection of this emotion with the external observation or anticipation of its possibility ("the eye of others"), so I will use the term "desocialized". Its supporters view shame as an emotion of self-assessment that is not limited to any narrow sphere (for example, the sphere of corporeality and sexuality) and can be associated with any violations of moral requirements. Guilt again turns out to be an alternative of shame, however, the border between them runs not along the real or imagined presence / absence of the others, but according to different accents of self-condemnation. Guilt is focused on the moral quality of an action and its consequences (the action is perceived by the agent as transgressive, the consequences – as harmful to others, bringing them pain, suffering, humiliation). Shame is concentrated on the moral quality of the agent's personality: the ashamed person perceives himself as a morally unfit person, devoid of those positive qualities that could support an acceptable level of self-esteem and self-respect. In this interpretation, shame also turns out to be a weak part of the opposition and even more so than in the framework of the socialized interpretation. Unlike guilt, it is destructive both for the personality of the moral agent and for his communication with other people[3].

Historically, these interpretations developed in parallel and, in the course of their development, interacted with each other in a complex manner. The first two of them took shape much earlier than the third, but elements of the third interpretation were also present in the history of ideas long before its full articulation. My task in the following sections of the article is to reconstruct the gradual formation of that theoretical image of shame which is concentrated on the damage to reputation and the painful experience of losing face. I will confine myself to the history of Western thought and touch on only three key episodes of this process (descriptions and assessments of shame contained in the writings of Aristotle and *The Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas as well as the place of shame in early modern typologies of passions). My research will focus on the following issues: how shame was defined, how the causes of shame and typical situations of experiencing shame were characterized, for what reasons shame was considered as such a phenomenon of moral experience that is inferior to some others. At the same time, I will try to find out how the characteristics of shame proposed in the history of philosophy differ from its contemporary descriptions belonging to the same paradigm. I mentioned two other theoretical interpretations of shame not because I plan to systematically reconstruct their history, but because some interesting intersections with them can be found in early socialized conceptions of shame.

Aristotle on shame

Aristotle used two ancient Greek words *aidos* and *aischyne* to denote shame. *On Rhetoric* uses only the latter, *The Nicomachean Ethics* contains their combination. The sublimely poetic word *aidos* denotes guiding and warning feelings, while the prosaic and everyday word *aischyne* denotes the retrospective emotionally loaded self-assessment. This allowed the author of a special work on honour and shame in ancient literature, Douglas Cairns, to view Aristotle's *aischyne* and *aidos* as separate aspects of a holistic moral phenomenon (Cairns 1993: 415)[4]. However, in *On Rhetoric*, *aischyne* overlaps various functions and aspects of shame being both a restraining (regulating) factor and

[2] In contemporary ethics, the interpretation is defended by David Velleman (Velleman, 2001), but if you take a small step back, its elements can be found in the works by Vladimir Soloviev, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre. For further details, see (Prokof'ev, 2016).

[3] In psychological studies, this interpretation is articulated by June Tangney (Tangney, Dearing, 2002), in philosophy – by Julien Deonna, Fabrizio Teroni and Rafaelo Rodogno (Deonna, Teroni, Rodogno). However, in the latter case, the authors argue for the equal importance of shame and guilt for the moral experience. For a general overview of the approach, see (Prokof'ev, 2017).

[4] I leave out the richness and specificity of shame-*aidos* discovered by Cairns, since they are weakly manifested in Aristotle's works.

a negative consequence of vicious or simply unsuccessful behaviour. The unity of *aidos* and *aischyne* in *The Nicomachean Ethics*, and even more so the unity and interconnection of the mental experiences denoted by the word *aischyne* in *On Rhetoric*, indicate that a person capable of shame is kept from shameful acts precisely by the fear that their commission will entail unpleasant feelings. This circumstance is decisive for the Aristotelian assessment of shame.

In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines shame as follows, "Let shame be… a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into disrespect" (Aristotle 2006: 134). *The Nicomachean Ethics* defines shame-*aidos* as "a kind of fear of dishonour" (Aristotle 2009: 79). Do these definitions unambiguously indicate that shame is mediated by other people's opinions? In principle and abstractly, the preservation of honour, like its loss, can be understood as states that do not depend on the real or imagined assessments of others. In this case, Aristotle, like contemporary proponents of the desocialized interpretation of shame, could regard such assessments only as a factor strengthening negative feelings. Shame, independent of the opinions of others, would have the minimum intensity. Aristotle has a statement that could be considered in this context, "They feel more shame at things done before… people's eyes and in the open; hence, too, the proverb "Shame is in the eyes" (Aristotle, 2006: 132).

However, in general, the Aristotelian understanding of honour is too closely tied to judgements and actions of other people (to the giving of honours or performing actions that dishonour the victim) for shame to be an autonomous experience. Aristotle directly confirms this by introducing an additional definition of this passion when discussing the question before whom people feel shame. It looks like this, "Shame is imagination [phantasia] about a loss of reputation" (Aristotle, 2006: 134). In other words, shame arises when somebody is imagining a situation in which informed and evaluating others are involved. In addition, Aristotle argues that nobody "cares" about someone else's opinion itself, it turns into a problem only when expressed ("no one cares about reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those who hold an opinion of him") (Aristotle 2006: 134)[5]. Accordingly, even if shamefulness of an act is not determined by the opinion of other people, then the feeling of shame, when an agent has committed something actually shameful, is connected precisely with a real or possible assessment on their part.

As for the intensification of shame in the presence of an observer mentioned by Aristotle, it should be understood not in connection with the appearance of an informed and evaluating other (a real or imaginary observer), but in connection with some peculiarities of his awareness of what is happening. Then the formula "before… people's eyes" takes on a literal meaning: shame intensifies when the other observes shameful actions directly, in comparison with those cases when awareness of them is obtained in other ways. This is evidenced by Aristotle's quotation of Kydias who tried to actualize the shame of the Athenians by inviting them to "imagine [all] the Greeks standing around them in a circle, actually seeing and not only later hearing about what they might vote" (Aristotle, 2006: 136). The same intensifying role can be played by the spatial proximity of other people accelerating the spread of information about a shameful action or making such spread inevitable (others "are nearby or are going to learn of it") (Aristotle, 2006: 136)[6].

Discussion about the causes of shame and those before whom people feel shame complements this picture in a significant way. The causes of shame are viewed by Aristotle in an objectivist (Cairns prefers the concept of "intrinsic") perspective. These are actions, personality traits and situations the negative character of which is not constituted by the opinion of others and is not even verified on

[5] For an indication of the important role of this additional definition, see (Grimaldi, 1980: 115).

[6] In this regard, the commentators of Aristotle try to guess what would be a reaction of the Aristotelian agent to his own 'secret crime', a crime that is unknown and cannot become known to others. Versions of the answer are the self-condemnation in the form of a dispassionate judgment (Konstan, 2006: 104) or self-disappointment (Fussi, 2015: 118-119), but not shame.

its basis[7]. They tend to lead to "dishonour and censures," but their shamefulness is a function of their being objectively bad. Thus, the first cause of shame is vicious actions. According to the general formulation, these can be any manifestations of any vices (Aristotle, 2006: 133). Then Aristotle discusses such a cause of shame as an absence of beautiful qualities (not necessarily in their highest manifestations, but at least in those inherent in the circle of people who are equal to the ashamed person). It is noteworthy that the elimination of the cause of shame in this area cannot always be ensured through intelligent choice and deliberate activity (Aristotle, 2006: 133). Finally, shame can be a result of other people's actions that cause a person to endure things that lead to "dishonour and censures," such as sexual violence. This statement also questions the necessary connection between shame and deliberate activity (although the proviso that in such cases shame is appropriate only in the absence of adequate resistance to the shameful actions of the other somewhat closes this gap) (Aristotle 2006: 134).

Moving on to the question of those before whom people feel shame, Aristotle introduces a generalized formulation – before those whose opinion we do not despise (Aristotle, 2006: 134). However, the reasons for our attention to the opinions of various representatives of this broad group are different. There is a reason that is directly related to the objectivity of the causes of shame. People "take account of prudent people as telling the truth, and their elders and educated people are of such a sort". Their opinion is important because they are able to assess the actual shamefulness of an action, trait of character or situation. They can act as a tuning fork. Other reasons are no longer associated with the ability of others to discover and tell "the truth", but with the individual sensitivity of the agent to the judgments of specific people. Such sensitivity is connected with the nature of relations with others – the judgments of people from whom a person wants to get something, the judgments of close people, the judgments of his rivals, the judgments of those whom he admires, and those for whom he wants to be an object of admiration, judgments of those who until now did not know anything bad about him, etc. are acutely perceived. Finally, the intensity of shame depends on the influence of the condemning other one on the potential strength and breadth of public condemnation. Someone from this group is inclined more than others to pay attention to the deeds and shortcomings of a person who is ashamed, someone is trying to widely disseminate their judgments about him. These are strict moral judges, people who do not have a condemned flaw, people who are offended by a condemned person, people prone to gossip and slander, comic poets and ridiculers (Aristotle, 2006: 134-135).

Unlike *On Rhetoric*, *The Nicomachean Ethics* contains not so much a description of shame as a discussion on its correlation with virtue. The analysis of this correlation leads Aristotle to the conclusion about the intermediate nature of shame. On the one hand, shame is close to virtue, since it is not the same as suffering from pragmatic losses and fear of such losses. Already in *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle emphasized that the experience of shame is generated by dishonour itself, and not by the consequences of this dishonour (Aristotle, 2006: 134). In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, on this basis, the thesis grows that the ability to experience shame makes an agent participating in the noble and elevates him above pragmatic motives. Aristotle distinguishes between gently born youths who loved all the beautiful, who can be made to be inspired by virtue through reasoning, and the most people who cannot. The reason is that the majority "do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment" (Aristotle, 2009: 199). The same characteristics of shame come to the fore in the discussion of "civic courage", or "the courage of the citizen-soldier", which "is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to desire of a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of

[7] *The Nicomachean Ethics* mentions acts that are "disgraceful in their truth" and ... "disgraceful only according to common opinion", and a good man should avoid them both. With this passage in mind, what has been said above applies only to causes of shame, which are "disgraceful in very truth" (Aristotle, 2009: 79).

disgrace, which is ignoble" (Aristotle, 2009: 52). This courage, although not a true virtue, still resembles it more than the courage of those who are forced to fight by the leaders, since it is not based on fear and the desire to avoid suffering.

However, despite the connection with the noble mediated by honour and dishonour, shame is not a virtue, and a person capable of shame is only "conditionally good" (Aristotle, 2009: 79). The reason is that a person who is ashamed or has a developed sense of shame retains desires that push him to commit shameful acts. They make him someone who is capable of committing a shameful act and always walks along this line. This is confirmed by the retrospective shame that occurs when a shameful act has already been committed (this is where Aristotle uses the word *aischyne*) (Aristotle, 2009: 79). Only for young people who live by passion and have not yet formed virtues in themselves, shame is a proper feeling because it acts as a protective barrier against committing shameful acts (passion, which temporarily replaces virtue). The discussion of "civic courage" in *Magna Moralia* further clarifies the relationship between shame and virtue. Although such courage is better than forced courage, it is clearly worse than the courage of the person "who is brave ... owing it to his thinking to be right and who acts bravely whether anyone be present or not" (Aristotle, 1915: 65-66). "Civic courage" is unstable – its owner ceases to be courageous if the shame that depends on the presence of others is removed.

Thus, Aristotle understands shame as a reaction to the judgment of other people or as an anticipation of such a judgment. This reaction is based on an objective foundation: a shameful act or a shameful situation remains shameful even outside the external negative assessment. However, outside of this assessment, they do not cause shame. This conclusion makes the Aristotle's conception related to the contemporary interpretation of shame which consider it a feeling associated with a real or possible loss of reputation, a positive image in the eyes of other people. Some versions of this interpretation emphasize the moral ambivalence of shame. Aristotle also argues that, while having a certain moral significance, shame is not the optimal basis for an ethical life. However, unlike contemporary ethicists, Aristotle's attitude to shame is connected not so much with the fact that shame is not autonomous, that it depends on external factors (this thought, as we have seen, is on the periphery of the Aristotelian thought), as with the fact that shame presupposes a struggle with lingering vicious aspirations, and in this struggle, fear and suffering restraining agents from shameful acts retain their role. On this basis, it can be argued that a more autonomous, purely internal experience of guilt, if Aristotle had an idea of it, would not be something preferable for him. A person capable of experiencing guilt and restraining himself on the basis of this experience would be as far from genuine virtue as the ashamed one. Finally, it is necessary to point out an unexpected structural resemblance of the Aristotelian understanding of shame to its contemporary desosialized interpretation. Aristotle's shame presupposes a direct transition from a violation of a norm to agent's negative assessment of his personality. The ashamed person is not concerned with the consequences of his actions for others, but with respect and self-respect. Thus, the Aristotelian understanding of shame leaves room for an emotion that would focus on consequences, harmful effects, etc., but this space is not filled. Such emotion could be called guilt[8].

Shame in *The Summa Theologica* by Thomas Aquinas

It would seem that the possibility of a purely internal shame in *The Summa Theologica* is closed by the very definition of this passion proposed during the discussion of fear in *A Treatise on the Passions*, "shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or

[8] David Konstan (Konstan, 2006: 102) and Alessandra Fussi (Fussi, 2015: 128) write about the connection between shame and personality assessment in Aristotle's works, but Konstant specifically emphasizes that the Aristotelian shame does not require from an agent to recognize oneself to be a completely unworthy person and does not block the possibilities to atone for the shameful act in one way or another. For Konstant, the contemporary understanding of guilt is more likely to be dissolved in the Aristotelian shame.

ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause" (Aquinas, 1914: 481) (in another case, when describing shame, he mentions "the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others" (Aquinas, 1914: 474). Based on Thomas's definitions, shame needs both planning or the actual commission of an "act of sin" and the condemnation of the act by other people. In this respect, the position of Thomas is opposite to the opinion of John Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa that "shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done" (Aquinas, 1921: 35).

However, in *A Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues*, trying to deal with the issue of the relationship between shame and the disgraceful character of action, Thomas offers a subtler analysis of this problem. Here he talks about not one, but two types of shame. Firstly, it is the shame "inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act" (Aquinas, 1921: 36). Such a feeling is internally contradictory, since an act depended on will alone should not have caused fear and for Thomas fear is part of the very definition of shame. Secondly, it is the shame which "is penal so to speak, and… consists in the reproach that attaches to a person" (Aquinas, 1921: 35). In this case, the reasons for the emergence of fear are understandable – the condemnation from others does not depend entirely on the will of the person capable of shame, it cannot be voluntary overcome by him and at the same time causes him suffering (in other words, it is an "arduous evil"). That is why Thomas considers the second kind of shame to be a genuine shame and returns to the original definition of this passion, which arose in the discussion of fear. At the same time, he enriches it in such a way that shame appears as a fear of "reproach", which in turn is "attestation to a person's defect, especially that which results from sin" (Aquinas, 1921: 38).

However, understanding shame as a form of fear raises an additional problem. Is it capable of embracing all the manifestations of the phenomenon? Thomas directly asks this question, "fear is of the future, as stated above. But shame regards a disgraceful deed already done, as Gregory of Nyssa says" (Aquinas, 1914: 473). In this regard, Thomas introduces an additional distinction. The fear of "the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others" can be different, "if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is shamefacedness; if, however, it be in a deed already done, there is shame" (Aquinas, 1914: 474). This is, of course, true: the act performed can leave the agent in limbo over the reactions of other people, in which case it causes fear. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that shame is a reaction not only to possible dishonour, but also to the actual one, and therefore it is not only fear, but also the Aristotelian suffering from disrepute. Answering the question "Is all suffering evil?", Thomas discusses shame in this very vein, as "sorrow or pain on account of this present evil" or "sorrows for the good was lost" (Aquinas, 1914: 449).

For Thomas, the problem of a possible connection of shame not with a shameful act itself, but with what seems shameful to people who condemn the agent, has a noticeably greater significance than for Aristotle. Thomas introduces a psychological explanation for this trend. "In man's opinion" condemnation can extend to "any kind of defect", including poverty, slavery, disrepute (Aquinas, 1921: 35). "In man's opinion" even virtuous deeds can appear vicious. Accordingly, people may be infamous for doing virtuous acts, being scolded for their faith or being forced into menial occupation. In all these cases, notoriety creates an opportunity for experiencing shame. Aristotle does not see any significant difficulty in this and recommends that a "good man" avoids both those acts that are disgraceful in very truth and those that are "disgraceful ... only according to common opinion" (Aristotle, 2009: 79). Thomas argues that "reproach is properly due to vice" and this should be the starting point for the feeling of shame (Aquinas, 1921: 36). If someone dishonours another "on account of virtue", then such ignominy should not cause shame, but contempt (Aquinas 1921: 36). In parallel, the establishment of an unambiguous connection between shame and sin closes the opportunity for justified shame in cases where it is caused by a

situation created by the other (for example, enslavement or violence on his part)[9].

Continuing the Aristotelian theme of causes of shame, Thomas, unlike Aristotle, introduces their gradation. Not all vices (sins) are equally shameful for him, and even more, from his point of view, the degree of shamefulness of an act does not in all cases follow its severity ("culpability"). At this point, the socialized interpretation of shame intersects with the one centred on human imperfection and corporeality (I called it "anthropological", but in the historical context it could be called "Augustinian"). From Thomas's point of view, the most shameful is intemperance (elsewhere – "sins of the flesh") (Aquinas, 1921: 37) because "it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals" (Aquinas, 1921: 26). They "dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish" (Aquinas, 1921: 26). According to Thomas, although spiritual sins are more grievous, they are noticeably less disgraceful than the sins of the flesh (Aquinas, 1921: 37). Thomas also mentions a second selection criterion, which is hardly objective and important only for "man's opinion". Associated with less dishonour are those sins that "connote a certain abundance of some temporal good", such as strength. In this regard, people are more ashamed of cowardice than reckless courage, robbery than theft (Aquinas, 1921: 37).

In discussing another Aristotelian theme – "before whom people feel shame" – Thomas offers a clarified classification of persons according to the reasons why the shame in front of them becomes or should become more intense. Aristotle's somewhat chaotic empirical observations acquire rigor and logical order. Firstly, those people are important for shame whose "attestation" of defect is "more weighty" because of its truth. On the part of *moral* truth, the judgments of those who are distinguished by "the rectitude of judgment" are important, like it happens "in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honoured" (Aquinas, 1921: 38). On the part of *empirical* truth, "the knowledge of the matter attested" is important, that is, awareness of the affairs of the condemned person (this awareness is shown by closely connected people). Secondly, the intensity of shame increases when an agent faces those people whose judgments have the greatest pragmatic effects (such are the judgments of those who can be useful for the ashamed person or can harm him) (Aquinas, 1921: 38).

Finally, Thomas rearranges the emphasis of the Aristotelian solution to the problem of "shame and virtue." Like in Aristotle, shame occupies an intermediate position between vice and virtue. For a person that is vicious or steeped in the sin, the inability to be ashamed is an additional flaw. If he could be ashamed of his deeds, then he would not be so vicious. For a virtuous person, the absence of shame is one of the hallmarks of his virtue. As a virtuous one, he cannot be afraid of committing shameful acts, since the avoidance of shameful acts is completely in his hands. However, Thomas emphasizes, he is "so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in him, he would be ashamed of it" (Aquinas, 1921: 41). The ability to be ashamed determines the life of those who are in between these extremes, but not only young men, as mentioned in Aristotle's works, but all "average men". The latter are ashamed because "they have certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil." And also because they are on the way to virtue and shame lays its foundations, which is true at least of the virtue of temperance (Aquinas, 1921: 41)[10].

Shame in early modern typologies of passions

As Hannah Dawson shows in her pioneering work *Shame in Early Modern Thought: from Sin to Sociability*, early modern culture used two concepts of shame. As a starting point for her conclusion, she takes *A Christian Diction-*

[9] Thomas Ryan suggests that in his description of shame, Thomas managed to find a balance between the perfectionist purpose of shame (a means of avoiding moral mistakes) and the communitarian one (emphasizing the importance of joint practice and the value of the other as a partner in this practice) (Ryan, 2013: 81– 83).

[10] See the work of Simo Knuuttila (Knuuttila, 2012) on the relationship between the Thomist theoretical image of shame and its other medieval conceptions.

arie by Thomas Wilson (the 1st edition of 1612), which characterizes the "shame of face" ("an affection which springeth, by reason of some civill dishonesty or filthinesse") and "shame of conscience" ("trouble, and perturbation of minde and conscience, beeing grieved and cast downe at the remembrance of sinne against God"), and traces the use of these meanings of shame in literature and philosophical treatises (mostly English). "Shame of conscience", or, as Dawson herself calls it, "guilt-shame", does not require any external judgements, except for the judgement of God who knows everything and is present everywhere. This shame arises in the course of sinner's turning to himself and is identical to a painful realization of a sin. Dawson records the constant presence of an association between "guilt-shame" and the ideas of imperfection of human nature and original sin in the texts of the 17th century. The metaphors that accompany the discussion of this type of shame often include images related to the shame of nudity (Dawson, 2019: 385). In other words, in this case we are confronted with various elements that will be later included in those contemporary interpretations of shame, which I have labelled "anthropological" and "desocialized". Here the conception of shame by Augustine, which laid the foundation of the anthropological interpretation, is directly reproduced and refracted in different ways. As for the similarity with the desocialized interpretation, they share the claim that shame is part of a person's relationship with himself, that it can be experienced in a complete solitude without even the imaginary presence of other people. At the same time, and this is no longer a similarity, but a difference, we do not see any attempts of early modern authors discussing the so called "guilt-shame" to answer the question what is the difference between shame and guilt or remorse.

An important circumstance is that there are no main philosophical authorities of that era among the authors whose texts Dawson uses as an illustration to the topic of "guilt-shame". Michel Montaigne and Blaise Pascal are mentioned only in connection with their general criticism of the dependence of self-esteem on the opinions of others (Dawson, 2019: 386, 388). And only the treatise *Of the Law of Nature and Nations* by Samuel von Pufendorf really represents the case when in the central philosophical text of that era, shame is seen both in the perspective of autonomous self-esteem, and in the perspective of public condemnation (Dawson, 2019: 387–388). Dawson's examples could have been supplemented with fragments from the works of another early modern titan, Hugo Grotius (Grotius, 2005: 1411), but in general, the mainstream of the Western philosophy of the 17th century reproduced what Dawson calls "reputation-shame" (Dawson, 2019: 389). Major early modern thinkers continued the line of Aristotle and Thomas and introduced new turns in the discussion of problems that had already emerged in antiquity and the Middle Ages. I will illustrate this with an example of three thinkers discussing shame: René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke.

If we compare their definitions of shame, we see an obvious similarity and continuity. Descartes and Spinoza discuss paired affects: pride and shame. Descartes's pride "is a kind of joy based on the love we have for ourselves and resulting from the belief or hope we have of being praised by certain other persons ... Shame, on the other hand, is a kind of sadness based also on self-love, which proceeds from the expectation or fear of being blamed" (Descartes, 1985: 401). The definition of shame from Spinoza's *Ethics* is as follows: "a sadness accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine that others blame". If we are faced with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of action, which in our imagination evokes praise from other people, then this is one of the subtypes of pride ("pride as love of esteem (gloria)") (Spinoza, 1994: 193). Locke's definition of shame, which does not correspond to the definition of pride, is "an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us" (Locke, 1824a: 219).

Early Modern thinkers following the Aristotelian-Thomistic paradigm of the understanding of shame distinguished it from the feelings of the agent which are directly related to the moral quality of his actions and do not

depend on the opinions of other people. They are analogous to guilt in the contemporary socialized interpretation of shame. In Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul*, these are remorse and repentance (Descartes, 1985: 392, 396–397). In Spinoza's *Ethics*, it is only repentance (Spinoza, 1994: 192). It is noteworthy that both thinkers do not directly oppose repentance and remorse to shame or consider these passions as something superior to shame (this is characteristic of some contemporary socialized conceptions of shame). They also do not criticize the identification of shame with those emotions of self-assessment that are not mediated by the opinion of others (we can find this kind of criticism in *The Summa Theologica)*. This fact is all the more unexpected since, as Dawson shows, such an identification was widespread in early modern culture.

Even if shame is related by Descartes, Spinoza and Locke to something more valuable, then it is not repentance or remorse, but virtue. In this respect, early modern thinkers also follow Aristotle and Thomas. For Descartes, such a correlation is devoid of sharpness and antagonism, since virtue for him does not replace the passions that deserve approval, but cooperates with them (Descartes, 1985: 386). Likewise, in Locke's works, the desire for a good reputation, which is the basis of shame, is something "nearest to" virtue (meaning virtue in the understanding present in the treatise *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, that is "the knowledge of a man's duty")[11] (Locke, 1824b: 44). In Spinoza's case, the recognition of the superiority of virtue over shame is accompanied by a sharply negative judgment about the latter. In *Ethics*, Spinoza does not give a direct assessment of the affect of shame, but instead proposes to carry it out on the model of the criticism of compassion and repentance[12]. This means that, like these two affects, shame is "evil of itself and useless" (Spinoza, 1994: 226). Like compassion, it often misleads the agent about what is good and what is bad (Spinoza, 1994: 226). Like repentance, it is a senseless suffering because the evil deed that makes us suffer has already been done (Spinoza, 1994: 228). However, all affects, which are passive states, receive a negative assessment in Spinoza. Virtue for Spinoza "is nothing but living according to the guidance of reason", and a person who is submitted to affects "allows himself to be guided by things outside him" (Spinoza, 1994: 219)[13].

