Siberian Federal University

Issue

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences. 2008 1 (3)

Authors

Egorychev, Ilya E.

Contact information

Ilya E. Egorychev: Saint-Petersburg State University, 5 Mendeleevskaya line, Saint-Petersburg, Russia, e-mail:

Keywords

algorithm; consciousness; contextualism; difference; cultural evolution; force; meme; mimesis; sense; repetition; replication

Abstract

The following text is the result of a deconstructive reading of two rather concrete works of E. Husserl that is «The Beginning of Geometry» and Chapter One of the second part of «Logical Researches», which is titled «Expression and Meaning». Thereat, one can understand that the given work is not possible without some general presentation of Phenomenology as a philosophical «method of original obviousness production from pre-scientific entities of the cultural world»2. In other words, we shall positively speak about metaphysical (and first of all about ontological) status of ideal objects, about their production in the acts of intentionality and identification of the «very same», and about some invariants of thought [“même”]3, or still wider – about seeing the One in multiple. In this sense, geometrical and logical objects of identities are considered by E. Husserl only as examples of «the ideal objectness» on the whole, and the phenomenologist should spend all his intellectual efforts in order to detect and to describe them. If we are courageous enough to follow the thread of an argument by E. Husserl himself, who, in his turn (at least, originally and to a large extent), repeats the famous meditations of Descartes, and then, if we methodically doubt everything, what can be doubt about at least theoretically4, we shall quite soon come to the apodictic authenticity of the only Cogito, and consequently, to a radically solipsistic point of view. Even upon the most strict and thorough phenomenological reflection, and though, the very structure of Cogito still turns out to be exceedingly filled by content, we cannot yet help avoiding epistemological solipsism, in case we consistently (and, we may say, quite justifiably) stick to the principle of cogitatum qua cogitatum. That is why in «The Beginning of Geometry» E. Husserl rather fairly raises the question of, how it has become possible, that the image, which having been constituted by the subject and belonging to the psychological sphere, acquires objective, or, at any case, inter-subjective being as some ideal objectness, which, having become geometrical, is already real not only psychically, though it has psychically come into being?

Pages

328-337

Paper at repository of SibFU

https://elib.sfu-kras.ru/handle/2311/792

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0).