Spinoza's criticism of shame is accompanied by its partial rehabilitation including arguments related to the beneficial social effects of this passion. Such arguments were absent from Aristotle's and Thomas's works. They saw the positive side of shame in the proximity of the states of mind and the behaviour formed on the basis of shame with the states of mind and the behavior of a virtuous person. As a starting point for this rehabilitation, Spinoza uses the fact that "man rarely live from the dictate of reason" and the absence of such guidance often leads to the prevalence of "pride as arrogance" (superbia) and the collapse of social relations. This turns most people into a "terrifying mob", which reduces the chances to "live from the dictate of reason" for both those who belong to the mob and those who successfully resists pride, but, like any person, depends on interaction with others. Fortunately, people have affects that oppose the transformation of society into a mob and, therefore, "bring more advantage than disadvantage". These are humility, repentance, hope and fear. Spinoza writes about them that "since men must sin, they ought rather to sin in that direction". Shame is absent from this listing, however, describing the position of "weak-minded men" that "were all equally proud" and cannot "be united or restrained by any bonds", Spinoza mentions not only that they are not afraid of anything, but also that they are "ashamed of nothing" (Spinoza, 1994: 228).

The same rehabilitative trend can be found in Descartes who also asks the question of whether we have "to rid oneself entirely of these passions [i.e. pride and shame], as the Cynics used to do", and responds negatively

[11] The concept of shame expressed in this treatise is analyzed by Robert Metcalf (Metcalf: 436-437).

[12] In contrast to criticism and partial rehabilitation of shame, Spinoza's criticism and partial rehabilitation of other affects have been fairly well studied, see (Alanen, 2012; Green, 2016; Soyarslan, 2018).

[13] The normative basis for Spinoza's criticism of affects has been analyzed in detail by Michael LeBuffe (2010: 175–193).

(Descartes, 1985: 401)[14]. But Locke's inquiry in the social roots and functions of shame no longer takes the form of a rehabilitation, since Locke initially does not accuse shame of anything. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* the behaviour of a moral agent is not discredited either by its affective basis, or its dependence on sanctions, or the external nature of such sanctions. One of the three key components of the "moral good" called "the law of opinion or reputation" is based on common sensitivity to public opinion (Locke, 1824a: 371) Everyone is inclined to obey this law because everyone is not indifferent to "commendation and discredit", "disgrace and disrepute". Locke evaluates this dependence on someone else's judgements as an extremely positive phenomenon. And even more than that, discussing "the law of opinion or reputation", he eliminates the very basis of the criticism of shame as a phenomenon that is less perfect than virtue because he claims that all standards of vice and virtue are established by the communicating people themselves ("by approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice") (Locke, 1824a: 373)[15].

Conclusion

Thus, the analysis of the discussions of shame from *The Nicomachean Ethics*, *Magna Moralia,* and *On Rhetoric* by Aristotle, *The Summa Theologica* by Thomas Aquinas, *The Passions of the Soul* by Descartes, *Ethics* by Spinoza, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* by Locke showed that all of them share the central feature of the socialized interpretation of shame: shame is understood as a form of the emotional moral self-assessment mediated by the opinion of others. These early socialized conceptions of shame, like their contemporary equivalents, perceive shame as not the most perfect mechanism of moral experience. However, there are some substantial differences between early and contemporary versions of the socialized interpretation of shame.

1. For contemporary theorists, the more perfect moral phenomenon than shame is the other negative emotion of self-assessment – guilt. For ancient, medieval, and early Modern thinkers, this place occupied by virtue which allows to avoid any kind of negative emotion of self-assessment.

2. Contemporary socialized conceptions of shame present as its central drawback the fact that shame forces moral agents to restrain themselves only in front of other people. For early socialized conceptions, this accusation is marginal (I have already mentioned Aristotle in this regard, a similar thought appears in *Appendix* to the 4th part of Spinoza's *Ethics* (Spinoza, 1994: 228)).

3. Another drawback of shame stressed by contemporary socialized conceptions is that shame depends on the contingent and ever-changing normative standards applied by condemning others. The possibility of this claim is created by Aristotle's objectivist line in understanding causes of shame. But the realization of the possibility was sporadic in ancient, medieval, and early modern ethical thought.

4. The main argument for considering shame a genuinely moral feeling provided by contemporary socialized conceptions is that an ashamed person retains at least part of his autonomy. This feature of shame was recorded by earlier thinkers (Aristotle discussed the capacity of an agent to be ashamed before imagined others and to select persons before whom he feels shame). But the moral status of shame was maintained by them on a different basis – shame generates the noble and right behaviour.

5. The other serious argument for considering shame a genuinely moral feeling used by contemporary socialized conceptions is that this feeling reflects the natural sociability of humans and belonging of every moral agent to various communities [16]. Early socialized con-

[14] John Marshall explains Descartes' special attention to factors that form the distorted self-esteem through pride and shame by the fact that the highest virtue of his ethics – generosity – requires evaluating oneself exclusively on the basis of the correct use of free will (Marshall, 1998: 103).

[15] Dawson views Locke's concept of shame as a product of the final transition of early modern thought to an analysis of shame from a social perspective (Dawson, 2019: 390).

[16] Cheshire Calhoun (2004) develops this idea in contemporary ethics. For more on the role of sociability in early modern philosophy, see: (Apressyan, 2019).

ceptions of shame differ in this respect. Stressing the connection of shame with social discipline and sociability is typical only for early modern thinkers.

References

Alanen, L. (2012). Spinoza on Passions and Self-knowledge: The Case of Pride. In *Emotion and Cognitice Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 234-254.

Apressyan, R.G. (2019). Problema sotsiabel'nosti v moral'noi filososii rannego Novogo vremeni [The Issue of Sociability in the Early Modern Philosophy]. In *Filosofskie nauki* [*Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences*], 62 (10), 7-24.

Aquinas, Thomas St. (1914). *The Summa Theologica. Part II (First Part). QQ. I-XLVIII.* London, R. & T. Washbourne, LTD, 538 p.

Aquinas, Thomas St. (1921). *The Summa Theologica. Second Part of the Second Part. QQ. CX-LI-CLXX.* London, Burnes Oates & Washbourne, LTD, 315 p.

Aristotle (1915). Magna Moralia. In *Works of Aristotle.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 27-127.

Aristotle (2006). *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 337 p.

Aristotle (2009). *The Nicomachean Ethics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 277 p.

Cairns, D. (1993). *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and in Ancient Greek Literature.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 474 p.

Calhoun, C. (2004). An Apology for Moral Shame. In *Journal of Political Philosophy,* 12 (2), 127-146.

Dawson, H. (2019). Shame in Early Modern Thought: from Sin to Sociability. In *History of European Ideas*, 45 (3), 377-398.

Deonna, J.A., Rodogno, R., Teroni, F. (2012). In Defence of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press, 268 p.

Descartes, R. (1985). The Passions of the Soul. In *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1, 325-404

Fussi, A. (2015). Aristotle on Shame. In *Ancient Philosophy*, 35(1), 113-135.

Green, K. (2016). Spinoza on Self-Hatred. In *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly,* 65, 73-95.

Grimaldi, W.M.A. (1980). *Aristotle, Rhetoric: A Commentary, Volume 2.* Fordham: Fordham University Press, 1980, 362 p.

Grotius, Hugo. (2005*). The Rights of War and Peace.* Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990 p.

Heller, A. (1982). The Power of Shame. In *Dialectical Anthropology,* 6 (3), 215-228.

Knuuttila, S. (2012). The Emotion of Shame in Medieval Philosophy. In *SpazioFilosofico*, 5, 2012, 243-249.

Konstan, D. (2006). *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 428 p.

LeBuffe, M. (2010). From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253 p.

Locke, J. (1824). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Books I–III). In *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes.* London: Rivington, 1, 1-511.

Locke, J. (1824). Some Thoughts Concerning Education. In *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes.* London: Rivington, 8, 1-211.

Marshall, J. (1998). *Descartes's Moral Theory.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 169 p.

Metcalf, R. (2004). Balancing the Senses of Shame and Humour. In *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 35 (3), 432-447.

Prokof'ev, A. (2017). Styd bez «Oka Drugikh» (eticheskii analiz desotsializirovannoi kontseptsii styda) [Shame without the 'Eye of Others': An Ethical Analysis of the Desocialized Conception of Shame]. In *Chelovek [Human Being*], 4, 38–51.

Prokof'ev, A. (2016). Moral' i polovoi styd (Vladimir Solov'ev – Maks Sheler – Devid Velleman) [Morality and Sexual Shame (Vladimir Soloviev – Max Scheler – David Velleman)]. In *Filosofiia i kul'tura* [*Philosophy and Culture*], 7, 889-899.

Ryan, T. (2013). Aquinas on Shame: A Contemporary Interchange. In *Aquinas, Education and the East.* New York: Springer, 73-100.

Scheff, T.J. (2003). Shame in Self and Society. In *Symbolic Interaction*, 26 (2), 239-262.

Soyarslan, S. (2018). Spinoza's Critique of Humility in the Ethics. In *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 56(3), 342-364.

Spinoza, Benedictus de (1994). Ethics. In *A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 85-276.

Tangney, J.P., Dearing, R.L. (2002). *Shame and Guilt*. New York: Guilford Press, 272 p.

Velleman, D.J. (2001). The Genesis of Shame. In *Philosophy & Public Affairs,* 30 (1), 27-52.

Под оком других (социализированная интерпретация стыда в истории этической мысли)

А.В. Прокофьев
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. Основная цель статьи состоит в том, чтобы реконструировать развитие социализированной интерпретации стыда в западной философской традиции с античности до XVII в. Наряду со стандартными методами проведения историко-философского исследования (критическим, сравнительным, герменевтическим и т. д.) автор прибегает к стратегии выявления исторических истоков и рудиментарных форм бытования современных теоретических подходов к пониманию тех или иных феноменов. В отношении стыда существуют три таких подхода, или три интерпретации: социализированная (отождествляющая стыд с негативными переживаниями по поводу реальной или воображаемой потери лица), антропологическая (отождествляющая стыд с болезненной реакцией на родовое несовершенство человека в сфере телесности) и десоциализированная (отождествляющая стыд с негативными переживаниями индивида, которые порождены осознанием негодности собственного морального характера). Анализ формирования каждой из них требует понимания того, как они исторически взаимодействовали между собой. Первое развернутое описание стыда в социализированной перспективе было предложено Аристотелем. В нем стыд выступает как страх бесчестья или страдание от него, то есть как негативное переживание, которое предполагает, что другие люди знают о совершении индивидом объективно порочного действия или об отсутствии у него какого-то объективно положительного качества. Аристотель рассматривал стыд как менее совершенную моральную способность, чем добродетель (в современных социализированных концепциях стыда его более совершенной альтернативой выступает обычно вина). Фома Аквинский опирается на аристотелевское понимание стыда, но: а) соединяет его с антропологической интерпретацией, предложенной Августином, б) делает специальный акцент на том, что стыд уместен исключительно в случае греховности деяния. Для новоевропейских социализированных

концепций стыда характерно движение от сомнения в разумной обоснованности этого чувства к его частичной реабилитации. При этом Р. Декарт, Б. Спиноза и Дж. Локк, в отличие от Аристотеля и Фомы, одобряют стыд не только потому, что он является несовершенным двойником добродетели, но и в связи с его положительной общественной ролью (как средство дисциплинирования и выражение социабельности). Хотя новоевропейские мыслители обсуждают моральные эмоции самооценки, не опосредованные «оком других» (раскаяние, угрызения совести), они не противопоставляют их стыду.

Ключевые слова: мораль, этика, стыд, социализированная интерпретация стыда, добродетель, вина, Аристотель, Фома Аквинский, Р. Декарт, Б. Спиноза, Дж. Локк.

Научная специальность: 09.00.05 – этика.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1370–1383

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0648
УДК 1-17

Axiology and Agathology

Vladimir K. Shokhin*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 05.04.2020, received in revised form 27.07.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. From the very beginning, attention is given to the fact that, being introduced at the very beginning of the 20th century, the *axiology* term, meaning the doctrine of values, almost immediately led to a boom in the development of theories of values (mainly in continental philosophy), whereas the *agathology* term, meaning the doctrine of goods, which was introduced in 1770 and then rediscovered in 1823, came to almost complete oblivion. For its rehabilitation, one of the commonplaces of the philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries is reviewed, namely, the actual identification of goods and values, as a result of which the former of these concepts is absorbed by the latter. As for values, they are also usually viewed as common human needs, rather than deep and indivisible individual "inner possessions". Therefore, it is proposed to distinguish between universal needs and personal valuables and to stratify the world of significant things into values, preferences, and goods. As a result, the latter of these varieties is interpreted as a sphere of practical mind (both in the Ancient and Kantian senses), teleologically loaded and with the potential to be included in a new, the fourth of the large programmes of theoretical ethics (able to compete well with consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics) and, at the same time, laid into the foundation of the cluster of philosophical disciplines, which is commonly termed as practical philosophy.

Keywords: values, preferences, goods, ethics, practical philosophy, axiology, agathology, heart, taste, practical mind.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Shokhin, V.K. (2020). Axiology and agathology. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1370–1383. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0648.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: vladshokhin@yandex.ru

Very different fate of "close relatives"

The fact that axiology in the first half of the 20th century became one of the most rapidly developing brands of continental philosophy is probably known to relatively many people. Yet, the fact that the very term *axiology* itself (from the Greek ἀξία "value" + λόγος "word, doctrine") was forged only at the beginning of the same century in France (by Paul Lapi in 1902) and in Germany (by Eduard von Hartmann till 1906) and soon received its "permanent residence" in philosophy is known to relatively few. As for the fact that the related meaning of the term *agathology* (from the Greek τὸ αγαφόν "good") was used in ethics much earlier (by the Lutheran theologian Christoph von Ammon in 1823[1]) and in practical philosophy even earlier (by the Wolffian philosopher Johann Feder in 1770[2]) to sink into oblivion, to be mentioned sometimes only in old lexicons, and to be rediscovered only in the 21st century in some cases without the slightest suspicion that it has its past[3], it is probably known only to singular historiographers. The reason why *agathology* did not survive Ammon was probably because of the lack of a philosophical rating and due to the fact that his "doctrine of the highest good" was inserted in confessional (Lutheran) ethics. And the reason why it was not "pulled to the surface" in the era of the axiological boom and much later is primarily due to the fact that the goods were practically not distinguished from the values, and of these two concepts, the latter has been regarded much more modern, "promoted"[4] and, therefore, supposedly able to naturally incorporate the former. And why, in fact, as Occam has already stated, unnecessarily multiply entities?

Problematic synonymy

This moment has been always crucial. If the identification of the good with the desirable is very common, but not universal, and is deservedly problematic after George Moore, then the identification of goods with values is almost universal. These concepts alternate in a lot of philosophical texts only for stylistic reasons for the most part. The main reason is that these concepts are very similar to each other (such as "civilization" and "culture", "transcendent" and "transcendental", "philosophy of religion" and "religious philosophy", for example). And what is similar is conveniently rounded up to synonymy.

However, it is not today when the merging of these related concepts began and was installed in the philosophical and academic environment. It is worthwhile dwelling upon the epoch of the initial formation of axiology again. In Friedrich Kirchner's popular *Lexicon of Basic Philosophical Concepts*, revised by D. Michaelis (1911) "value is an effective ability of things to become goods for the people

[1] His "Textbook on Christian moral teaching" contained a separate (third) section "Agathology, or on the highest good" (Agathologie, oder von dem höchsten Gute) (Ammon, 1823: 214-259).

[2] In "The textbook on practical philosophy" (1770), he divided the subject matter of this discipline into Agathologie (the doctrine of goods), Telematologie (the doctrine of will), and Nomologie (the doctrine of laws). The first teaching was described in §§ 18-23 (Feder, 1770: 23-51).

[3] Refer to: (Shokhin, 2004; cf. Shokhin, 2014; Delcomminette, 2006). A Prague philosopher coined the term "agatheism" to refer to his theological doctrine (see, for example, Salamon, 2017).

[4] Approximately fifteen years ago I wrote: "The word *values* is one of the most prestigious and respectable in modern cultural vocabulary. At the same time it is one of the most popular or even "populist" as one might say. A political figure who wants his words to be taken more seriously will prefer to say that he offers a certain programme for the implementation of national or, on the contrary, international, pluralistic, or even, on the contrary, global values as it is now customary to say. The editor of a magazine preparing an advertising announcement will say that its authors appeal to the reader for whom liberal or, on the contrary, traditional values are significant or close (or both, as it often happens in our country). A writer or a director informing about his plans in an interview will almost certainly mention that he sees his task as promoting people's awareness of genuine social, aesthetic, or common cultural values (and, most often, all of them together). And a bank or other commercial enterprise that invites you to buy its shares will sometimes present the case in such a way that only the holders of its securities can understand what "true values" are. As a result, the word we are interested in undergoes a clear degradation, turning from a term of theoretical reflection into an "iconic" word of everyday language" (Shokhin, 2006: 7). All this remains valid for the present time when the research of what is sometimes a little tastelessly termed the "axiosphere" in all areas of life from the so-called sociological values (housing, work, wages, recreation, etc.) to gender ones is in full swing. "Value systems" of a wide variety of respondents in all parts of the world are regularly calculated by such "sociological giants" as the World Values Survey (WVS), and provide good grants to numerous armies of sociologists in the main countries of the world.

worthy of aspiration". Everything that a person feels impelled to, wants, and sets as a goal is a value for him/her. Although goods, according to Kirchner, as we have just seen, correlate with values like the determining and the determined, the good itself is designated as everything that a person attaches value to, since it promises him/her pleasure whether in memory, in pleasure proper, or in anticipation (Kirchner, 1907: 1095, 375-376).

Yet, lexicons can only reflect what already exists in the philosophical culture. One of the first scholars who gave an authoritative definition of value was the theorist of the Austrian economic school Friedrich von Wieser (a student of K. Menger, its founder and one of the strongest critics of Marx), who wrote a special monograph "On the origin and basic history of economic value" (1884). "Value (Wert)", according to Wieser, "is the human interest, which is thought of as the 'state of the goods' (Zustand der Güter)". In his *Introduction to Philosophy* (1895) which went through as many as 12 editions, Oswald Külpe, the founder of the Würzburg school of psychology, while mapping philosophical disciplines, O. Külpe considered it possible (as many others before and after him) to distinguish not only objective values (the value of money, for example, that one can get) and subjective values (personal preferences), but also positive and negative ones (Wert / Unwert), which are equivalent to goods (Güter) and, accordingly, non-goods (Übeln). "If something satisfies someone or if something is preferred to something," says Külpe, "it is a (relative) value or good. And if it leaves someone unsatisfied or even rejected, it is a negative value or evil". They also correspond to pleasure and aversion, happiness and misery, honour and contempt etc. (Külpe, 1910: 233-235). In the book *The Idea of Value,* which is often quoted in modern English-language philosophical literature, John Laird considered it most correct to present the concept of value through the selective approach. The selective conception assumes an approach to any value *X* as a good from a certain point of view (timologically)[5] as to an irrespective good (as if, according to the old expression, X were a good in the eyes of God). But the good, in its turn, is defined by Laird through value: the good is either a character or a property of value. To say that beauty is or contains good is to say that the good has value, and to say that love is the greatest good is to recognize it as the greatest value (Laird, 1929: XVII, 321-322).

This "circular relationship" between value and good has been pointed out by such an astute critic of axiology as Martin Heidegger. In his lectures on European nihilism in the early 1940s, where Nietzsche's "re-evaluation of higher values" was very sympathetically interpreted, Heidegger unobtrusively demonstrates that the concept of value itself is logically a "non-reference" one: the good is usually defined through value, which, in its turn, is defined through the good, and such is the relationship of value with the concepts of significance, purpose, and foundation. In short, axiology revolves in logical circles and, claiming to interpret the entire world culture, is not the best product of the second half of the 19th century only (Heidegger, 1997: 45, 47-48).

In Heidegger's assessment of the concept of values, there was a lot of sharpness. He wrote that being a sort of pseudo-concepts for this reason, "values" are also responsible for an individual's pseudo-existence: they made the mankind believe in the idea that any attempt on them threatens to destroy its existence, but, in fact, value is just a weak and leaky cover for "the objectivity of things that has lost its volume and background", since it is responsible for the fact that a person lives his/her 'pseudo-life' while measuring and calculating everything, and this pseudo-existence is comparable to Plato's cave, from which the true human existence must be "extracted"[6]. There is a certain contradiction in these harsh cavils: a concept, which, according to Heidegger, is so "weak and leaky", can hardly exert such a powerful influence on humanity and keep it under such a strong hypnosis (therefore, it should not be compared with Plato's cave, but rather with the Advaitic Māyā). However, in his verdict on

[5] It should be clarified that meant is use of the Greek word τῑμή with the meaning of "reverence", "high appreciation", "honour", and "value".

[6] Refer to (Heidegger, 1997: 47) for the fact that the definition of value of something is inseparable from comparing things with each other through "weighing" them.

the circular definitions of values and goods (as well as related concepts), he was undoubtedly right. In analytical philosophy, however, the problem noted by him was not given due attention. This contradicts to the analytical method itself, which should first of all be aimed at demarcating the concepts under the research. Below are just a few specimens.

Thus, in the article "The Theory of Value", Thomas Hurka, a renowned Canadian ethicist and political philosopher, who is in a certain sense "responsible" for axiology in modern analytical practical philosophy, interprets the doctrine of value, or, of the good (which means the same for him) as one of the two main branches of ethical theory alongside the "theory of the right". His article starts with the "postulate of identity" in the field under the discussion: "The theory of value or of the good is one of the two main branches of ethical theory, alongside the theory of the right. Whereas the theory of the right specifies which actions are right and which are wrong, the theory of value says which states of affairs are intrinsically good and which intrinsically evil. The theory of the right may say that keeping promises is right and lying wrong; the theory of value can say that pleasure is good and pain evil, or that knowledge and virtue are good and vice evil. Since these states are not actions they cannot be right or wrong, but they can have positive or negative value" (Hurka, 2007: 357).

In his book *The Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good*, the authoritative American theologian and philosopher Robert Adams distinguishes between the types of goodness, insisting, for example, that it is not enough to characterize the virtue simply as the good. Thus, perfection for Adams is equivalent to intrinsic goodness. Yet, the world of the goods, according to Adams, is partly diversified: the differences in temperament, experience, vocation, moral and religious views are likely to make some people more susceptible to some goods, and others to other goods (Adams, 2006: 186). However, Adams also suggests identifying types of goodness or, equivalently, value. Thus, utility is a purely instrumental goodness or value that something has as a means to something else that is good or valued.

E.J. Bond, the author of the article "Theories of Good" for the second edition of the L. and S. Becker's famous ethical lexicon (2001), is also well known among the ethicists, as is his book on the related topic *Ethics and Human Well-Being* (1996). He distinguishes between functional goodness (with syncagorematical meaning of 'good food', 'good knife', 'good doctor', etc.) and goodness in its proper sense, which belongs to life, honour, pleasure, etc. There is, however, one thing that is the highest good, such as pleasure, for example. In general, the good (or the highest good) can be spoken of in various ways, but the good as such is something that has value in itself and for itself, regardless of its relation to anything else, or, in another way, it is the "intrinsic value" (Bond, 2001: 620).

In one of her articles, American Kantian Christine Korsgaard, the author of *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (1996), suggests distinguishing several subject fields. In the section "Differentiations of the good" of her survey "Theories of the Goods", the most significant of them, according to Korsgaard, is the distinction between the things that are valued as means, or "instrumental goods", and as ends, or "final goods". This distinction is indistinguishable from another one – between internal and external values. To say that something is intrinsically valuable is to say that it is good because it is due to its intrinsic nature, whereas to say that something is externally good is to say that it is good because of its relations to the things outside of it. The means, for example, have an obvious external value, since their goodness comes from the fact that they contribute to other things, whereas the ends have an intrinsic value. Goodness can also be divided into objective and subjective. It is worthwhile regarding them as the goodness for everyone and the goodness for someone, even though the goods and values are viewed as interchangeable concepts. In Korsgaard's point of view, philosophers of the 20th century discussed the issue of their relationship as per the following propositions: 1) the good is something "inherently subjective", and people have a reason to strive for common objects only when their interests coincide; 2) subjective val-

ues always serve the basis for objective ones (if it is subjectively good for me to have something, it is objectively good for me to have it); 3) some subjective values, such as those related to needs, are basic for the objective ones, others are not; 4) subjective values are always basic for the objective ones (if it is subjectively good for me to have something, then it is objectively good for me to have it); 5) subjective values are derived from the objective ones (I cannot insist that something is good for me because it makes me happy if I do not consider my happiness objectively good) (Korsgaard, 1998: 132). In other words, "values" can be substituted for "the goods" in absolutely any position and nothing will change from this.

A slightly different map of contemporary discussions on the issues related to the good is drawn in Johan Bränmark's review article "The Good" (2006). The author, who is also quite close to deontology[7], divides the differences between ethicists in connection with the *concept* of the good (what does it mean to be good?) and the *conceptions* of the good (which things are really good?)[8]. Scrutiny of the concept of the good begins only with Moore, of the conceptions already with antiquity. Considering the issue of whether the good is a single concept, Bränmark claims that for Franz Brentano and many others this question would have been rhetorical, but gradually it ceased to be so, while Peter Geach proposed to distinguish between predicative and attributive use of the concept of the good. So, if the proposition "*X* is *AB*" is used predicatively, then it can be divided into "*X* is *A*" and "*X* is *B*", and if this is impossible, then *A* is used attributively. When applied to goodness, the judgments like "This is a good event" will be predicative, and the judgments like "This is a good knife" will be attributive. Whereas Aristotle leaned toward an attributive understanding of the good and Moore toward a predicative one, Geach believed that "good" is always an attributive adjective, since nothing is just good. Bränmark argues that the predicative use of "good" corresponds to the indication of "value", while the attributive one does not (Korsgaard, 1998: 151).

This does not mean that there are no voices against this identification. Yet, they are very rare and not always intelligible. Thus, T.J. Higgings, the author of the article "Moral Good" for the "New Catholic Encyclopedia" (2003), in its conclusion complains that the concept of good is now almost replaced by the concept of value and that both concepts are thought to be almost identical. Intrinsic values encompass truth, beauty, talent, health, peace, morality, and religion. Value, therefore, encompasses the entire spectrum of human desires and interests, rather than individual actions and objects of desire. But in this case value, according to the author, covers less than good (Higgings 2003: 354).

Higgins's complaints are quite justified: according to a well-known law of logic, the larger the scope of a concept is, the poorer its content becomes, and the inflation which "the values"[9] are subject to cannot but affect (as in the case of any defaults) the neighbouring categories as well and the coin called "the values" in modern culture, becomes worn-out. And this is not the opinion of the author of these lines alone. The oldest American axiologist of the 20th century, Abraham Edel, noted the success of the "general theory of values", designed to unite all normative philosophical disciplines from ethics to the philosophy of religion. Long ago, he wrote that "descriptively, a man's "values" may refer to all his attitudes for-or-against anything" (Edel, 1953: 198). Later, he stated that "its influence dissipated... when the use of the term "value" became so trivial and lost any definite meaning" (Edel, 1992: 1269).

Listening to the language

I think that implementation of "anti-inflationary measures" should begin first of all by following the advice of the same critic of classical axiology, Heidegger, who strongly recommended listening to the language that he, as

[7] Deontological ethics proceeds from the fact that the norms of correct action are set by the performance of duty and based on obligations. This differs it from consequentialist ethics with consequences of actions as a criterion, primarily in the form of individual and social benefits. It also differs from aretaic ethics with the criterion corresponding to virtues and, in some cases, directly to personified moral models. Ultimately, deontological ethics goes back to Kant.

[8] In his discussion of evaluative concepts, he refers to John Rawls.

[9] Refer to Note 4 above.

we know, even considered "the abode of Being". This course of action will not contradict Moore's intuitionism, from which meta-ethics as such begins. So, in my opinion, the Russian language has some advantages in the area under study, and the opinion that it should only be a borrowing party is unfounded. Thus, this language does not need to resort to special lexical constructions to distinguish between *dobro* (approximately "benignity", "benevolence") and *blago* (the good), which was done in his time by Kant, who did not become consistent here. In Russian, they are differentiated naturally – both morphologically and grammatically: one can form a plural from *blago*, but one cannot form a plural from *dobro*. This corresponds to "the things themselves": there are many goods, but there is only one "benignity" equal to itself. But benefits from the language are waiting for us in the case of *values* as well.

The fact is that there is no lexical difference between "value" and "value/cost" in the languages of economically more developed cultures. Value/cost is lexically the same not only in English. German *Wert*, Swedish *värde*, French *valeur*, Spanish *valor*, Italian *valore*, etc. also have the same initial commodity meaning, which makes it difficult to distinguish it from "good (beneficial) things". And the fact that "the borders of my world are the borders of my language" (as another notorious philosopher of the 20th century noted) is convincingly evidenced by the history of practical philosophy. Thus, not least of all, Thomas Hutcheson's approaches to calculations of the goods[10] were due to the fact that in English the word "goods" means not only "the benefits" but, and in the first place, simply the "commodity". In utilitarianism, consideration of goods as a 'commodity' item was "substantiated" with both the worldview and the vocabulary since Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism and Hutcheson's follower[11]. Yet, value means "the importance or worth of something for someone" only in its secondary sense, whereas it is "cost" in the primary one. Is it surprising that goods and values are perceived (as fractions with the same denominator) as almost indistinguishable? The genius of the Russian language is that it is the only one of the cultural priorities in which *stoimost'* ("cost") and *tsennost'* ("value") are also distinguished lexically (as well as *dobro* and *blago*, see above), and the spirit of the language makes it possible to distance *the cost-for-all* and *the value-for-someone*. That is why a closely related word is *drago-tsennost'* ("what is most valuable"), which means not something that has a good value/cost in general, but something extremely precious for someone personally. However, in his time it was Kant who distinguished "Wert" from the word "Würde"[12] (and did it more consistently than he did with the case of good). Nevertheless, the second word does not mean value in the specified hue of personal *drago-tsennost'* but in the general meaning of "dignity" (Russian *dostoinstvo* = Roman *honestum*), which all men possess as humans in contrast to things.

This, of course, does not mean that there are no correspondences to the values, understood this way in Western languages, at all. In French, the word *drago-tsennost'* ("valuable") corresponds to "objet précieux" with the ad-

[10] See, e.g., his opus magnum "A System of Moral Philosophy" (published posthumously in 1755), where calculations of public goods and "estimation of the value of this life" along with measuring of corresponding evils are undertaken (Hutcheson, 1755: 101, 223 etc.).

[11] See his detailed calculations of intensivity, duration, reliability narrowness and other indexes of pleasures (i.e. values) and pains (non-values) in his *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation published in 1780 (Bentham, 1859: 15:17)*.

[12] In his *Lectures on Ethics* (1775 – 1781), Kant used the expression *der Wert der Person*, but in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) he already wrote: "In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price (Preis) or a dignity (Würde). What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity". What refers to universal human inclinations and needs has a "market price" (Marktpreis); our individual life events, i.e. what corresponds to a certain taste or disposition for the play of the senses (in other words, the aesthetic sphere of life) – the "affective price" (Affectionspreis); what constitutes the condition under which it is only possible for something to be an end in itself, i.e. to have not a relative value (price), but an internal one, is dignity (Würde). Explaining what is said by the examples, Kant illustrates the "market price" by skill and diligence, the "affective price" by wit, vivid imagination, and gaiety, and what has "intrinsic value" – by loyalty to a promise and benevolence from principle rather than from instinct (Kant, 1903: 434-435). For the evolution of Kantian interpretations of "value" in general, one could refer to the detailed study in (Shokhin, 2006: 289-334).

jective bearing the main semantic load. The same meaning is carried by the English adjective "precious", the Italian "prezioso", and the German noun "Schatz". However, the situation is more complicated with the corresponding abstract nouns: for example, the French "préciosité" means just the opposite of "the value" ("zhemannost'", "manernost'", "vychurnost'"), whereas there are no such nouns in English and German. At least, I have not found such[13]. That is why the desired place in axiological vocabulary is firmly fixed by value/cost.

But one can listen to another language, primary to Russian and all the languages mentioned above. In the Gospel of Matthew, there are two shortest neighbouring parables obviously relating to the issue discussed here. In one of them the Kingdom of heaven (βασιλεία των οὐρανων) is likened to the person who found, somehow, a treasure hidden in a field (θησαυρω κεκρυμμένω ἐν τω ἀγρω), which a man found and hid, and for joy over it he goes and sells a ll that he has and buys that field (Matthew, 13: 44). The same Kingdom is likened to a merchant who seeks for precious pearls (ζητουντι καλοὺς μαργαρίτας), finds one (πολύτιμον μαργαρίτην), sells all he has again and buys it (Matthew, 13: 45-46).

In the first case, a person does not take any action, but, having seized his *sokrovishche* (treasure / θησαυρός), hides it as his (and only his) highest prize, and his joy in acquiring it is inseparable from concealment. In the second case, he carefully and purposefully "selects" riches, tests them and makes investments in what seems to him more promising than others. Etymologically, sokro-vishche ("treasure") is something that is carefully hidden[14] and, therefore, it is in a certain sense synonymous with drago-tsennosti ("valuables") as something desired and causing almost ecstatic joy. It should be on the "field" that contains values and which is the field of the heart. The search for good pearls and selection of the best ones will correspond to understanding of the good, which, already among the Stoics, corresponded to "what is worthy of selection" (αρρετόν), i.e. the choice made by another "part of the human", this part being practical mind[15]. However, in contrast to *blagopriobreteniya* ("benefits"), the "treasures" which the New Testament refers to are far from unambiguous. Jesus Christ says, according to the same Evangelist, that *the good man out of his good treasure* (ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ) *bringeth forth good things: and the evil man out of his evil treasure* (ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ) *bringeth forth evil things* (Matthew, 12: 35). And when he says that *where the treasure* (θησαυρός) *is, there also will your heart* (καρδδα) *be* (Matthew, 6: 21), this treasure is not only localized in the heart, but it is also warned that the soul will take its main internal wealth, accumulated during life, with it, this wealth being possibly very different.

Listening to the language as a starting point for further research also corresponds to the very ancient universal idea that words correspond to the essence of things. However, it corresponds well to modern epistemology, in particular to epistemological fundamentalism with the ethical intuitionism as one of its branches. The essence of the ethical intuitionism is that the discourse begins not with the syllogisms but with those basic perceptions, visions, knowledge, without which the syllogisms would have to rely on other syllogisms, these syllogisms relying on the next ones and so on until the regress to the infinity (not to say into the void). From this launching platform, we can estimate how "values" have been understood (in main lines) in the history of philosophy, attempt at somewhat different approach, and, on this basis, design other adjacent territories of the intentional subject.

How the world
of personal significancies is constituted?

In 1785, in his *The Groundwork of* the *Metaphysics of Morals* Immanuel Kant introduced a very expressive but ambiguous concept of "a kingdom of ends" (ein Reich der Zwecke),

[13] They can, however, be constructed so that there will be something like calque from Russian, for example, in the form of *inner possesion*.

[14] These shades are not found, for example, when this Evangelical noun has the form of trésor, treasure, and Schatz.

[15] This is how Antipater of Tarsus (the 2nd century BC), a disciple of Diogenes of Babylon, defined the good according to the "Eclogues" of the early Byzantine encyclopedist Stobaeus (Stobaeus II.5.5 i).

which, on the one hand, corresponds to the set of special goals that each human being sets for him/herself, on the other hand, – to the understanding of these very beings as goals-in-themselves in their community[16]. In both cases, we are dealing with a reflection of a purely rationalistic anthropology, which reduces the essence and nature of a man to mere goal-setting and leaves that complex inner world of the individual behind the scenes (as if these were only "empirical remnants"). Whereas Kant divided the world into the spheres of nature and freedom, his distant follower Heinrich Rickert in his Manifesto "Vom Begriff der Philosophie" (1910) – into the areas of reality (Wirklichkeit) and significancies (Geltungen)[17]. He populated the latter with the values (he wrote that the essence of value is its significance), having "edited" Kant's Kingdom of Ends as the Kingdom of Values.

However, in addition to Kant, Plato was also reliably present in his picture of the world, since this self-sufficient kingdom is as ontologically separated from our world as the hierarchy of eidoses is separated from earthly things. Being values-for-themselves (for example, in the form of scientific truths that are not discovered yet), Rickert's values are located on the other side of both objects and subjects, and the philosopher constantly emphasized their "non-psychological nature". Yet, at the same time they "affect" humanity (in a sense as Kantian things-in-themselves "affect" our experience), revealing themselves in its history in the form of primarily cultural values (there are, however, both cognitive and ethical ones which are also non-subjective). There must be some connecting links between us and these values. The latter have the form of the goods (Güter), which both belong to reality (as, for example, canvas, varnish, paint) and are carriers of the values (as, for example, their manifestation, such as an artistic work)[18]. For Rickert, this dualism had a programme meaning in the context of its specific "science education": all areas of reality, in his vision, have long been divided by certain sciences, and philosophy should become the only "science of significances". The same correlation of eidetic, non-objective values and their empirical carriers (goods) was also perceived outside the Baden school – in phenomenology, as can be seen from the works by Max Scheler, Nikolai Hartmann, and, later, Roman Ingarden.

Having worked with these concepts for a long time, I firmly believe that the introduction of *Geltungen* into the philosophy of neo-Kantianism was highly constructive, and their interpretation as non-subject-object ones was absurd. To say that something is significant without specifying for what or, more importantly, for whom it is significant, is the same as to say that a certain segment of the path is simply "equal" (without specifying to what) or "more" or "less" (without specifying than what) or, when using philosophical and theological language, that something is coessential (also without specifying towards what). The same applies to the value: the irrelevant statement "Man is the highest value" without specifying for whom (Kant was one of the first to formulate such a proposition), will, as I have already repeatedly noted, be neither true nor false, but meaningless, whereas such a statement as, for example, "Spencer Tracy was the highest value for Katherine Hepburn"[19] is not quite correct (it would be more correct to specify it with "the feelings for Spencer Tracy" or "the rendezvous with Spencer Tracy"), but it is quite meaningful. Therefore, I found it necessary to clear the "significances" from all "non-psychological" (just as Rickert cleared them from all "psychological") and then raise them into a general concept describing the world of an intentional personal subject – the world that can and should be further stratified.

But first, it is important to understand one thing. The reason why "values" became "our all" to the enthusiasm of the majority and the frustration of the minority is very simple. It is their populist understanding, which is the exact opposite of Rickert's one. The world and national sociological services work so "suc-

[16] Refer to: (Kant, 1903: 433-434).

[17] Listening to the language again, one make sure that English *significancies* not too easy could be appropriated for conveying *Geltungen*. The same is true with French *significativité or* Spanish *significado* which are not capable to form a plural.

[18] Refer to: (Rickert, 1910).

[19] Just in case, we mention the primary Hollywood stars of the 1940s – 1960s.

cessfully" with them (see above) because they do not distinguish them from natural human needs, which are both universal and unlimited. But while natural needs of human beings can really be "calculated" in the manner of Bentham (see above), it is more than difficult to do this with personal values. They can only be compared with each other, first of all, according to the degrees of their "separability" and intersubjectivity, which implies much more.

In fact, we mean fairly transparent things. If we continue to use the example already given, it is possible to assume that although it made a certain amount of difference to Catherine and Spencer what brands of cars they used or from whom they ordered their suits, the significance of these artifacts for them was probably still not comparable to the significance of their feelings after their first rendezvous. And if this is true, then the designation of the significance of both types as values (which in the Russian language associate with 'drago-tsennosti' (valuables) – see above) seems to me to be a "devaluation" of the latter, which is not justified by the degree of intensity of this inflation (due to the philosophers' reluctance to work with their language). Therefore, I would leave the nomination of values for the values of the second kind only and designate the first as preferences shared by many people with us and used by store advertisers (from book stores to meat stores) for selling products, by homeopathic doctors for a typology of people, by sociologists for their surveys, by politicians for their promises, and so on. In personal significances at the level of preferences, the intentional subject (which must necessarily be distinguished from other ones, primarily from the cognitive one) is entirely defined by his/her interests and tastes, and since we are similar in this with a great number of representatives of our kind, they will be "divisible" or shared by us with many and even with very many.

The case with significancies that I would regard as values as "inner possessions" and that the same individual with preferences has got but without which he/she would seem to lose his/her very personal core is opposite. This modality of significancies is localized in what might be called the keys, the innermost folds of the heart. Friedrich Eduard Beneke, the now completely forgotten German philosopher who justly rebelled (along with many others) against Kant's anthropological rationalism, very aptly called them "the spaces of bliss" (Lusträume) (Beneke 1828: 136).

On the psychological level, everyone can easily find out their actual values and not just preferences through introspection: by viewing those "contemplations" that they would not like to share with others; the feelings that they would betray themselves if they communicated them to someone else (it is worthwhile remembering 'sokro-vishcha'); deep expectations that they are passionately afraid to "jinx", etc. All this very intimacy defines the boundaries of the value in the meaning discussed. On the essentialist level, the values could be regarded as pure particulars that have the characteristics of "indivisibility", in the sense that they cannot be shared with anyone: they belong either to this subject, and to him/her only, or (if they are profane) to no one at all. To have someone else's values in this sense is just as impossible as to live or die for someone because it is about the uniqueness of hearts but not about social and other sensory characteristics. The case does not change when the same "value referent" can be an object for several subjects: their heart constitutions (in which this value is localized) are particular "by creation"[20].

As for the goods, we deal here with a much more complex modality of personal significancies than the two under consideration, since it borders on both and, differing from them essentially, has a lot in common with them. Values are the sphere of the heart, preferences are the sphere of taste and interest, and in this case the question is primarily about practical reason, which the Greeks already knew well before Kant (cf. the first of the cardinal virtues (φρόνησις)) and which primarily performs "selection functions" concerning the objects of desire[21]. The individual's agathological practi-

[20] For example, although Suzette Gontar should have been of interst and attractive not to the unfortunate Friedrich Hölderlin alone, who served her husband, it was for him only that she was Diotima. Thus, the forced separation from her directly accelerated his mental illness development.

[21] One text of much importance in this regard contains several definitions of the good, including the definition of the good

cal mind can evaluate his/her preferences and values (if he/she has any control over his heart), ranking the former and trying to justify or, on the contrary, "neutralize" the latter (the heart's desires are very different). At that, this mind proceeds from certain norms, therefore, not only from what is desired, but also from what is due, and if it is endowed with a deeper reflection, then from system normative representations, and, if further, from the worldview ones.

This, however, does not mean that this practical reason is only a judge of interests and hearts: it "takes into account" the former and cannot do without the consent, "confirmation" of the latter. As for the "divisibility", the goods can be ranged between values and preferences: we strive for the goods that are common to both groups of people and even the entire human race, yet, at the same time everyone constructs their own ones (which makes the creativity of the "agathological subject"). The latter point is also associated with their "active modality": we give preferences to something, we experience our "inner possessions", and, due to the normative aspect of the goods, we strive to implement them in our lives and (if we are not moral autists) to "convert" others to them and, therefore, their intentionality is *intersubjective*. Hence it is clear that of all the layers of significance these are the goods that are ethically relevant. This cannot be said of the other two. But it is also possible to understand why public goods are possible, which every morally adequate person is obliged to contribute to in one way or another by conscience[22].

Compared with other modes of personal significancies, this "activity" of the goods in combination with their "reasonableness" provides a specific modality of their hierarchy. Values as treasures and the desires of the heart are either absolute or none. Preferences as matters of tastes and interests are too ephemeral for consistent stratification. Yet, the world of the goods not only allows for significant gradation in the subject's consciousness but is constituted by it in a certain sense.

The matter is a specific *teleology* inherent in this world, which was noted by Aristotle with his normative distinction of the goods as means and the goods as ends. The goods of gymnastics is a means for good health, the goods of family life – for harmonic inner state, a trip to some country for participation in the prestigious conference can be a means for such a greater good as being employed in a certain position in academic circles to advance certain "good ideas" in the society, a successful deal – for such a greater good as participation in charity, etc. With this "ladder" it is quite natural for practical mind (if it is, of course, endowed with the ability to contemplate) to raise the question of the highest good (summum bonum), which can no longer be a means for any other. Otherwise, "blago-polaganie" ("good-belief") will be only instinctively rational but not reasonable in the proper sense. This is fully recognized in modern literature on various branches of practical philosophy.

Much less attention is paid to the *verticality* of goods which results from the hierarchy in human nature itself. In this case, the Platonic-Aristotelian hierarchy (external, physical, and spiritual goods) has not lost its relevance either and can only be completed if based on the theistic picture of the world. And it would be possible to distinguish the prevailing common goods on each tier. Thus, we should distinguish the goods that arise from the ability to dispose of certain property from the external goods, the goods that arise from health from the bodily goods, the goods of the opportunities to develop skills (the highest of which are, of course, creative ones), and it is most likely that those goods that come from disposition to contemplation (what the ancients philosophers were absolutely right in) and to moral activity (what they have paid less attention to) are to be favored among the spiritual goods. Yet, for truly religiously gifted people there are "talents" which are obtained by grace and should be put

as what corresponds to the instructions of mind and, thus, for each individual the good will be something that the mind points out to regarding each particular case (Arist. Rhet. I. 6. 1362a 21-28).

[22] There is a rather pathetic, but by no means meaningless expression of the famous philosopher Ivan Ilyin. According to the philosopher, values are what a person is ready to die for. Most likely, it should not be so much about the values as about the goods. These were freedom and other public goods that some great Romans or resistance heroes during World War II were willing to die for (and did it).

into growth (cf. Matthew, 25: 14-30, Luke, 19: 11-28)[23]. Those involved in practical philosophy pay usually little attention to this vertical, since contemporary philosophical community teaches people think mainly horizontally, within the framework of evolutionary anthropology.

Another feature of this modality of significances is connected with temporality. Language does not prevent us from talking about both temporary and eternal, "imperishable" goods located beyond the borders of this earthly life, whereas the value experiences of the heart can be primarily thought of as temporal and the taste preferences as contingent only.

There are also certain "qualitative" differences between the three modalities of personal significancies highlighted here. Preferences can be very different in their merits (someone likes to watch classical opera, someone likes to watch football, and someone likes to watch snuff movies), and, therefore, it is said that tastes differ, although they can be evaluated from an ethical or cultural point of view. Values can be both mostly life-fulfilling and absolutely fatal for a person (if, for example, his/her whole heart lies near a roulette table or a slot machine). But false or illusory goods (to which both Feder and Ammon, the first systematizers of agathology, paid great attention to) are self-contradictory concepts. The division into objective and subjective, which is very popular at the present time, does not apply to the goods either. But here they do not differ from other modalities of significances, to which this division does not apply in principle. The fact that I have individual goods (the goods for me only) does not make them merely subjective, since their belonging to me is quite an objective fact, and quantitative indicators cannot determine transition from the subjective to the objective. The goods are not "objective" in principle (at least in the framework of the conception promoted here): they can be someone else's and for someone else only[24], just like other significancies under discussion. The difference from values, which are "cardiological" in nature, is only in the fact that the kinds of my goods determined by my practical reason are much more similar to what it determines for others.

At that, the modalities of significancies cannot, of course, be thought of as "materially" isolated. A value that is absolute for someone today (the values of "cardiological" nature can be only absolute – see above) can transform to the area of the preferred only or even the non-preferred tomorrow with the inconstancy of the heart, and vice versa[25]. It is an issue of distinguishing the "forms" of these modalities proper, but not that of the changes to which their respective objects may be subject to. Nor are they "conflict-free": any developed person must constantly choose between desires of the heart and maxims of reason, and in many cases this choice leads to harsh conflicts, whereas preferences (as a kind of buffer zone between the values and the goods) provide a certain modus vivendi for the individual.

As a result, we can try to give a comparative definition of the goods based on intuition-

[23] In contrast to the ability to paint, write poetry, do mathematics, etc., religiousness in one form or another is inherent in man as such, as evidenced by the absence of completely irreligious periods in the history of mankind and the fact that even the most anti-religious ideological systems have denied religion in the name of some sort of quasi-religion. According to John Calvin, who relied on the patristics and ancient thought (historical proof of the existence of the divine world based on the universality of the worship of God among both the Hellenes and the barbarians), a man comes into the world not as a "pure board", but as a being endowed with such an "instinct" as *divinitatis sensus* ("the sense of the divine"). At present, this Calvinistic idea has been consistently developed by such a famous analytical philosopher as Alvin Plantinga. The abovementioned parable of the talents, according to which one person was given five talents, another – three ones, and a third person – only one talent without further profit, also indirectly indicates that there are no people who are completely devoid of this "sense of the divine" but not all try to realize it.

[24] One of the very few advocates of this understanding of the goods in analytical philosophy is R. Kraut, a specialist in Aristotle's practical philosophy, who successfully uses the historical and philosophical arsenal to develop modern topics. See: (Kraut, 2011).

[25] Not to mention, of course, that the same object may have different significances, preferences, goods, and values for different individuals. If you take such an ordinary case as renting an apartment at the moment, then for someone, who simply considers this form of earning money more convenient than other forms, it will be a preference; for someone who, when choosing from different opportunities, is guided by the fact that such earnings will give him more opportunities for self-realization in other areas of life or help someone else, it will be a good; and in the case of those, for whom regular income of money from the residents will be trembling and coveted (such cases also take place), we will deal with the value, "the space of bliss".

ism or, in another way, the discretion of entities. It is reasonable to regard them as such a modality of personal significancies that can be described in the context of specific rationality, intersubjectivity, teleology, hierarchy, positivity, and eternity in some of its dimensions. To the greatest extent, they localize the individual's practical, ethical, and religious intentionality.

Practical conclusions for practical philosophy

From the mentioned above, it follows that there could be a correlation between axiology and agathology different from the one stated in the beginning of this article. Axiology, which has not yet overcome the crisis after Heidegger's criticism (see above), is now beyond the divisions of philosophy into the disciplines not only in the Anglo-American tradition but also in the Continent. These disciplines are divided mainly into theoretical, practical, and applied. One can make very serious claims to this division[26], but it is not possible to ignore it because of the lack of something better. It is difficult to find a place for the doctrine of values beyond anthropology (which is very difficult to fit into any of these "compartments", since it can be attributed to all the three), whereas the doctrine of the goods can be successfully integrated into both ethics and practical philosophy, of which ethics can be considered a part. The ethics based on the goods could constitute a very serious alternative to all three main programmes of theoretical ethics, i.e. virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and consequentialist ethics (with which it has external similarities[27]). Regarding the building of practical philosophy, agathology could form its foundation, since practice itself (in any field of human activity, except destructive one) can be defined as a way of realizing certain goods[28]. It is precisely because of its pronounced spiritual teleology that the agathological reason can be the main arbiter of goal-setting in any area of life, and it is precisely this that directs intelligent life as such.

[26] Thus, applied philosophy (angewandte Philosophie) is an obvious oxymoron, since philosophy by definition can only be fundamental or none, and what is considered to be classical applied philosophy, such as bioethics, is only application of general ethical principles to specific situations, and nothing more. There is nothing "applied" in philosophy of science, philosophy of culture, philosophy of law, philosophy of art and other large "philosophies of something", which are usually included in this group. Practical philosophy is much better. This is not only because of its Aristotelian origin but also because it is clear that we mean a philosophical reflection on certain types of individual and social activities. However, this phrase can only be used conditionally, since any philosophy can be only theoretical.

[27] Similarities are shown in the following: consequentialism, which is utilitarianism in both its essence and origin, very readily operates with the notion of the goods. Yet, the good of consequentialists is, in fact, a mere well-being (it is not incidentally that a very influential element of this programme is called welfarism), whether it is thought only selfishly or even also socially. The highest goods for those, who are able to perceive them and strive for them, just come into conflict with well-being. The consequentialists' empirical criteria for the goodness of something cannot be accepted in agathological ethics also because it can deal with not only "verifiable" goods.

[28] Alasdair MacIntyre wrote about this in his main work. He defined practice as "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human concepts of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended" (MacIntyre, 2007: 187).

References

Adams, R.M. (2006). *A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Ammon, C.F. (1823). *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre.* Bd. I. Leipzig, Georg Ioachim Göschen.

Beneke, F.E. (1828). *Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten: ein Gegenstück zu Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten mit einem Anhange über das Wesen und die Erkenntnißgränzen der Vernunft*. Berlin; Posen, Mittler.

Bentham, I. (1859). *The Works.* Vol.1. Edinburgh, William Tait.

Bond, E.J. (2001). Good, Theories of. In *Encyclopedia of Ethics.* L.C. Becker and C.B. Becker (Eds.). Vol. I. New York and London, Routledge, 620-624.

Bränmark, J. (2006). Good, the. In: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Second Edition. D.M. Borchert (Editor in Chief). New York, Gale, 150–153.

Delcomminette, S. (2006). *Le Philebe de Platon: introduction à l'agathologie platonicienne.* Philosophia Antiqua, 100. Leiden, Boston, Brill.

Edel, A. (1953). Concept of Values in Contemporary Philosophical Value Theory. In *Philosophy of Science*, 20 (3), 198-207.

Edel, A. (1992). Value. Theory of. In *Encyclopedia of Ethics*. L.C. Becker and C.B. Becker (Eds.). Vol. 2. New York, London, Routledge, 1269-1273.

Feder, J.G.H. (1770). *Lehrbuch der praktischen Philosophie*. Göttingen und Gotha, Johann Christian Dietrich.

Heidegger, M. (1997). *Gesamtausgabe. I Abt. Heröffentliche Schriften 1910-1976. Bd.6:2. Nietzsche*. Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.

Higgings, T.J. (2003). Moral Good. In: *New Catholic Encyclopedia.* T. Carson, J. Ceritto (Eds.). Vol. 6. Detroit, Gale, 350–354.

Hurka, T. (2007). Theory of Value. In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory.* D. Copp (Ed.). New York, Oxford University Press, 357–379.

Hutcheson, T. (1755). *A System of Moral Philosophy.* Two Volumes in One. Vol. 1. Glasgow: R. and A. Foulis.

Kant, I. (1903). *Akademieausgabe von Kants Gesammelten Werken*. Bd. IV. Berlin, Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Kirchner, F. (1911). *Wörterbuch der philosophosche**n** Grundbegriffen.* Neubearbeitung von Dr. C. Michaëlis. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung.

Korsgaard, C. (1998). Goods Theories of the. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* E. Craig (Gen. Ed.). Vol. 4. New York – London, Routledge, 130–135.

Kraut, R. (2011). *Against Absolute Goodness.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Külpe, O. (1910). *Einführung in die Philosophie.* Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel.

Laird, J. (1929). *The Idea of Value*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.* Notre Dame (Ind), Univesity of Notre Dame Press.

Rickert, H. (1910). Vom Begriff der Philosophie. In *Logos*. 1910, 1–34.

Salamon, J. (2017). Agatheology and naturalisation of the discourse on evil. In *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology*, 78 (4-5), 469-484.

Shokhin, V.K. (2004) Agatologia (Agathology). In *Filosofiia: Entsyclopeditheskii slovar'*. Pod. red. A.A. Ivina [*Philosophy: an Encyclopaedic Dictionary.* Ed. by A. Ivin]. Moscow, Gardariki, 15–16.

Shokhin, V.K. (2006). *Filosofiia tsennostei i ranniaia aksilogitcheskaia mysl'* [*Philosophy of Values and Early Axiological Discourse*]. Moscow, People's Friendship University of Russia.

Shokhin, V.K. (2014). *Agatologia: sovremennost' i klassika* [*Agathology: Modernity and the Classics*]. Moscow, Canon+.

Wieser, J. von (1884). *Über der Ursprung und der Hauptgeschichte der wirtschaftlichen Wert*. Wien: A. Hölder.

Аксиология и агатология

В.К. Шохин
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. Внимание с самого начала привлекается к тому факту, что термин *аксиология,* означающий учение о ценностях, будучи введенным в самом начале XX века, почти сразу повлек за собой целый бум разработок теорий ценностей (преимущественно в континентальной философии), тогда как термин *агатология,* означающий учение о благах и созданный в 1770, а затем открытый заново в 1823 году, пришел в почти полное забвение. С целью его реабилитации пересматривается одно из общих мест философии XX и XXI веков, а именно фактическое отождествление благ и ценностей, вследствие которого первое из этих понятий фактически поглощается вторым. Но то, что считается ценностями, также, как правило, клишированно понимается как общие человеческие потребности, а не глубинные и неделимые индивидуальные «внутренние обладания». Поэтому предлагается различать общечеловеческие потребности и личностные значимости и стратифицировать мир значимостей посредством дифференциации ценностей, преференций и благ. В результате последняя из этих разновидностей трактуется как сфера практического разума (в античном и в кантовском смыслах), телеологически нагруженная и могущая быть заложенной в новую, четвертую из больших программ теоретической этики (способную хорошо конкурировать консеквенционизмом, деонтологизмом и этикой добродетели) и одновременно в общий фундамент того кластера философских дисциплин, который принято называть практической философией.

Ключевые слова: ценности, предпочтения, блага, этика, практическая философия, аксиология, агатология, сердце, вкус, практический разум.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1384–1397

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0649
УДК 130.3

Journey as a Philosophical Project

Yulia V. Sineokaya*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 10.04.2020, received in revised form 27.07.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. Based on literary and philosophical texts describing journeys of Xavier de Maistre, Albert Camus, Hermann Hesse, Joseph Brodsky, etc. in their rooms, the author discusses the entelechy of journey as an experience of self-identification, the archetype of journey as a sacred return to oneself that is infinitely repeated regardless of time... A journey is viewed as an experience of a wanderer's personal freedom, movement of culture in space: memory, myth. A journey acts as a kind of pilgrimage: a person goes on a journey in search of those moments when he can go beyond his personality, realize his potential, thus transforming himself into a different, more true and free self-consciousness. The article is devoted to a mental journey presented as an experiment in the acquisition of the meaning of life by a person, as an experience of philosophical self-reflection and gaining identity with oneself. An existential journey through the inner intelligible space is both an experience of personifying history and an attempt at self-identification.

Keywords: existentialism, self-identification, archetypes of internal space, entelechy, travel round my room.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Sineokaya, Yu.V. (2020). Journey as a philosophical project. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1384–1397. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0649.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: jvsineokaya@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000–0003–4401–1070
Translation of an article published in Russian: Sineokaya, Yu.V. (2014). Puteshestviye kak filosofskiy proyekt [Journey as a Philosophical Project]. In *Filosofskiy zhurnal* [*Philosophical Journal*], 1 (12), 59–80.

Some travel because they are looking
for themselves others –
because they want to lose themselves[1]
(Nietzsche. Letter
to Fraulein Simone, February 6, 1884)

The idea to write an article about the experience of a mental journey through the confined space of a room was formed several years ago under the impression of the essay "A Journey Around My Room" by the officer of the Kingdom of Sardinia Xavier de Maistre, who was under house arrest for a duel in the spring of 1794. In the spring of 2020, being alone during home isolation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, these long-time reflections seemed to me not only timely, but also of a practical value. The experience of compelled lack of freedom, simultaneously experienced by people from different countries, seems to me the right time to embark on an existential journey. Usually the soul and body of a person go on a journey together, but in the case, I am describing, only the soul is a traveller.

***

A journey is wandering, the route of which does not necessarily lie only in the external (physical) space. A journey is movement in the space of culture: memory, myth, imagination, dreams. An existential journey through the inner space is both an experience of personifying history and an attempt at self-identification.

In the essay "The Four Cycles," Jorge Luis Borges writes that European culture is an endless variation and interweaving of the plots of four original legends: about the heroic defence of a city doomed to death, about eternal return, about an inconsolable search and about the death of God. The second and third stories are related to a journey.

What does journey mean? The way to yourself? Comprehending your meaning? Or, on the contrary, an attempt to escape from the hassle of everyday life, the labyrinth of actions, the flow of words and experiences? Is it an experience of freedom or doom? A breakthrough from a cell called "here and now," which is wide open by a thought, or a dictate of a closed route? What caused the eternal craving of people for vagrancy, changing times and places?...

Journey is the experience of a wanderer's personal freedom: freedom to leave the familiar world, cross borders, immerse yourself in someone else's space, freedom to choose a route due to the traveller's individual motives that induce him to change places, and sometimes times.

The most common motives for journey are the desire for self-identification, the craving for discovery and new knowledge.

Traditionally, a journey also served as a social ritual. For example, in medieval Europe, a journey was often a knightly "initiation," the purpose of wandering was to justify or confirm the social status of the traveller. Medieval travel routes had a vertical vector of movement. The pilgrim wanderer, following his own path, ascended the ladder of goodness from hell to heaven. The recurrence of walking to holy places mythologized the process of wandering. The texts of pilgrimage are dominated by the myth of purification. The whole path is the path to goodness, catharsis. The path of the medieval wanderer is a return to the origins, to the beginning of the world. Mircea Eliade describes the archetype of journey as a sacred path of return to oneself endlessly repeating outside time, to "the beginning of all beginnings": "It is necessary to start your journey from some definite moment, as close to the present time as possible, and to make it all the way backwards in order to reach the origins, ad originem, to where the very first life, having emerged in the world, will give rise to Time, to achieve an amazing moment when Time will no longer exist, since there is nothing, nothing is present. The meaning and purpose of this technique is clear: the one who goes back in time must inevitably reach the starting point, which ultimately coincides with the creation of the world."[2]

In secular culture, a journey is also a kind of pilgrimage. A person sets off on a journey in search of those moments when he can go beyond his personality, realize his potential, transforming himself into a different, more

[1] F. Nietzsche Letters (2007). M., Cultural Revolution, p. 217.

[2] Eliade, M. (2010). *Aspects of the myth*. M., Academic project, p. 84.

true and free self-consciousness. A journey is a path of understanding the world and oneself through the Absolute: "An ancient Russian traveller prefers to touch the shrine directly, and a new wanderer touches the representation of the shrine, the embodiment of the Absolute through the reception of another person, which is, the cognition through art. The art object inherits supernatural properties of the hieratical object."[3] It is essential that the wandering is not so much a way of understanding another, but self-modelling, self-actualization.

Entelechy of journey

The phenomenon of journey is of interest to me, first of all, as entelechy – a form of human self-realization, as an experience of self-identification.

Entelechy (or entelecheia) is a philosophical term introduced by Aristotle, that means "realization," the fixation of things in existence on the form that opens up to consciousness. Aristotle called entelechy the revelation of the inner desire inherent in being and compelling it to acquire a form, i.e. to the realization of its essence and meaning: "Matter is a possibility, essence is entelechy."[4]

In the third chapter of the ninth book of "Metaphysics," Aristotle brings together the terms "energy" and "entelechy" as those denoting reality, but points out that the first of them originally meant a certain movement or activity, while the second denotes the factual givenness or realization of something.[5]

In the first chapter of the second book of his treatise "On the Soul," Aristotle defines entelechy as the essence and form of a thing, presenting the soul as the entelechy of the body. "The soul must be a substance of a natural body which potentially has life. But substance as a [form] is entelechy; therefore, the soul is the entelechy of such a body."[6] However, Aristotle does not fully clarify the identity of the soul and the entelechy: "Moreover, it is not clear whether the soul is the entelechy of the body in the same sense that a shipman is the entelechy of a ship."[7]

Entelechy is something "potentially capable of living," a realizing potency, an objectifiable probability of something. "We must not understand by that which is 'potentially capable of living' what has lost the soul it had, but only what still retains it; but seeds and fruits are bodies which possess the qualification. Consequently, while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal."[8] Entelechy takes place when matter, physical or spiritual, takes shape and form, when potency becomes embodied by reality, and the general acquires individuality, when an idea is realized or manifested. Entelechy, according to Aristotle, is the revelation of the internal energy inherent in being and forcing it to acquire a form, i.e. to the realize its essence and meaning. Matter is possibility, essence is entelechy.

Entelechy turned out to be one of the least developed, but the most essential categories of European philosophy. A modern researcher points out the fact that "entelechy is associated with a certain incomplete distinctiveness, an escape from logical clarity and clear unambiguity that put the perception of this phenomenon on the brink of analytical cognition and inner experience."[9]

In the intellectual history of Europe in modern times, we can find the experience of using this category in the works of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Unlike Aristotle, Leibniz distinguishes between "soul" and "entelechy." In Monadology, entelechy appears not so much as an acquired state of being, but as an independently existing discrete reality. "All simple substances, or created monads, could be called

[3] Schönle, A. (2004). Authenticity and fiction in the author's self-awareness of Russian travel literature 1790-1840. SPb., Academic project, p. 105.

[4] Aristotle. (1976). On the soul. Collection of works in 4 vols., M., Mysl', (1), p. 394.

[5] Ibid, p. 238.

[6] Ibid, p. 395.

[7] Ibid, p. 396.

[8] Ibid, p. 396.

[9] Knabe, G.S. (1994). The entelechy of culture. Materials for lectures on the general theory of culture and culture of ancient Rome. M., Indrik. p. 141.

entelechy, for they have certain perfection in them and they have self-sufficiency, which makes them the source of their internal actions and, so to speak, incorporeal automata... If we wanted to call everything that has perceptions and aspirations in the general sense, as I have just explained, souls, then all simple substances, or created monads, also could be called souls; but since feeling is something more than simple perception, I agree that for simple substances that have only the latter, a common name for monads and entelechies is enough, and that only those monads, the perceptions of which are more distinct and accompanied by memory, can be called souls.[10]

In the 20th century, the concept of "entelechy" was used by Edmund Husserl to describe European culture as a process of unfolding the ideas of ancient Hellenic philosophy in time. In the chapter "History of Modern Philosophy as a Struggle for Human Meaning" from the book "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology," Husserl refers to the category of "entelechy" not as an embodied idea, but as the energy of embodiment of the values discovered in Greece. In an intelligible sense, Europe is the entelechy of philosophy as a science. However, Husserl leaves open the question of whether the entelechy, first manifested in the Greek people, is inherent in humanity as such or not. In other words, it remains unclear whether European humanity, along with the emergence of Greek philosophy, acquired as its goal the aspiration to be humanity proceeding exclusively from a philosophical sense, or whether it is just a historical illusion that took possession of the Greek people due to certain historical events. The answer to this question determines the understanding of whether European humanity carries an absolute idea in itself, or whether it represents an empirically fixed anthropological type, similar to the inhabitants of China or India. Only in the case of a positive answer to this question, the Europeanization of other peoples would be endowed with an absolute meaning, which is included in the meaning of world history.

Husserl sees entelechy not as an act or its result, but as a process, not as an embodied idea, but as an endlessly unfolding energy of its embodiment.

The idea of looking at the phenomenon of journey as an entelecheic process, the purpose of which is self-embodiment, the search for the traveller's self-identity, came to me while reading the chronicle of an unusual journey that laid the foundation for a new genre two centuries ago – a journey round one's room.

Journey in the interior

In 1794, François-Xavier de Maistre, a thirty-year-old officer of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was placed under house arrest. The reason for this state of affairs was a duel over a ladylove, as a result of which the opponent of our hero was mortally wounded. The confinement lasted 42 days. Every day he wrote a new chapter in a book called *Voyage autour de ma chambre* (A Journey Round My Room).

The very fate of Count Xavier de Maistre could serve as a plot for an exciting historical novel. A writer whose talent was celebrated by Charles Augustin de Sainte-Beuve in France and Vladimir I. Dal in Russia, a landscape and portrait painter who captured six-year-old Alexander Pushkin, a brilliant officer of the Napoleonic Wars era, Xavier de Maistre was the twelfth of fifteen children in the family of a Sardinian nobleman. Xavier was the younger brother of the famous philosopher Joseph de Maistre, who helped him to publish the book "A Journey Round My Room" (Joseph found his brother's notes interesting and without the author's knowledge gave the book to the publisher).

Xavier had served as a lieutenant in the Sardinian army until 1800, participating in the wars with France in 1796 and 1798-1899, and then joined the Russian army under the command of General Bagration. Xavier de Maistre retired as Major General of the General Staff of the Russian troops and soon married Sophia I. Zagriazhskaia, the aunt of Natalia N. Goncharova, the wife of Alexander S. Pushkin.

At the beginning of the book, Xavier de Maistre admits that the idea of describing the wanderings in his own room came to him a

[10] Leibniz, G.-V. (1982). *Monadology*. Works in four volumes: V. 1, Ed. and comp. by V.V. Sokolov. M. Mysl'. p. 416.

long time ago, but the forced lack of freedom allowed the idea to come true. Before venturing the journey, the writer notices that his journey is unique in that it does not require money and is available to everyone, and he can invite all his readers to travel alongside him.

He calls his journey transcendental. Usually the soul and body of a person go on a journey together, in his case, only the soul turns out to be a traveller. Xavier de Maistre considers this type of a journey the most wonderful. Despite the fact that the body of our hero continues to languish locked up, his soul moves freely in time and space, gaining new knowledge about itself and forming the personality of the writer. This entertaining 42-day journey of a young man can be compared to a cathartic experience of self-discovery, confession or even a mystery. "The journey of my soul around my own room gave me a sense of metaphysical freedom."[11]

Every day, the author's attention is focused on a new piece of the interior of his refuge. Looking at things, each of which has its place and its own history in his destiny, the writer makes an exciting mental journey into his past, present, and sometimes into the future, talks with friends and loved ones who are far from him, analyses the meaning of everyday life and experiences.

The journey around the room is full of funny episodes. The first object in the centre of the traveller's attention is his bed, symbolizing the entrance to the world of secular whirlwind, and now he feels like an outside observer and judge over it.

The next object that attracts his attention is a portrait of a pretty initiator of the duel. Pondering over the natural-scientific explanation of the nature of the artistic phenomenon: no matter where the audience was in the room, everyone looking at the portrait had the impression that the lady's gaze was focused on him – Xavier de Maistre suddenly comes to the conclusion that this portrait is brilliant in its truthfulness. A woman's heart is fickle: even being next to him, his beloved one looks at and flirts with all the gentlemen around her.

Days go by, plots change.

A writing desk, in the depths of which the memory of the past is kept...

Father's bust is a warm caress of home comfort...

A dried rose is an incombustible, unquenchable passion...

Engravings depicting urban everyday life are the earnest sermon of a freethinker dreaming of revolution...

Raphael's self-portrait is a virtuoso essay about the dissimilarity of the nature of painting and music: the artist's work requires experience, the art of thinking and symbolization of meanings, while the musician gives passion of a soul directly, without mediation of a rationalizing mind...

Labyrinths of bookshelves are unpredictable facets of a wandering soul...

And finally, a mirror is a brilliant invention that reflects, according to the writer, the view of each of us at ourselves through the prism of sincere, pure and unconditional love for ourselves. Each person takes pleasure in admiring his face and invariably discovering there exactly what he wanted to see. There are no people who do not experience a sense of blissful pleasure from observing their own reflection transformed by their imagination beyond recognition for the sake of an all-overcoming love for themselves. It would be nice, notes Xavier de Maistre, to invent another mirror that reflects the inner world of people and demonstrates to everyone their ideals and values, motives and principles of actions, however, the writer continues, probably no one would want to look into such a mirror, except for philosophers, and it is likely that even they would not want to.

The journey round the room ends with a noisy dispute between two ladies – the soul (l'ame) and the flesh (la bete) contesting their priority right to the journey. As a result, the author compromises the action, equalizing the significance of the soul and body, and draws a conclusion about the dual nature of existence. Both sensuality and corporeality are proclaimed as the guarantee of the feasibility of an intellectual journey, since for its transcendental wanderings the soul needs sensations delivered to it by the flesh.

[11] Xavier de Maistre Voyage autour de ma chambre (1984). Edition Jose Corti, c. 82.

Journey as an Experience of Metaphysical Freedom

Xavier de Maistre's transcendental journey around his own room, which is based on his house arrest, is reproduced in a different way a century and a half later in one of the episodes of Albert Camus's famous novel The Stranger [L'Étranger] (1942). The protagonist of the story, a thirty-year-old Frenchman named Meursault, who lives in Algeria, turns out to be imprisoned. The court sentenced him to death. The reason for this sentence was manslaughter. While awaiting sentencing in solitary confinement, Meursault experiences complete isolation from the outside world. Staying in an absolute eventive and informational vacuum: outside of time, the account of which he has lost, without the possibility of any movement outside the cell, without any kind of communication (dating and reading are prohibited to him), Meursault is trying not to lose his identity, to find a way to preserve his self. As a result, after several fruitless efforts, Meursault finds a way to autonomize himself from emptiness, to protect his personality from decay: "Yes, I had to endure some troubles, but I was not very unhappy. Again, the most important thing for me was to kill time. But since I learned to recall things, I have not been bored anymore. Sometimes I remembered my bedroom: I imagined myself leaving one corner and walking across the room, then returning back; I cast about in my mind everything that I met on my way. In the beginning, I was quick to deal with it. But each time the journey took more and more time. I remembered not only a wardrobe, a table or a shelf, but all the things that were there, and I imagined every thing in all its details: colour and material, inlay pattern, crack, chipped edge, etc. I tried in every possible way not to lose the thread of my inventory, not to forget a single item. Within a few weeks, I could spend hours describing everything in my bedroom. The more I thought about it, the more forgotten or neglected things came to my mind. And then I realized that a person who lived in the world for at least one day could easily spend a hundred years in prison. He would have enough memories not to get bored. In a sense, it was beneficial."[12]

The source of freedom to remain himself for Camus' hero, as well as for another prisoner – Xavier de Maistre, turns out to be the archetype of eternal return, initiating an entelechy existential journey in the closed space of human memory.

The genre of a transcendental journey around one's own room, introduced into the literary and philosophical discourse by Xavier de Maistre, turned out to be extremely popular only in the 20th century. However, for the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that in 1863 the German educator, teacher and writer Hermann Wagner published a book for children titled "Traveling around the room" intended to familiarize kids with the world around them. This publication, of course, does not belong to the genre of a transcendental journey.

A mental journey through the closed space of your own home, the starting points in which are pieces of furniture, books, souvenirs and other things that give a unique face to the house and serve as landmarks in the fate of travellers. It is important not to confuse it with another popular literary genre of the 20th century – chosisme (materialism, from the French word *"chose" – "a thing, object"*). Alain Robbe-Grillet, the author of "In the Labyrinth," is considered to be the founding father of chosisme. The idea of chosisme consists in a detailed description of objects as they are, outside the connections between them, in writing out everyday details, seemingly completely unnecessary and pushing back the story of events and images of characters.[13] Such descriptions are mesmerizing: the author sets an unexpected experiment on the reader, and even on himself, assigning to human consciousness the role of Democritean empty "nothingness" – a repository of an infinite number of things. Being in such texts is reduced to an inventory of the objects that fill it. These objects have meaning only for themselves; they are signs of themselves, not symbols or metaphors.

[12] Camus, A. (1989). *The Stranger*. M., Prometheus, p. 71.
[13] Robbe-Grillet, A. In the labyrinth (1999). SPb: Azbuka.

Journey as a communal project

Another experience of the entelechy journey around the room, surpassing the immanence of chosisme, is the socially oriented collective project of the circle of Moscow conceptualists of the 1970-1990's – Ilya Kabakov, Joseph Backstein, Andrei Monastyrskii and others, which is called "Rooms" (1986). In the preamble of the collection the authors of the project emphasize that their work is devoted to housing problems of the world avant-garde in the mid-80's.

It is noteworthy that the conceptualists themselves call their association a "geographic club," and themselves – travellers and discoverers of terra incognito – the Soviet housing reality in particular, and the Soviet everyday tradition in general, for the world outside the Soviet Union. Reflection on the space of "socialist everyday life" is at the centre of the conceptualists' creative work.

The realities of the Soviet existence need to be explained for everyone who is unfamiliar with them from their own everyday experience, otherwise it is impossible to understand the meaning of the creative work of these artists. The works of conceptualists presuppose the "involvement" of the life and cultural situation of their authors. The sad paradox is that the most powerful understatement of the conceptualists' works is understandable only to people close to them by the type of everyday culture, and the interpretation and explanation of their works for an external viewer requires such clarification that inexorably destroys the meaning of their works. For the artists of this circle, it was important that their work did not get lost, did not disappear overnight along with the Soviet era, so that their works would sound and remain in Russian culture, would be involved in the common European artistic tradition. After all, works of art live only when they give a creative impulse to the audience, remaining a necessary link in the continuity of the creative process.

The "Rooms" project was created as a meta-journey of conceptualists into Soviet everyday life. The communal apartment in this context acquires the status of the most important component of Soviet life, expressing its essence. The Soviet reality in "Rooms" appears not only as a politicized, ideologized form of everyday life, but is also an existential object of the emotional attitude of artists.

At the centre of the project there is Ilya Kabakov's installation "A Room. (The man who flew to space from his room)" (1985), considered by his colleagues as a problematization of the ordinary by the author, an attempt at aesthetic sublimation of the element of life.

Kabakov's "Room" is one of the rooms in a large, overcrowded communal apartment. Inside this room, objects are in extreme disarray: sticks, jars, belts, newspapers, papers are lying interspersed... The furnishings of the dwelling are wretched: instead of a bed there is a cot with an old pillow and a blanket, there is no table at all, instead of wallpapers the walls are pasted over with all kinds of posters placed in the most ridiculous way, so that together they form an unthinkable absurdity and a mess. In the midst of all this, a mysterious machine hangs in the air. It consists of a saddle for a chair, a spring and rubber bands. The lonely inhabitant of this room, as it becomes clear from the story of his neighbour, was overwhelmed by the dream of traveling into space, and he did realize this dream – his "great project." One night, the neighbours in the communal apartment were awakened by a terrible crash. The local police officer recorded the disappearance of the resident and a through hole of unknown origin in the ceiling of his home.

Considering the centuries-old history of the Russian dream of space flight and the space migration of mankind from the overpopulated Earth to the nearest planets, it is not difficult to include the "Room" installation in a number of similar projects, among which there are the ideas of Nikolai Fedorov and Konstantin Tsiolkovskii.

The existential layer of Kabakov's work was generated by the fact that the author identified himself with a character who reveals his essence, existence. The main impulse of the author-hero is a sincere desire to get out, fly out of the situation of the Soviet everyday life.

In my opinion, the "apartment myth" of Moscow conceptualists can be viewed as a special genre of a journey, an attempt to move

from the plane of a "picture" to a three-dimensional, open, dynamic reality. Entering the "room," the viewer finds himself entirely within the work. The structure of perception and experience of the artist's idea, the semantic features of his work are determined by the correlation between the rhythm of the image and the viewer's journey through it, by the change in the position of his body. There is no traditional exhibition distance between the viewer and the work. The possibility of free movement-travel in the exhibition space determines both the freedom of perception of the author's work and freedom from its influence. The activity of spectator behaviour, its subjectivity is not dulled by the author's logic, which allows the spectator-wanderer to remain independent, to generate aesthetic meanings himself.

The "Rooms" project also includes a visual journey along fifteen routes – the real interiors of rooms of the representatives of the elite of the Soviet underground art of the "developed socialism" era. This voyage through the rooms is intended to testify to the lifestyle and mental structure of their inhabitants, artists. Now, not the "author" of the room himself acts as a commentator-guide, but the conceptual artist Georgy Kiesewalter, who wrote the text "Fifteen Rooms" – a detailed commentary on the photo gallery.

Moving from photograph to photograph and reading text after text, we seem to move from room to room in a huge communal apartment that has sheltered the colour of the Russian avant-garde. Here is a room – a"public thoroughfare,"where amid chaos and glaring poverty we suddenly notice a Swiss saxophone on a bed, in the corner near the window there is a fashionable and expensive sound amplifier "Yamaha;" and a modest, carefully tidied room characterized by the absence of everyday excesses bordering with asceticism, and a gloomy closet of a beatnik or a hippie. There is also a room here, the main difference of which is tightness. This is just an example of the very "universal" room, which combines a bedroom, living room and workshop. In installation it is indicated that the artist himself, his wife and children, a cat, a rather large dog, a couple of budgerigars also live in this room, and on the top of all that, there is a goat in the bathroom (combined), which is unusual for the city, but children always have milk...

In the classical cultural context, the completeness of the dwelling does not act as a sacred space: the kitchen or hallway are ordinary places, but the bedroom or study are sacred. In the situation of communality and overcrowding of the Soviet everyday life, where the kitchen smoothly turns into the bedroom and into the study, due to the absence of a sacred room with a clear boundary, a curious phenomenon – a "sacred point" emerges. Thus, the sacred appears in the form of the very dynamic, it fights for its existence. We are witnessing the mystical transformation of the profane into the sacred.

Journey as an experience of self-discovery

The peak of his enthusiasm for philosophical journeys in his own room fell on the first half of the past century. Among the classics of this literary genre, I would point out the story of Somerset Maugham "Honolulu" and Hermann Hesse's essay "A Walk in the Room."

Somerset Maugham, it seems to me, has revealed the secret of most "room travellers": "An old Frenchman wrote a book called *Voyage autour de ma chamber*. I have not read this book and do not even know what it is about, but its title excites my imagination. In a similar way, I could travel around the world..."[14] Maugham's story "Honolulu" (1921) is an experience of such a trip around the world.

Having noticed at the very beginning of his story that truly wise travellers wander only in their imagination, and "the most beautiful journeys are those that you make sitting by a fireplace, because thus you do not lose your illusions," the writer sets off on a long journey.

The wandering narrator considers the regions traditionally surrounded by a halo of romance to be the most attractive places for the pilgrimage. A traveller usually expects to see something beautiful there, but the impression he has formed is immeasurably more complex than that which a simple contemplation of

[14] Maugham, S. (1990). *Honolulu*. Catalina: stories. Kiev, Politizdat of Ukraine, p. 44.

beauty can give. The pilgrim is doomed to inevitable disappointment, which, however, gives these places a special attraction. Maugham likens this feature to the weaknesses of great people, making them less wonderful, but more interesting.

Maugham considers Russia to be one of the "mysterious places;" and an icon hanging on the wall of his room serves as a window into this country. Another such a place is China symbolized by a porcelain trinket on a bookshelf. And Honolulu – a city of primitive superstitions, one of which is the plot of the story.

Another experience of such a journey is Hermann Hesse's "A Walk in the Room" (1928) – a virtuoso confession of the writer taking the route of finding inner supports in a time of fading youth, when the time comes for forced reconciliation with the coming "winter of life." At this stage, the present and the future are woven from the past, and are built mainly from memories and reflection on what once happened. "A new time is coming, a different life – life in a room, by the light of a lamp, with books and sometimes with music, a life in which there is also a lot of beauty and depth, but the transition to it is difficult and unpleasant, it begins with chills, sadness and internal rebellion... More recently, my room was a haven for hours of rest and work, a refuge with open doors and windows... I was in this room only as a guest, life was not here, but outside, in the forest, by the lake... And now suddenly the room has become important again, it has become a home – or a prison, a permanent abode..."[15]

The author gazes intently at the new abode – his old room, trying to "get closer and make friends" with it. Here are his main assistants – the objects of the familiar interior: old books, a large writing table, chairs, paints, watercolours, which Hesse calls tangible pieces of his memory. These are things that he has gained confidence in over the years, watching them gradually age. There is an extraordinary plush animal – "half deer, half giraffe, with a bewildered fabulous look," which for a long time served as his only pet, replacing a dog or a cat; and a Ceylon sacred relic made of bronze – a boar (a scapegoat in the Old Testament): "For me, a boar is not a rare thing, but rather a symbol, he is my brother among us marked with a sign, clairvoyants, jesters and poets, with their souls covered with stigmas, bearing the curses of the era, while their contemporaries dance and read newspapers..."[16] And only when an inner reconciliation with a new way of life has occurred, the habit of living locked up in a room comes to Hesse. In the end, such a life seems to the writer quite bearable.

Journey as a social phenomenon

In the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of this century, there was also interest in the genre of a journey around the room, however, the spirit of these wanderings has changed markedly. The subjective and objective components of journey notes have been split and now exist independently. Thus, the essays by Viacheslav P'etsukh and Anri Volokhonskii can serve as polar examples of "subjective" and "objective" perception of the route around one's room.

The text of the writer and publicist Viacheslav P'etsukh, who was popular during the years of Gorbachev's Perestroika, can be viewed as a journey to the 1990's. By inviting the reader for a walk through his one-room apartment located under the roof of a skyscraper in the distant Moscow outskirts, the author opens the door to his private life for us. Viacheslav P'etsukh calls the last decade of the 20th century "the outrage of evil times." He presents the events of that contradictory time in the style of "pure existence," supplying his fellow traveller-reader with a myriad of deeply intimate experiences, while managing to abundantly quote his own works of art from different years.

In the very first lines of his essay, puzzled by the question "Why do people travel?" P'etsukh answers directly: "It seems to me that the universal human passion for travel is from a lack of mental strength."[17] And he continues

[15] Hesse, H. (1995). *A walk in the room.* Collection in 8 vols., M., AST, vol. 6, p. 331.

[16] Ibid, p. 332.

[17] P'etsukh, V. *Traveling around my room*. October, 2004, 10, p. 38.

to substantiate his thought: "It's a completely different matter when you travel around your room. The travelling clothes is the most ordinary: a chintz robe sewn by his ex-wife in the manner of a Japanese kimono; there are no drips from above, no drafts, the air temperature is favourable, about 20 °C, even in the dead of winter; safety everywhere; well, except that a stray plane will demolish your twenty-second floor, which seems unlikely, if you take into account the maximum distance from all the airfields near Moscow. The means of transportation are extremely reliable, there are only two transfers, namely from the sofa to legs and from legs to the sofa, where you can lie down so deftly that it seems as if you are soaring above your bed from an excess of mental strength; food is regular and of high quality... Finally, you do not depend on anyone, and nothing can poison your journeys: neither Islamists, nor rogue tour operators, nor transport workers' strikes, nor stomach cramps."[18] Thus, our voyager full of mental strength plunges into the depths of his memory.

The journey of Viacheslav P'etsukh is made in the genre of memoirs. Interior items and imagination now and then carry the author to distant countries, in which he himself has never been, however, the main theme of his wanderings is his own personality in the interior of the Russian perestroika. The text of "Traveling in My Room" is interesting not so much because it is a kind of exhibitionistic act of its author, but because it is the most important document of the era. "Maybe a Russian cultural person is only able to take care of the good of the fatherland and believe in a better future only because he hates the unscrupulous, drunken, corrupt, shameless and unprincipled Russia, but for the most part he hates that it is not what he sees in dreams, but such as it is. In any case, the smartest Russian people did not love their fatherland, from Pushkin to Academician Pavlov, and we all know how Lenin hated it, not to mention Peter the Great. For me, all these attitudes are disproportionately strong, even too much. It is not that I adored Russia (although I adore it unconsciously), not that I did not love it (although I certainly do not love it). I am rather afraid of it."[19]

I believe that nothing else can tune a person to self-reflection and self-understanding so correctly as travelling. It is not for nothing that sometimes unfamiliar travel companions, in a few hours of conversations with random interlocutors, learn about themselves as much as they would not have revealed during any confession or interrogation. Travel notes are the most entelechic literary genre.

Anri Volokhonskii's essay "Some pictures from my room" completes the recent book by this author titled "Memories of the Long Forgotten." Anri Volokhonskii is an iconic figure of the Russian underground of the 1950's-70's, "a Leningrad-Israeli-German poet at different stages of his life" (Danila Davydov). His text is completely devoid of existential, emotional and spiritual dimensions. Volokhonskii's story is akin to a home game. On the table there are picture cards laid out in such a way that you can get a solid impression of the life in a foreign land of an emigrant at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. One has only to pick up one of the cards that make up this mosaic, turn it over, and you will read important information about this piece of furniture and the cultural context in which it is immersed, and, probably, you will also hear a historical anecdote or an amusing story from the era in which this or that little thing from the everyday environment of the author appeared, diligently avoiding even a hint of his own, private, intimate being: "At the end of the rack there is a brass crucifix in the shape of a diamond with holes drilled in the corners for attachment to the grave cross. In 1972, I was walking around the city of Vladimir one summer and I met a boy of about eight years old, who frantically rubbed this crucifix with chalk, trying to clean off the patina. "Be careful, or you'll spoil it," I said, and proceeded on my way. After some time, the boy caught up with me and gave it to me. Below there was a plate with a blue bird. We thought it was a dodo bird. I have a lot of drawings of the dodo: an engraving from the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary, a postcard with a famous painting by Savery, a vivid image in the

[18] Ibid, p. 38.

[19] Ibid, p. 47.

bestiary of Aloys Zötl, two photos – side-face and full-face – of a dodo model made of brownish fluff of an ostrich that was exhibited in a local pharmacy. I consider the dodo to be the heraldic bird of the Russian intelligentsia, so I collect images on occasion. But it was not a dodo on the plate, it was a phoenix."[20]

What a wonderful metaphor for the final chapter of the book of memoirs of a Russian intellectual, isn't it? In the place of the dodo, an extinct flightless, non-swimming and poorly running bird symbolizing extinction, to accidentally discover a symbol of eternal renewal – the mythical phoenix that, foreseeing death, burns itself, and then returns to life from the ashes...

Journey as an experience of acquiring identity

A classic journey through one's own room in search of finding oneself and clarifying the entelechy of one's existence is, in my opinion, the book by Joseph Brodsky "A Room and a Half" (1985).[21] This is a multidimensional human document in the genre of a philosophical essay, touching upon the realities of Soviet Russia in the 1950's and 1980's.

The text of "Room and a half" was written by Brodsky in English during his emigration to the United States. The centre of the story is the fate of the poet himself through the prism of the life of his parents.[22] In the summer of 1972, Joseph Brodsky was forced to emigrate to the United States. The possibility of even a short-term return to the USSR was forever excluded. Since then he had never seen his mother, Maria M. Volpert, and father, Alexander I. Brodsky, who applied for permission to see their son twelve times in twelve years of solitude. Congressmen and prominent cultural figures of the United States made the same request to the government of the USSR, but even after Brodsky underwent open-heart surgery in 1978 and needed care, his parents were denied an exit visa. Brodsky's mother died in 1983, a little over a year later, his father died. Both times Brodsky was not allowed to come to the funeral.

"Those who are poor are ready to recycle everything. I am utilizing the feeling of guilt," – with this confession Joseph Brodsky begins his book, written at the intersection of memoir and utopian genres. "Now that they [parents – Iu.S.] have died, I see their life as, as it was before, and before she included me. Also, I think, they might remember me. If, of course, now they do not have the gift of omniscience and watch me sitting in the kitchen in the apartment, I rented for the college, writing these lines in the language, which they do not know, although, for that matter, now they must be all-lingual. This is the only opportunity for them to see me and America. This is the only way for me to see them and our room."[23]

"Room and a Half" is a conversation between Joseph Brodsky and himself, a journey into the depths of himself, an attempt to catch up with himself and understand himself who has departed, a search for self-identification, and finally, a self-portrait of one of the heroes of the 20th century, whose personal experience was typical for many of his compatriots and contemporaries.

Reflecting on the path of his life, Joseph Brodsky returns to childhood, at a time when a child strives for adulthood and independent existence, longs to escape from home – his cramped nest – out into the vast world, in real life. In due time, this wish comes true and the young man, conquered by new perspectives, starts building his own nest, his own reality. But when the new reality is studied, independence is realized, it suddenly turns out that the old nest has disappeared, and those who gave

[20] Volokhonskii, A. (2007). *Memories of the Long Forgotten*. M., New Literary Review, p. 109.

[21] In 2008, based on Joseph Brodsky's book "Room and a Half", a feature film "Room and a half, or a Sentimental Journey to the Homeland" was shot (directed by Andrei Khrzhanovskii, scriptwriters – Andrei Khrzhanovsky and Yuri Arabov). In May 2015, the municipality of St. Petersburg officially announced the opening of a museum-apartment of Joseph Brodsky in the Muzuri apartment building (24 Liteiny Prospekt, apt. 28), created on the basis of one and a half rooms that the Brodsky family had occupied there since 1955, and from where the poet forever left Russia in 1972 for forced emigration.

[22] In addition to the essay "Room and a Half", Brodsky dedicated the book "Part of Speech" to his parents, the poems "The thought of you removed, as a servant demoted..." and "In Memory of Father: Australia."

[23] Brodsky, J. (1995). *Room and a Half*. New world, 2, p. 55.

him life have died. And then comes the realization of oneself as deprived of the cause and effect. "If once there was something real in life, it was the nest, cramped and stuffy, from which he wanted to escape so bad. For the nest was built by others, those who gave him life, and not by himself knowing all too well the true value of his own labour and using, in essence, only the life given to him... After all, with all his skills, a person will never be able to recreate the primitive, sturdy nest that heard his first cry of life. And he will not be able to recreate those who put him there. As a consequence, he cannot restore his cause."[24]

Brodsky knew that his fate worried his parents; they suffered, but they always supported him as best as they could, because he was their child. "Subsequently, when I managed to print something here and there, they were flattered and sometimes even proud of me, but I know that if I were an ordinary graphomaniac and a failure, their attitude towards me would be exactly the same. They loved me more than themselves, and most likely would not understand my feeling of guilt towards them..."[25] (Brodsky, 1995: 95).

Reflecting on the phenomenon of a room in a communal apartment as a limited area in which his young years passed, Brodsky notes that, oddly enough, the compression of space is always clearer and better organized than the open space. "For confined spaces there are more names: a cell, a closet, a grave. There is only a broad gesture for the vastness."[26]

In the USSR, the minimum living space was 5 square meters per person. With all the unsightly aspects of this form of living, the communal apartment, according to Brodsky, had one important metaphysical feature. It uncovered the very foundations of existence: destroyed any illusion about human nature. "What barbs or medical and culinary advice, what confidential information about products that suddenly appeared in one of the stores, are exchanged in the evenings in the communal kitchen by the wives preparing food! It is here where you learn the basics of life – with half an ear, out of the corner of your eye. What quiet dramas open up when someone suddenly stops talking to someone! What a school of facial expressions this is! What an abyss of feelings a frozen, offended spine or an icy profile can express! What smells, odours and fragrances float in the air around a hundred-watt yellow tear hanging from a tousled braid of an electric cord! There is something tribal about this dimly lit cave, something primordially evolutionary, if you will; and pots and pans hang over gas stoves like tom-tom drums."[27]

Brodsky also emphasizes another important feature of the organization of space in Russia. In our country, it is more difficult to come to terms with breaking bonds than anywhere else. "Russians are much more sedentary people than other inhabitants of the continent, who move much more often, if only because they have cars and have no reason to take borders seriously. For us, an apartment is practically a life-long haven, a city – for life, a country – for life."[28] Consequently, the idea of constancy, a small motherland, attachment to a place in domestic culture is deeper, just as the feeling of their loss is more tragic and irreparable.

A mental return to Leningrad, in the Russian years of his life, brings Brodsky to the main question of his book, which arises before everyone whose fate is the route of finding themselves, finding the meaning of their existence as a series of attempts to surpass their current self: when and where does the transition from freedom to slavery, and from slavery to freedom acquire the status of inevitability? When does the choice of freedom become acceptable to a layman? For what age does the substitution of a free state become most painless? The poet leaves the answer to these questions open, but these questions themselves are by no means rhetorical for Brodsky: "A revolutionary or a conqueror should at least know the correct answer. Genghis Khan, for example, knew it. He simply killed anyone whose head rose above the hub of a cart wheel."[29]

[24] Ibid, p. 94.
[25] Ibid, p. 95.
[26] Ibid, p. 50.
[27] Ibid, p. 55.
[28] Ibid, p. 96.
[29] Ibid, p. 101.

***

For me, the genre of an existential journey through one's own room is an experience of philosophical self-reflection and self-identity. These literary journeys are not akin to historical memoirs, they do not defy death and do not represent an escape from oblivion. Memory is inevitably selective, which makes it indistinguishable from forgetting, non-being. Memory flaws, like the findings of the imagination, distort reality. The shorter the memory, the longer the life, the proverb says. Otherwise, the longer the future, the shorter the memory. Traveling around your own room is not a memory, but a living, effective entelechy process that implements the likelihood of self-embodiment, the purpose of which is to find yourself.

The entelechy journey is an event of individualization of the general. It is the embodiment of physical or spiritual matter into the reality of appearance and form through an existential experiment. In other words, a metaphysical journey is the identification of a common property, principle, paradigm from the bustle of everyday life, the realization of the potential.

It is also important to note that a mental journey through inner space is transcendental to the space-time continuum. A narrator himself finds himself on the other side of the spatial and temporal dimension of his path, observing it as if "from a distance."[30]. Obviously, like an ordinary journey, a mental journey always takes place with reference to a certain point in space, be it a natural landscape, a closed space of your own room, a myth, a dream or the virtual world. Each moment of the journey corresponds to one specific point of space included in the route (it does not matter real, virtual or imaginary). In this case, the time coordinate turns out to be additional, and, sometimes, unnecessary. A metaphysical journey can take place at any time: before, during and after the actual journey itself.

The implementation of an entelechy journey presupposes two defining vectors of movement – "up": to abstraction from everyday events and stereotypes of behaviour, to generalization of practice in ideas, concepts and images, and "down": to everyday life activity. The defining feature of the trajectory of reflection-journey is its fundamental openness – the infinity of the horizon, the absence of a fixed "arrival" point in the route.

[30] See: Dunne, J. (2000). *An Experiment with Time*. M., Agraf.

References

Aristotle (1976). *O dushe* [*On the Soul*]. Collection in 4 vols., Moscow, Mysl', 1. p. 394.

Brodsky, J. (1995). Poltory komnaty [A Room and a Half]. In *Novyi mir* [*New World*], (2), p. 55.

Camus, A. (1989). *Postoronnii* [*The Stranger*]. Moscow, Prometheus, p. 71.

Dunne, J. (2000). *Eksperiment so vremenem* [*An Experiment with Time*]. Moscow, Agraf.

Eliade, M. (2010). *Aspekty mifa* [*Aspects of myth*]. Moscow, Academic project, p. 84.

Hesse, H. (1995). *Progulka po komnate* [*A Walk in the Room*]. Collection in 8 vols., Moscow, AST, 6, p. 331.

Knabe, G.S. (1994). *Entelekhiia kul'tury. Materialy k lektsiiam po obshchei teorii kul'tury i kul'ture antichnogo Rima* [*The entelechy of culture. Materials for lectures on the general theory of culture and culture of ancient Rome*]. Moscow, Indrik, p. 141.

Leibniz, G.W. (1982). *Monadologiia* [*Monadology*]. Collection in four volumes: 1, Ed. and comp. by V.V. Sokolov. Moscow. Mysl', p. 416.

Maugham, S. (1990). Gonolulu [Honolulu]. In *Katalina: rasskazy* [*Catalina: Stories*]. Kiev, Politizdat of Ukraine, p. 44.

Nietzsche, F. (2007). Pis'ma [Letters]. Moscow. In *Kul'turnaia revoliutsiia* [*Cultural Revolution*], p. 217.

P'etsukh, V. (2004). Puteshestvie po moei komnate [Traveling around my room]. In *Oktiabr'* [*October*], (10), p. 38.

Robbe-Grillet, A. (1999). *V labirinte* [*In the labyrinth*]. SPb. Azbuka.

Schönle, A. (2004). *Podlinnost' i vymysel v avtorskom samosoznanii russkoi literatury puteshestvii 1790-1840* [*Authenticity and fiction in the author's self-awareness of Russian travel literature of the 1790-1840's*]. SPb. Academic project, p. 105.

Xavier de Maistre (1984). *Voyage autour de ma chambre*, Edition Jose Corti, p. 82.

Volokhonskii, A. (2007). Vospominaniia o davno pozabytom [Memories of the long forgotten]. Moscow. In *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* [*New Literary Review*], p. 109.

Путешествие как философский проект

Ю.В. Синеокая
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. Опираясь на литературные и философские тексты, описывающие путешествия по собственной комнате Ксавьера де Местра, Альбера Камю, Германа Гессе, Иосифа Бродского и др., автор рассказывает об энтелехии путешествия как опыте самоидентификации, об архетипе путешествия как сакральном бесконечно повторяющемся вне времени возвращении к себе. Путешествие рассматривается как опыт личной свободы странника, движение в пространстве культуры: памяти, мифа. Путешествие выступает своего рода паломничеством: человек отправляется в путь в поисках тех моментов, когда он может выйти за пределы своей личности, реализовать свой потенциал, преобразуя себя в иное, более истинное и свободное самосознание. Статья посвящена мыслительному путешествию, представленному как эксперимент по обретению человеком смысла жизни, как опыт философской саморефлексии и обретения тождества с собой. Экзистенциальное путешествие по внутреннему интеллигибельному пространству является одновременно и опытом персонификации истории, и попыткой самоидентификации.

Ключевые слова: экзистенциализм, самоидентификация, архетипы внутреннего пространства, энтелехия, путешествие по собственной комнате.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1398–1404

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0650
УДК 1(091)

Rational Theology in Polemic Strategies of Early Christian Apologues

Roman V. Svetlov[a] and Dmitry V. Shmonin[a,b,c*]
[a]*Institute of Human Philosophy*
Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia
St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
[b]*Saints Cyril and Methodius Institute for Postgraduate Studies*
Moscow, Russian Federation
[c]*UNESCO Chair on theory of education*
Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia
St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Received 06.07.2020, received in revised form 05.08.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. The texts of early Christian apologists are an example of a clear argumentative reaction to a number of external and internal challenges. The internal ones included changes in the size and structure of the community, increased heterodoxia, and a decrease in eschatological moods. Among the external – on the one hand, the growth of hostility and systematic persecution on the part of Rome, on the other, the specific atmosphere of the "age of the Antonines", age of imperators who practiced, at least formally, a policy of mercy. All this stimulated the development of rhetoric in Christian literature, the formation of the genre of Christian apology, as well as specific apologetic strategies, in which early Christian rational theology was reflected. Its most important element was the formation of ideas about a righteous life as the root condition of philosophical wisdom. It is this approach that helps, for example, Justin Martyr find a way to convert ancient wisdom into a rational-theological toolkit of apologetics.

Keywords: Socrates, Justin the Martyr, rational theology, cultural conflict in the Roman Empire.

The reported study was funded by RFBR according to the research project no. 18-00-00727 (18-00-00628).

Research area: theology; history of philosophy.

Citation: Svetlov, R.V., Shmonin, D.V. (2020). Rational theology in polemic strategies of early Christian apologues. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1398–1404. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0650.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: spatha@mail.ru, dmitry.shmonin@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000–0001–7767–1441 (Svetlov); 0000–0002–5396–0027 (Shmonin)

The teachings of rational theology (theologia rationalis) were commonly thought to be developed when rational procedures were applied to simple, basic truths (revelabile). In Christian scholastics such a layer of rational-religious knowledge was known as natural or philosophical theology. However, the term ration theology was also applied to truths, given in Revelation (revelatum), which did not apply to the mystical experiences of divine communion in Christian life but described how mysticism takes root in theology.

Currently, rational theology is being talked about as the correct descriptor for systems of religious teaching in traditional Christian confessions, from their origins and to church-confessional specifics (Shmonin, 2019). In some way, one can even speak about the origins of rational theology in ancient religious mindsets. Using this understanding of rational theology, one can also talk about Jewish and Islamic theology; pursuing these possibilities they should be used correctly in the context of united worldviews in modern theological science. Religious teaching about law and rights in Judaism and Islam contain similar to Christianity Abrahamic roots, wherein are contained the stories about the divine creation of the world, man, eternal values and non-theological knowledge – including those in the organized three dimensional space of scientific rationality.

At the injunction of the middle ages and modern times, within the tenants of classical science, the term "theologia rationalis" received new connotations (Vdovina, 2007). Francisco Suárez, for example perceives rational theology as an attempt to view God through the mind's eye and the world created by him, not only in the basic interpretation but also in the moral-ethical one. In short, that is precisely the difference between rational theology and metaphysics: they align on topics but theology has a higher goal and while metaphysics might carry only a theoretical character, theology exists in the realms of both the practical and the mind's eye. Both dimensions are important to Christianity, although practical theology in catholic tradition often ends up beyond the framework of knowledge and education.

We have already examined the topic of rational theology with several historical examples. From a historical perspective, discussions, which attempt to "rationalize" religious truths, adapting them to the realities and arguments that prevail in education, science and consciousness of the time period, are particularly prevalent in three separate situations. We will remark here that these situations vary by their cause as well as their consequences.

The first – the altering of the intellectual horizon, making it no longer conform to the traditional religions world view (Svetlov, 2019). The second – an encounter with a radically different religious tradition (Svetlov, 2020). And the third – the birth of a fundamentally different religious truth, as it occurred in the case of Christianity. This is precisely the scenario that we wish to examine in the following paper.

We shall remark first that rational theology among apologues of the II and III centuries was not an intellectual goal in of itself. Everything was a lot more serious, since its formation was directly tied to the fate the Christian community. In the following paper we aim exactly to study this, 'functional' side of the problem.

Let us begin with a rather weighty topic. The project of Philo of Alexandria had the goal of translating the philosophical language of the Hellenistic period and the language of the Revelation of Old Testament. A translation which have placed the history of Israel into the universality of the Hellenistic history but did not end up achieving the author's desired results. The roman-jewish conflicts of the I and II centuries have ended any attempts at such syncretic interpretations of the Old Testament in the context of Judaism and have led to a negative reception of the Septuagint in Jewish culture. Some Christian authors, especially from the Alexandria, took positively to the ideas expressed in Philo's project, but ended up interpreting it through their own views. Philo was important for them because he was propped up as an example that one could talk about the scriptures not only in the norms of tradition but also in the norms of "scientific" thought, which at the time, was mainly found in ancient philosophy.

Why did the apologues need these norms? We believe, that the need for them can be explained by the various obstacles that Christian communities have encountered during the earliest periods of its history. This multifaceted situation must be taken into account if we are to talk about how Christianity transforms from "barbaric wisdom" (Tatianus), that was put in opposition to the Hellenic teachings to "true philosophy" (Clement of Alexandria), that claims that it has embraced everything good that was created since the times of Moses and transcends "both the Hebrew and the Hellenic".

The challenges were connected to the outer historical, political and cultural circumstances, as well as the inner histories of early Christian communities that had gone through a whole host of upheavals. Let us try to characterize them.

The most important upheavals occurred naturally within the church itself. The pertain to the growth of its membership, exceeding the Hebrew and Hellenic "heterotoxy", the refusal to compromise with "faith of the parents", along with attempts to centralize various Judeo-Christian movements and, in some cases, attempts to fully separate from the Old Testament (of Marcion). Proselytization of the Christian dogma, with all its benefits, could also lead to the watering down of New Testament Christian dogma.

The second important factor was the lessening of eschatological expectation in Christian communities in the II century. The logic is obvious – waiting for the inevitable and soon-to-come end of the world makes a religious community quite desensitized to anything happening in the world around it. It can swing either to radical piety, concerned only with the greatest possible sainthood of its members or to calls to radically remake society, which would otherwise be left without hope for salvation. Either options will put a religious community in conflict with its surrounding (for this reason, modern religious studies dub such communities "dualistic" – not so much because of what is contained in their teachings but because of complete rejection of anything that is outside of the community). In the II century we can see a whole host of attempts to create such dualistic groups within the confines of Christianity – from sects of gnostic interpretation to Montanism. We understand how much the contents of gnostic gospels and concept of Montan (who we know very little about) differed from each other, however, one and the other both cut Christendom from its surrounding culture, the social and political realities, foremost due to their high eschatology.

The criticism of actually knowing when the end of the world will arrive was already a contentious religious topic. But even without it, the degree of eschatologicality was decreasing (but it should be noted that during the middle ages there would be waves of anticipation of the Second Advent – especially during societal or natural calamities). And this means that the church needs to define the goals of its societal programs and have a clear understanding of what the Scriptures say about them.

The third factor – heterodoxy, which arose within communities that called themselves Christian at the very beginning of their history. If a generation of apostles was chiefly concerned with movements such as the so called nicolaism, then already by the end of the I century, the amount of "Gnostic" sects was rapidly increasing. Without delving into the question about how much one can talk about gnosticism as a conceptually whole phenomenon, we will nevertheless draw attention to the fact that early Christian texts contained a lot of metaphors that resembled that of gnosticism. It is enough to read "Haermae Pastor", to see the allegorical forms in need of specialized "knowing" interpreting. The border with Gnostic apocalypse seems rather thin and while the author of "Haermae Pastor" does not cross it, it is obvious that early Christians viewed themselves not just as keepers of new knowledge but also those living on the edge between this world and the realm of God. Gnosticism exploited these perception, adding to the norms prescribed in the New Testament, the prelude of genesis (the "Gnostic myth"), as well as an expended sum of esoteric knowledge about Pleroma (true reality) and ways of achieving it (through a special intellectual and ritualistic communion). This "esoteric" variant of Christianity was, without question, adogmatic and adoctrinal. Added to

this was the fact that every community had its own procedures for obtaining gnosis, which caused a great amount of headache for future Christian Heresiologists when they tried to describe gnostic views.

For brevity we will skip a part of questions, which also were of concern to Christian communities (for example, the date of Easter) and let us transition to outer circumstances, which required the apologues to react.

The growth of the Christian community naturally provoked concerns from the roman government. If the story about the conversation between Domitian and the descendants of the family of Jesus Christ could be a late fiction (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. III, 20), the emperor Trajan was obvious set to implement harsher limiting measures towards Christianity and during his rule we can see attempts to formulate arguments to depropogandize then leaders of Christian communities (Plin. Ep. Tra. X.96. 2-3). A contentious situation arises. On one end, Christianity does not participate in a battle against the Roman government – compared to Judaism – but is unable to find its own place in the structure of the Roman government, a problem that carried a fundamental character. It pertains not only to the distrusts of the pagans to this new knowledge but also the refusal of Christians to cooperate with the government on various important topics: religious burials, which would have shown their loyalty to the ruling class, as well as take an oath to the emperor as one's lord and (in the case of soldiers).

Because of this, the dynasty of Antonine, which had been in power for almost the entirety of the II century, a dynasty which espoused the tenants of mercy (Misericordia, Clementia) that had once been a pragmatic part of Cesar's politics (Ahiev, 2002) and later sung by Seneca as one of the chief goods of ruler (Sen. De Clem. I. 11. 4), continued to pursue Christians, while notably distinguishing between them and Judaists. However, the prestige of carrying the titles of "philosopher kings", which was more or less consciously supported by a part of Antonines, created the possibility of having a polemic conversation with them. After all, the most respected philosopher at the time, Socrates, has claimed that the greatest measure of wisdom is the ability to have a conversation. But, naturally, to have a conversation with the emperor himself one needs a truly extraordinary situation. Such has been court, which in principle, allowed for various mediations. From the descriptions of court procedures from early Christian sources we can see that they often employed methods of early ancient rhetoric, both in word and in gesture (Panteleev, 2018).

Another example of this rhetoric became "Apologues", which were created by early Christian writers. Similar to the earliest court defense – the defense of Socrates in 399 BCE, apologues demonstrate their philosophical education and cultural prowess, putting themselves as equals to ancient "martyrs" of philosophy. The famous pallium ("tribon") of Justin Martyr was a symbol of this – the closeness in spirit to the wise men of the past who suffered at the hands of corrupt governments and unenlightened mobs.

The typology of Christian apologues, ways of argumentation, that were used there – that is a separate question, that has been studied by researchers more than once (Vdovichenko, 2000: 24-38). It is clear, that the subjects of several of apologues could likely not know about their existence (especially when talking about the very heights of power – Hadrianus, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius). Christianity at the time was viewed by the ruling class, to use modern terms, a totalitarian sect and its texts were not given any polemical or theoretical importance (we can even see this type of attitude towards Christianity from followers of Neoplatonism of the Athenian school, who lived in the age Christian dominance). Because of this, the ability to communicate with the ruling class of the Antonines with their specific propaganda and ideology, was naturally, very indirect but still happened as part of that Zeitgeist.

In the end, however, it seems that the true receiver of the apologues would be the Christian communities themselves – already mature enough to receive philosophical arguments and be swayed historical precedents. An indirect proof of this is the polemic writings against the jews of the II centuries – "Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus" (Ariston of Pella) and "Dialogue with Trypho" (Justin). They were obvious-

ly written for the wider christian community, many of which could be swayed toward Judeo-Christianity or outright Judaism (especially during a time in which judais, while severely restricted, still had a legal place within the Roman empire, while Christianity remained in limbo). The apologues were also targeted at pagans, becoming a way to deliver information about the most important moments of Christian doctrine, giving further validation to the truthfulness of the new faith.

Polemic battles against the enemies of Christianity led to the creation of the Christian holy speech, which did not match that of the Scriptures but was also not a repeat of the language of ancient philosophy and science, which were normally used by Christian writers (Edwards 1999). We should remark, that some of them (Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origen) have directly led to the formation and development of Christian educational institutions "didascalias" (in Rome and Alexandria). "Stromata" of Clement of Alexandria and "De principiis" of Origen have shown, the breadth of topics, that was studied there, as well as philosophical concepts, which transferred from Platonism and Stoicism but changed their tone and roles among Christian authors (Drog, 1987; Young, 1989).

While arguing with pagans and Judaists, the apologues began dictating the normative side of Christian doctrine, which created the conditions for battling heterodoxy and developing the criteria for what, from then on, will be known as heresy. The slow dim of eschatological expectations was expressed by the apologues stimulation of the formation of a system of arguments through which the wider roman society could be evangelized. As such, early Christian apologian literature became the narrative that became vital to constructing the united church – both in social as well as discursive levels, since the adaptation of discursive norms leads to the adaptation of social responsibilities. Rational theology played a huge role in consolidating the Church and forming its political and social strategies. And the reaction of the original apologues to the upheavals, from a historical point of view, can be deemed a successful one.

To confirm our thesis on Apologues not being a replication of Hellenic philosophy, but rather connected to an entirely different religious system and, because of this, a whole other form of discourse, we shall provide just one example.

The Apologies of Justin were the first examples where philosophical terminology was used in order to solve theological problems as [art of studying the nature of God. The differences between the positions of the philosopher and the preacher are elucidated in the already mentioned "Dialogue with Trypho", where discussions about how philosophers could speak and thing correctly about god, if they have no practical knowledge of him, ends with the thought that philosophical knowledge needs to be supplemented by knowledge of the prophets, who "only spoke that, which they saw and heard, while being vessels for the Holy Spirit". To the rational philosopher will be opened additional opportunities through theological rationality. These opportunities are given to a man in response to his faith, since rational theology can't exist without revelations, without the "prayer, that opens the pathway to light": for "such things are incomprehensible to all if God and Christ do not enlighten".

Justin the Martyr looked at Socrates (as well as Heracles) in precisely this context, as a "Christian before Christ" (Apol. I. 46) (Franek, 2016). In the opinion of the Christian apologue, Socrates was righteous (lived in accordance to logos), because precisely such a life coincides with wisdom. As Hebrew prophets were often maligned, so was Socrates at the hands of corrupt governments. To Justin Logos, which Socrates "partially glimpsed", is Jesus Christ himself (Apol. II. 10). Naturally, "historical" Socrates (the Socrates from the texts of Plato and Xenophon) talks about logos in a different meaning. For him it is a way of thinking, which allows someone to be freed from the "power of opinions" and to build their life by applying "second navigation" – using grasped values and meanings, critically analyzing everything. For an apologue, the rational side of the Logos is important but far more important is the understanding of Logos as a divine personality, which has been guiding people even before its

coming into the world. Because of this, for Justin a life lived with Logos means a life lived in accordance to moral codes, proclaimed in the Sermon on the Mount but also known to wise men of the past. In the view of Justin, philosophical knowledge needs to be supported by the knowledge of prophets. When this condition is fulfilled, only then does philosophy can become an effective instrument in the hands of a preacher. "The people that are truly virtuous and wise need to love and respect only the truth…" (Apol. I. 2) – he writes, and then provides the thoughts of Plato, that if rulers ceased to engage in philosophy, there will not be prosperity in their states (Pl. Resp. 473 d-e).

In this context, Justin simultaneously agrees with the Socrato-Platonic thesis, that "virtue is knowledge". But also understands it differently: Socrates "historically" achieves knowledge by himself (references to daimonion or the prophetess Diotima can be understood as metaphors for rational discourse), and this achievement because the pretense for his virtue (let us recall the famous Cicero's anecdote about the physiognomist Zopir, where Socrates says that philosophy has reeducated him – Cic. Tusc. IV, 37 (80)). The Socrates of Justin lives in accordance to the Logos of Revelation, and agreement is the logical pretense to virtue and wisdom. While Justin does not say when exactly Socrates converts but for him this conversion does not have a rational character, instead a spiritual one.

This is precisely the interpretation of Socrates (whit which some apologues disagreed with – ex. Tatianus "Oratio ad graecos") that lets Justin's convert ancient wisdom into rational-theological instruments of the apologues. This effort of Justin is supported by the thinkers of Alexandria who found themselves in a peculiar cultural situation within their city – the most important cultural center of the Hellenic epoch. This is why Alexandria can probably be viewed as the place where the matured form of Christian rational theology was developed but that is another topic.

References

Edwards, M.J. (1999). Justin's Logos and Word of God. In *Christianity in relation to Jews, Greeks, and Romans*. New York: Garland Publishing. P. 85-104.

Drog, A.J. (1987). Justin Martyr and the Restoration of Philosophy. In *Church History*, 56, 3 (Sep., 1987), 303-319.

Franek, J. (2016). Omnibus Omnia: The Reception of Socrates in Ante-Nicene Christian Literature. In *Graeco-Latina Brunensia*, 21, (1), 31-58.

Young, M.O. (1989). Justin, Socrates and the Middle-Platonists. In *Studia Patristica*, 18(2), 161–166.

Ahiev, S.N. (2002). Clementia Caesaris: sushchnost, prichiny, tseli [Clementia Caesaris: essence, reasons, goals]. In *Ancient world and archeology*, 11, 71-80.

Panteleev, A.D. (2018). "Muchenichestvo Apolloniya": ritoricheskiye strategii khristianina i sudi [The Martyrdom of Apollonius: the Christian's and the Judge's rhetorical strategies]. In *Mnemon,* 18, 2, 201-214.

Shmonin, D.V. (2019). Nauchnaya ratsionalnost i "vozvrashcheniye k teologii" [Scientific rationality and "reduction to the theology"]. In *Issues of Theology*, 1, 3, 280-306.

Svetlov, R.V. (2020). Ratsionalnaya teologiya: kazus Filona Aleksandriyskogo [Rational Theology: the case of Philo of Alexandria]. In *Issues of Theology*, 2, 1, 65-74.

Svetlov, R.V. (2019). Ratsionalnaya teologiya v antichnosti [Rational theology in antiquity]. In *Proceedings of the Department of Theology of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy*, 1 (3), 7-16.

Vdovichenko A. V. (2000) Khristianskaya apologiya. Kratkiy obzor traditsii [Christian apology. Tradition at a glance] In*: Early Christian apologists of the 2nd-4th centuries*. Moscow, P. 5-38.

Vdovina G. V. (2007) Estestvennaya teologiya v skholastike srednevekovia i rannego novogo vremeni [Natural Theology in Medieval and Early Modern Scholasticism]. In: *Philosophy of Religion. Almanac*. 2006-2007, P. 300-311.

Рациональная теология в полемических стратегиях раннехристианских апологетов

Р.В. Светлов[а], Д.В. Шмонин[а,б,в]
[а]Институт философии человека
Российский государственный педагогический
университет им. А.И. Герцена
Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург
[б]Общецерковная аспирантура и докторантура
имени святых равноапостольных Кирилла и Мефодия
Российская Федерация, Москва
[в]Кафедра ЮНЕСКО «Образование в поликультурном обществе»
Российский государственный педагогический
университет им. А.И. Герцена
Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург

Аннотация. Творчество раннехристианских апологетов представляет собой пример четкой реакции на целый ряд внешних и внутренних вызовов. К числу внутренних относилось изменение численности и структуры общины, усиление гетеродоксии, снижение эсхатологических настроений. К числу внешних – с одной стороны, рост враждебности и систематического преследования Рима, с другой – особая атмосфера «века Антонинов», практиковавших хотя бы формально политику милосердия. Все перечисленное стимулировало развитие риторики в христианской литературе, формирование жанра христианской апологии, а также специфических апологетических стратегий, в которых получила отражение раннехристианская рациональная теология. Важнейшим ее элементом стало формирование представлений о жизни праведной как корневом условии философской мудрости. Именно такой подход помогает, например, Иустину найти способ конвертации античной мудрости в рационально-теологический инструментарий апологетики.

Ключевые слова: Сократ, Иустин Мученик, рациональная теология, культурный конфликт в Римской империи.

Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ в рамках научного проекта № 18–00–00727 (18–00–00628).

Научные специальности: 26.00.00 – теология; 09.00.03 – история философии.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1405–1415

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0651
УДК 1’17; 1’1(091)

Foundations of a Philosophical Theory of Exceptions: A Historical Perspective

Alexey G. Zhavoronkov*
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russian Federation

Received 02.04.2020, received in revised form 27.07.2020, accepted 10.08.2020

Abstract. The article presents the largely neglected ‘alternative’ history of the philosophical notion of exception, from Ancient Rome till the late 19th century, illustrated by Cicero, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. While arguing against the common narrow view on exceptions as a political concept (following Carl Schmitt and others), the analysis lays out the much-needed historical foundation for a potential broad theory of exception, still notoriously absent in modern practical philosophy. The main goal is to demonstrate that in the history of philosophy the discussion concerning exceptions was not limited to philosophy of law, encompassing many other fields like epistemology, ethics, anthropology, social and political philosophy.

Keywords: exception, practical philosophy, history of philosophy, Cicero, Leibniz, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche.

Research area: philosophy.

Citation: Zhavoronkov, A.G. (2020). Foundations of a philosophical theory of exceptions: a historical perspective. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1405–1415. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0651.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: outdoors@yandex.ru
ORCID: 0000–0001–8362–1782

1. A philosophical theory of exceptions?

Exceptions, along with norms, are an integral part of our everyday life. Any new knowledge which contradicts one's accustomed order of things, any non-typical situation, decision and action can be (in a broad sense) defined as exceptions. While exceptions can lead to confusion and at times to some dangerous decisions, they also help us to question our established ideas and worldview, thus leading to important insights and developments.[1] Recent events during the pandemic of COVID-19 have once more shown us on a global scale that exceptional situations and decisions are a crucial part of our reality and understanding of the world. Still, somewhat surprisingly, modern philosophy is reluctant in dealing with this topic on a systematic basis, even though we can find some attempts in separate areas which have some history of dealing with the concept of exception, for instance in ethics[2] and in philosophy of law. A coherent theory of exceptions which would neither confine itself to political agenda nor play a subservient role in the ongoing battle between different normative theories is still not in sight. In what follows, I will present some general thoughts concerning this potential theory of exception and its historical foundations.

In order to recognise a person, a case or an action as an exception, i.e. to understand that at least some part of it lies outside the norm, we have to compare the new information with the one already known to us. In the course of history, this process of comparison has gradually become more complex as the evolution of the means of communication has made new knowledge more accessible. In the modern digital era, which can rightly be called the age of comparison, this process is both simpler, because of the accessibility of information, and more complex, given the amount of knowledge available to us. Exceptions show similarities to earlier cases (in this respect, they are not completely foreign or opaque) without being fully identical to them.

Generally speaking, the term 'exception' can either relate to 'exceptional' people who make decisions and take actions or, more directly, to exceptional situations, decisions or actions. In the first case, the discussion about exceptions is often limited to political topics since exception as a philosophical concept can be traced to Carl Schmitt's idea of sovereign action in the state of exception. Schmitt or, less often, Friedrich Nietzsche are mostly referenced when scholars apply the term 'exception' to outstanding people who consider themselves as exceptions or who look like exceptions in the eyes of others.[3] As soon as we convince ourselves to look at the problem exclusively from this angle, we forget that, in principle, any person can consider itself an exception because of its uniqueness. In the second case, exception usually plays a subordinate role in various normative theories. However, if one focuses only on (undoubtedly important) rules and principles, it is very easy to underestimate topics related to decisions and actions of each person in exceptional situations and to mechanisms of making non-standard decisions under various circumstances, not all of which are necessarily unusual.

In the coordinate system of modern social sciences, a theory of exceptions which aims to avoid the mentioned methodological traps and to present a multi-layered philosophical view of exceptions from a practical perspective finds itself at the intersection between neurobiology, theories of action, applied ethics, sociology of disaster, philosophy of law, political theories and philosophy of science. A possible method, allowing to take into account many theories and arguments from these vastly different areas, could be the anthropological approach since the latter can simultaneously take into account the biological, ethical and social perspective. Our starting point could be the idea that we should not consider exceptions as a rare privilege of the few but as an integral part of

[1] Of course, on the social and political level, exceptions can also be subject to manipulations if used to instigate ungrounded conclusions and to undermine the existing strategies and agreements.

[2] See, for instance, the debate on moral exceptions in vol. 62/6 (2014) of "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie".

[3] In its most radical and simplified form, this view of exceptions can be easily instrumentalised for justification of political arbitrariness.

the daily life and a key element of our everyday orientation.

But before undertaking the difficult task of constructing a comprehensive practical theory of exceptions, for instance, by analytically dividing exceptions into types according to the initial situation, the form of action, or its consequences, one has to understand what has been done for the analysis of exceptions as elements of human decisions and actions. Of course, in the history of Western philosophy significantly more attention has traditionally been paid to norms and rules while the concept of exception remained in the shadow, until it has found its widely recognised, but in fact very narrow philosophical niche in the 20th century. In rare (and mostly short) dictionary articles on the notion of exception its history usually begins with Kierkegaard and Schmitt. Still, it is easy to notice that the concept of exception has been present in the history of philosophy since ancient times.

The following overview which focuses on sources and thinkers before Carl Schmitt is in no way exhaustive. Its main goal is to define some key tendencies in the past interpretations of the concept of exception as a philosophical term and to demonstrate the complexity of its – still mostly neglected – history. A deeper historical understanding of the concept of exception, can, in turn, help us to think this concept beyond the traditional political framework into which it is usually placed.

2. Ancient origins:
Cicero and the Roman law

As far as we can judge from extant ancient sources, the concept of exception was first used in a legal context, namely in Cicero's defence of Lucius Cornelius Balbus, an influential official of Gaditan descent (i.e., a native of the Spanish town of Gades, modern Cadiz) who served under the command of Julius Caesar in Spain as a chief of military workers, which was only a starting point for his overall very successful political career. Defending Balbus' right to retain his Roman citizenship granted to him by Pompeius, Cicero battles against his opponents who seek to prove that the very procedure of obtaining Roman citizenship was illegal in Balbus' case. The main debate revolves around a conflict between two different laws. The actions of Pompeius who granted Roman citizenship were supposedly in accord with the consular law of 72 BC but – at least at a first glance – directly contradicted the Lex Julia according to which citizens of a community allied with Rome had the right to obtain Roman citizenship only with the permission of the community.

The key part of Cicero's argument is based on his examination of the relation between rules and exceptions in Roman law. He acknowledges that some treaties between the Romans and the ethnic groups they conquered, for instance, in case of the Germans, the Insubres, the Helvetians and the Iapydes, specifically state that representatives of these tribes cannot obtain Roman citizenship. However, Cicero adds, since there is no such exception clause in the treaty with the Gaditans, we cannot appeal to it (Balb., 14). The logic is quite simple. From the fact that there are some treaties with a clause stating the impossibility of obtaining Roman citizenship, we cannot conclude that such a clause should be presumed in other similar treaties without this explicit clause. Moreover, since these few treaties specifically classify the prohibition as an exception, there has to be a general rule according to which members of ethnic groups can obtain Roman citizenship if there is a treaty with Rome. The argument looks good *per se*, but it is not enough to refute the counterarguments of Cicero's opponents who refer to the law of Julius which applies to Hades as an allied community. Understanding this, Cicero takes a further step, claiming that the Gellian and Cornelian law from 72 BC allows exceptions from Julius's law, although only those of legitimate kind which do not violate the sacred status of treaties. According to Cicero, to doubt Balbus' right to retain his Roman citizenship is not to doubt the merits of the accused (since these merits are quite obvious) but rather to dispute Pompeius' right to grant this citizenship. So why does Pompeius have this right in the case of Balbus? According to Cicero, because the text of the agreement with the Gaditans has a legitimate status but is not sacred and, thus, inviolable. The sacred

status would require a ratification by a public decision, which was not the case for the treaty with the Gaditans (Balb., 14–15). Since only a sacred status of a treaty would not allow any exceptions, including the ones that are legally sanctioned, we can conclude that the agreement with Hades does not prevent legitimate exceptions.

It is in connection with his defence of Balbus that the famous phrase "exception proves the rule" (*exceptio probat regulam*) or, in its full form, "exception proves the rule in cases not excepted" (*exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis*) is attributed to Cicero. Although Cicero himself does not use it,[4] it accurately describes the first part of his argument regarding exceptions in treaties. In this concise form, the phrase has taken root in the European legal tradition[5] and in the cultural tradition as a whole, gradually turning into an everyday principle applicable to conclusions, decisions and actions of any person. Even though the claim behind it, namely that the rule still stands despite the exception and, secondly, that the exception, does not undermine the rule but rather confirms it, may look flawed from a general point of view, it works for specific arguments, especially in legal cases (Holton, 2010).

3. Leibniz: Exceptions as a condition of justice

One of the most prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment who paid substantial attention to the concept of exception, both in the traditional legal context and in connection with ethics, social philosophy and philosophy of religion, was Leibniz. The term 'exception' was first used in his article "The New Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence" (Leibniz, 1667), published shortly after the defence of his habilitation thesis. Unlike his predecessors, Leibniz does not use the Latin word *exceptio* in the discussion about specific laws. Instead, he turns it into a key element of a universal general theoretical (methodological) argument, according to which any exception to the rule makes the latter useless since it can no longer be trusted ("Quod si regulae habent exceptiones, frustraneae sunt, quia fidi illis non potest"). To the popular objection that there is no rule without exceptions ("Nullam regulam esse sine exceptione"), Leibniz resolutely replies: such an axiom contradicts itself, actually representing a liar paradox (Leibniz, 1667: 63).

However, in his later work "Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice" ("Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice", presumably 1702), Leibniz's opinion regarding the concept of exception takes a drastic turn, presumably because he now considers its role not only from a legal but also – long before Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard – from a theological, ethical and social perspective.[6] Contrary to his argument in "Nova methodus", Leibniz states that we need exceptions from a strict rule (*jus strictum*), linking the exception with the idea of equality (*equitas*) and piety (*pietas*). In this context, he criticises Hobbes and some unnamed Latin lawyers who only pay attention to strict rules to the disadvantage of the ideas of equality and piety. According to Leibniz, only the latter can provide the necessary foundation for the principles of universal justice outlined by Aristotle. Strict adherence to the strict rule without regard for equity could only lead to lawlessness (in accordance with the proverb *summum jus summa est injuria*, "the more law, the more injustice"[7]), so in justified cases we have to make an exception from it, in order to mitigate it (Leibniz, 1989: 571).

From a contemporary perspective, the flexible concept of exception proposed in "Reflections" looks much more relevant, at least in legal, ethical and social aspects. It not only helps us to explain some features of the modern legal system where exceptions can sometimes be in great abundance (for instance, in

[4] In the original text, Cicero's statement looks as follows: "quod si exceptio facit ne liceat, ubi non sit exceptum, ibi necesse est licere" ("And if the exception does not permit it, it should be allowed in cases when there is no exception").

[5] Cf. Jones, 1729: 221. In a different form (*exceptio figit regulam in non exceptis*), the phrase can be found in some earlier sources, like Collins, 1617: 100. When Leibniz added the notion of exception to his theory of justice, he was dealing with a legal term commonly used in practice.

[6] Unfortunately, there are no special studies on this very interesting topic. Still, we can find some important observations in Stephan Meder's book on Leibniz (Meder, 2018: 77 ff.).

[7] Here, Leibniz implicitly references Cicero, since the proverb is mentioned in his work "De officiis" (I.10.33).

copyright laws), but it also broadens the perspective of the discussion concerning the relationship between rules and the ever-changing reality of life. It is also important to note that Leibniz takes an important – while also necessary – philosophical step from the technical use of the concept of exception in the legal context to its broader philosophical understanding from the natural, ethical and social perspective. In later philosophical theories of exceptions, these perspectives will often intersect with each other.

4. German Idealism: Rationalisation and anthropological rehabilitation of exceptions

In German idealism which concentrated on norms and moral principles, the concept of exception mostly played a marginal role. Still, this does not mean that there were no instances of using exception as a notion. The question of whether exceptions are necessary becomes part of Immanuel Kant's ethical and anthropological arguments in his late works of the 1780s and the 1790s, for instance in connection to the problem of deviation from general principles and laws and to the topic of pragmatic limitations of our use of reason. In the "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals" (1785) and in the "Metaphysics of Morals" (1797), exception mostly means a violation of laws, moral rules or customs. In the latter work, Kant provides a key example for his analysis of the main differences between murder and execution, namely the example of a criminal (which was later inverted by Nietzsche in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra"):

> Now the criminal can commit his misdeed either on a maxim he has taken as an objective rule (as holding universally) or only as an exception to the rule (exempting himself from it occasionally). In the *latter* case *he only deviates* from the law (though intentionally) […]. In the first case, however, he rejects the authority of the law itself, which validity he still cannot deny before his own reason, and makes it his rule to act contrary to the law. His maxim is therefore opposed to the law not by way of default only (*negative*) but by *rejecting* it (*contrarie*) […].
>
> The reason for horror at the thought of the formal execution of a monarch *by his people* is therefore this that while his *murder* is regarded as only an *exception* to the rule that the people makes its maxim, his execution must be regarded as a complete *overturning* of the principles of the relation between a sovereign and his people […], so that violence is elevated above the most sacred rights brazenly and in accordance with principle. Like a chasm that irretrievably swallows everything, the execution of a monarch seems to be a crime from which the people cannot be absolved, for it is as if the state commits suicide (Kant, 1991: 132; AA VI, 320[8]).

For Kant (and later for Hegel), the concept of exception is still closely related to legal issues, as was the case for Leibniz. Of course, Kant's main goal in this case is not to discuss specific issues of public law but rather to answer the central question in the discussion of the events and consequences of the French Revolution: can we consider the execution of a monarch as an ordinary murder? Continuing his line of criticism against those who directly participated in the bloody events of the French Revolution, Kant points out that a violent severance of relations between the sovereign and the people is unacceptable both from the ethical and legal point of view. His contrasting description of an ordinary crime as an exception from the rule which the perpetrator still "cannot deny before his own reason" is, in turn, connected to his argument on the consequences of the crime from an internal point of view, culminating in the famous metaphor of the inner court of conscience.

To a somewhat different line of reasoning related to exceptions belongs the question on the limitations of a pragmatic application of reason. Kant initially introduces it in the "Groundwork" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason" (1788) where the rules of exceptions (*exceptivae*), along with the practical rules of

[8] Along with the English translation, I reference the German Academy Edition of Kant's works (Akademie-Ausgabe, AA).

commission (*praeceptivae*) and omission (*prohibitivae*), become part of the 'quality' category of freedom regarding the concepts of good and evil (Kant, 2015: 56; AA V, 66). Realizing that people are inclined to consider themselves as an exception to any rule and, at the same time, to assume that others should not and will not do so (Kant, 1998: 34; AA IV, 424), Kant has repeatedly pointed out the role of the categorical imperative in opposing this antimoral tendency which deprives ethical maxims of all their meaning. However, realising that the need for exceptions is inherent in human nature, Kant takes a more lenient approach, differentiating between two kinds of principles – universality (*universalitas*) that does not allow exceptions and generality (*generalitas*) that allows them in some, presumably inconsiderable, cases when "the practical rational principle is to meet the maxim half way" (Kant, 1998: 34)[9] while the respect for the categorical imperative is still maintained. In his "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" (1798), Kant takes a closer look at some specific manifestations of exceptions in human actions. On one occasion, he discusses the dangers of procrastination as a mechanism that impedes the moral self-improvement of a person and constantly produces new exceptions, and on another, he proves that from a pragmatic perspective, habits are generally harmful to us, with the exception of certain mechanical elements of the daily routine which he deems necessary to maintain one's health (Kant, 2014: 40, 79; AA VII, 149, 186).

Like Kant, Hegel mentions exceptions primarily in the discussion on law and morality, for instance in the "Elements of the Philosophy of Right" (1820). While discussing the question of how we follow laws and traditions (in § 150), he revisits the Kantian problem of manifestation of human egoism in the individual tendency to see oneself as an exception to the general rule. In this light, Hegel examines the relationship between the general idea of virtue and manifestations of virtue, noting that virtue not only can but also should serve as a subject of the human disposition to distinguish oneself from others in an intelligent way, thus showing one's individual character. When separated from concrete examples, the discussion concerning virtue in general would look too abstract, and therefore unconvincing. In other words, virtue according to Hegel (and contrary to Kant) is morality in its application to the special, i.e. exceptional (Hegel, 1911: 136–137). For instance, pure respect for virtue as a law which does not take into account our individual interests cannot yield any reliable practical results in specific life circumstances.[10] Simplifying the views of Kant and Hegel on the concepts of virtue and the good, we can say that from Hegel's standpoint exceptions become a much more significant factor, as a normal practical necessity guided by our reason rather than a moral hindrance which we could reluctantly accept in some rare cases.

5. Kierkegaard: Exception as interpretation of the universal

Kierkegaard continues the previous discussion on the interaction between the universal and the exception. However, he raises exceptions to a higher theoretical position in comparison to Hegel, giving them priority over the general. In the afterword to "Repetition" (1843), Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius) provides a full-fledged, theologically oriented theory of exceptions:

> On the one side stands the exception, on the other the universal, and the struggle itself is a strange conflict between the rage and impatience of the universal over the disturbance the exception causes and its infatuated partiality for the exception […]. The relation is as follows. The exception also thinks the universal in that he thinks himself through; he works for the universal in that he works himself through; he explains the universal in that he explains himself. Consequently, the exception explains the universal and himself, and if one

[9] These aspects of Kant's view on exceptions, in comparison to Nietzsche, are discussed in more detail in Werner Stegmaier's article on ethical aspects of exceptions (Stegmaier, 2003: 127–140).

[10] More on the differences between Kant and Hegel on the topic of virtue, see in Allen Wood's study on Hegel's ethics (Wood, 1990: 214–215).

> really wants to study the universal, one only needs to look around for a legitimate exception; he discloses everything far more clearly than the universal itself. The legitimate exception is reconciled in the universal; basically, the universal is polemical toward the exception, and it will not betray its partiality before the exception forces it, as it were, to acknowledge it. If the exception does not have this power, he is not legitimized […] (Kierkegaard, 1983: 226–227).

In Kierkegaard's interpretation, exception becomes the basis of the universal. The dialectical nature of the struggle between the universal and the exception is manifested in the simultaneous presence of sympathy and antipathy, a combination of impatient anger and "infatuated partiality". An 'unjustified' exception, unlike a justified one, does not try to force the general to express its addiction and sympathy for the exception, but simply wants "to bypass the universal" without fighting it (Kierkegaard, 1983: 227), that is, it refutes the active, agonal principle of interaction with the universal. This also means that only due to its struggle with exception the universal can look at itself from the outside and interpret itself, thereby entering our individual consciousness.[11] In "Either/Or" (1843), Kierkegaard gives a more concise existential definition of legitimate exceptions, stating that only these exceptions can suffer from the fact that they are exceptions. In particular, only an exceptional person (for instance, a poet) who has gone through suffering is able to understand that each person is both an exception and part of the universal, thus finding reconciliation with his own existence (Kierkegaard, 1987: 297).

In Kierkegaard (and later in Nietzsche), the elevation of the status of exception to a key philosophical concept coincides with the increase of the status of the individual in the light of the crisis of classical systematic philosophy. The exception is no longer compelled to justify its own existence but becomes an equal and at a later point a dominant participant in the dialogue with the universal, challenging traditional concepts and ideas. And while Kierkegaard mostly concentrates on the existential topic of exceptional uniqueness of individual existence, Nietzsche paints a broader picture, bringing together many different perspectives.

6. Nietzsche: Crisis of the universal and totality of exceptions

In Nietzsche, one of the key critics of German idealism and systematic philosophy in general, the notion of exception has its strongest advocate, both in a performative and in a theoretical (strictly philosophical) sense. Nietzsche repeatedly calls himself an exceptional person and presents himself as such, especially in the late works. The concept of exception is a part of his criticism against theories of knowledge in German Idealism and also an important factor in his crusade against Platonic morality. Moreover, it serves as a foundation for some of Nietzsche's original concepts.

In Nietzsche's "Untimely Meditations" (1873–1876), and especially in "Human, All Too Human" (1878/1886), the word 'exception' refers to outstanding types and individuals, for instance to 'free spirits', as opposed to those who are restricted by cultural rules. In aphorism 33 of the first book of "Human, All Too Human", the idea of exception is simultaneously associated with rare talented people and, most likely in an implicit polemic with Kant, with a certain 'unclean' strategy of thinking that sacrifices the whole for the sake of focusing on these exceptional individuals. According to Nietzsche, it is precisely such a strategy that is necessary to believe in the value of life (Nietzsche, 1996: 29). Here, exceptions work as a principle of limitation of perspective which is essentially inevitable for an individual, although, as Nietzsche emphasises, not every limitation is useful. Still, the need for limitations does not mean that we do not need to study any rules and 'ordinary' actions which

[11] For a more in-depth analysis of Kierkegaard's position, see the monograph of Raphael Benjamin Rauh (Rauh, 2016: 174–182). Unfortunately, most comparisons between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche suggested by Rauh are based on the questionable premise that Nietzsche's philosophy is essentially a form of existentialism (this explains why Rauh largely ignores the cosmological and social perspective of Nietzsche's analysis of exceptions). The idea that Kierkegaard's notion of exception gives meaning to the universal is shared by Hannah Arendt (Arendt, 2005: 174).

stem from them. Much later, in aphorism 26 of "Beyond Good and Evil", Nietzsche laments that the serious long-term work of studying an "average" man is perhaps the most unpleasant part of the "life story of every philosopher" but also points out that this work is still necessary (Nietzsche, 2002: 27).

As we can see in "Daybreak" (1881) and in the later works and fragments, Nietzsche's focus gradually shifts from exceptional persons to exceptional actions, as examples of disobedience to tradition. In this context, he pays considerable attention to the analysis of successful and unsuccessful strategies of adapting non-standard ideas and 'exceptional' (often illegal) actions to the 'mediocre' environment[12] and to the guiding voice of the mind.[13] From now on, the notion of exception also plays an anthropological role since these actions are prerequisites for overcoming oneself and overstepping the boundaries of traditional epistemic and moral prejudices – while the overcoming itself is only possible for human beings and not for animals.

In "The Gay Science" (1882/1887), Nietzsche presents a cosmological view of exceptions which subsequently plays a significant role in his epistemological arguments. In aphorism 109, he states that "the astral order in which we live" is itself an exception which in turn makes possible "the exception from exceptions", namely "the development of the organic" in the general chaos of the world (Nietzsche, 2001: 109). But although exception is the basic condition for human life, people are accustomed to consider it the rule. This supposed contradiction is used by Nietzsche as one of the decisive arguments against the traditional idea of the existence of laws in nature.

Since the mid-1880s, Nietzsche also studies exceptions from a social perspective, as part of his analysis of cultural, legal, and political mechanisms in community and society. The most important example is paragraph 11 of the second treatise in "On the Genealogy of Morality" (1887):

> To talk of 'just' and 'unjust' *as such* is meaningless, an act of injury, violence, exploitation or destruction cannot be 'unjust' *as such*, because life functions *essentially* in an injurious, violent, exploitative and destructive manner, or at least these are its fundamental processes and it cannot be thought of without these characteristics. One has to admit to oneself something even more unpalatable: that viewed from the highest biological standpoint, states of legality can never be anything but *exceptional states*, as partial restrictions of the true will to life, which seeks power and to whose overall purpose they subordinate themselves as individual measures, that is to say, as a means of creating greater units of power. A system of law conceived as sovereign and general, not as a means for use in the fight between units of power but as a means *against* fighting in general, rather like Dühring's communistic slogan that every will should regard every other will as its equal, this would be a principle *hostile to life*, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of fatigue and a secret path to nothingness (Nietzsche, 2006b: 50).

Some legal scholars think that the cited passage decisively proves that Nietzsche is a forefather of Carl Schmitt's political-legal theory of exceptions. (cf. Rudlof, 2018: 151) However, Nietzsche's subject is not sovereign action in an exceptional situation, but rather the idea of separating our thinking about justice and the legal order from the struggle between units of power. Considering such a strategy impossible, Nietzsche argues that law is not something that stands above life since it is merely an exception which limits its diversity. Thus, in Nietzsche's view, there is a whole chain of exceptions: organic life is a

[12] See the example of Homeric heroes in fragment 12[186] of Nietzsche's Nachlass from 1881 (Nietzsche, 1988a: 608). See also aphorism 175 in "The Wanderer and his Shadow" (Nietzsche, 1996: 352).

[13] See Nietzsche's description of the pale criminal in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra": "An image made this pale human pale. He was equal to his deed when he committed it, but he could not bear its image once he had done it. / From then on he always saw himself as the doer of one deed. I call this madness: the exception reversed itself to the essence. / A streak in the dirt stops a hen cold; the stroke he executed stopped his poor reason cold – madness after the deed I call this." (Nietzsche, 2006a: 26)

cosmological exception, and law, in turn, is an exception to this exception.

Significantly closer to Schmitt, even though only at a first glance, would be aphorism 281 in "The Wanderer and His Shadow" since it is the only instance of using the word *Ausnahmezustand* ("state of emergency", or "state of exception") in Nietzsche's works. The main topic is the gradual loss of power by the "offices of the king and emperor" under the non-violent, constitutional pressure of democracy. To stop this, the kings "cling with their teeth to their dignity as warlords", trying to start wars with the aim to impose "states of emergency in which that slow constitutional pressure of the forces of democracy lets up" (Nietzsche, 1996: 379). Still, Nietzsche's account of this tendency is not normative but purely descriptive, looking as a premonition of many political events of the 20th and 21st century.

Nietzsche does not mean that to have exceptional talents means to abandon all conventions and legal mechanisms. In "On Genealogy of Morality" and in several unpublished fragments of the same period, he clearly states that hatred against mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher and even prevents him from being one. Moreover, from Nietzsche's perspective, a person who thinks of himself as exception must protect the rule at all cost (Nachlass 1887, 10[175], in: Nietzsche, 1988b: 559–560). Rather than fighting rules, we have to fight their hypocritical elements, formed by certain moral prejudices. Thus, it is clear that Nietzsche speaks of exceptional people and exceptional actions not in the narrow political or religious sense, as is the case for Carl Schmitt or for Giorgio Agamben, since his scope is not limited to those who make political decisions. According to Nietzsche, exceptions cannot be considered rules and turned into rules, which thus excludes the possibility of a permanent state of exception (including the political state of emergency). The plurality of wills to power, which constantly limit each other, is a guarantee that rules will not spontaneously change as a result of individual decisions.

Conclusion

The history of the notion of exception mirrors several major tendencies in the development of Western philosophy between the 17th and the 19th century. The gradual expanding of thematic scope and elevation of the theoretical status of exceptions coincided with the gradual decline in popularity of German Idealism and with the rise of the opposing (and in this sense anti-systematic) philosophical projects, like the one of Nietzsche. From now on, exceptions were even stronger associated with individualism and, from a later point onwards, with postmodernism. This development, together with the unfortunate 'Schmittian shift' in the interpretation of the notion of exception, are perhaps the main factors that deter the modern analytical philosophy and some other philosophical schools from using it for systematic purposes. Taking a broader approach and leaving behind some old prejudices against exceptions, we could understand that such a task is not only possible but also very fruitful.

References

Arendt H. (2005). What Is Existential Philosophy? In *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism*, ed. J. Kohn. New York, Schocken Books, 163–187.

Collins, S. (1617). *Epphata to F.T.* Cambridge, C. Legge.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1911). *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*]. Leipzig, Meiner.

Holton, R. (2010). The Exception Proves the Rule. In *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 18(4), 369–388.

Jones, Th. (1729). *The Reports of Several Special Cases Adjudged in the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas at Westminster, in the Reign of King Charles II.* Savoy, R. Nurr and R. Gosling.

Kant, I. (1991). *The Metaphysics of Morals.* Transl. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1998). *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Transl. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2014). *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Transl. by R. Louden. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (2015). *Critique of Practical Reason*. Transl. and ed. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1983). *Writings*. Vol. VI: *Fear and Trembling; Repetition*. Ed. and transl. by Howard V. Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1987). *Writings*. Vol. IV: *Either/Or*. Ed. and transl. by Howard V. Hong and Edna Hong. Vol. 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Leibniz, G.W. (1667). *Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae* [*The New Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence*]. Frankfurt, J.D. Zunner.

Leibniz, G.W. (1989). *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Transl. and ed. by L.E. Loemker. Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Meder, S. (2018). *Der unbekannte Leibniz: Die Entdeckung von Recht und Politik durch Philosophie* [*The Unknown Leibniz: Discovery of Law and Politics through Philosophy*]. Köln, Böhlau.

Nietzsche, F. (1988a): *Kritische Studienausgabe*. Bd. 9. *Nachgelassene Fragmente: Nachlaß 1880–1882*. München/Berlin/New York, DTV/De Gruyter.

Nietzsche, F. (1988b). *Kritische Studienausgabe*. Bd. 12. *Nachgelassene Fragmente: Nachlaß 1885–1887*. München/Berlin/New York, DTV/De Gruyter.

Nietzsche, F. (1996). *Human, All Too Human*. Transl. by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (2002). *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to the Philosophy of the Future*. Transl. by Judith Norman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (2001). *The Gay Science*. Transl. by J. Nauckhoff. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (2006a). *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Transl. by A. del Caro. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (2006b). *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Transl. by C. Diethe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Rauh, R.B. (2016). *Modulationen der Einsamkeit: Theorien der Ausnahme als Moralkritik bei Sören Kierkegaard und Friedrich Nietzsche* [*Modulations of Loneliness: Theories of Exception as Moral Criticism in Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche*]. Freiburg/München, Karl Alber.

Rudlof, M. (2018). *Das Gesetz zur Strafbarkeit der geschäftsmäßigen Förderung der Selbsttötung* [*The Law Against Commercial Promotion of Suicide*]. Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter.

Stegmaier, W. (2003). Mit Ausnahmen umgehen: Zur Praxis der ethischen Orientierung [Dealing with Exceptions: On the Practice of Ethical Orientation]. In *Die Ausnahme denken. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Klaus-Michael Kodalle*, hg. von Claus Dierksmeier, Bd. 1. Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 127–140.

Wood, A. (1990). *Hegel's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Основания философской теории исключения: историческая перспектива

А.Г. Жаворонков
Институт философии РАН
Российская Федерация, Москва

Аннотация. Статья посвящена рассмотрению в значительной степени забытой «альтернативной» истории философского понятия исключения, начиная с Древнего Рима и до конца XIX века, на примере Цицерона, Лейбница, Канта, Гегеля, Кьеркегора и Ницше. Приводя доводы против узкого (ориентированного на работы Карла Шмитта) взгляда на исключение как на политический термин, автор намечает контуры историко-философского фундамента, необходимого для новой, широкой теории исключений, пока отсутствующей в современной практической философии. Основная цель исследования – показать, что в истории философии обсуждение исключений не ограничивалось философией права и охватывало многие другие области, в том числе эпистемологию, этику, антропологию, а также социальную и политическую философию.

Ключевые слова: исключение, практическая философия, история философии, Цицерон, Лейбниц, Кант, Кьеркегор, Ницше.

Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences
2020 13(8): 1416–1423

DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0175
УДК 74.01/.09

D.V. Pivovarov's Concept of the Ideal as the Basis of Modern Theory of Fine Arts

Vladimir I. Zhukovsky
Siberian Federal University
Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation

Received 14.07.2017, received in revised form 10.08.2017, accepted 23.08.2017

Abstract. The article reveals the methodological principles of the Russian researcher D.V. Pivovarov's synthetic theory of the ideal, which laid the foundation for the research of regularities of an ideal-forming process in fine arts. According to the theory, the ideal is as an intermediary between a human and the world and has a feature of a harmonious unity of the two opposite sides of being – material and spiritual. A work of fine arts is an artificial and skillfully produced ideal, a temptation which is aimed at a representative relation of the finite with the finite and the finite with the infinite. Finding the place of a work of art in the system of artistic culture, the author of the present paper argues that D.V. Pivovarov's concept of the ideal is a basis of modern theory of fine arts, it promotes the scientific study of fine arts, helps to master a difficult dialectical process of a human's (a viewer's) representative relationship with his / her soul, souls of the others, the Spirit of God.

Keywords: D.V. Pivovarov, the synthetic theory of the ideal, ideal, object model, artistic culture, fine arts, model, work of art, viewer, artistic process.

Research area: history of art.

Citation: Zhukovsky, V.I. (2020). D.V. Pivovarov's concept of the ideal as the dasis of modern theory of fine arts. J. Sib. Fed. Univ. Humanit. Soc. Sci., 13(8), 1416–1423. DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0175.

* Corresponding author E-mail address: art_dec@lan.krasu.ru

In January 2016 Daniil Valentinovich Pivovarov, a famous Russian philosopher, died. A researcher with a broad array of interests, D.V. Pivovarov established a scientific school "The Synthetic Paradigm in Philosophy", developed his own integrated conception of the religion which was recognized by the scientific community, defined a special dialectical-and-logical algorithm of categorial synthesis. The issues of visual thinking, culture and creativity set forth in a number of monographs and articles, some of which are written together with the author of this paper (Zhukovskii, Koptseva, Pivovarov, 2006; Zhukovskii, Pivovarov, 1991, 1998, 2010, 2015; Zhukovskii, Pivovarov, Rakhmatullin, 1988), take not the last place in his scientific pursuits.

D.V. Pivovarov's scientific and creative heritage is still in need for its researchers. Yet, we can already formulate the main provisions of D.V. Pivovarov's synthetic theory of the ideal, which became a methodological basis of an innovative concept of fine arts (Zhukovskii, 2011).

Daniil Valentinovich's synthetic theory of the ideal is extremely attractive because when applied to the solution of actual problems of fine arts it is effective for mastering an extremely complex mechanism of a viewer's representative (through an idol) relationship with his / her soul, souls of other people, the Spirit of God and the Perfection of the Fullness of Being through an artistic work as a sign complex. According to the synthetic theory of the ideal developed by the researcher, this requires an object model or its sign (a work, piece of art); a scheme of a mental action linked with the model and a viewer's subjective ability to mentally reproduce the image of a class of things, standing for the model.

The ideal is a philosophical category denoting the typical properties of eidoses, ideas, ideals and idols. According to D.V. Pivovarov, the most important of these properties are non-extended nature and immateriality, content similarity of an image and an object linked with it, an ability of image to become an entity of a human's subjective world and keep him / her informed about objective entities and phenomena (Pivovarov, 2004: 246).

Introducing such a definition, D.V. Pivovarov notes that the explanation of the nature of the ideal is determined by the philosopher's ideological position; a generally valid notion of the ideal has not been formed yet because of the difference of these positions (Pivovarov, 2004: 246). Most often the nature of the ideal is revealed through the relationship of the categories of spirit, soul, matter, embodiment, reflection, creativity.

Analyzing the spatio-temporal, substrate-and-content and epistemological aspects of the ideal, Daniil Valentinovich came to the following conclusion:

− in its spatio-temporal aspect the ideal should be understood as the involvement of the image in the eternal, free, other and non-extended, when the image lacks the substance of an object created by the standards of the image and opposed to the real and, thus, extended and material being;

− in its substrate-and-content aspect the ideal is thought to be a property of the image to link with its object, be similar with it in content, relate to it with some correspondence;

− in its epistemological aspect the ideal should be understood as the ways of subjective existence of noumenal and phenomenal characteristics of the objects in a human's activity and consciousness, whether these are the scheme of practice, sensitive and rational images or direct (mystical) knowledge of the original (Pivovarov, 2004: 246).

Turning to the source of the problem, D.V. Pivovarov states that the concept of the ideal is rooted in animism and totemism, according to which:

a) every object has its own unique soul able to move in space and get into other objects and people in the form of steam, air or shadow;

b) every class of people owes its origin and common characteristics to the ancestor (totem) (Pivovarov, 2004: 247).

D.V. Pivovarov revealed that a particular aspect of the animistic view on the object's soul as a specific cause of life in the being animated by it was termed as "eidos" (Latin *forma*, *species*) in ancient Greek culture, whereas some moments of the totemic views on the spirit of

the race and the world soul were termed as "idea" (Pivovarov, 2004: 247).

Having carefully studied the monist doctrine of the ideal, proposed by Democritus in his time, Daniil Valentinovich concluded that in this ancient Greek philosopher's conception the object is cognized through the emitted eidos. Floating in the air, the spices, duplicating the objects, are laid over in a human in the form of subjective images of the objective world as they enter the subject through his / her senses.

According to Democritus, there are three aspects of eidos:

− being a part of an object, eidos embodies its holistic characteristics; it is a material copy of a particular kind of objects and may become an immediate object of particular knowledge;

− transferring the information about certain objects or their categories from the outside world into a human, eidos plays the role of a vehicle: in other words, eidos is a material representative of some cognized object area in relation to a knowing individual;

− when in a human, eidos becomes a material image of consciousness, a building component of complex knowledge about the world in general" (Liubutin, Pivovarov, 1993: 237).

For many centuries, right up to the XVII century, the materialistic theory of knowledge was strongly attracted by the position of Democritus. However, in the process of the natural science development this theory was abandoned as the emission of eidoses was not detected by telescopes and microscopes. The searches for material duplicates of objects in the human brain and body were unsuccessful either. In this regard, thanks to Feuerbach's philosophy, the knowledge of the ideal as a subjective image of the objective world became firmly established in the materialist theory of knowledge. This knowledge is only the third aspect of Democritus's eidos. As far as the first two aspects of eidos are concerned, they turned to be completely ignored.

However, in the XX century in Russian philosophy there originated the doctrines which collectively form the basis for the revival of Democritus's theory of the ideal. "The alternative conceptions by D.I. Dubrovskii, E.V. Il'enkov, E.G. Klassen, A.F. Losev, M.A. Lifshits favoured the restoration of the three-aspect conception of the ideal" (Liubutin, Pivovarov, 1993: 240).

D.V. Pivovarov studied the conceptions of the abovementioned philosophers in their logical order, which is opposite to the chronology of their appearance. The reason why a human, operating with certain objects, is able to reflect their holistic, general, significant, generic features was explained by Aleksei Fiodorovich Losev and Mikhail Aleksandrovich Lifshits. According to their conclusions, there are both perfect and imperfect objects of the same kind in nature. A specific element from a group of elements can absorb their main characteristics to a greater extent than other elements of the group. So, it can serve a good representative of the group (the whole) in relation to a person, and, operating with it only, one seems to immediately reflect the whole class of objects standing for this model (Livshits, 1997; Losev, 1993). A solid is broken by a more solid. A sharp is cut by a more sharp, etc.

Analyzing A.F. Losev's and M.A. Lifshits's theoretical messages, Daniil Valentinovich Pivovarov came to the conclusion that these philosophers discovered "a true equivalent of the first aspect of Democritus's eidos: an object does not double itself in the emitted duplicate but it is its special, perfect part with an ability of objective potential representativeness in relation to the subject that is a material copy of this or that object (object area)". According to Losev and Lifshits, the ideal is an objective perfection, a natural ideal, a model that does not contain the substances of the whole reflected class of objects, but represents the entire class to a person (Pivovarov, 2004: 249).

E.V. Il'enkov and E.G. Klassen, the Russian philosopher's, tried to answer the question about the carrier of the information about really common and universal from an object to a subject. These researchers pointed to a particular signal component of human practice, determining the formation of a subjective image of the common and universal from outside. The scheme of practice (algorithms, operations, stereotypes) is a carrier of the information about

generic properties of objects in the space between an object and a subject, and the scheme of action does not contain the substances of the object, along the contour of which the subject is moving. In this sense, the scheme or form of activity can be called the ideal (Il'enkov, 1984, Klassen, 1984).

Analyzing Klassen's and Il'enkov's conceptions, D.V. Pivovarov noticed that by their joint efforts these philosophers managed to give a modern coverage of the second aspect of Democritus's eidos: "It is not the substance of an object that is transferred to a person's subjective world but it is the scheme of activity that reads the information about the common (substantial) from an object and transports it to a person's subjective world" (Pivovarov, 2004: 250). As an ideal, the scheme of activity is independent of an individual's consciousness. At the same time, being in consistency with the peculiar features of a class of objects and modeling this class, the scheme of activity does not contain the substances of objects objectively reproducible in it. It is unreal and, thus, immaterial in this sense; as such it cannot be measured with instruments, as it cannot be perceived with the naked senses.

David Izrailevich Dubrovskii, a Russian philosopher, made an attempt to answer the question of why and how the knowledge about a certain model, formed under the influence of the activity scheme, is subjectively experienced by a person as the integrity of the object area the representative model stands for.

The information approach proposed by the researcher is linked with the identification of the human brain's extrapolation ability to create the internal conditions for the elimination of marks of the characteristic features of all previous signaling process from the consciousness and for subjective processing of the information about the object area in its "pure form", that is in the form of consciousness proper, immaterial copying of external entities. In other words, actually interacting with some fragment of a certain object, a human construes not only an immaterial image of this object as a whole entity with the help of his / her brain but also transfers his / her mental vision to all the objects of a single class. Without this unique activity of the brain the ideal as such could not exist (Dubrovskii, 2002).

Analyzing Dubrovskii's philosophical concept, D.V. Pivovarov came to the conclusion that in this case the third aspect of Democritus's eidos turned out to be fundamentally clarified: "Eidos does not penetrate into a human in its final form, there is no eidos in real objectness, taken by itself. A subjective image is formed in the process of eliminating its signal characteristics and actualization of the content of reality the representative stands for" (Pivovarov, 2004: 251).

Comparing modern conceptions of the Russian philosophers with Democritus's ancient doctrine, D.V. Pivovarov concluded that D.I. Dubrovskii searched for the ideal on the side of the subject while contrasting the ideal as a purely subjective reality to the material nature of the world of objects, whereas E.G. Klassen and E.V. Il'enkov extended the concept of the ideal. They incorporated the forms of socio-cultural representation in it and focused on the ideal side of human activity. As for M.A. Lifshits and A.F. Losev, they further expanded this concept, analyzing the problem from an object side of the subject-object relationship. Thus, all the real sides of the relationship of the two opposites were under the materialistic research, and a generic property of the ideal – to contain not a grain of substance of the reflected object – turned to be inherent to all parts of this relationship one way or another. Indeed, the image of human consciousness is immaterial; the scheme of the activity only models the object, but it does not transfer the substance of the object in a human's subjective world; in a concentrated form an ideal object (model) embodies the system properties of a whole class of objects but not the substance of this class. All this suggested D.V. Pivovarov an idea that the ideal is not just a subjective reality, or a scheme of the activity, or object model, but a systemic quality of the whole relationship of a subject and an object (Pivovarov, 2004: 251).

Daniil Valentinovich Pivovarov fundamentally synthesized many conceptions of the ideal: "The ideal is a special medium of reproduction of common and integral characteristic features of the reality through the representa-

tives of this reality. This way is peculiar for the interaction of the subject and the object. As a way of the relationship (reflection in the Hegelian sense of the term), the ideal necessarily implies the presence of three "strong points": the object model or its sign; the scheme of practical or mental activity coupled with the model; a human's subjective ability to use his / her brain and reproduce in consciousness the idea of the class of objects the model stands for.

The ideal is not exclusively opposite to the material; as a medium of relationship it starts with the material representatives and ends with the immaterial visual image that contains not a grain of substance reproduced with the help of the representatives of the reality" (Liubutin, Pivovarov 1993: 252).

D.V. Pivovarov showed that as a specific relationship between a human and the world an ideal (through the object model or its sign) familiarization with the world is achieved by means of possessing some part of the world. But for all that, as an object model such part of the world may lack a complete, accurate and sufficient representativeness. However, a human does not always realize it, and, thus, tends to recognize it as such in the absence of other means for holistic reproduction of a specific whole being, which is sensually unavailable.

According to Pivovarov, the ideal is characterized by the unity of the sensual and the super sensual, as well as the real and the illusory (a part of an object is seen as a true model of the entire object, i.e. the whole is seen instead of the part) (Pivovarov, 2011: 26).

According to Pivovarov's synthetic conception of the ideal, the term "material" is not opposed to the term "ideal" which implies the relationship of the subject and the object, the unity of the material and immaterial poles. The true opposite of the "ideal" (a representative relationship) is "direct relationship" (Pivovarov, 2011: 26). And while there can be neither absolute directness nor absolute mediation (they reveal through each other), they are, nonetheless, two useful abstractions.

Supposing that an object of our direct relationship is a piece of canvas coated with the colour mass of different colors, then if a person interacts only with the object and nothing but the object, such interaction can be explained by direct relationship. A human's interaction with the painted canvas as with Velázquez's portrait of, say, Philip IV, is a fundamentally different relationship in which such a new super sensual reality as the portrait of Philip IV is structured by means of the same object (a piece of canvas with a colored surface) in the space between two interacting partners. In this case we mean the ideal relationship: the physical object, perceived by senses, starts playing the role of a representative of a different reality which is at the given moment hidden from the viewer. This example leads to understanding of the theoretical meaning of opposing the ideal relationship (through an idol) to the direct one.

It is clear that the ideal relationship is impossible without direct perception of a representative (or an object model or a sign). Yet, a direct perception of a part of the reality or a body of its sign is only a mandatory prerequisite of an ideal interaction but not a product of the ideal relationship. It is only due to other component parts of the ideal process such as special schemes of actions with the representatives and the operations of the extrapolation of knowledge about the part on the hidden whole that the ideal relationship acquires the features of super sensuality and immateriality.

According to D.V. Pivovarov's synthetic theory of the ideal, the object model, the scheme of actions with it and extrapolation of knowledge about the object model onto the super sensual reality are the main components of any ideal relationship. The choice and (collective or individual) recognition of the representative of a super sensual reality are influenced by a human's attitudes, faith, conscience and knowledge available. The same is true with regard to both the scheme of action with a model of an entity (unity) and the nature of the extrapolation of the information about the model on to other object areas. It turns out that the concept of the ideal (reflection in the Hegelian sense) describes the whole totality of a human's spiritual life. The relationship of the subject and the object (the ideal) involves conscious, subconscious and unconscious acts.

Among numerous modern culturological conceptions that differently define the concept

of "culture", it is necessary to emphasize, in our opinion, the most precise definition, thoroughly studied and analyzed by D.V. Pivovarov, the definition being the following one: "Culture is a side of human life and activities that forms the ideals" (Pivovarov, 2009).

The ideal contains all the qualities separately mentioned in the traditional analysis of culture. The ideals are what is cultivated by culture. They are the foundation of culture. It is an ability of fundamental ideals to realize its "supporting" mission that the strength and durability of culture depend on.

Not only scientific standards and industrial samples but also artistic works can represent themselves as ideals. As a distinctive feature of any culture, formation of the ideal is a process of preservation and change of models of reproduction of a specific social life in all its dimensions, revered for the ideals. It is also a process of rejection of the ideals that no longer have a life-giving influence on the growth of culture. Ideals are formed not only by people, societies and civilizations, but also by social groups and individuals. Therefore, it can be argued that in addition to the culture of the society or nation, there is a unique culture of an individual (Zhukovskii, 2013).

The carrier of culture correlates with any object not directly but only through one or another "ideal". The relation of the carrier of culture with any sphere of life can be called ideal as it happens thanks to the ideal, acting as a representative, intermediary, and mediator.

Daniil Valentinovich Pivovarov stated that there are several models answering the question of who forms basic ideals of culture: "the elitist model", "the collegiate model" and "the model of individual evolution".

According to "the elitist model", one or another basic ideal of culture is formed by a genius or an outstanding personality in a particular field of knowledge. An outstanding personality creates or opens a new ideal, while other members of the society progressively comprehend and then recognise the innovation and start cultivating it.

According to "the collegiate model", a basic ideal of culture is formed by mutual agreement or collective agreement. In this case, the ideal gets the status of law the adoption of which defines the rules and standards of behavior of all people of this society. Cultivation of the accepted ideal gradually becomes a tradition.

According to "the model of individual evolution", everyone can become developed and independent in the matters of production and choice of cultural ideals through gradual evolution. Everyone is able to grow to the level of a creator of his / her own ideals.

For D.V. Pivovarov the "ideal" is a balance of the external and the internal. Externally (sensually) the "ideal" is presented as an "idol", internally (super sensually) the content of the "ideal" appears as an "idea". Thus, it can be argued that culture is a human activity of cultivation, raising, growing of ideals favouring the process of comfortable existence of each person with him / herself, other people, objects of first and second nature, and the entire universe (Pivovarov, 2013).

Artistic culture is able to generate the ideals that tend to the model ideal of harmony. Sensual representatives of the artistic culture are unique objects, things that equally reveal the material and immaterial sides. The ideal here is an intermediary between a human and the world, and it has a feature of a harmonious unity of the two opposite sides of being – a material and an immaterial ones (Liubutin, Pivovarov, 2000). The absolute-centric ideals, the works of fine arts including, have the greatest representativeness in the sphere of culture.

Fine arts is a sphere of human activity for masterly production and preservation of architectural, sculptural, pictorial, graphic and decorative works as artificial, skilful and tempting ideals. A work of fine arts is an artificial and skillfully produced ideal, an ordeal of which is aimed at the ideal (representative) relationship of the finite with the finite and the finite with the infinite. A work of art is a phenomenon which is able to act as an "illusory finite" object, the most effective means of recovery of the quality of participation of a human's individual being in self-assertion of universal Being (Zhukovskii, 2013). As a basic ideal of artistic

culture the works of art unfold as an extremely complex and contradictory dialectical process.

"Illusory finite" works of art can be defined as "one-dimensional", "two-dimensional" and "three-dimensional". These works of art are created to meet the needs of a human's "fleshly", "emotional" and "spiritual" aspects, accordingly. The representatives of an ideal relationship of the finite with the finite are mostly "one-dimensional" and "two dimensional" works of art due to a relatively large extent of the single and the specific in their "illusory finiteness". Common and universal dominate in "illusory finiteness" of "three-dimensional" works of art due to their possibility to represent an ideal relationship of the finite with the infinite.

Modern science of art has been searching for forms of scientific research of fine arts, seeking to be involved in the artistic process and analyze the trends and prospects of modern art development. Yet, even nowadays there are the conceptual provisions that are put forward and lay the foundation for the theoretical knowledge of fine arts in the integrity of works of various types and genres (Zhukovskii, 2011; Zhukovskii, Koptseva, 2004).

D.V. Pivovarov's synthetic theory of the ideal provided the basis, became the foundation for an innovative concept of fine arts. Methodological principles of the theory paved the way for the conditions to justify the elitist, collegiate, and individually evolutionary aspects of establishing the ideal and to research the regularities of an ideal-forming process in fine arts. According to the synthetic theory of the ideal, developed by the researcher, the object model or its sign (a work of art) as well as the scheme of a mental action coupled with the model contribute to the representative (ideal) relationship of a human and the Universe in their various manifestations.

References

Dubrovskii, D.I. (2002). *Problema ideal'nogo. Sub'ektivnaia real'nost' [The Issue of the Ideal. The subjective reality]*. Moscow, Kanon+, 366 p.

Il'enkov, E.V. (1984). *Dialekticheskaia logika [Dialectical Logic]*. Moscow, Politizdat, 318 p.

Klassen, E.G. (1984). *Ideal'noe [The Ideal]*. Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk State University, 146 p.

Liubutin, K.N., Pivovarov, D.V. (1993). *Dialektika sub'ekta i ob'ekta [The Dialectics of Subject and Object]*. Ekaterinburg, Ural State University, 415 p.

Liubutin, K.N., Pivovarov, D.V. (2000). *Sinteticheskaia Teoriia [Synthetic Theory]*. Ekaterinburg; Pskov, 2000. 207 p.

Livshits, R.L. (1997). *Dukhovnost' i bezdukhovnost' lichnosti [Spirituality and Non-Spirituality of the Individual]*. Ekaterinburg, Ural State University, 150 p.

Losev, A.F. (1993). *Bytie. Imia. Kosmos [Being. Name. Space]*. Moscow, Mysl', 958 p.

Pivovarov, D.V. (2004). *Ideal'noe [The Ideal]*. Sovremennyi filosofskii slovar'. Pod. red. V. Kemerova [Contemporary Philosophical Dictionary. Ed. by V. Kemerov]. Moscow, Academic Project, 864 p.

Pivovarov, D.V. (2009). Problema sinteza osnovnykh definitsii kul'tury [The Problem of Synthesis of the Main Definitions of Culture], *In Bulletin of the Russian Philosophical Society*, 1, 157-161.

Pivovarov, D.V. (2011). *Sinteticheskaia paradigma v filosofii: izbrannye stat'i [The Synthetic Paradigm in Philosophy: Selected Articles]*. Ekaterinburg, Ural State University, 536 p.

Pivovarov, D.V. (2013). *Kul'tura i religiia. Sakralizatsiia bazovykh idealov [Culture and Religion. Sacralization of Basic Ideals]*. Ekaterinburg, Ural State University, 24 p.

Zhukovskii, V.I. (2011). *Teoriia izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva [The Theory of Fine Arts]*. St.-Petersburg, Aletheia, 496 p.

Zhukovskii, V.I. (2013). Proizvedenie iskusstva v epitsentre khudozhestvennoi kul'tury [A Work of Art in the Epicenter of the Artistic Culture], *In Philosophy and Culture*, 11, 1613-1620. DOI: 10.7256/1999-2793.2013.11.9845

Zhukovskii, V.I., Koptseva, N.P. (2004). *Propositsii teorii izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva [Propositions of the Theory of Fine Arts]*. Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk State University, 265 p.

Zhukovskii, V.I., Koptseva, N.P., Pivovarov, D.V. (2006). *Vizual'naia sushchnost' religii [Visual Nature of Religion]*. Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk State University, 460 p.

Zhukovskii, V.I., Pivovarov, D.V. (1991). *Zrimaia sushchnost'. (Vizual'noe myshlenie v izobrazitel'nom iskusstve) [Visible Entity. (Visual Thinking in Fine Arts)]*. Sverdlovsk, Ural State University, 284 p.

Zhukovskii, V.I., Pivovarov D.V. (1998). *Intellektual'naia vizualizatsiia sushchnosti [Intellectual Visualization of Entity]*. Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk State University, 222 p.

Zhukovskii, V., Pivovarov, D. (2010). Works of Art and Visual Thinking, *In European Journal of Natural History*, 2, 38-42.

Zhukovskii, V.I., Pivovarov D.V. (2015). "Diskobol" Mirona kak representant dialektiki Geraklita ["The Discus Thrower" by Myron as a Representant of Heraclitus's Dialectics], *In Intellekt. Innovatsii. Investitsii [Intelligence. Innovations. Investments],* 1, 142-147.

Zhukovskii, V.I., Pivovarov, D.V., Rakhmatullin, R.Iu. (1988). *Vizual'noe myshlenie v strukture nauchnogo poznaniia [Visual Thinking in the Structure of Scientific Knowledge]*. Krasnoyarsk, 188 p.

Концепция идеального Д.В. Пивоварова – фундамент современной теории изобразительного искусства

В.И. Жуковский
Сибирский федеральный университет
Российская Федерация, Красноярск

Аннотация. Статья раскрывает методологические положения синтетической теории идеального отечественного ученого Д. В. Пивоварова, которые легли в основу исследования закономерностей идеалообразующего процесса в изобразительном искусстве. Согласно теории, разработанной ученым, идеал выступает посредником между человеком и миром и обладает качеством гармоничного единения двух противоположных сторон бытия – материальной и духовной. А произведение изобразительного искусства есть искусственный и искусно произведенный идеал, искус которого направлен на репрезентативное отношение конечного с конечным и конечного с бесконечным. Определяя место произведения искусства в системе художественной культуры, автор статьи утверждает, что концепция идеального, разработанная Д. В. Пивоваровым, является фундаментом современной теории изобразительного искусства, способствует научному изучению изобразительного искусства, помогает освоить сложный диалектический процесс репрезентативного отношения человека (зрителя) со своей душой, душами других людей, Духом Божиим.

Ключевые слова: Д. В. Пивоваров, синтетическая теория идеального, идеал, эталон, художественная культура, изобразительное искусство, модель, художественное произведение, зритель, художественный процесс.

Научная специальность: 17.00.00 – искусствоведение.

Замеченные опечатки

В номере 13(5) «Журнала Сибирского федерального университета. Гуманитарные науки. Journal of Siberian Federal University»» за 2020 год на страницах 728 и 737 ошибочно напечатан номер гранта: 19-39-90017.

Нужно читать 19-311-90017.

Авторы приносят извинения читателям и редакции за допущенную опечатку.